feat(approval-gate): wire gateDestructive into live destructive handlers (Phase 4b) #2382

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devops-engineer merged 1 commits from feat/platform-agent-gate-wiring into main 2026-06-06 23:25:29 +00:00
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Phase 4b — activates the merged 4a approval-gate infra (#2372).

Scope (the design decision, made explicit)

The gate must NOT blanket every caller — that would force every workspace delete/secret-write platform-wide through async approval. Scope is centralized in gateDestructive:

  • default-OFF rollout flag MOLECULE_PLATFORM_APPROVAL_GATE (mirrors 3a/3c; inert until the platform agent ships, protecting existing org-token automation).
  • org-token callers only: the platform agent runs with an org-admin token (auth middleware sets org_token_id); ordinary workspace-token agents + human CP sessions (cp_session_actor — the approvers) are NOT gated. Realises the file-header trust boundary ("anything holding an org-admin token still goes through the gate") without gating everyone.

Wired

  • WorkspaceHandler.Deletedelete_workspace
  • SecretsHandler.Setsecret_write (context includes the key, so an approval for one secret cant authorise another)

requireApproval/gateDestructive now take the events.EventEmitter interface and tolerate a nil emitter (SecretsHandler has no broadcaster) — the pending row is still persisted, only the live canvas push is skipped.

Tests

3 new unit tests (default-off, org-token detection, scope short-circuits) + existing approval/secret/delete suites green; golangci-lint clean. Full flag-on→202 path covered by the real-PG approval_gate_integration_test.go.

Deferred (documented)

org_token_mint (OrgTokenHandler is org-scoped — no workspace_id to key the approval; needs the org→platform-agent-workspace mapping) and deprovision_workspace (no workspace-server handler — CP-side).

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

Phase 4b — activates the merged 4a approval-gate infra (#2372). ## Scope (the design decision, made explicit) The gate must NOT blanket every caller — that would force every workspace delete/secret-write platform-wide through async approval. Scope is centralized in `gateDestructive`: - **default-OFF** rollout flag `MOLECULE_PLATFORM_APPROVAL_GATE` (mirrors 3a/3c; inert until the platform agent ships, protecting existing org-token automation). - **org-token callers only**: the platform agent runs with an org-admin token (auth middleware sets `org_token_id`); ordinary workspace-token agents + human CP sessions (`cp_session_actor` — the approvers) are NOT gated. Realises the file-header trust boundary ("anything holding an org-admin token still goes through the gate") without gating everyone. ## Wired - `WorkspaceHandler.Delete` → `delete_workspace` - `SecretsHandler.Set` → `secret_write` (context includes the key, so an approval for one secret cant authorise another) `requireApproval`/`gateDestructive` now take the `events.EventEmitter` interface and tolerate a **nil** emitter (SecretsHandler has no broadcaster) — the pending row is still persisted, only the live canvas push is skipped. ## Tests 3 new unit tests (default-off, org-token detection, scope short-circuits) + existing approval/secret/delete suites green; golangci-lint clean. Full flag-on→202 path covered by the real-PG approval_gate_integration_test.go. ## Deferred (documented) `org_token_mint` (OrgTokenHandler is org-scoped — no workspace_id to key the approval; needs the org→platform-agent-workspace mapping) and `deprovision_workspace` (no workspace-server handler — CP-side). 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
devops-engineer added 1 commit 2026-06-06 23:18:26 +00:00
feat(approval-gate): wire gateDestructive into live destructive handlers (Phase 4b)
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acb9d81169
Activates the merged 4a approval-gate infra. Scope is centralized in
gateDestructive so each handler is a one-liner, and the policy is uniform +
testable:
  - default-OFF rollout flag MOLECULE_PLATFORM_APPROVAL_GATE (mirrors 3a/3c
    default-off; protects existing org-token automation until the platform
    agent ships);
  - ONLY org-token callers are gated. The platform agent runs with
    MOLECULE_API_KEY=<org-admin token> (auth middleware sets org_token_id);
    ordinary workspace-token agents and human CP-session operators are NOT
    gated, so normal operation is byte-identical. Realises the file-header
    trust boundary without gating everyone.

Wired: WorkspaceHandler.Delete (delete_workspace) + SecretsHandler.Set
(secret_write). requireApproval/gateDestructive now take the events.EventEmitter
interface and tolerate a nil emitter (SecretsHandler is broadcaster-less) — the
pending approval row is still persisted, only the live canvas push is skipped.

3 new unit tests (flag default-off, org-token detection, scope short-circuits)
+ existing approval/secret/delete suites green; golangci-lint clean.

Deferred (documented follow-on): org_token_mint (OrgTokenHandler is org-scoped,
no workspace_id to key the approval) + deprovision_workspace (no workspace-server
handler — lives CP-side).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
molecule-code-reviewer approved these changes 2026-06-06 23:25:09 +00:00
molecule-code-reviewer left a comment
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Independent review confirmed: scope is centralized + default-off (MOLECULE_PLATFORM_APPROVAL_GATE) + org-token-only (org_token_id), so ordinary workspace/CP callers are byte-identical; nil EventEmitter handled (pending row still persisted); context-sensitive request_hash (key/name); 3 unit tests + existing suites green. Approving.

Independent review confirmed: scope is centralized + default-off (MOLECULE_PLATFORM_APPROVAL_GATE) + org-token-only (org_token_id), so ordinary workspace/CP callers are byte-identical; nil EventEmitter handled (pending row still persisted); context-sensitive request_hash (key/name); 3 unit tests + existing suites green. Approving.
core-security approved these changes 2026-06-06 23:25:19 +00:00
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Security review: gate is fail-safe default-off, scoped to org-admin-token callers per the trust boundary; secret-write approval keyed by secret key (no cross-secret authorization); no regression to normal ops. Approving.

Security review: gate is fail-safe default-off, scoped to org-admin-token callers per the trust boundary; secret-write approval keyed by secret key (no cross-secret authorization); no regression to normal ops. Approving.
devops-engineer merged commit 884ae06e9f into main 2026-06-06 23:25:29 +00:00
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Reference: molecule-ai/molecule-core#2382