.gitea/scripts/review-refire-status.sh

@@ -13,20 +13,26 @@ set -euo pipefail
 OWNER="${REPO%%/*}"
 NAME="${REPO##*/}"
 API="https://${GITEA_HOST}/api/v1"
-CONTEXT="${TEAM}-review / approved (pull_request)"
+# Branch-protection requires the (pull_request_target) context variant.
+# The refire path must post the EXACT BP-required name so the gate flips.
+CONTEXT="${TEAM}-review / approved (pull_request_target)"
 TARGET_URL="https://${GITEA_HOST}/${OWNER}/${NAME}/pulls/${PR_NUMBER}"
 
 authfile=$(mktemp)
+post_authfile=$(mktemp)
 prfile=$(mktemp)
 postfile=$(mktemp)
 # shellcheck disable=SC2329 # invoked by EXIT trap
 cleanup() {
-  rm -f "$authfile" "$prfile" "$postfile"
+  rm -f "$authfile" "$post_authfile" "$prfile" "$postfile"
 }
 trap cleanup EXIT
 
-chmod 600 "$authfile"
+chmod 600 "$authfile" "$post_authfile"
 printf 'header = "Authorization: token %s"\n' "$GITEA_TOKEN" > "$authfile"
+# STATUS_POST_TOKEN is narrow-scoped write:repository for explicit status POST.
+# Falls back to GITEA_TOKEN for backward compatibility (e.g. local test).
+printf 'header = "Authorization: token %s"\n' "${STATUS_POST_TOKEN:-$GITEA_TOKEN}" > "$post_authfile"
 
 code=$(curl -sS -o "$prfile" -w '%{http_code}' -K "$authfile" \
   "${API}/repos/${OWNER}/${NAME}/pulls/${PR_NUMBER}")
@@ -68,7 +74,7 @@ body=$(jq -nc \
   '{state:$state, context:$context, description:$description, target_url:$target_url}')
 
 code=$(curl -sS -o "$postfile" -w '%{http_code}' -X POST \
-  -K "$authfile" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
+  -K "$post_authfile" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
   -d "$body" \
   "${API}/repos/${OWNER}/${NAME}/statuses/${head_sha}")
 if [ "$code" != "200" ] && [ "$code" != "201" ]; then

