CRITICAL (#164):
POST /bundles/import — anon callers could create arbitrary workspaces
with user-supplied system prompts, plugins, and secrets envelopes.
Fixed by gating behind AdminAuth (bundleAdmin group).
HIGH (#165):
GET /bundles/export/:id — anon UUID probe leaked full system prompts,
agent_card, plugins, memory for any workspace.
GET /events + GET /events/:workspaceId — anon read of the append-only
event log leaked org topology, workspace names, card fragments.
Both moved into the same bundleAdmin / eventsAdmin groups.
MEDIUM (#166):
PUT /canvas/viewport — anon callers could reset shared viewport state.
Gated via a scoped viewportAdmin group; GET stays open so canvas
bootstraps without a bearer.
GET /admin/liveness — operational-intel leak (scheduler cadence
reveals work pattern). Inline AdminAuth on the single handler.
All 6 routes use the same lazy-bootstrap admin auth the rest of the
platform uses: zero-token installs fail-open, once any token exists
every request must present a valid bearer.
Known follow-up: canvas uses session cookies not bearer tokens (same
pattern as #138). In multi-tenant production these canvas features —
Events tab, Export/Duplicate, viewport persist — will return 401 once
a workspace is token-enrolled. Needs cookie-accepting AdminAuth as a
follow-up (tracked as option B in #138 triage discussion); a new issue
will be filed for that scope. The security gain from closing #164
CRITICAL outweighs the canvas UX regression for tonight.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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