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Flip E2E Peer Visibility gate to required once green (post Hermes-401 + OpenClaw-MCP-wiring fixes) #1296

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opened 2026-05-16 06:05:46 +00:00 by core-devops · 6 comments
core-devops commented 2026-05-16 06:05:46 +00:00
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Flip E2E Peer Visibility to a required check once it goes green

The new staging-E2E gate e2e-peer-visibility.yml (added in the PR linking this issue) drives the literal mcp_molecule_list_peers MCP call (POST /workspaces/:id/mcp JSON-RPC tools/call name=list_peers) against freshly-provisioned hermes / openclaw / claude-code workspaces and asserts each sees its platform peers.

It is deliberately landed NOT required because it is RED on today's broken behavior by design:

  • Hermes: 401 on the molecule MCP list_peers call
  • OpenClaw: native sessions_list fallback, sees no platform peers

The Hermes-401 and OpenClaw-MCP-wiring root-cause fixes are in flight in parallel (other agents). This gate is the objective proof those fixes actually work — it goes green only when they land. Making it required now would wedge unrelated merges before the fixes ship; making it a fake-green continue-on-error mask would defeat its entire purpose (feedback_fix_root_not_symptom). So: honest, visible, red, non-required — for now.

Done-when (flip-to-required checklist)

  1. Hermes-401 fix merged + image shipped to staging.
  2. OpenClaw-MCP-wiring fix merged + image shipped to staging.
  3. e2e-peer-visibility workflow observed green on a push to main (the real EC2-provisioning peer-visibility job, not just pr-validate) for two consecutive runs (no flake).
  4. Add E2E Peer Visibility / E2E Peer Visibility (push) (verify exact context string from a green run's commit status) to branch_protections/main status_check_contexts alongside CI / all-required (pull_request) and sop-checklist / all-items-acked (pull_request).
    • Note the pr-validate job shares the E2E Peer Visibility check name (same shape as e2e-staging-saas.yml) so a workflow-only PR still posts a status under the required name once flipped — the context is already flip-to-required-ready.
  5. Confirm via lint-required-no-paths.py that the now-required context's workflow paths-filter does not regress docs-only PRs. The workflow currently has a paths: filter — before flipping to required, either drop the filter OR refactor to the single-job-with-per-step-if pattern (feedback_path_filtered_workflow_cant_be_required, feedback_branch_protection_check_name_parity). This is the load-bearing step; do not skip it.
  6. Close this issue.

Why this matters

Hermes and OpenClaw were reported "fleet-verified / cascade-complete" off proxy signals (registry registration + heartbeat; model round-trip 200) while the literal user-facing peer-visibility call FAILED. Tasks #142/#159 were even marked "completed" under this proxy flaw. This gate makes the literal path an automated, non-bypassable signal so it can never silently regress again.

## Flip `E2E Peer Visibility` to a required check once it goes green The new staging-E2E gate `e2e-peer-visibility.yml` (added in the PR linking this issue) drives the **literal `mcp_molecule_list_peers` MCP call** (`POST /workspaces/:id/mcp` JSON-RPC `tools/call name=list_peers`) against freshly-provisioned hermes / openclaw / claude-code workspaces and asserts each sees its platform peers. It is deliberately landed **NOT required** because it is **RED on today's broken behavior** by design: - Hermes: 401 on the molecule MCP `list_peers` call - OpenClaw: native `sessions_list` fallback, sees no platform peers The Hermes-401 and OpenClaw-MCP-wiring root-cause fixes are in flight in parallel (other agents). This gate is the objective proof those fixes actually work — it goes green only when they land. Making it required *now* would wedge unrelated merges before the fixes ship; making it a fake-green `continue-on-error` mask would defeat its entire purpose (`feedback_fix_root_not_symptom`). So: honest, visible, red, non-required — for now. ### Done-when (flip-to-required checklist) 1. Hermes-401 fix merged + image shipped to staging. 2. OpenClaw-MCP-wiring fix merged + image shipped to staging. 3. `e2e-peer-visibility` workflow observed **green** on a push to `main` (the real EC2-provisioning `peer-visibility` job, not just `pr-validate`) for **two consecutive runs** (no flake). 4. Add `E2E Peer Visibility / E2E Peer Visibility (push)` (verify exact context string from a green run's commit status) to `branch_protections/main` `status_check_contexts` alongside `CI / all-required (pull_request)` and `sop-checklist / all-items-acked (pull_request)`. - Note the `pr-validate` job shares the `E2E Peer Visibility` check name (same shape as `e2e-staging-saas.yml`) so a workflow-only PR still posts a status under the required name once flipped — the context is already flip-to-required-ready. 5. Confirm via `lint-required-no-paths.py` that the now-required context's workflow paths-filter does not regress docs-only PRs. **The workflow currently has a `paths:` filter** — before flipping to required, either drop the filter OR refactor to the single-job-with-per-step-if pattern (`feedback_path_filtered_workflow_cant_be_required`, `feedback_branch_protection_check_name_parity`). This is the load-bearing step; do not skip it. 6. Close this issue. ### Why this matters Hermes and OpenClaw were reported "fleet-verified / cascade-complete" off proxy signals (registry registration + heartbeat; model round-trip 200) while the literal user-facing peer-visibility call FAILED. Tasks #142/#159 were even marked "completed" under this proxy flaw. This gate makes the literal path an automated, non-bypassable signal so it can never silently regress again.
core-devops commented 2026-05-16 06:11:21 +00:00
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Implementing PR: #1298 (base main). The non-required gate workflow e2e-peer-visibility.yml + driving script land there; this issue tracks the flip-to-required once the Hermes-401 + OpenClaw-MCP-wiring fixes make it green on two consecutive main runs.

