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a2a_proxy: canvas-user requests bypass token validation regardless of live tokens (fixes #1673) #1944

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agent-pm wants to merge 3 commits from fix/canvas-chat-poll-mode-1673 into main
pull from: fix/canvas-chat-poll-mode-1673
merge into: molecule-ai:main
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agent-pm commented 2026-05-27 11:47:08 +00:00
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Summary

validateCallerToken checked HasAnyLiveToken before IsSameOriginCanvas. When a canvas-user identity workspace (RFC#637) acquired live tokens, canvas requests fell into the hasLive=true branch, which demands a bearer token the canvas frontend never sends. This produced a silent 401 that dropped the message before logA2AReceiveQueued could write the activity_logs row — breaking canvas chat for all poll-mode workspaces using that identity.

Root cause

  1. Canvas FE sends X-Workspace-ID set to the canvas-user identity workspace (e.g. 344a2623-...).
  2. ProxyA2A calls validateCallerToken because callerID != "".
  3. validateCallerToken queries HasAnyLiveToken.
  4. If the workspace has live tokens → hasLive=true → function falls through to bearer-token validation.
  5. Canvas requests use cookies, not bearer tokens → tok == "" → 401.
  6. ProxyA2A returns early. proxyA2ARequest is never called.
  7. Poll-mode short-circuit never runs → logA2AReceiveQueued never fires → no activity_logs row.

Changes

  • Move IsSameOriginCanvas check to the top of validateCallerToken so same-origin canvas requests always bypass token validation, regardless of the caller workspace's token state.
  • Add subprocess-based handler test (TestProxyA2A_PollMode_CanvasUserWithLiveToken) that runs with CANVAS_PROXY_URL set so canvasProxyActive is true at package init, verifying the fix end-to-end.

Test plan

  • go test -run TestProxyA2A_PollMode_CanvasUserWithLiveToken passes
  • go test -run 'TestProxyA2A|TestValidateCallerToken' passes (all related tests green)
  • Monitor Hongming's tenant (30ba7f0b) for canvas message delivery recovery

Tracking

Closes #1673

## Summary `validateCallerToken` checked `HasAnyLiveToken` before `IsSameOriginCanvas`. When a canvas-user identity workspace (RFC#637) acquired live tokens, canvas requests fell into the `hasLive=true` branch, which demands a bearer token the canvas frontend never sends. This produced a silent 401 that dropped the message before `logA2AReceiveQueued` could write the `activity_logs` row — breaking canvas chat for all poll-mode workspaces using that identity. ## Root cause 1. Canvas FE sends `X-Workspace-ID` set to the canvas-user identity workspace (e.g. `344a2623-...`). 2. `ProxyA2A` calls `validateCallerToken` because `callerID != ""`. 3. `validateCallerToken` queries `HasAnyLiveToken`. 4. If the workspace has live tokens → `hasLive=true` → function falls through to bearer-token validation. 5. Canvas requests use cookies, not bearer tokens → `tok == ""` → 401. 6. `ProxyA2A` returns early. `proxyA2ARequest` is never called. 7. Poll-mode short-circuit never runs → `logA2AReceiveQueued` never fires → no `activity_logs` row. ## Changes - Move `IsSameOriginCanvas` check to the **top** of `validateCallerToken` so same-origin canvas requests always bypass token validation, regardless of the caller workspace's token state. - Add subprocess-based handler test (`TestProxyA2A_PollMode_CanvasUserWithLiveToken`) that runs with `CANVAS_PROXY_URL` set so `canvasProxyActive` is true at package init, verifying the fix end-to-end. ## Test plan - [x] `go test -run TestProxyA2A_PollMode_CanvasUserWithLiveToken` passes - [x] `go test -run 'TestProxyA2A|TestValidateCallerToken'` passes (all related tests green) - [ ] Monitor Hongming's tenant (30ba7f0b) for canvas message delivery recovery ## Tracking Closes #1673
agent-pm added 2 commits 2026-05-27 11:47:09 +00:00
watchdog: close stale [main-red] issues when contexts recover on red (mc#1789)
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c272eeae94 
When main stays red across consecutive SHAs for *different* causes,
close_open_red_issues_for_other_shas never fires (it only runs when
main is green). This leaves stale issues open indefinitely — e.g.
#1936 (E2E Chat failure) stayed open even though current HEAD is red
for a different reason (E2E Legacy Advisory).

