Two vulnerable call sites confirmed on origin/main:
1. org_helpers.go:loadWorkspaceEnv (line 101): filesDir from untrusted org YAML
joined directly with orgBaseDir without traversal guard. A malicious filesDir
like "../../../etc" escapes the org root and reads arbitrary files.
2. org_import.go:createWorkspaceTree (line 494): same pattern directly in the
env-loading block — not covered by staging-targeted PR #345.
Fix (both locations): call resolveInsideRoot(orgBaseDir, filesDir) before
filepath.Join. On traversal detection, org_helpers.go returns an empty map
(caller contract); org_import.go silently skips the workspace .env override
(matches existing template-resolution pattern in the same function).
Tests: org_helpers_test.go — 3 cases covering traversal rejection,
workspace-override happy path, and empty filesDir edge case.
Closes: molecule-core#362, molecule-core#321
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