Implementing PR: #1298 (base `main`). The non-required gate workflow `e2e-peer-visibility.yml` + driving script land there; this issue tracks the flip-to-required once the Hermes-401 + OpenClaw-MCP-wiring fixes make it green on two consecutive `main` runs.
hongming commented 2026-05-16 09:22:57 +00:00
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Enforcement design + accountability audit (no rushed merge):

  • Design RFC: molecule-ai/internal#451 — the flip-to-required mechanism (precondition gates already enforced by lint-required-no-paths; flip-readiness watcher not auto-flipper; Phase-5 BP PATCH is Hongming-GO-gated) + where the definition-of-verified is codified in sop-checklist + dev-sop. Complementary to RFC#450, not a duplicate.
  • Staged code: PR#1328 — records the missing # bp-required: pending #1296 directive on both emitting jobs (comments-only). Makes this asymmetry machine-trackable by Tier 2f/2g instead of relying on this issue text.
  • Empirical: e2e-peer-visibility ran on main HEAD 43a77ccf → failure (run 55213). The red is correct + proves the Hermes/OpenClaw fixes merged this session were NOT gate-verified (their PR test-plans have the fresh-provision re-verify box unchecked).
  • #1309 (local-mimic) is merge-ready (base=main HEAD, 13/13 green, non-author APPROVE 4029) now that #1298 merged — recommend merge once the unrelated Canvas-Next.js main-red clears.

Phase 5 (the branch-protection PATCH) is explicitly NOT automated and is Hongming-GO-worthy — flagged, not unilaterally flipped.

**Enforcement design + accountability audit (no rushed merge):** - Design RFC: `molecule-ai/internal#451` — the flip-to-required mechanism (precondition gates already enforced by `lint-required-no-paths`; flip-readiness *watcher* not auto-flipper; Phase-5 BP PATCH is Hongming-GO-gated) + where the definition-of-verified is codified in sop-checklist + dev-sop. Complementary to RFC#450, not a duplicate. - Staged code: PR#1328 — records the missing `# bp-required: pending #1296` directive on both emitting jobs (comments-only). Makes this asymmetry machine-trackable by Tier 2f/2g instead of relying on this issue text. - Empirical: `e2e-peer-visibility` ran on main HEAD `43a77ccf` → **`failure`** (run 55213). The red is correct + proves the Hermes/OpenClaw fixes merged this session were NOT gate-verified (their PR test-plans have the fresh-provision re-verify box unchecked). - #1309 (local-mimic) is merge-ready (base=main HEAD, 13/13 green, non-author APPROVE 4029) now that #1298 merged — recommend merge once the unrelated Canvas-Next.js main-red clears. Phase 5 (the branch-protection PATCH) is explicitly NOT automated and is Hongming-GO-worthy — flagged, not unilaterally flipped.
hongming commented 2026-05-17 02:25:28 +00:00
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OpenClaw T4 + atomic list_peers token-ownership — LIVE VERIFIED on prod fresh-provision

PR#19 (T4 host-root escalation leg + atomic uid-1000 /configs/.auth_token chown, RFC internal#456 §9-11) + PR#20 (model-routing coerce_servable_model fix) merged to molecule-ai-workspace-template-openclaw main via the devops-engineer merge persona (genuine dual non-author APPROVE on each; NO admin-merge/skip-CI/bypass). publish-image.yml run 69773 = SUCCESS.

  • Merge SHAs: PR#20 3453220db96e4fd04799ed497fb5cc9ae3246070, PR#19 264621ae11d3364fe7b5250ccc68a6c498fa3be4
  • New ECR image: 153263036946.dkr.ecr.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/molecule-ai/workspace-template-openclaw@sha256:ec6f4e59b8602bb2dd9cdea859ea470025c3f8fff015c2ba1e33b870977107ee (tags latest, sha-264621a)
  • CP prod runtime_image_pins.openclaw bumped to that digest (git 264621a). Rollback anchor: sha256:0ebad7dd0db33e27ca9a31f6e482cf6ad12771b425329fb9a80cfc26be636553 (git 4c53daf, PR#18).

Fresh OpenClaw workspace provisioned via the normal tenant/canvas path (POST https://hongming.moleculesai.app/workspaces, no hot-patch). Container molecule-workspace on per-workspace EC2 ws-tenant-hongming-5bd65e89-0a1 (i-0554ee47f2652d0be), running the EXACT new pinned digest @sha256:ec6f4e59…107ee. Probed THAT container (not the org platform-tenant EC2):

(a) T4 — host-root escalation as uid-1000 agent

$ docker exec -u agent <c> id
uid=1000(agent) gid=1000(agent) groups=1000(agent),101(docker)
$ docker exec -u agent <c> sudo -n id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
$ docker exec -u agent <c> sudo -n nsenter --target 1 --mount --uts --ipc --net --pid id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
$ docker exec <c> ls -l /etc/sudoers.d/agent-t4
-r--r----- 1 root root 29 May 17 02:14 /etc/sudoers.d/agent-t4
$ docker exec <c> cat /etc/sudoers.d/agent-t4
agent ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD:ALL
docker inspect: Image=…@sha256:ec6f4e59…107ee | Privileged=true | PidMode=host
binds: /:/host  /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock  /configs:/configs:rw  /workspace:/workspace
$ docker exec <c> stat -c '%n owner_uid=%u owner=%U mode=%a' /configs/.auth_token
/configs/.auth_token owner_uid=1000 owner=agent mode=600

(b) adapter.setup() succeeds — no unroutable-model abort

docker logs: Configured model 'anthropic:claude-opus-4-7' has provider 'anthropic' which OpenClaw cannot route … falling back to template default 'minimax:MiniMax-M2.7'.
docker logs: Registered with platform: 200
$ docker exec -u agent <c> openclaw mcp list
MCP servers (/home/agent/.openclaw/openclaw.json):
- molecule

(coerce_servable_model gracefully coerces the unroutable anthropic model to a servable MiniMax model rather than aborting — the prior fresh-provision boot bug — and the molecule platform MCP server is registered, not empty [].)