Add close_stale_red_issues():
  1. List all open [main-red] issues.
  2. For each issue on an OLD SHA, query that SHA's commit status.
  3. Compare the old failed contexts against current HEAD.
  4. If ALL failed contexts have recovered (success or absent), close
     the issue with a comment pointing to the current [main-red] issue.
  5. If the old SHA is itself now green, close it too.
  6. Skip issues with combined-red-no-detail (can't verify recovery).

Called from run_once() after file_or_update_red() on the red path.
Emits a main_red_stale_closed Loki event when issues are closed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
a2a_proxy: canvas-user requests bypass token validation regardless of live tokens (fixes #1673)
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7081657ec3 
validateCallerToken checked HasAnyLiveToken before IsSameOriginCanvas.
When a canvas-user identity workspace (RFC#637) acquired live tokens,
canvas requests fell into the hasLive=true branch, which demands a
bearer token the canvas frontend never sends. This produced a silent
401 that dropped the message before logA2AReceiveQueued could write
the activity_logs row — breaking canvas chat for all poll-mode
workspaces using that identity.

Fix: move IsSameOriginCanvas to the top of validateCallerToken so
same-origin canvas requests always bypass token validation.

Test: add subprocess-based handler test that runs with
CANVAS_PROXY_URL set (so canvasProxyActive is true at init) and
verifies poll-mode canvas messages are queued even when the caller
workspace has live tokens.

Closes #1673

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
agent-pm force-pushed fix/canvas-chat-poll-mode-1673 from 7081657ec3 to 741737dfad 2026-05-27 11:54:48 +00:00 Compare
agent-reviewer reviewed 2026-05-27 13:18:20 +00:00
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HOLD - SECURITY. Explicit security call: this is NOT a safe restoration; moving IsSameOriginCanvas to the TOP of validateCallerToken opens a NEW auth widening. Not approving.

Why it is a real change, not a no-op restore:

  • Pre-fix (main): IsSameOriginCanvas only short-circuits INSIDE the !hasLive (tokenless caller) branch. When the caller workspace HAS a live token (hasLive==true), the code REQUIRES a valid bearer matching callerID, else 401. Same-origin canvas does NOT bypass that.
  • Post-fix: the check returns isCanvasUser=true unconditionally, including when hasLive==true. So a same-origin request that names a token-holding workspace in X-Workspace-ID now (a) skips the previously-mandatory bearer for that caller, and (b) gets isCanvasUser=true, which in proxyA2ARequest BYPASSES registry.CanCommunicate(callerID,target) - i.e. it can reach ANY target workspace.

Why it matters / spoofability:

  • isSameOriginCanvas is documented IN THIS REPO as NOT an auth boundary: wsauth_middleware.go L156-158 says canvasOriginAllowed/isSameOriginCanvas are intentionally NOT used in the strict path because Origin/Referer are 'trivially forgeable by any container'; L286-292 says non-cosmetic routes MUST NOT gate on it (re-opens #164 CRITICAL). A2A dispatch + CanCommunicate bypass is decidedly non-cosmetic. Any non-browser client that can reach /a2a on the tenant origin and set Referer: https:/// passes the check.
  • It only fires when CANVAS_PROXY_URL is set (combined per-tenant image), which narrows the blast radius to that topology - but within it, the bearer path that protected hasLive==true callers is now skipped, and the #761 guard only blocks system-caller prefixes, not arbitrary workspace IDs.

Net: the fix legitimately addresses #1673 (canvas-user with live tokens silently 401s), but the chosen mechanism removes a real bearer check on the hasLive==true path AND grants CanCommunicate bypass behind a forgeable signal. Need a tighter gate before this can land. Options to discuss: (a) keep the top-level bypass ONLY when callerID==workspaceID or callerID is the canvas-user identity that owns the same-origin session (not an arbitrary X-Workspace-ID); (b) require the same-origin AND a session/CSRF token the canvas actually sends (not just Referer/Origin); (c) keep IsSameOriginCanvas inside !hasLive and instead fix #1673 by classifying canvas-user identity workspaces so they are not treated as hasLive peers. Until then: HOLD.

