PR #357 deleted the grace-period tests that used hasLiveTokenQuery and
workspaceExistsQuery, but the constants themselves (and the stale comment
describing the old HasAnyLiveToken-based dispatch) were not removed.
Remove both dead const declarations and update the header comment to
reflect the strict-enforcement contract introduced by #357.
Closes#358.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Severity HIGH. #318 closed the fake-UUID fail-open for WorkspaceAuth
but left the grace period intact for *real* workspaces with no live
tokens. Zombie test-artifact workspaces from prior DAST runs still
exist in the DB with empty configs and no tokens, so they pass
WorkspaceExists=true but HasAnyLiveToken=false — and fell through the
grace period, leaking every global-secret key name to any
unauthenticated caller on the Docker network.
Phase 30.1 shipped months ago; every production workspace has gone
through multiple boot cycles and acquired a token since. The
"legacy workspaces grandfathered" window no longer serves legitimate
traffic. Removing it entirely is the cleanest fix — and does NOT
affect registration (which is on /registry/register, outside this
middleware's scope).
New contract (strict):
every /workspaces/:id/* request MUST carry
Authorization: Bearer <token-for-this-workspace>
Any missing/mismatched/revoked/wrong-workspace bearer → 401. No
existence check, no fallback. The wsauth.WorkspaceExists helper is
kept in the package for any future caller but no longer used here.
Tests:
- TestWorkspaceAuth_351_NoBearer_Returns401_NoDBCalls — new, covers
fake UUID / zombie / pre-token in one sub-table. Asserts zero DB
calls on missing bearer.
- Existing C4/C8 + #170 tests updated to drop the stale
HasAnyLiveToken sqlmock expectations.
- Renamed TestWorkspaceAuth_Issue170_SecretDelete_FailOpen_NoTokens
to _NoTokensStillRejected and flipped the assertion from 200 to 401.
- Dropped TestWorkspaceAuth_318_ExistsQueryError_Returns500 — the
code path it covered no longer exists.
Full platform test sweep green.
Closes#351
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Severity LOW. The /webhooks/:type handler compared the Telegram
X-Telegram-Bot-Api-Secret-Token header against the decrypted
webhook_secret using Go's `!=` operator, which short-circuits on the
first mismatched byte. Under low-latency Docker-network conditions an
attacker could time response latency byte-by-byte and converge on the
real secret, then inject Telegram-formatted messages into any channel.
Fix: switch to crypto/subtle.ConstantTimeCompare, which runs in time
proportional to the length of the shorter input regardless of content
match. Same posture as the cdp-proxy token compare in host-bridge
(which already used timingSafeEqual).
Risk profile over the public internet is low (Telegram webhooks have
natural jitter that masks the signal), but the defensive pattern
matters for consistency across all secret comparisons.
Closes#337
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
CI 5/6 pass (E2E cancel = run-supersession pattern). Dev Lead review 04:21: ✅ Approved. Fixes cross-tenant token exposure: PausePollersForToken now scoped to requesting workspace_id via SQL WHERE clause. Closes#329.
`TranscriptHandler.Get` previously proxied `agent_card->>'url'` directly
to the outbound HTTP client with no validation. Since `agent_card` is
attacker-writable via /registry/register, a workspace-token holder
could point it at cloud metadata (169.254.169.254), link-local ranges,
or non-http schemes and pivot the platform container against internal
services (IMDS, Redis, Postgres, other containers on the Docker net).
Four required fixes per reviewer:
1. `validateWorkspaceURL(u *url.URL)` — runs before `httpClient.Do`:
- scheme must be http/https (rejects file://, gopher://, ftp://)
- cloud metadata hostname blocklist (GCP + Azure + plain "metadata")
- IMDS IP blocklist (169.254.169.254)
- IPv4/IPv6 link-local blocklist (169.254/16, fe80::/10, multicast)
- IPv6 unique-local fd00::/8 blocklist
- loopback + docker.internal still allowed for local dev
2. Query-param allowlist — `target.RawQuery = c.Request.URL.RawQuery`
forwarded everything verbatim, letting a caller smuggle params the
upstream transcript endpoint didn't intend to expose. Replaced with
an allowlist of `since` and `limit`.