.gitea/scripts/tests/test_gate_review_auto_fire.py

@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+"""Regression test #765 — gate auto-fire on real qa/security APPROVED review.
+
+Validates the structural configuration of qa-review.yml and security-review.yml
+so that a real team-member APPROVED review fires the workflow and POSTs the
+exact branch-protection-required context name. This is the test #2020's
+stale-context failure would have caught.
+"""
+
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import yaml
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
+
+
+def load_workflow(name: str) -> dict:
+    with (ROOT / "workflows" / name).open() as f:
+        return yaml.safe_load(f)
+
+
+def _job_guard_string(workflow: dict) -> str:
+    """Return the raw job-level `if:` string for the single job."""
+    jobs = workflow["jobs"]
+    # Both qa-review and security-review have exactly one job named "approved".
+    job = jobs["approved"]
+    return str(job.get("if", ""))
+
+
+def _post_step(workflow: dict) -> dict:
+    """Return the explicit POST /statuses step from the job steps list."""
+    jobs = workflow["jobs"]
+    steps = jobs["approved"]["steps"]
+    for step in steps:
+        name = step.get("name", "")
+        if "Post required status context" in name:
+            return step
+    raise AssertionError("No explicit POST status step found")
+
+
+class TestQaReviewDirectTrigger:
+    def test_trigger_is_pull_request_review_submitted(self):
+        wf = load_workflow("qa-review.yml")
+        # PyYAML parses bare 'on' as boolean True.
+        on = wf[True]
+        assert "pull_request_review" in on, (
+            "qa-review must trigger on pull_request_review"
+        )
+        types = on["pull_request_review"].get("types", [])
+        assert "submitted" in types, (
+            "pull_request_review must include 'submitted' type"
+        )
+
+    def test_job_guard_requires_approved_state(self):
+        wf = load_workflow("qa-review.yml")
+        guard = _job_guard_string(wf)
+        assert "github.event.review.state == 'APPROVED'" in guard, (
+            "job guard must check review.state for 'APPROVED'"
+        )
+        assert "github.event.review.state == 'approved'" in guard, (
+            "job guard must check review.state for 'approved' (case fallback per #2135)"
+        )
+
+    def test_post_step_uses_status_post_token(self):
+        wf = load_workflow("qa-review.yml")
+        post = _post_step(wf)
+        env = post.get("env", {})
+        assert env.get("GITEA_TOKEN") == "${{ secrets.STATUS_POST_TOKEN }}", (
+            "POST step must use STATUS_POST_TOKEN for write-scoped status POST"
+        )
+
+    def test_post_step_context_name_exact(self):
+        """The context POSTed must byte-match the branch-protection requirement."""
+        wf = load_workflow("qa-review.yml")
+        post = _post_step(wf)
+        run = post.get("run", "")
+        assert '"qa-review / approved (pull_request_target)"' in run, (
+            "POST step must emit exact BP-required context name"
+        )
+
+
+class TestSecurityReviewDirectTrigger:
+    def test_trigger_is_pull_request_review_submitted(self):
+        wf = load_workflow("security-review.yml")
+        # PyYAML parses bare 'on' as boolean True.
+        on = wf[True]
+        assert "pull_request_review" in on, (
+            "security-review must trigger on pull_request_review"
+        )
+        types = on["pull_request_review"].get("types", [])
+        assert "submitted" in types, (
+            "pull_request_review must include 'submitted' type"
+        )
+
+    def test_job_guard_requires_approved_state(self):
+        wf = load_workflow("security-review.yml")
+        guard = _job_guard_string(wf)
+        assert "github.event.review.state == 'APPROVED'" in guard, (
+            "job guard must check review.state for 'APPROVED'"
+        )
+        assert "github.event.review.state == 'approved'" in guard, (
+            "job guard must check review.state for 'approved' (case fallback per #2135)"
+        )
+
+    def test_post_step_uses_status_post_token(self):
+        wf = load_workflow("security-review.yml")
+        post = _post_step(wf)
+        env = post.get("env", {})
+        assert env.get("GITEA_TOKEN") == "${{ secrets.STATUS_POST_TOKEN }}", (
+            "POST step must use STATUS_POST_TOKEN for write-scoped status POST"
+        )
+
+    def test_post_step_context_name_exact(self):
+        """The context POSTed must byte-match the branch-protection requirement."""
+        wf = load_workflow("security-review.yml")
+        post = _post_step(wf)
+        run = post.get("run", "")
+        assert '"security-review / approved (pull_request_target)"' in run, (
+            "POST step must emit exact BP-required context name"
+        )
+
+
+class TestRefireScriptContextName:
+    """review-refire-status.sh must emit the BP-required (pull_request_target) context."""
+
+    def test_refire_script_context_is_pull_request_target(self):
+        script = ROOT / "scripts" / "review-refire-status.sh"
+        content = script.read_text()
+        assert 'CONTEXT="${TEAM}-review / approved (pull_request_target)"' in content, (
+            "refire script CONTEXT must be the exact BP-required (pull_request_target) variant"
+        )
+        assert 'approved (pull_request)"' not in content, (
+            "refire script must NOT post bare (pull_request) context"
+        )
+
+
+class TestRefireTokenSeparation:
+    """The /qa-recheck + /security-recheck backstop must also use STATUS_POST_TOKEN."""
+
+    def _refire_step(self, workflow_name: str, step_name_keyword: str) -> dict:
+        wf = load_workflow(workflow_name)
+        jobs = wf["jobs"]
+        steps = jobs["review-refire"]["steps"]
+        for step in steps:
+            name = step.get("name", "")
+            if step_name_keyword in name:
+                return step
+        raise AssertionError(f"No refire step matching {step_name_keyword!r}")
+
+    def test_qa_refire_uses_status_post_token(self):
+        step = self._refire_step("sop-checklist.yml", "Refire qa-review")
+        env = step.get("env", {})
+        assert env.get("STATUS_POST_TOKEN") == "${{ secrets.STATUS_POST_TOKEN }}", (
+            "qa refire must receive STATUS_POST_TOKEN env var"
+        )
+        # Evaluator stays on read token
+        assert "SOP_TIER_CHECK_TOKEN" in env.get("GITEA_TOKEN", "") or "GITHUB_TOKEN" in env.get("GITEA_TOKEN", ""), (
+            "qa refire evaluator must stay on read-scoped token"
+        )
+
+    def test_security_refire_uses_status_post_token(self):
+        step = self._refire_step("sop-checklist.yml", "Refire security-review")
+        env = step.get("env", {})
+        assert env.get("STATUS_POST_TOKEN") == "${{ secrets.STATUS_POST_TOKEN }}", (
+            "security refire must receive STATUS_POST_TOKEN env var"
+        )
+        assert "SOP_TIER_CHECK_TOKEN" in env.get("GITEA_TOKEN", "") or "GITHUB_TOKEN" in env.get("GITEA_TOKEN", ""), (
+            "security refire evaluator must stay on read-scoped token"
+        )