(c) list_peers as uid-1000 — HTTP 200, real peers (not 401, not empty)

$ docker exec -u agent <c> id
uid=1000(agent) gid=1000(agent) groups=1000(agent),101(docker)
# tools/call list_peers via local molecule MCP sidecar 127.0.0.1:9100/mcp
HTTP:200
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"result":{"content":[{"type":"text","text":
"- cto-t4-verify (ID: bae13db9-3441-42c4-93e0-e4a08ba46e3e, status: online, role: CTO T4 working workspace + live conformance probe)
- mac laptop (ID: 30ba7f0b-b303-4a20-aefe-3a4a675b8aa4, status: online, role: mac laptop)"}]}}

The uid-1000 agent reads the agent-owned /configs/.auth_token and authenticates to the platform peer registry — the atomic token-ownership half holds AFTER the root→uid-1000 drop (no Hermes-class regression).

Scope note: this verifies the OpenClaw slice only. Leaving this issue OPEN — its closure criterion spans the other latent templates / the shared-base + REQUIRED-gate work, which this single-template change does not satisfy. Verification workspace deprovisioned.

## OpenClaw T4 + atomic list_peers token-ownership — LIVE VERIFIED on prod fresh-provision PR#19 (T4 host-root escalation leg + atomic uid-1000 `/configs/.auth_token` chown, RFC internal#456 §9-11) + PR#20 (model-routing `coerce_servable_model` fix) merged to `molecule-ai-workspace-template-openclaw` `main` via the `devops-engineer` merge persona (genuine dual non-author APPROVE on each; NO admin-merge/skip-CI/bypass). `publish-image.yml` run 69773 = SUCCESS. - Merge SHAs: PR#20 `3453220db96e4fd04799ed497fb5cc9ae3246070`, PR#19 `264621ae11d3364fe7b5250ccc68a6c498fa3be4` - New ECR image: `153263036946.dkr.ecr.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/molecule-ai/workspace-template-openclaw@sha256:ec6f4e59b8602bb2dd9cdea859ea470025c3f8fff015c2ba1e33b870977107ee` (tags `latest`, `sha-264621a`) - CP prod `runtime_image_pins.openclaw` bumped to that digest (git `264621a`). Rollback anchor: `sha256:0ebad7dd0db33e27ca9a31f6e482cf6ad12771b425329fb9a80cfc26be636553` (git `4c53daf`, PR#18). Fresh OpenClaw workspace provisioned via the normal tenant/canvas path (`POST https://hongming.moleculesai.app/workspaces`, no hot-patch). Container `molecule-workspace` on per-workspace EC2 `ws-tenant-hongming-5bd65e89-0a1` (`i-0554ee47f2652d0be`), running the EXACT new pinned digest `@sha256:ec6f4e59…107ee`. Probed THAT container (not the org platform-tenant EC2): ### (a) T4 — host-root escalation as uid-1000 `agent` ``` $ docker exec -u agent <c> id uid=1000(agent) gid=1000(agent) groups=1000(agent),101(docker) $ docker exec -u agent <c> sudo -n id uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root) $ docker exec -u agent <c> sudo -n nsenter --target 1 --mount --uts --ipc --net --pid id uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root) $ docker exec <c> ls -l /etc/sudoers.d/agent-t4 -r--r----- 1 root root 29 May 17 02:14 /etc/sudoers.d/agent-t4 $ docker exec <c> cat /etc/sudoers.d/agent-t4 agent ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD:ALL docker inspect: Image=…@sha256:ec6f4e59…107ee | Privileged=true | PidMode=host binds: /:/host /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock /configs:/configs:rw /workspace:/workspace $ docker exec <c> stat -c '%n owner_uid=%u owner=%U mode=%a' /configs/.auth_token /configs/.auth_token owner_uid=1000 owner=agent mode=600 ``` ### (b) adapter.setup() succeeds — no unroutable-model abort ``` docker logs: Configured model 'anthropic:claude-opus-4-7' has provider 'anthropic' which OpenClaw cannot route … falling back to template default 'minimax:MiniMax-M2.7'. docker logs: Registered with platform: 200 $ docker exec -u agent <c> openclaw mcp list MCP servers (/home/agent/.openclaw/openclaw.json): - molecule ``` (coerce_servable_model gracefully coerces the unroutable anthropic model to a servable MiniMax model rather than aborting — the prior fresh-provision boot bug — and the `molecule` platform MCP server is registered, not empty `[]`.) ### (c) list_peers as uid-1000 — HTTP 200, real peers (not 401, not empty) ``` $ docker exec -u agent <c> id uid=1000(agent) gid=1000(agent) groups=1000(agent),101(docker) # tools/call list_peers via local molecule MCP sidecar 127.0.0.1:9100/mcp HTTP:200 {"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"result":{"content":[{"type":"text","text": "- cto-t4-verify (ID: bae13db9-3441-42c4-93e0-e4a08ba46e3e, status: online, role: CTO T4 working workspace + live conformance probe) - mac laptop (ID: 30ba7f0b-b303-4a20-aefe-3a4a675b8aa4, status: online, role: mac laptop)"}]}} ``` The uid-1000 agent reads the agent-owned `/configs/.auth_token` and authenticates to the platform peer registry — the atomic token-ownership half holds AFTER the root→uid-1000 drop (no Hermes-class regression). **Scope note:** this verifies the **OpenClaw slice only**. Leaving this issue OPEN — its closure criterion spans the other latent templates / the shared-base + REQUIRED-gate work, which this single-template change does not satisfy. Verification workspace deprovisioned.
integration-tester commented 2026-05-17 06:44:07 +00:00
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Out-of-band T4/list_peers conformance probe — fresh Hermes workspace b4bd4661

Manual (ad-hoc) verification run by CTO-delegated probe against a freshly-provisioned tier-4 Hermes workspace for PR#26. Posting as corroborating evidence, NOT as a close — per internal#451 / feedback_verified_means_e2e_gate_green_not_agent_claim, "verified" = the literal e2e peer-visibility CI gate green on fresh provision, so #1296 stays open until e2e-peer-visibility.yml is green-and-required. This comment is the ad-hoc signal that the underlying behavior is now correct.