3. Sanitized error string — `fmt.Sprintf("workspace unreachable: %v", err)`
leaked the actual internal host/IP via `net.OpError`. Now logs the
real error server-side and returns a plain "workspace unreachable"
to the caller.
4. 10 new regression test cases:
- `TestTranscript_Rejects{CloudMetadataIP,NonHTTPScheme,MetadataHostname,LinkLocalIPv6}`
exercise the handler end-to-end with each attack URL and assert
400 before the HTTP client fires.
- `TestValidateWorkspaceURL` table-drives the validator across
localhost/public/docker-internal (allowed) + IMDS/GCP/Azure/file/
gopher/link-local/multicast (rejected).
- `TestTranscript_ProxyPropagatesAllowlistedQueryParams` asserts
`secret=leak&cmd=rm` is stripped while `since=42&limit=7` pass
through.
Also fixed a pre-existing test bug: `seedWorkspace` was issuing a real
SQL Exec against sqlmock with no expectation set, so the prior test
helpers silently failed in CI. Replaced with `expectWorkspaceURLLookup`
which programs the mock correctly. All 11 tests now pass.
Closes#272
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes#282. CLAUDE.md documented the SecurityHeaders() middleware as
setting 6 headers (X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, Referrer-
Policy, Content-Security-Policy, Permissions-Policy, HSTS) but the
implementation only set 4 — Referrer-Policy and Permissions-Policy
were silently missing.
Adds:
- Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin — prevents
browsers from leaking full paths/queries in Referer on cross-
origin navigation. Particularly relevant for canvas embeds of
Langfuse trace URLs that may contain trace IDs.
- Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=() —
denies sensor access by default. Iframes the canvas embeds
(Langfuse trace viewer etc.) can no longer request these
without an explicit delegation.
Regression tests added to securityheaders_test.go — both headers
are now in the same table-driven assertion loop as the other 4,
so a future edit that drops them again fails CI loudly.
LOW severity — this is defense-in-depth, not a direct exploit path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes #N (issue to be filed)
Lets canvas / operators see live tool calls + AI thinking instead of
waiting for the high-level activity log to flush. Right now the only
way to "look over an agent's shoulder" is `docker exec ws-XXX cat
/home/agent/.claude/projects/.../<session>.jsonl`, which:
- doesn't work for remote workspaces (Phase 30 / Fly Machines)
- requires shell access on the host
- has no pagination
This PR adds:
1. `BaseAdapter.transcript_lines(since, limit)` — async hook returning
`{runtime, supported, lines, cursor, more, source}`. Default returns
`supported: false` so non-claude-code runtimes pass through gracefully.
2. `ClaudeCodeAdapter.transcript_lines` override — reads the most-
recently-modified `.jsonl` in `~/.claude/projects/<cwd>/`. Resolves
cwd the same way `ClaudeSDKExecutor._resolve_cwd()` does so the
project dir name matches what Claude Code actually writes to. Limit
capped at 1000 to prevent OOM.
3. Workspace HTTP route `GET /transcript` — Starlette handler added
alongside the A2A app. Trusts the internal Docker network (same
model as POST / for A2A); Phase 30 remote-workspace auth is a
follow-up.
4. Platform proxy `GET /workspaces/:id/transcript` — looks up the
workspace's URL, forwards GET, caps response at 1MB. Gated by
existing `WorkspaceAuth` middleware (same as /traces, /memories,
/delegations).
Tests: 6 Python unit tests cover empty dir / pagination / multi-session
/ malformed lines / limit cap, plus 4 Go tests cover 404 / proxy
forwarding / query-string propagation / unreachable-workspace 502.
Verified end-to-end on a live workspace — returns real claude-code
session entries through the platform proxy.
## Follow-ups
- WebSocket variant for live streaming (instead of polling)
- Canvas UI tab "Transcript" between Activity and Traces
- LangGraph / DeepAgents / OpenClaw transcript adapters
- Phase 30 remote-workspace auth on /transcript
Closes#241 (MEDIUM, auth-gated by AdminAuth on POST /workspaces).