.gitea/workflows/qa-review.yml

@@ -9,19 +9,19 @@
 #   Triggers on:
 #     - `pull_request_target`: opened, synchronize, reopened
 #         → initial status posts when PR opens / re-pushes
-#     - `pull_request_review_approved`
+#     - `pull_request_review` types: [submitted]
 #         → re-evaluate when a team member submits an APPROVE review so
 #           the gate flips immediately (no wait for the next push or
-#           slash-command). Gitea Actions uses the specific event name
-#           `pull_request_review_approved` (not the GitHub-style
-#           `pull_request_review` catch-all). Verified via Gitea source
-#           code audit (go-gitea/gitea main, modules/webhook/type.go +
-#           services/actions/notifier.go). The event payload carries
-#           `review.type="pull_request_review_approved"`; there is no
-#           `review.state` field. Branch-protection requires the
-#           `(pull_request_target)` context variant, so the
-#           pull_request_review_approved path EXPLICITLY POSTS the
-#           required context via the API. Trust boundary preserved
+#           slash-command). Verified live: sop-tier-check.yml uses this
+#           same event and provably fires (produces
+#           `sop-tier-check / tier-check (pull_request_review)` contexts).
+#           The job-level `if:` guard checks
+#           `github.event.review.state == 'APPROVED' || 'approved'` so
+#           only APPROVE reviews run the evaluator; COMMENT and
+#           REQUEST_CHANGES are skipped at the job level.
+#           Branch-protection requires the `(pull_request_target)`
+#           context variant, so the review-event path EXPLICITLY POSTS
+#           the required context via the API. Trust boundary preserved
 #           (BASE ref, no PR-head).
 #     - comment refires are handled by `sop-checklist.yml` review-refire job
 #         → `/qa-recheck` slash-command re-evaluates this gate.
@@ -97,7 +97,8 @@ name: qa-review
 on:
   pull_request_target:
     types: [opened, synchronize, reopened]
-  pull_request_review_approved:
+  pull_request_review:
+    types: [submitted]
 
 permissions:
   contents: read
@@ -114,7 +115,8 @@ jobs:
     # Comment-triggered refires live in sop-checklist.yml review-refire job.
     if: |
       github.event_name == 'pull_request_target' ||
-      github.event_name == 'pull_request_review_approved'
+      (github.event_name == 'pull_request_review' &&
+       (github.event.review.state == 'APPROVED' || github.event.review.state == 'approved'))
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
       - name: Privilege check (A1.1 — INFORMATIONAL log only, NOT a gate)
@@ -174,8 +176,8 @@ jobs:
           REVIEW_CHECK_STRICT: '0'
         run: bash .gitea/scripts/review-check.sh
 
-      - name: Post required status context on pull_request_review_approved
-        # Gitea Actions auto-publishes (pull_request_review_approved) context
+      - name: Post required status context on pull_request_review
+        # Gitea Actions auto-publishes (pull_request_review) context
         # for this event, but branch-protection requires (pull_request_target).
         # We explicitly POST the BP-required context so the gate flips.
         # Trust boundary: same BASE-ref script result, no PR-head code.
@@ -185,7 +187,7 @@ jobs:
         # for the explicit status POST. Evaluator step stays on
         # SOP_TIER_CHECK_TOKEN (read-only) per deliberate security
         # separation: eval computes, POST writes, never the same cred.
-        if: github.event_name == 'pull_request_review_approved' && always()
+        if: github.event_name == 'pull_request_review' && always()
         env:
           GITEA_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.STATUS_POST_TOKEN }}
           GITEA_HOST: git.moleculesai.app
@@ -211,10 +213,10 @@ jobs:
 
           if [ "$EVAL_OUTCOME" = "success" ]; then
             status_state="success"
-            description="Approved via pull_request_review_approved trigger"
+            description="Approved via pull_request_review trigger"
           else
             status_state="failure"
-            description="Review check failed via pull_request_review_approved trigger"
+            description="Review check failed via pull_request_review trigger"
           fi
 
           body=$(jq -nc \

.gitea/workflows/security-review.yml

@@ -7,24 +7,25 @@
 # See `qa-review.yml` header for the full A1-α / A1.1 / A4 / A5 design
 # rationale; everything below is identical in shape.
 #
-# A1-α addendum (internal#760): `pull_request_review_approved` trigger
-# added so the security gate flips immediately when a team member submits
-# an APPROVE review. Gitea Actions uses the specific event name
-# `pull_request_review_approved` (not the GitHub-style `pull_request_review`
-# catch-all). Verified via Gitea source code audit (go-gitea/gitea main,
-# modules/webhook/type.go + services/actions/notifier.go). The event
-# payload carries `review.type="pull_request_review_approved"`; there is
-# no `review.state` field. Branch-protection requires the
-# `(pull_request_target)` context variant, so the
-# pull_request_review_approved path EXPLICITLY POSTS the required context
-# via the API. Trust boundary preserved (BASE ref, no PR-head).
+# A1-α addendum (internal#760): review-event trigger added so the security
+# gate flips immediately when a team member submits an APPROVE review.
+# Uses `pull_request_review` types: [submitted] — verified live via
+# sop-tier-check.yml which provably fires this event (produces
+# `sop-tier-check / tier-check (pull_request_review)` contexts).
+# The job-level `if:` guard checks
+# `github.event.review.state == 'APPROVED' || 'approved'` so only APPROVE
+# reviews run the evaluator; COMMENT and REQUEST_CHANGES are skipped at
+# the job level. Branch-protection requires the `(pull_request_target)`
+# context variant, so the review-event path EXPLICITLY POSTS the required
+# context via the API. Trust boundary preserved (BASE ref, no PR-head).
 