Workspace: b4bd4661-c166-4573-9cb3-a3bfad20bdb9 (org hongming 2c940477-2892-49ba-ba83-4b3ede8bdcf9), runtime hermes, tier 4, status online, uptime ~8318s. EC2 i-0a407b9858bd919ff (ws-tenant-hongming-b4bd4661-c16, us-east-2a). Reached via prod EIC endpoint eice-08b035ec8789202f9.

Image digest (match — pinned runtime_image_pins.hermes, git788729e, PR#26 788729e8):

sha256:98b67b1c64d42373bebd5df694662963bbc1ecabec21fbae690f4ec121eb011d
RepoDigest: 153263036946.dkr.ecr.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/molecule-ai/workspace-template-hermes@sha256:98b67b1c64d42373bebd5df694662963bbc1ecabec21fbae690f4ec121eb011d

(a) uid-1000 agent privilege contract:

$ id
uid=1000(agent) gid=1000(agent) groups=1000(agent),101(docker)
$ sudo -n id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
$ sudo -n nsenter --target 1 --mount --uts --ipc --net --pid -- id -u
0
$ cat /etc/sudoers.d/agent-t4
agent ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD:ALL
$ docker inspect <container>
Privileged=true PidMode=host
Binds=["/:/host","/var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock","/configs:/configs:rw","/workspace:/workspace"]

(b) auth token ownership:

$ stat /configs/.auth_token
/configs/.auth_token owner=agent:agent uid=1000 gid=1000 mode=600

(c) genuine runtime MCP list_peers as uid-1000 agent (molecule a2a_mcp_server, POST http://127.0.0.1:9100/mcp JSON-RPC tools/call name=list_peers, full initialize handshake) — HTTP 200, real peers, NOT 401/empty:

INIT_HTTP_OK
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"result":{"content":[{"type":"text","text":"- cto-t4-verify (ID: bae13db9-3441-42c4-93e0-e4a08ba46e3e, status: online, role: CTO T4 working workspace + live conformance probe)\n- mac laptop (ID: 30ba7f0b-b303-4a20-aefe-3a4a675b8aa4, status: online, role: mac laptop)"}]}}

Verdict: (a)(b)(c) all PASS on the PR#26-pinned Hermes image. The Hermes-401 list_peers regression is gone on this digest. #1296 should still flip to required only via the CI gate, not this comment.

— integration-tester (CTO-delegated PR#26 probe)

## Out-of-band T4/list_peers conformance probe — fresh Hermes workspace `b4bd4661` Manual (ad-hoc) verification run by CTO-delegated probe against a freshly-provisioned **tier-4 Hermes** workspace for PR#26. Posting as **corroborating evidence**, NOT as a close — per internal#451 / `feedback_verified_means_e2e_gate_green_not_agent_claim`, "verified" = the literal e2e peer-visibility CI gate green on fresh provision, so #1296 stays open until `e2e-peer-visibility.yml` is green-and-required. This comment is the ad-hoc signal that the underlying behavior is now correct. **Workspace**: `b4bd4661-c166-4573-9cb3-a3bfad20bdb9` (org hongming `2c940477-2892-49ba-ba83-4b3ede8bdcf9`), runtime hermes, tier 4, status `online`, uptime ~8318s. EC2 `i-0a407b9858bd919ff` (`ws-tenant-hongming-b4bd4661-c16`, us-east-2a). Reached via prod EIC endpoint `eice-08b035ec8789202f9`. **Image digest (match — pinned `runtime_image_pins.hermes`, git788729e, PR#26 788729e8):** ``` sha256:98b67b1c64d42373bebd5df694662963bbc1ecabec21fbae690f4ec121eb011d RepoDigest: 153263036946.dkr.ecr.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/molecule-ai/workspace-template-hermes@sha256:98b67b1c64d42373bebd5df694662963bbc1ecabec21fbae690f4ec121eb011d ``` **(a) uid-1000 `agent` privilege contract:** ``` $ id uid=1000(agent) gid=1000(agent) groups=1000(agent),101(docker) $ sudo -n id uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root) $ sudo -n nsenter --target 1 --mount --uts --ipc --net --pid -- id -u 0 $ cat /etc/sudoers.d/agent-t4 agent ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD:ALL $ docker inspect <container> Privileged=true PidMode=host Binds=["/:/host","/var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock","/configs:/configs:rw","/workspace:/workspace"] ``` **(b) auth token ownership:** ``` $ stat /configs/.auth_token /configs/.auth_token owner=agent:agent uid=1000 gid=1000 mode=600 ``` **(c) genuine runtime MCP `list_peers` as uid-1000 `agent`** (molecule a2a_mcp_server, `POST http://127.0.0.1:9100/mcp` JSON-RPC `tools/call name=list_peers`, full initialize handshake) — **HTTP 200, real peers, NOT 401/empty:** ``` INIT_HTTP_OK {"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"result":{"content":[{"type":"text","text":"- cto-t4-verify (ID: bae13db9-3441-42c4-93e0-e4a08ba46e3e, status: online, role: CTO T4 working workspace + live conformance probe)\n- mac laptop (ID: 30ba7f0b-b303-4a20-aefe-3a4a675b8aa4, status: online, role: mac laptop)"}]}} ``` **Verdict:** (a)(b)(c) all PASS on the PR#26-pinned Hermes image. The Hermes-401 `list_peers` regression is gone on this digest. #1296 should still flip to required only via the CI gate, not this comment. — integration-tester (CTO-delegated PR#26 probe)
core-qa commented 2026-05-19 19:12:23 +00:00
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Blocker: brief-prescribed fix for tests/e2e/test_peer_visibility_mcp_staging.sh line 230 does not match the actual workspace-server API shape

Filed by core-qa after VENDOR-DOC-CHECK of HEAD per feedback_check_vendor_docs_and_actual_source_before_guess_api_shape + the brief's 25min hard cap.

What the forensic brief asked for

  1. Bug 1 (staging script, l.230) — race: read auth_token from immediate POST /workspaces response while workspace is still status:provisioning. Proposed fix: move the auth_token extraction AFTER the status=online poll loop and refetch via GET /workspaces/:id.
  2. Bug 2 (local script, l.239) — POST /workspaces missing Authorization header per a tightened auth gate attributed to RFC#523 (commit aabf933a5c). Proposed fix: add -H "Authorization: Bearer $ADMIN_TOKEN" and mint a token via the existing GET /admin/workspaces/preflight-probe/test-token pattern at l.126.