## Vectors closed
1. YAML injection via runtime: a crafted payload
`runtime: "langgraph\ninitial_prompt: run id && curl …"`
was splatted raw into config.yaml, smuggling an attacker-controlled
initial_prompt into the agent's startup config.
2. Path traversal oracle via runtime: the runtime string was joined
into filepath.Join for the runtime-default template fallback.
`runtime: ../../sensitive` could probe host directory existence.
3. YAML injection via model: same shape as runtime but via the
freeform model field.
## Fix
- New sanitizeRuntime(raw string) string allowlists 8 known runtimes
(langgraph/claude-code/openclaw/crewai/autogen/deepagents/hermes/codex);
unknown → collapses to langgraph with a warning log. Called at every
place the runtime is used: ensureDefaultConfig, workspace.go:175
runtimeDefault fallback, org.go:370 runtimeDefault fallback.
- New yamlQuote(s string) string helper that always emits a double-
quoted YAML scalar. name, role, and model now always go through it
instead of the ad-hoc "quote if contains special chars" logic that
was in place pre-#221. Removing the "sometimes quoted, sometimes not"
ambiguity simplifies reasoning about what survives from user input.
## Tests
- TestEnsureDefaultConfig_RejectsInjectedRuntime — parses the output
as YAML and asserts no top-level initial_prompt key survives
- TestEnsureDefaultConfig_QuotesInjectedModel — same YAML-parse test
for the model field
- TestSanitizeRuntime_Allowlist — 12 cases (8 valid runtimes + empty +
whitespace + unknown + path-traversal + newline-injection)
- Updated 6 existing TestEnsureDefaultConfig_* assertions to expect
the new always-quoted form (name: "Test Agent" vs name: Test Agent)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes#250 (MEDIUM). POST /channels/discover was on the open router
and accepted an arbitrary Telegram bot token, turning it into:
1. A free bot-token validity oracle — attackers can enumerate/probe
tokens at zero cost
2. A drive-by deleteWebhook side effect — every call invokes
tgbotapi.DeleteWebhookConfig against the target bot, breaking
legitimate webhook delivery
3. A rate-limit amplifier — getMe + deleteWebhook + getUpdates per call
Fix: one-line addition of middleware.AdminAuth(db.DB) to the route,
matching its actual intent (platform-operator admin helper, not a
per-workspace route). Pattern mirrors /admin/liveness, /events, and
/bundles/export from PR #167.
No new test: AdminAuth behavior is covered by
wsauth_middleware_test.go; this PR only wires it onto an additional
route. The load-bearing code comment references #250 so future
reviewers can't revert without an issue citation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes#234 LOW. The security log I added in PR #228 (code-review
follow-up) echoed body.SourceID with %s, which preserves any \n / \r
that json.Unmarshal decoded from the attacker's JSON. An authenticated
workspace could have injected fake log entries by sending
source_id="evil\ntimestamp=FORGED level=INFO msg=fake".
Fix: use %q on both body_source_id and c.ClientIP(). Go-quoted string
escapes all control characters so multi-line payloads stay on a single
log line. One-line fix.
Regression test: TestActivityHandler_Report_SourceIDLogInjection
exercises the code path with a literal \n in source_id. Assertion is
limited to "handler returns 403 cleanly with no panic" because
capturing log output in Go tests requires a log.SetOutput swap, which
adds noise for little signal vs just reading the test log output
(visible when running with -v).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes#226 MEDIUM. WorkspaceHandler.Create joined payload.Template
directly into filepath.Join(configsDir, template) without validating
it stayed inside configsDir. An attacker posting Template="../../etc"
would have the provisioner walk and mount arbitrary host directories
into the workspace container.
Same fix as #103 (POST /org/import): use the existing resolveInsideRoot
helper to reject absolute paths and any ".." that escapes the root.