 name: security-review
 
 on:
   pull_request_target:
     types: [opened, synchronize, reopened]
-  pull_request_review_approved:
+  pull_request_review:
+    types: [submitted]
 
 permissions:
   contents: read
@@ -41,7 +42,8 @@ jobs:
     # Comment-triggered refires live in sop-checklist.yml review-refire job.
     if: |
       github.event_name == 'pull_request_target' ||
-      github.event_name == 'pull_request_review_approved'
+      (github.event_name == 'pull_request_review' &&
+       (github.event.review.state == 'APPROVED' || github.event.review.state == 'approved'))
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
       - name: Privilege check (A1.1 — INFORMATIONAL log only, NOT a gate)
@@ -87,8 +89,8 @@ jobs:
           REVIEW_CHECK_STRICT: '0'
         run: bash .gitea/scripts/review-check.sh
 
-      - name: Post required status context on pull_request_review_approved
-        # Gitea Actions auto-publishes (pull_request_review_approved) context
+      - name: Post required status context on pull_request_review
+        # Gitea Actions auto-publishes (pull_request_review) context
         # for this event, but branch-protection requires (pull_request_target).
         # We explicitly POST the BP-required context so the gate flips.
         # Trust boundary: same BASE-ref script result, no PR-head code.
@@ -98,7 +100,7 @@ jobs:
         # for the explicit status POST. Evaluator step stays on
         # SOP_TIER_CHECK_TOKEN (read-only) per deliberate security
         # separation: eval computes, POST writes, never the same cred.
-        if: github.event_name == 'pull_request_review_approved' && always()
+        if: github.event_name == 'pull_request_review' && always()
         env:
           GITEA_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.STATUS_POST_TOKEN }}
           GITEA_HOST: git.moleculesai.app
@@ -124,10 +126,10 @@ jobs:
 
           if [ "$EVAL_OUTCOME" = "success" ]; then
             status_state="success"
-            description="Approved via pull_request_review_approved trigger"
+            description="Approved via pull_request_review trigger"
           else
             status_state="failure"
-            description="Review check failed via pull_request_review_approved trigger"
+            description="Review check failed via pull_request_review trigger"
           fi
 
           body=$(jq -nc \

.gitea/workflows/sop-checklist.yml

@@ -179,10 +179,10 @@ jobs:
       - name: Refire qa-review status
         if: steps.classify.outputs.run_qa == 'true'
         env:
-          # RFC_324_TEAM_READ_TOKEN is read-only (team membership read scope only).
-          # review-refire-status.sh POSTs to /statuses — requires write scope.
-          # SOP_TIER_CHECK_TOKEN carries write:repository + write:issue + read:organization.
+          # Evaluator (review-check.sh + GET /pulls) stays on read-scoped token.
           GITEA_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.SOP_TIER_CHECK_TOKEN || secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+          # Explicit POST /statuses uses narrow-scoped write:repository token.
+          STATUS_POST_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.STATUS_POST_TOKEN }}
           GITEA_HOST: git.moleculesai.app
           REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
           PR_NUMBER: ${{ github.event.issue.number }}
@@ -198,10 +198,10 @@ jobs:
       - name: Refire security-review status
         if: steps.classify.outputs.run_security == 'true'
         env:
-          # RFC_324_TEAM_READ_TOKEN is read-only (team membership read scope only).
-          # review-refire-status.sh POSTs to /statuses — requires write scope.
-          # SOP_TIER_CHECK_TOKEN carries write:repository + write:issue + read:organization.
+          # Evaluator (review-check.sh + GET /pulls) stays on read-scoped token.
           GITEA_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.SOP_TIER_CHECK_TOKEN || secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+          # Explicit POST /statuses uses narrow-scoped write:repository token.
+          STATUS_POST_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.STATUS_POST_TOKEN }}
           GITEA_HOST: git.moleculesai.app
           REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
           PR_NUMBER: ${{ github.event.issue.number }}