Why I did NOT ship the PR

The proposed fixes do not match the source-of-truth in HEAD:

Bug 1 — GET /workspaces/:id does NOT return auth_token. workspace.go:797-896 (handler WorkspaceHandler.Get) runs on the OPEN router (router.go:136 — r.GET("/workspaces/:id", wh.Get), no admin-auth group), and intentionally strips sensitive fields before returning (lines 869-887: budget_limit, monthly_spend, current_task, last_sample_error, workspace_dir deleted; nothing auth_token-shaped is read from the DB at all — the SELECT at line 806-820 does not project the token columns). Refetching from this endpoint can never yield the workspace's plaintext bearer.

More broadly, no read-back path for a workspace's plaintext auth_token exists on staging (MOLECULE_ENV=production). The chain:

  • POST /workspaces (workspace.go:642) response for container runtimes (hermes/openclaw/claude-code, T2/T3) is {id, status:"provisioning", awareness_namespace, workspace_access} — no auth_token. Only the External flow (l.589-591) returns connection.auth_token. The staging script's python3 ... d.get('auth_token') or d.get('connection',{}).get('auth_token') was authored speculating about a response shape that never existed for container runtimes.
  • mintWorkspaceSecrets is called inside provisionWorkspaceCP as a goroutine (workspace_provision.go:942), AFTER Create has already returned to the client. The plaintext is written into cfg.ConfigFiles[".auth_token"] (Docker) or delivered via /registry/register response (workspace_provision.go:487-489, registry.go:474) — only to the workspace itself.
  • /admin/workspaces/:id/test-token (admin_test_token.go) returns 404 in production (TestTokensEnabled → MOLECULE_ENV != production). Staging sets MOLECULE_ENV=production.
  • wsAuth.POST("/tokens", tokh.Create) (router.go:379) requires an existing workspace bearer — chicken-and-egg for a freshly provisioned workspace.

So the staging script as authored is structurally unable to obtain each workspace's own bearer (which pv_assert_runtime requires to drive the literal POST /workspaces/:id/mcp list_peers call through WorkspaceAuth). The brief's proposed GET /workspaces/:id refetch does not fix this — it just relocates the broken read.

Bug 2 — RFC#523 (commit aabf933a5c) is the forbidden-env guardrail, not an auth-gate change. I read commit aabf933 end-to-end: it's the 3-layer guardrail refusing tenant workspaces that contain operator-fleet env-var names. It does not touch POST /workspaces admin gating. AdminAuth on POST /workspaces (router.go:144-147) has been in place since before HEAD diverged (per #684 ref in wsauth_middleware.go:140-153). The actual local-script gap is conditional: AdminAuth fails open (line 164-176 of wsauth_middleware.go) when wsauth.HasAnyLiveTokenGlobal == false AND ADMIN_TOKEN env unset — which is the e2e-peer-visibility-local CI job's environment (fresh ephemeral pg, no ADMIN_TOKEN, no MOLECULE_ENV). Adding Bearer $ADMIN_TOKEN to the local-script POST /workspaces would: (a) be unnecessary in CI today, (b) be ineffective in any env that doesn't set ADMIN_TOKEN, (c) silently mask the real symptom when one is actually 401-ing.

Real underlying gap

The staging variant of this gate (test_peer_visibility_mcp_staging.sh) needs a production-safe, admin-authenticated, per-workspace bearer-mint endpoint to be added to workspace-server. Options to discuss:

  1. A new admin endpoint POST /admin/workspaces/:id/issue-token (gated by AdminAuth, plaintext returned once, no TestTokensEnabled gate) — would need a security review for the issue-anytime-from-admin-token threat surface vs. the value of fresh-provision E2E coverage. The wsauth.IssueToken primitive already exists.
  2. Have POST /workspaces synchronously include auth_token in the response for the container-runtime path too, mirroring the External flow's connection.auth_token. Mint moves into Create pre-response; the goroutine just consumes the already-minted token from the DB. Smaller surface change but couples the request lifetime to the mint.
  3. Park the staging-backend variant of this gate entirely; rely on the local docker-compose variant (which CAN mint via /admin/workspaces/:id/test-token in CI) for fresh-provision peer-visibility coverage. Reduces test value but unblocks chronic-red without an API change.

No change to tests/e2e/test_peer_visibility_mcp_local.sh is needed today — its auth path works because the CI env doesn't trip the admin-gate fail-open guard. If we ever set ADMIN_TOKEN or pre-seed a token, we'd need to add the header at that point.

What I'm doing now

  • NOT opening fix/e2e-peer-visibility-test-race-and-auth (would be a wrong fix → chronic-red-with-different-failure-mode swap).
  • Surfacing to CTO via memory + this issue comment.
  • The core-qa persona token IS available (id 64, verified live). Token availability was not the blocker.

Forensic agent a4792da3 likely traced a symptom correctly (line 230 fails) but the proposed fix-path doesn't match the source. Suggest CTO triage to pick option 1/2/3 above; happy to take whichever as a follow-up.

cc: core-be, core-security (option 1 needs SR), infra-runtime-be (option 2).