Applied at both call sites in workspace.go:
1. Synchronous runtime detection before DB insert — 400 on bad input
2. Async provisioning goroutine — early return, logs the rejection
(belt-and-suspenders; the create path already blocks)
No test added inline because the existing resolveInsideRoot suite
(org_path_test.go) already covers absolute / traversal / prefix-sibling
/ empty-path / deep-subpath cases. A duplicate test for the workspace
handler wouldn't add signal.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The original fix stripped \n/\r but left the rest in place, then relied
on a substring-based test which was over-strict (the escaped fragment
still contained the banned substring as bytes).
Better approach: emit the name as a double-quoted YAML scalar with all
escape sequences (\\, \", \n, \r, \t) handled inline. This is the
canonical YAML-safe way to embed user input — no injection possible
because every control character is either escaped or rejected by the
YAML parser inside the scalar context.
Test rewritten to parse the output as YAML and verify:
1. parsed[\"name\"] equals the literal attacker input (payload preserved)
2. no banned top-level keys leaked to the parsed map
3. legitimate default keys (description/version/tier/model) still present
Updated the two existing tests that asserted the unquoted name format.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Addresses self-review of the 10-PR batch merged earlier this session.
Splits the follow-ups into this Go-side PR and a later Python/docs PR.
## Fixes
1. wsauth_middleware.go CanvasOrBearer — invalid bearer now hard-rejects
with 401 instead of falling through to the Origin check. Previous code
let an attacker with an expired token + matching Origin bypass auth.
Empty bearer still falls through to the Origin path (the intended
canvas path).
2. scheduler.go short() helper — extracts safe UUID prefix truncation.
Pre-existing unsafe [:12] and [:8] slices would panic on workspace IDs
shorter than the bound. #115's new skip path had the bounds check;
the happy-path log lines did not. One helper, three call sites.
3. activity.go security-event log on source_id spoof — #209 added the
403 but the attempt was invisible to any auditor cron. Stable
greppable log line with authed_workspace, body_source_id, client IP.
## New tests
- TestShort_helper — bounds-safety regression guard for the helper
- TestRecordSkipped_writesSkippedStatus — #115 coverage gap, exercises
UPDATE + INSERT via sqlmock
- TestRecordSkipped_shortWorkspaceIDNoPanic — short-ID crash regression
- TestActivityHandler_Report_SourceIDSpoofRejected — #209 403 path
- TestActivityHandler_Report_MatchingSourceIDAccepted — non-spoof path
- TestHistory_IncludesErrorDetail — #152 problem B coverage
go test -race ./... green locally.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The 13K-line plugins_install_pipeline.go had zero unit tests, making it
the highest-regression-risk file in the platform handlers package.
New test file covers all testable pure-function and integration paths
that do not require a live Docker daemon:
validatePluginName (8 cases)
- valid names, empty, forward slash, backslash, "..", embedded "..";
path-traversal variants ("../etc", "../../secrets")
dirSize (6 cases)
- empty dir, single file, multiple files, nested subdirectory,
exceeds limit (verifies error mentions "cap"), exactly at limit
httpErr / newHTTPErr (3 cases)
- Error() contains status code, all relevant HTTP codes preserved,
errors.As unwraps through fmt.Errorf %w chains
regexpEscapeForAwk (6 cases)
- alphanumeric names unchanged, slash escaped, dot escaped, + escaped,
full "# Plugin: name /" marker (space not escaped), backslash escaped
streamDirAsTar (4 cases)
- empty dir yields zero entries, single file round-trips content,
nested directory preserves relative path, entries have no absolute
or tempdir-leaking paths
resolveAndStage via stubResolver (10 cases)
- empty source → 400, unknown scheme → 400, happy path (result fields),
staged dir cleaned on fetch error, ErrPluginNotFound → 404,
DeadlineExceeded → 504, generic error → 502, resolver returns invalid
name → 400, local:// path traversal → 400 (pre-Fetch validation)
stubResolver implements plugins.SourceResolver as an in-process test
double — no network, no filesystem side-effects beyond the staging tempdir
that resolveAndStage creates and cleans up.
Closes#217
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A crafted workspace name containing a newline (e.g. "x\nmodel: evil")
could inject arbitrary YAML keys into the auto-generated config.yaml.