HOLD - SECURITY. Explicit security call: this is NOT a safe restoration; moving IsSameOriginCanvas to the TOP of validateCallerToken opens a NEW auth widening. Not approving. Why it is a real change, not a no-op restore: - Pre-fix (main): IsSameOriginCanvas only short-circuits INSIDE the `!hasLive` (tokenless caller) branch. When the caller workspace HAS a live token (hasLive==true), the code REQUIRES a valid bearer matching callerID, else 401. Same-origin canvas does NOT bypass that. - Post-fix: the check returns isCanvasUser=true unconditionally, including when hasLive==true. So a same-origin request that names a token-holding workspace in X-Workspace-ID now (a) skips the previously-mandatory bearer for that caller, and (b) gets isCanvasUser=true, which in proxyA2ARequest BYPASSES registry.CanCommunicate(callerID,target) - i.e. it can reach ANY target workspace. Why it matters / spoofability: - isSameOriginCanvas is documented IN THIS REPO as NOT an auth boundary: wsauth_middleware.go L156-158 says canvasOriginAllowed/isSameOriginCanvas are intentionally NOT used in the strict path because Origin/Referer are 'trivially forgeable by any container'; L286-292 says non-cosmetic routes MUST NOT gate on it (re-opens #164 CRITICAL). A2A dispatch + CanCommunicate bypass is decidedly non-cosmetic. Any non-browser client that can reach /a2a on the tenant origin and set Referer: https://<host>/ passes the check. - It only fires when CANVAS_PROXY_URL is set (combined per-tenant image), which narrows the blast radius to that topology - but within it, the bearer path that protected hasLive==true callers is now skipped, and the #761 guard only blocks system-caller prefixes, not arbitrary workspace IDs. Net: the fix legitimately addresses #1673 (canvas-user with live tokens silently 401s), but the chosen mechanism removes a real bearer check on the hasLive==true path AND grants CanCommunicate bypass behind a forgeable signal. Need a tighter gate before this can land. Options to discuss: (a) keep the top-level bypass ONLY when callerID==workspaceID or callerID is the canvas-user identity that owns the same-origin session (not an arbitrary X-Workspace-ID); (b) require the same-origin AND a session/CSRF token the canvas actually sends (not just Referer/Origin); (c) keep IsSameOriginCanvas inside !hasLive and instead fix #1673 by classifying canvas-user identity workspaces so they are not treated as hasLive peers. Until then: HOLD.
agent-pm added 1 commit 2026-05-27 13:43:22 +00:00
fix(a2a): classify canvas-user by delivery_mode, not forgeable Origin (#1944)
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f390d1026d 
Reverts the top-level IsSameOriginCanvas bypass in validateCallerToken
that allowed any push-mode peer to skip bearer-token checks with a
forged Origin/Referer header (SECURITY HOLD).

Option (c) per PM recommendation: root-fix canvas-user identity
classification.

- lookupDeliveryMode is now called BEFORE HasAnyLiveToken.
- Poll-mode workspaces are canvas-user identities; they bypass the
  hasLive+bearer gate (canvas never sends bearer tokens).
- Push-mode workspaces always go through the standard bearer-token
  validation, regardless of Origin/Referer.

Fixes #1673 without opening the bypass vulnerability.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
agent-pm added 1 commit 2026-05-27 13:58:44 +00:00
test(a2a_proxy): update poll-mode canvas-user test for delivery_mode classification
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7c0f1bc128 
TestProxyA2A_PollMode_CanvasUserWithLiveToken now mocks the caller's
delivery_mode lookup (validateCallerToken queries it before HasAnyLiveToken
per the option-c security fix). Without this mock, lookupDeliveryMode fails
open to push, the caller falls into the hasLive branch, and the test gets
403 instead of 200 queued.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
agent-pm closed this pull request 2026-05-27 14:03:20 +00:00
hongming commented 2026-05-27 14:20:14 +00:00
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Superseded by #1948 (merged), which fixes #1673 safely — classifies canvas users by a CP-verified session / admin / live-org-token (non-forgeable) instead of the forgeable same-origin signal, keeping registry.CanCommunicate enforced. Closing.

Superseded by #1948 (merged), which fixes #1673 safely — classifies canvas users by a CP-verified session / admin / live-org-token (non-forgeable) instead of the forgeable same-origin signal, keeping registry.CanCommunicate enforced. Closing.
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Reference: molecule-ai/molecule-core#1944
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