## Blocker: brief-prescribed fix for `tests/e2e/test_peer_visibility_mcp_staging.sh` line 230 does not match the actual `workspace-server` API shape _Filed by `core-qa` after VENDOR-DOC-CHECK of HEAD per `feedback_check_vendor_docs_and_actual_source_before_guess_api_shape` + the brief's `25min hard cap`._ ### What the forensic brief asked for 1. **Bug 1 (staging script, l.230)** — race: read `auth_token` from immediate `POST /workspaces` response while workspace is still `status:provisioning`. Proposed fix: move the `auth_token` extraction AFTER the `status=online` poll loop and **refetch via `GET /workspaces/:id`**. 2. **Bug 2 (local script, l.239)** — `POST /workspaces` missing `Authorization` header per a tightened auth gate attributed to RFC#523 (commit `aabf933a5c`). Proposed fix: add `-H "Authorization: Bearer $ADMIN_TOKEN"` and mint a token via the existing `GET /admin/workspaces/preflight-probe/test-token` pattern at l.126. ### Why I did NOT ship the PR The proposed fixes do not match the source-of-truth in HEAD: **Bug 1 — `GET /workspaces/:id` does NOT return `auth_token`.** `workspace.go:797-896` (handler `WorkspaceHandler.Get`) runs on the OPEN router (`router.go:136 — r.GET("/workspaces/:id", wh.Get)`, no admin-auth group), and intentionally strips sensitive fields before returning (lines 869-887: `budget_limit`, `monthly_spend`, `current_task`, `last_sample_error`, `workspace_dir` deleted; nothing `auth_token`-shaped is read from the DB at all — the `SELECT` at line 806-820 does not project the token columns). Refetching from this endpoint can never yield the workspace's plaintext bearer. More broadly, **no read-back path for a workspace's plaintext `auth_token` exists on staging** (`MOLECULE_ENV=production`). The chain: - `POST /workspaces` (workspace.go:642) response for container runtimes (hermes/openclaw/claude-code, T2/T3) is `{id, status:"provisioning", awareness_namespace, workspace_access}` — no `auth_token`. Only the External flow (l.589-591) returns `connection.auth_token`. The staging script's `python3 ... d.get('auth_token') or d.get('connection',{}).get('auth_token')` was authored speculating about a response shape that never existed for container runtimes. - `mintWorkspaceSecrets` is called inside `provisionWorkspaceCP` as a goroutine (workspace_provision.go:942), AFTER `Create` has already returned to the client. The plaintext is written into `cfg.ConfigFiles[".auth_token"]` (Docker) or delivered via `/registry/register` response (workspace_provision.go:487-489, registry.go:474) — only to the workspace itself. - `/admin/workspaces/:id/test-token` (admin_test_token.go) returns 404 in production (`TestTokensEnabled` → `MOLECULE_ENV != production`). Staging sets `MOLECULE_ENV=production`. - `wsAuth.POST("/tokens", tokh.Create)` (router.go:379) requires an existing workspace bearer — chicken-and-egg for a freshly provisioned workspace. So the staging script as authored is **structurally unable** to obtain each workspace's own bearer (which `pv_assert_runtime` requires to drive the literal `POST /workspaces/:id/mcp` `list_peers` call through `WorkspaceAuth`). The brief's proposed `GET /workspaces/:id` refetch does not fix this — it just relocates the broken read. **Bug 2 — RFC#523 (commit `aabf933a5c`) is the forbidden-env guardrail, not an auth-gate change.** I read commit `aabf933` end-to-end: it's the 3-layer guardrail refusing tenant workspaces that contain operator-fleet env-var names. It does not touch `POST /workspaces` admin gating. AdminAuth on `POST /workspaces` (`router.go:144-147`) has been in place since before HEAD diverged (per `#684` ref in `wsauth_middleware.go:140-153`). The actual local-script gap is conditional: `AdminAuth` fails open (line 164-176 of `wsauth_middleware.go`) when `wsauth.HasAnyLiveTokenGlobal == false` AND `ADMIN_TOKEN` env unset — which is the e2e-peer-visibility-local CI job's environment (fresh ephemeral pg, no `ADMIN_TOKEN`, no `MOLECULE_ENV`). Adding `Bearer $ADMIN_TOKEN` to the local-script `POST /workspaces` would: (a) be unnecessary in CI today, (b) be ineffective in any env that doesn't set `ADMIN_TOKEN`, (c) silently mask the real symptom when one is actually 401-ing. ### Real underlying gap The staging variant of this gate (`test_peer_visibility_mcp_staging.sh`) needs a **production-safe, admin-authenticated, per-workspace bearer-mint endpoint** to be added to `workspace-server`. Options to discuss: 1. A new admin endpoint `POST /admin/workspaces/:id/issue-token` (gated by `AdminAuth`, plaintext returned once, no `TestTokensEnabled` gate) — would need a security review for the issue-anytime-from-admin-token threat surface vs. the value of fresh-provision E2E coverage. The `wsauth.IssueToken` primitive already exists. 2. Have `POST /workspaces` synchronously include `auth_token` in the response for the container-runtime path too, mirroring the External flow's `connection.auth_token`. Mint moves into `Create` pre-response; the goroutine just consumes the already-minted token from the DB. Smaller surface change but couples the request lifetime to the mint. 3. Park the staging-backend variant of this gate entirely; rely on the local docker-compose variant (which CAN mint via `/admin/workspaces/:id/test-token` in CI) for fresh-provision peer-visibility coverage. Reduces test value but unblocks chronic-red without an API change. No change to `tests/e2e/test_peer_visibility_mcp_local.sh` is needed today — its auth path works because the CI env doesn't trip the admin-gate fail-open guard. If we ever set `ADMIN_TOKEN` or pre-seed a token, we'd need to add the header at that point. ### What I'm doing now - NOT opening `fix/e2e-peer-visibility-test-race-and-auth` (would be a wrong fix → chronic-red-with-different-failure-mode swap). - Surfacing to CTO via memory + this issue comment. - The `core-qa` persona token IS available (id 64, verified live). Token availability was not the blocker. Forensic agent `a4792da3` likely traced a symptom correctly (line 230 fails) but the proposed fix-path doesn't match the source. Suggest CTO triage to pick option 1/2/3 above; happy to take whichever as a follow-up. cc: `core-be`, `core-security` (option 1 needs SR), `infra-runtime-be` (option 2).
core-qa commented 2026-05-19 19:12:29 +00:00
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Blocker: brief-prescribed fix for tests/e2e/test_peer_visibility_mcp_staging.sh line 230 does not match the actual workspace-server API shape

Filed by core-qa after VENDOR-DOC-CHECK of HEAD per feedback_check_vendor_docs_and_actual_source_before_guess_api_shape + the brief's 25min hard cap.