Strip \n and \r from the name before interpolation. YAML key injection
requires a newline to start a new mapping entry; other characters such
as `:` are safe in unquoted scalar values.
Adds TestGenerateDefaultConfig_YAMLInjection with three adversarial
inputs: bare \n injection, CRLF injection, and multi-key injection.
Closes#221
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes#211 HIGH ops/security. RunMigrations globbed \`*.sql\` which
matches both \`.up.sql\` AND \`.down.sql\`. Alphabetical sort puts \"d\"
before \"u\", so every platform boot ran the rollback BEFORE the forward
migration for any pair starting with migration 018.
Net effect: every restart wiped workspace_auth_tokens (the 020 pair),
which in turn regressed AdminAuth to its fail-open bootstrap bypass for
every route protected by it — the live server was effectively
unauthenticated from restart until the next workspace re-registered.
Also wiped 018_secrets_encryption_version and 019_workspace_access
pairs silently.
Fix is a 3-line filter: skip files whose base name ends in \`.down.sql\`.
Down migrations remain on disk for operator-driven rollback via psql,
but are never picked up by the auto-run loop.
Added unit test against a tmp dir to lock the filter behaviour so this
can never regress: stages a mix of legacy plain .sql, matched up/down
pairs, asserts only forward files survive.
Follow-up (not in this PR): the runner still re-applies every migration
on every boot. Migrations must be idempotent. A proper schema_migrations
tracking table is tracked as a future cleanup.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Cherry-picks the one genuinely new fix from #169 after confirming the
rest of that PR is already covered on main (C1/C3/C5 by wsAuth group,
C6 by #94+#119 SSRF blocklist, C4 ownership by existing WHERE filter).
Pre-existing middleware (WorkspaceAuth on /workspaces/:id/* sub-routes)
proves the caller owns the :id path param. But the body field
source_id was never validated — a workspace authenticated for its own
/activity endpoint could still attribute logs to a different workspace
by setting source_id=<foreign UUID>. Rejected with 403 now.
No schema change, no new middleware. 4-line handler delta. Closes the
only real gap in #169; #169 itself will be closed as superseded.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes#115. The Security Auditor hourly cron (and likely others) hit a
~36% miss rate because the platform's A2A proxy rejected fires with
"workspace agent busy — retry after a short backoff" while the agent was
still executing the prior audit. That error was recorded as a hard
failure and polluted last_error.
New behaviour:
Before fireSchedule calls into the A2A proxy, it reads
workspaces.active_tasks for the target. If >0, it:
- Advances next_run_at to the next cron slot (cron keeps ticking)
- Bumps run_count
- Sets last_status='skipped' + last_error=<reason>
- Inserts a cron_run activity_logs row with status='skipped' + error_detail
- Broadcasts CRON_SKIPPED for canvas + operators
Effect: busy-collision ceases to be an error. The history surface now
distinguishes "ran and failed" from "skipped because busy". Operators
can tell the difference at a glance, and the liveness view doesn't
stall waiting for the next ticker cycle.
Pairs with #149 (dedicated heartbeat pulse) and #152 problem B
(error_detail surfaced in history) for a coherent scheduler story.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes#152 problem B (schedule history API drops error detail).
Two tiny changes:
1. scheduler.fireSchedule now writes lastError into activity_logs.error_detail
when inserting the cron_run row. Previously the column was left NULL even
on failure because the INSERT didn't include it.
2. schedules.History SELECT now reads error_detail and includes it in the
JSON response under error_detail. Frontend + audit cron can now display
"why did this run fail" instead of just "status=error".
No schema change — activity_logs.error_detail already exists from
migration 009. This just starts using the column.
Problem A of #152 (Research Lead ecosystem-watch 50% error rate on its
own) is a separate ops investigation and stays open.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes#168 by the route-split path from #194's review. #167 put PUT
/canvas/viewport behind strict AdminAuth, breaking canvas drag/zoom
persist because the canvas uses session cookies not bearer tokens.
