* docs: add CLAUDE.md for agent onboarding Inherits platform conventions from molecule-core: - Cron discipline and triage rules - Build/test/release commands (pytest, PyPI tag workflow) - Platform integration notes (Phase 30 endpoints table) - SDK-specific conventions (async patterns, token security, tar safety) - Known issues policy (file GH issue before patching silently) Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: add known-issues.md and .claude/settings.json - known-issues.md: 5 entries (KI-001 inbound A2A server, KI-002 delegation idempotency, KI-003 symlink silent skip, KI-004 token file races, KI-005 plugin manifest secret scanning) - .claude/settings.json: permissions for pip/npm/go tools, PreToolUse Bash hook, cleanupPeriodDays 30 Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Molecule AI SDK-Dev <sdk-dev@agents.moleculesai.app> Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
156 lines
5.7 KiB
Markdown
156 lines
5.7 KiB
Markdown
# Known Issues — molecule-sdk-python
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Issues identified in source but not yet filed as GitHub issues (GH_TOKEN
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unavailable in automated agent contexts). Each entry has: location,
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symptom, impact, suggested fix.
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Format per entry:
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```
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## KI-N — Short title
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**File:** `<path>:<line>`
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**Status:** TODO comment / identified / partially fixed
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**Severity:** Critical / High / Medium / Low
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**Platform phase:** (optional — which Phase 30 sub-phase is affected)
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### Symptom
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...
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### Impact
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...
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### Suggested fix
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...
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---
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```
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---
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## KI-001 — RemoteAgentClient does not implement inbound A2A server
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**File:** `molecule_agent/client.py`
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**Status:** Known limitation; not yet implemented
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**Severity:** Medium
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**Platform phase:** Phase 30.8b
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### Symptom
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`RemoteAgentClient` can call other workspaces via A2A (outbound), but cannot
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receive inbound A2A calls. Any workspace that tries to delegate to or message
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this agent will get a connection refused or timeout.
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### Impact
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Agents running outside the platform's Docker network via `molecule_agent` are
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one-directional. Platform agents cannot push work to them — the remote agent
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must poll or be provisioned with a publicly reachable webhook endpoint.
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### Suggested fix
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Add an `A2AServerMixin` class that exposes a `FastAPI` or `flask` route
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(`POST /a2a/inbound`) and runs in a background thread alongside the client's
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heartbeat loop. Register the inbound URL with the platform via the
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`/registry/discover` update endpoint when the server starts. See Phase 30.8b
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in the platform `PLAN.md`.
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---
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## KI-002 — Delegation has no server-side idempotency key enforcement
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**File:** `molecule_agent/client.py` (client-side SHA256 key)
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**Status:** Partially mitigated client-side (SHA256 rounded-to-minute)
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**Severity:** Medium
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**Platform phase:** Phase 30.6
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### Symptom
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The client generates an idempotency key as `SHA256(task + current_minute)`, but
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the platform's `POST /workspaces/:id/delegate` endpoint does not enforce
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idempotency server-side. Two identical tasks sent within the same calendar
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minute produce duplicate processing if the platform accepts both.
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### Impact
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A workspace container restart mid-delegation (e.g. liveness probe restart) that
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fires the same delegation request twice will result in duplicate side-effects
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(double commits, double API calls, double messages) if the platform has not yet
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stored the first delegation's result.
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### Suggested fix
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Platform-side: accept an optional `idempotency_key` field in
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`POST /workspaces/:id/delegate`, check for existing non-failed delegation with
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the same `(workspace_id, idempotency_key)`, return HTTP 200 with existing ID
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instead of creating a new row. Client-side key generation is correct; it is
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the server that needs to honor it.
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---
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## KI-003 — `_safe_extract_tar` silently skips all symlinks
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**File:** `molecule_agent/client.py:_safe_extract_tar`
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**Status:** By design (security posture)
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**Severity:** Low (misleading behavior)
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### Symptom
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When extracting plugin tarballs, `_safe_extract_tar` silently skips any entry
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that is a symlink. This means plugin tarballs that legitimately use symlinks
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for shared assets (e.g., `assets/logo.png -> ../shared/logo.png`) will be
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silently omitted from the extracted plugin directory with no error or warning.
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### Impact
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Some valid plugins may appear to install successfully but be missing files at
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runtime. This can manifest as confusing "file not found" errors that are hard to
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trace to the install step.
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### Suggested fix
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Emit a `logger.warning()` for each skipped symlink so operators can see what
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was dropped. Alternatively, allow safe relative symlinks (those resolving
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within the extraction root) while blocking absolute symlinks and `..`-escaping
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symlinks. Document the behavior in the plugin authoring guide.
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---
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## KI-004 — Token file races between concurrent instances of RemoteAgentClient
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**File:** `molecule_agent/client.py` (token caching)
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**Status:** Identified
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**Severity:** Low
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### Symptom
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Multiple `RemoteAgentClient` instances sharing the same `workspace_id` write to
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the same token cache file (`~/.molecule/<workspace_id>/.auth_token`). If two
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instances start simultaneously, the file read/write is not atomic — one
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instance may read a partially-written token or overwrite a valid token with an
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older one.
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### Impact
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On a cold start with multiple workers for the same workspace, some workers may
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fail to register because their token is stale. The platform refuses to issue a
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second token when one exists on disk.
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### Suggested fix
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Use a file-based lock (e.g. `fcntl.flock` or `portalocker`) around token read
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and write operations. Alternatively, use per-process token storage (in-memory)
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and only write to disk as a recovery fallback.
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---
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## KI-005 — `validate_plugin` does not check for secrets in bundle manifests
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**File:** `molecule_plugin/manifest.py:validate_manifest`
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**Status:** Not yet implemented
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**Severity:** High
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### Symptom
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`validate_manifest` does not scan the `env:` or `secrets:` fields of a
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`plugin.yaml` for hardcoded credentials (API keys, passwords, tokens). Plugin
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authors could accidentally commit secrets into what should be a generic bundle.
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### Impact
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Secrets committed to a plugin manifest are visible in the repo and any tarball
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published to PyPI or the plugin registry. Per platform constraints
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(`constraints-and-rules.md`), bundles must never contain secrets.
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### Suggested fix
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Add a `validate_no_secrets()` check in `validate_manifest` that scans all
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string values in the manifest for patterns matching common secret formats
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(`sk-`, `ghp_`, ` Bearer `, 32+ char hex strings, etc.). Return a
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`ValidationError` with level `HIGH` if any are found, even in example or
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placeholder values. Add a corresponding test with a manifest containing a
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known secret pattern.
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