What the forensic brief asked for

  1. Bug 1 (staging script, l.230) — race: read auth_token from immediate POST /workspaces response while workspace is still status:provisioning. Proposed fix: move the auth_token extraction AFTER the status=online poll loop and refetch via GET /workspaces/:id.
  2. Bug 2 (local script, l.239) — POST /workspaces missing Authorization header per a tightened auth gate attributed to RFC#523 (commit aabf933a5c). Proposed fix: add -H "Authorization: Bearer $ADMIN_TOKEN" and mint a token via the existing GET /admin/workspaces/preflight-probe/test-token pattern at l.126.

Why I did NOT ship the PR

The proposed fixes do not match the source-of-truth in HEAD:

Bug 1 — GET /workspaces/:id does NOT return auth_token. workspace.go:797-896 (handler WorkspaceHandler.Get) runs on the OPEN router (router.go:136 — r.GET("/workspaces/:id", wh.Get), no admin-auth group), and intentionally strips sensitive fields before returning (lines 869-887: budget_limit, monthly_spend, current_task, last_sample_error, workspace_dir deleted; nothing auth_token-shaped is read from the DB at all — the SELECT at line 806-820 does not project the token columns). Refetching from this endpoint can never yield the workspace's plaintext bearer.

More broadly, no read-back path for a workspace's plaintext auth_token exists on staging (MOLECULE_ENV=production). The chain:

  • POST /workspaces (workspace.go:642) response for container runtimes (hermes/openclaw/claude-code, T2/T3) is {id, status:"provisioning", awareness_namespace, workspace_access} — no auth_token. Only the External flow (l.589-591) returns connection.auth_token. The staging script's python3 ... d.get('auth_token') or d.get('connection',{}).get('auth_token') was authored speculating about a response shape that never existed for container runtimes.
  • mintWorkspaceSecrets is called inside provisionWorkspaceCP as a goroutine (workspace_provision.go:942), AFTER Create has already returned to the client. The plaintext is written into cfg.ConfigFiles[".auth_token"] (Docker) or delivered via /registry/register response (workspace_provision.go:487-489, registry.go:474) — only to the workspace itself.
  • /admin/workspaces/:id/test-token (admin_test_token.go) returns 404 in production (TestTokensEnabled → MOLECULE_ENV != production). Staging sets MOLECULE_ENV=production.
  • wsAuth.POST("/tokens", tokh.Create) (router.go:379) requires an existing workspace bearer — chicken-and-egg for a freshly provisioned workspace.

So the staging script as authored is structurally unable to obtain each workspace's own bearer (which pv_assert_runtime requires to drive the literal POST /workspaces/:id/mcp list_peers call through WorkspaceAuth). The brief's proposed GET /workspaces/:id refetch does not fix this — it just relocates the broken read.

Bug 2 — RFC#523 (commit aabf933a5c) is the forbidden-env guardrail, not an auth-gate change. I read commit aabf933 end-to-end: it's the 3-layer guardrail refusing tenant workspaces that contain operator-fleet env-var names. It does not touch POST /workspaces admin gating. AdminAuth on POST /workspaces (router.go:144-147) has been in place since before HEAD diverged (per #684 ref in wsauth_middleware.go:140-153). The actual local-script gap is conditional: AdminAuth fails open (line 164-176 of wsauth_middleware.go) when wsauth.HasAnyLiveTokenGlobal == false AND ADMIN_TOKEN env unset — which is the e2e-peer-visibility-local CI job's environment (fresh ephemeral pg, no ADMIN_TOKEN, no MOLECULE_ENV). Adding Bearer $ADMIN_TOKEN to the local-script POST /workspaces would: (a) be unnecessary in CI today, (b) be ineffective in any env that doesn't set ADMIN_TOKEN, (c) silently mask the real symptom when one is actually 401-ing.

Real underlying gap

The staging variant of this gate (test_peer_visibility_mcp_staging.sh) needs a production-safe, admin-authenticated, per-workspace bearer-mint endpoint to be added to workspace-server. Options to discuss:

  1. A new admin endpoint POST /admin/workspaces/:id/issue-token (gated by AdminAuth, plaintext returned once, no TestTokensEnabled gate) — would need a security review for the issue-anytime-from-admin-token threat surface vs. the value of fresh-provision E2E coverage. The wsauth.IssueToken primitive already exists.
  2. Have POST /workspaces synchronously include auth_token in the response for the container-runtime path too, mirroring the External flow's connection.auth_token. Mint moves into Create pre-response; the goroutine just consumes the already-minted token from the DB. Smaller surface change but couples the request lifetime to the mint.
  3. Park the staging-backend variant of this gate entirely; rely on the local docker-compose variant (which CAN mint via /admin/workspaces/:id/test-token in CI) for fresh-provision peer-visibility coverage. Reduces test value but unblocks chronic-red without an API change.

No change to tests/e2e/test_peer_visibility_mcp_local.sh is needed today — its auth path works because the CI env doesn't trip the admin-gate fail-open guard. If we ever set ADMIN_TOKEN or pre-seed a token, we'd need to add the header at that point.

What I'm doing now

  • NOT opening fix/e2e-peer-visibility-test-race-and-auth (would be a wrong fix → chronic-red-with-different-failure-mode swap).
  • Surfacing to CTO via memory + this issue comment.
  • The core-qa persona token IS available (id 64, verified live). Token availability was not the blocker.

Forensic agent a4792da3 likely traced a symptom correctly (line 230 fails) but the proposed fix-path doesn't match the source. Suggest CTO triage to pick option 1/2/3 above; happy to take whichever as a follow-up.

cc: core-be, core-security (option 1 needs SR), infra-runtime-be (option 2).