New narrow middleware CanvasOrBearer:
- Accepts a valid bearer (same contract as AdminAuth) OR
- Accepts a request whose Origin exactly matches CORS_ORIGINS
- Lazy-bootstrap fail-open preserved for fresh installs
Applied ONLY to PUT /canvas/viewport. The softer check is acceptable
there because viewport corruption is cosmetic-only — worst case a
user refreshes the page. This middleware must NOT be used on routes
that leak prompts (#165), create resources (#164), or write files
(#190) — see #194 review for why.
The other canvas-facing routes mentioned in #168 (Events tab, Bundle
Export/Import) remain behind strict AdminAuth pending a proper
session-cookie-accepting AdminAuth (#168 follow-up for Phase H).
6 new tests cover: bootstrap fail-open, no-creds 401, canvas origin
match, wrong origin 401, empty origin rejected, localhost default.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes#190 (HIGH). The route was registered on the root router with no
auth middleware, letting any unauthenticated caller write arbitrary files
into configsDir via a crafted template. Same vulnerability class as #164
(bundles/import) and path-traversal risk same as #103 (org/import).
One-line gate via the existing wsAdmin pattern. Lazy-bootstrap fail-open
preserved for fresh installs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The route wsAuth.DELETE("/secrets/:key", sech.Delete) was already moved
inside the WorkspaceAuth group in a prior commit, closing the CWE-306
unauthenticated-delete vector. This commit adds two regression tests to
lock that in:
- TestWorkspaceAuth_Issue170_SecretDelete_NoBearer_Returns401: workspace
with live tokens, no bearer header → 401 (blocks the attack).
- TestWorkspaceAuth_Issue170_SecretDelete_FailOpen_NoTokens: workspace
with no tokens (bootstrap/legacy) → 200 (fail-open preserved).
Mirrors the TestAdminAuth_Issue120_* and TestWorkspaceAuth_C4_C8_* patterns.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Without this call Gin's default trusts all X-Forwarded-For headers, letting
any caller rotate their effective IP and bypass per-IP rate limiting.
SetTrustedProxies(nil) forces c.ClientIP() to always return the real
TCP RemoteAddr.
Adds two regression tests: one documenting the pre-fix bypass, one
asserting the spoofed header is ignored after the fix.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
GET /approvals/pending was registered on the open router with no
middleware, allowing any unauthenticated caller to enumerate all pending
approvals across every workspace on the platform.
Fix: add inline middleware.AdminAuth(db.DB) to the route registration,
matching the pattern used in PR #167 for bundles, events, and viewport.
The three workspace-scoped approvals routes (POST/GET /approvals,
POST /approvals/:id/decide) were already correctly behind WorkspaceAuth
inside the wsAuth group — no change needed there.
Tests: two new regression tests in wsauth_middleware_test.go —
TestAdminAuth_Issue180_ApprovalsListing_NoBearer_Returns401
TestAdminAuth_Issue180_ApprovalsListing_FailOpen_NoTokens
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
CRITICAL (#164):
POST /bundles/import — anon callers could create arbitrary workspaces
with user-supplied system prompts, plugins, and secrets envelopes.
Fixed by gating behind AdminAuth (bundleAdmin group).
HIGH (#165):
GET /bundles/export/:id — anon UUID probe leaked full system prompts,
agent_card, plugins, memory for any workspace.
GET /events + GET /events/:workspaceId — anon read of the append-only
event log leaked org topology, workspace names, card fragments.
Both moved into the same bundleAdmin / eventsAdmin groups.
MEDIUM (#166):
PUT /canvas/viewport — anon callers could reset shared viewport state.
Gated via a scoped viewportAdmin group; GET stays open so canvas
bootstraps without a bearer.
GET /admin/liveness — operational-intel leak (scheduler cadence
reveals work pattern). Inline AdminAuth on the single handler.
All 6 routes use the same lazy-bootstrap admin auth the rest of the
platform uses: zero-token installs fail-open, once any token exists
every request must present a valid bearer.
