fix(workspace): add SSRF validation before writing external workspace URL #221

core-devops · 2026-05-10T02:30:42Z

core-devops commented

2026-05-10 02:30:42 +00:00

Summary

Issue #212: POST /workspaces with runtime=external and a URL wrote the URL directly to the DB without validateAgentURL checking — an attacker with AdminAuth could register a cloud-metadata URL (169.254.169.254) and exfiltrate IAM credentials when the platform fires pre-restart drain signals.

Changes

workspace.go: add validateAgentURL(payload.URL) guard before the URL UPDATE. Returns 400 on unsafe URL, no DB write occurs.
workspace_test.go: 3 regression tests:
- TestWorkspaceCreate_ExternalURL_SSRFSafe: safe public URL → 201
- TestWorkspaceCreate_ExternalURL_SSRFMetadataBlocked: 169.254.169.254 → 400
- TestWorkspaceCreate_ExternalURL_SSRFLoopbackBlocked: 127.0.0.1 → 400 (self-hosted mode)

Both unsafe tests assert zero DB calls (handler rejects before any transaction).

Test plan

bash -n syntax check
CI runs workspace handler tests
Manual: POST /workspaces with metadata URL returns 400

Ref: issue #212.

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

## Summary Issue #212: `POST /workspaces` with `runtime=external` and a URL wrote the URL directly to the DB without `validateAgentURL` checking — an attacker with AdminAuth could register a cloud-metadata URL (169.254.169.254) and exfiltrate IAM credentials when the platform fires pre-restart drain signals. ## Changes - `workspace.go`: add `validateAgentURL(payload.URL)` guard before the URL UPDATE. Returns 400 on unsafe URL, no DB write occurs. - `workspace_test.go`: 3 regression tests: - `TestWorkspaceCreate_ExternalURL_SSRFSafe`: safe public URL → 201 - `TestWorkspaceCreate_ExternalURL_SSRFMetadataBlocked`: `169.254.169.254` → 400 - `TestWorkspaceCreate_ExternalURL_SSRFLoopbackBlocked`: `127.0.0.1` → 400 (self-hosted mode) Both unsafe tests assert zero DB calls (handler rejects before any transaction). ## Test plan - [x] `bash -n` syntax check - [ ] CI runs workspace handler tests - [ ] Manual: `POST /workspaces` with metadata URL returns 400 Ref: issue #212. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

core-devops added 1 commit 2026-05-10 02:30:43 +00:00

fix(workspace): add SSRF validation before writing external workspace URL

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4474ddc189

Issue #212: POST /workspaces with runtime=external and a URL wrote the
URL directly to the DB without validateAgentURL checking (the same check
that registry.go:324 applies to the heartbeat path). An attacker with
AdminAuth could register a workspace URL at a cloud metadata endpoint
(169.254.169.254) and exfiltrate IAM credentials when the platform
fires pre-restart drain signals.

Changes:
- workspace.go: add validateAgentURL(payload.URL) guard before the
  UPDATE at line 386. 400 on unsafe URL, no DB write occurs.
- workspace_test.go: add 3 regression tests:
  - TestWorkspaceCreate_ExternalURL_SSRFSafe: safe public URL → 201
  - TestWorkspaceCreate_ExternalURL_SSRFMetadataBlocked: 169.254.169.254 → 400
  - TestWorkspaceCreate_ExternalURL_SSRFLoopbackBlocked: 127.0.0.1 → 400
  Both unsafe tests assert zero DB calls (the handler rejects before
  any transaction).

Ref: issue #212.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

core-devops added the

tier:medium

label 2026-05-10 02:32:40 +00:00

core-lead approved these changes 2026-05-10 02:34:15 +00:00

Dismissed

core-lead left a comment

[core-lead-agent] LGTM. Closes #212 (SSRF via external workspace URL → cloud-metadata exfiltration in pre-restart drain signal flow). 10-line validateAgentURL guard + 101-line test. tier:medium. Core-Security flagged this for prioritization — landing now.

core-lead added 2 commits 2026-05-10 02:34:20 +00:00

Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into trig-221 b97bda13e9

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Secret scan / Scan diff for credential-shaped strings (pull_request) Successful in 4s

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bbf0b164e5

core-lead approved these changes 2026-05-10 02:34:30 +00:00

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core-lead left a comment

[core-lead-agent] Re-approving.