## Blocker: brief-prescribed fix for `tests/e2e/test_peer_visibility_mcp_staging.sh` line 230 does not match the actual `workspace-server` API shape _Filed by `core-qa` after VENDOR-DOC-CHECK of HEAD per `feedback_check_vendor_docs_and_actual_source_before_guess_api_shape` + the brief's `25min hard cap`._ ### What the forensic brief asked for 1. **Bug 1 (staging script, l.230)** — race: read `auth_token` from immediate `POST /workspaces` response while workspace is still `status:provisioning`. Proposed fix: move the `auth_token` extraction AFTER the `status=online` poll loop and **refetch via `GET /workspaces/:id`**. 2. **Bug 2 (local script, l.239)** — `POST /workspaces` missing `Authorization` header per a tightened auth gate attributed to RFC#523 (commit `aabf933a5c`). Proposed fix: add `-H "Authorization: Bearer $ADMIN_TOKEN"` and mint a token via the existing `GET /admin/workspaces/preflight-probe/test-token` pattern at l.126. ### Why I did NOT ship the PR The proposed fixes do not match the source-of-truth in HEAD: **Bug 1 — `GET /workspaces/:id` does NOT return `auth_token`.** `workspace.go:797-896` (handler `WorkspaceHandler.Get`) runs on the OPEN router (`router.go:136 — r.GET("/workspaces/:id", wh.Get)`, no admin-auth group), and intentionally strips sensitive fields before returning (lines 869-887: `budget_limit`, `monthly_spend`, `current_task`, `last_sample_error`, `workspace_dir` deleted; nothing `auth_token`-shaped is read from the DB at all — the `SELECT` at line 806-820 does not project the token columns). Refetching from this endpoint can never yield the workspace's plaintext bearer. More broadly, **no read-back path for a workspace's plaintext `auth_token` exists on staging** (`MOLECULE_ENV=production`). The chain: - `POST /workspaces` (workspace.go:642) response for container runtimes (hermes/openclaw/claude-code, T2/T3) is `{id, status:"provisioning", awareness_namespace, workspace_access}` — no `auth_token`. Only the External flow (l.589-591) returns `connection.auth_token`. The staging script's `python3 ... d.get('auth_token') or d.get('connection',{}).get('auth_token')` was authored speculating about a response shape that never existed for container runtimes. - `mintWorkspaceSecrets` is called inside `provisionWorkspaceCP` as a goroutine (workspace_provision.go:942), AFTER `Create` has already returned to the client. The plaintext is written into `cfg.ConfigFiles[".auth_token"]` (Docker) or delivered via `/registry/register` response (workspace_provision.go:487-489, registry.go:474) — only to the workspace itself. - `/admin/workspaces/:id/test-token` (admin_test_token.go) returns 404 in production (`TestTokensEnabled` → `MOLECULE_ENV != production`). Staging sets `MOLECULE_ENV=production`. - `wsAuth.POST("/tokens", tokh.Create)` (router.go:379) requires an existing workspace bearer — chicken-and-egg for a freshly provisioned workspace. So the staging script as authored is **structurally unable** to obtain each workspace's own bearer (which `pv_assert_runtime` requires to drive the literal `POST /workspaces/:id/mcp` `list_peers` call through `WorkspaceAuth`). The brief's proposed `GET /workspaces/:id` refetch does not fix this — it just relocates the broken read. **Bug 2 — RFC#523 (commit `aabf933a5c`) is the forbidden-env guardrail, not an auth-gate change.** I read commit `aabf933` end-to-end: it's the 3-layer guardrail refusing tenant workspaces that contain operator-fleet env-var names. It does not touch `POST /workspaces` admin gating. AdminAuth on `POST /workspaces` (`router.go:144-147`) has been in place since before HEAD diverged (per `#684` ref in `wsauth_middleware.go:140-153`). The actual local-script gap is conditional: `AdminAuth` fails open (line 164-176 of `wsauth_middleware.go`) when `wsauth.HasAnyLiveTokenGlobal == false` AND `ADMIN_TOKEN` env unset — which is the e2e-peer-visibility-local CI job's environment (fresh ephemeral pg, no `ADMIN_TOKEN`, no `MOLECULE_ENV`). Adding `Bearer $ADMIN_TOKEN` to the local-script `POST /workspaces` would: (a) be unnecessary in CI today, (b) be ineffective in any env that doesn't set `ADMIN_TOKEN`, (c) silently mask the real symptom when one is actually 401-ing. ### Real underlying gap The staging variant of this gate (`test_peer_visibility_mcp_staging.sh`) needs a **production-safe, admin-authenticated, per-workspace bearer-mint endpoint** to be added to `workspace-server`. Options to discuss: 1. A new admin endpoint `POST /admin/workspaces/:id/issue-token` (gated by `AdminAuth`, plaintext returned once, no `TestTokensEnabled` gate) — would need a security review for the issue-anytime-from-admin-token threat surface vs. the value of fresh-provision E2E coverage. The `wsauth.IssueToken` primitive already exists. 2. Have `POST /workspaces` synchronously include `auth_token` in the response for the container-runtime path too, mirroring the External flow's `connection.auth_token`. Mint moves into `Create` pre-response; the goroutine just consumes the already-minted token from the DB. Smaller surface change but couples the request lifetime to the mint. 3. Park the staging-backend variant of this gate entirely; rely on the local docker-compose variant (which CAN mint via `/admin/workspaces/:id/test-token` in CI) for fresh-provision peer-visibility coverage. Reduces test value but unblocks chronic-red without an API change. No change to `tests/e2e/test_peer_visibility_mcp_local.sh` is needed today — its auth path works because the CI env doesn't trip the admin-gate fail-open guard. If we ever set `ADMIN_TOKEN` or pre-seed a token, we'd need to add the header at that point. ### What I'm doing now - NOT opening `fix/e2e-peer-visibility-test-race-and-auth` (would be a wrong fix → chronic-red-with-different-failure-mode swap). - Surfacing to CTO via memory + this issue comment. - The `core-qa` persona token IS available (id 64, verified live). Token availability was not the blocker. Forensic agent `a4792da3` likely traced a symptom correctly (line 230 fails) but the proposed fix-path doesn't match the source. Suggest CTO triage to pick option 1/2/3 above; happy to take whichever as a follow-up. cc: `core-be`, `core-security` (option 1 needs SR), `infra-runtime-be` (option 2).
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