Three changes to stop ferrying sensitive content through our public monorepo. All content already imported to Molecule-AI/internal (private) — see linked PRs below. Contained full security audit cycle records with CWE references, file:line pointers to historical vulnerabilities, and severity ratings. None of that belongs in a public repo. → Moved to Molecule-AI/internal/security/incident-log.md (PR #20). Monorepo file becomes a 17-line stub pointing at the internal location. Future incidents land in the internal file only. Had AWS account ID `004947743811` and IAM role name `MoleculeStagingProvisioner` embedded. Even though the fleet described isn't actually running (see state note), these identifiers are account-specific and don't belong in public git. → Removed both values, replaced with generic references + a pointer to Molecule-AI/internal/runbooks/canary-fleet.md (PR #21) where the actual identifiers live. Any future rotation touches the internal file, no public-git-history rewrite needed. Contained the full ops runbook: bootstrap script output, per-tenant SG backfill loop with live SG IDs, customer slug names (hongmingwang). Useful content but too specific for a public repo. → Moved to Molecule-AI/internal/runbooks/workspace-terminal.md (PR #22). Monorepo file becomes a 30-line public summary of what the feature does + pointers to code, so external readers / self-hosters still get the design story. Marketing briefs, SEO plans, campaign copy, research dossiers, and internal product designs (hermes-adapter-plan, medo-integration, cognee-*) are the next batches. See docs policy doc coming next to set team expectations. Net removal: ~820 lines from public git going forward. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Canary release pipeline
How a workspace-server code change reaches the prod tenant fleet — and how to stop it if something's wrong.
⚠️ State note (2026-04-22): this doc describes the intended design. As of this write, the canary fleet described below is not actually running — no canary tenants are provisioned,
CANARY_TENANT_URLS/CANARY_ADMIN_TOKENS/CANARY_CP_SHARED_SECRETare empty in repo secrets, andcanary-verify.ymlfails every run.Current merges gate on manual
promote-latest.ymldispatches, not canary. See molecule-controlplane/docs/canary-tenants.md for the Phase 1 code work that's already shipped + the Phase 2 plan for actually standing up the fleet + a "should we even do this now?" decision framework.Account-specific identifiers (AWS account ID, IAM role name) referenced below in the original design have been redacted from this public doc. The actual values — if they exist — are in
Molecule-AI/internal/runbooks/canary-fleet.md. If you're implementing Phase 2, start there.When Phase 2 lands, delete this note and reconcile the two docs.
The loop
PR merged to staging → main
│
▼
publish-workspace-server-image.yml ← pushes :staging-<sha> ONLY
│ (NOT :latest — prod is untouched)
▼
Canary tenants auto-update to :staging-<sha>
│ (5-min auto-updater cycle on each canary EC2)
▼
canary-verify.yml waits 6 min, runs scripts/canary-smoke.sh
│
├─► GREEN → crane tag :staging-<sha> → :latest
│ │
│ ▼
│ Prod tenants auto-update within 5 min
│
└─► RED → :latest stays on prior good digest
GitHub Step Summary flags the rejected sha
Ops fixes forward OR rolls back manually
Canary fleet
Lives in a separate AWS account via an assumed role. The CP's is_canary org flag routes provisioning there; every other org goes to the default account. Specific account ID and role name are tracked in the internal runbook (Molecule-AI/internal/runbooks/canary-fleet.md) rather than here, so rotating them doesn't require rewriting public git history.
Canary tenants are configured to pull :staging-<sha> (not :latest) via TENANT_IMAGE on their provisioner, so they ingest each new build before prod does.
Smoke suite
scripts/canary-smoke.sh hits each canary tenant (URL + ADMIN_TOKEN pair) and asserts:
/admin/livenessreturns a subsystems map (tenant booted, AdminAuth reachable)/workspacesreturns a JSON array (wsAuth + DB healthy)/memories/commit+/memories/searchround-trip (encryption + scrubber)/eventsadmin read (C4 fail-closed proof)/admin/livenesswithout bearer → 401 (C4 regression gate)
Expand by editing the script — each check "name" "expected" "$response" call is one line.
Adding a canary tenant
POST /cp/orgs— create the org normally (is_canary defaults to false)POST /cp/admin/orgs/<slug>/canarywith{"is_canary": true}— admin only, refuses to flip if already provisioned- Re-trigger provision (or delete + recreate if the org was already provisioned into staging) — the fresh EC2 lands in the canary AWS account (see internal runbook for the specific ID)
Then set repo secrets:
CANARY_TENANT_URLS— append the new tenant's URLCANARY_ADMIN_TOKENS— append its ADMIN_TOKEN in the same position
Rolling back :latest
When canary was green but something surfaces post-promotion, retag :latest to a prior digest:
export GITHUB_TOKEN=ghp_... # write:packages
scripts/rollback-latest.sh 4c1d56e # retags both platform + tenant images
scripts/rollback-latest.sh pre-checks that :staging-<sha> exists before moving :latest, and verifies the digest after the move. Prod tenants pick up the rolled-back image on their next 5-min auto-update.
A post-mortem should always include:
- the commit sha that broke
- why canary didn't catch it (new code path the smoke suite doesn't exercise?)
- whether the smoke suite should grow a new check to prevent the same class of bug
What this gate doesn't catch
- Bugs that only surface under prod-only data (customer workloads with scale or shape canary doesn't produce). Canary uses real traffic shapes but can't simulate weeks of accumulated state.
- Config drift between canary and prod (different env-var values, different feature flags). Keep canary's config deltas minimal and documented.
- Cross-tenant interactions — canary tenants run in their own AWS account, so a bug that only appears when two tenants compete for a shared resource won't reproduce here.
When these miss, rollback-latest.sh is the escape hatch.