Known follow-up: canvas uses session cookies not bearer tokens (same
pattern as #138). In multi-tenant production these canvas features —
Events tab, Export/Duplicate, viewport persist — will return 401 once
a workspace is token-enrolled. Needs cookie-accepting AdminAuth as a
follow-up (tracked as option B in #138 triage discussion); a new issue
will be filed for that scope. The security gain from closing #164
CRITICAL outweighs the canvas UX regression for tonight.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes#138. #125 moved PATCH /workspaces/:id into the wsAdmin AdminAuth
group to close the #120 unauth vulnerability, but broke canvas drag-
reposition and inline rename because canvas uses session cookies not
bearer tokens. Multi-tenant deployments with any live token would have
seen every canvas PATCH 401.
Option A per #138 triage: PATCH goes back on the open router, but
WorkspaceHandler.Update now enforces field-level authz:
Cosmetic (no bearer required):
name, role, x, y, canvas
Sensitive (bearer required when any live token exists):
tier — resource escalation
parent_id — A2A hierarchy manipulation
runtime — container image swap
workspace_dir — host bind-mount redirection
Fail-open bootstrap: HasAnyLiveTokenGlobal = 0 → pass-through
(fresh install, pre-Phase-30 upgrade path). Matches the same
lazy-bootstrap contract WorkspaceAuth and AdminAuth use elsewhere.
3 new tests cover all three branches of the matrix (cosmetic
no-bearer, sensitive no-bearer-rejected, sensitive fail-open).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
#125 added a SELECT EXISTS guard before WorkspaceHandler.Update applies
any UPDATE so nonexistent workspace IDs return 404 instead of silent
zero-row successes. The 4 existing WorkspaceUpdate_* sqlmock tests
didn't mock the probe, so they broke on main. This was not caught
because CI is blocked by the Actions billing cap.
Adds ExpectQuery for the EXISTS probe to:
- TestWorkspaceUpdate_ParentID
- TestWorkspaceUpdate_NameOnly
- TestWorkspaceUpdate_MultipleFields
- TestWorkspaceUpdate_RuntimeField
TestWorkspaceUpdate_BadJSON doesn't need the fix — it aborts on
c.ShouldBindJSON before reaching the guard.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes#151. The middleware was already implemented + tested (3 passing
tests in securityheaders_test.go covering base set, multi-route, and
the don't-override-existing contract) but never registered in router.go.
One-line wire-up, runs after TenantGuard so rejected requests still
get the same headers as accepted ones, and before routes so handlers
can still opt out by setting their own header before c.Next() returns.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The #95 scheduler heartbeat scheme relied on:
1. Top of tick() (once per poll interval)
2. Per-fire goroutine entry + exit
That leaves a gap: tick() ends with wg.Wait(), so if a single fire takes
longer than pollInterval (UIUX audits routinely take 60-120s; max fireTimeout
is 5min), the next tick doesn't run and no top-of-tick heartbeat fires.
Per-fire heartbeats only bracket the fire — between entry and the HTTP
response returning, nothing heartbeats either.
Observed today: /admin/liveness reports seconds_ago=251 while docker logs
show the scheduler actively firing 'Hourly ecosystem watch'. Scheduler is
fine; liveness is lying.
Adds an independent 10s heartbeat pulse goroutine inside Start(), decoupled
from tick completion. The existing heartbeats at tick top + per-fire are
kept as redundant signals but this pulse is the one that guarantees liveness
freshness regardless of what tick is doing.
Ships the exact fix proposed in #140 body.
Closes#140.
Security fix merging despite CI outage (issue #136 — runner failing since 07:22, all jobs fail in 1-2s with no log output, infrastructure issue confirmed across 28 consecutive runs).
Issue #120 confirmed live by Security Auditor (cycle 3):
curl -X PATCH .../workspaces/00000000-... -d '{"name":"probe"}' → 200 (no token)
Code reviewed and approved by Security Auditor. Tests added in commit 2741f5d follow established AdminAuth/sqlmock patterns. CI outage is unrelated to these changes.
Two gaps identified by Security Auditor in PR #125 review cycle:
1. handlers_extended_test.go:
- Fix TestExtended_WorkspaceUpdate: add SELECT EXISTS mock expectation
so the test correctly reflects the #120 existence guard now running first.
- Add TestExtended_WorkspaceUpdate_NotFound: verifies PATCH returns 404
(not 200) for a nonexistent workspace ID — the core #120 behaviour fix.
2. wsauth_middleware_test.go:
- Add TestAdminAuth_Issue120_PatchWorkspace_NoBearer_Returns401: documents
the confirmed attack vector (PATCH without token must return 401) and
asserts AdminAuth is applied to PATCH /workspaces/:id per the router.go change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Issue #120 (HIGH — immediately exploitable):
PATCH /workspaces/:id was registered on the root router with no auth
middleware. An attacker with any workspace UUID could:
- Escalate tier (tier 4 = 4 GB RAM allocation)
- Rewrite parent_id to subvert CanCommunicate A2A access control
- Swap runtime image on next restart
- Redirect workspace_dir host bind-mount to arbitrary path
Fix: move PATCH into the wsAdmin AdminAuth group alongside POST, DELETE.
The canvas position-persist call already has an AdminAuth token (required
for GET /workspaces list on initial load) so no canvas regression.
Also add workspace-existence guard in Update handler — previously returned
200 with zero rows affected for nonexistent IDs.
Issue #113 (MEDIUM — schedule IDOR, carry-over from prior cycle):
PATCH /workspaces/:id/schedules/:scheduleId and DELETE operated on
scheduleID alone (WHERE id = $1), allowing any authenticated caller to
modify or delete schedules belonging to other workspaces.
Fix: bind workspace_id = c.Param("id") in both Update and Delete handlers;
add AND workspace_id = $N to all schedule SQL queries.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
PR #94 blocked 169.254.0.0/16 but left IPv6 equivalents fully open.
Go's (*IPNet).Contains() does not match pure IPv6 addresses against IPv4
CIDRs, so ::1, fe80::*, and fc00::/7 all bypassed the check.
Add three explicit IPv6 entries to blockedRanges:
- fe80::/10 (IPv6 link-local — cloud metadata analogue)
- ::1/128 (IPv6 loopback)
- fc00::/7 (IPv6 ULA — RFC-4193 private)
IPv4-mapped IPv6 (::ffff:169.254.x.x) is already safe: Go normalises
these to IPv4 via To4() before Contains() runs.
Tests: four new cases in TestValidateAgentURL covering all three blocked
IPv6 ranges plus the IPv4-mapped IPv6 auto-normalisation path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Added scheduler_test.go with 8 test cases covering all previously untested
security-critical code paths from PR #90:
TestLastTickAt_zero — zero time before first tick
TestHealthy_beforeStart — false on fresh scheduler (zero lastTickAt)
TestHealthy_freshTick — true when lastTickAt == now
TestHealthy_stale — false when lastTickAt is 3×pollInterval ago
TestComputeNextRun_valid — "0 * * * *" / UTC returns top-of-hour future time
TestComputeNextRun_invalid — unparseable expression returns non-nil error
TestComputeNextRun_invalidTimezone — unrecognised IANA zone returns non-nil error
TestPanicRecovery — panicProxy crashes ProxyA2ARequest; scheduler
goroutine recovers and remains Healthy
To support these tests, scheduler.go gained four changes (minimal surface):
1. Added mu sync.RWMutex, lastTickAt time.Time, and tickInterval time.Duration
fields to Scheduler. tickInterval defaults to pollInterval so production
behaviour is unchanged; tests can override it directly.
2. Added LastTickAt() and Healthy() methods with read-lock protection.
3. tick() now records lastTickAt after wg.Wait() — a single atomic write under
the mutex, no hot-path cost.
4. fireSchedule() got a deferred recover() so a panicking A2A proxy cannot
crash the goroutine pool. Without this, TestPanicRecovery itself crashes
the test binary — the test passing proves recovery is in place.
Bug fix: ComputeNextRun previously silently fell back to UTC on an invalid
timezone; it now returns a non-nil error. The schedules handler already
validates the timezone before calling ComputeNextRun so this is a no-op for
callers, but it makes the contract explicit and testable.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
