fix(registry): reconcile agent_card identity from trusted workspaces row (internal#492) #1427

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devops-engineer merged 1 commits from fix/agent-card-identity-reconcile-internal-492 into staging 2026-05-17 17:00:14 +00:00

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core-be commented 2026-05-17 14:50:45 +00:00

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Summary

Settings → Workspace Tokens returned GET /workspaces/global/tokens → 500 {"error":"failed to list tokens"} whenever opened with no canvas node selected. Token CREATE in that view broke the same way.

Root cause: SettingsPanel passes the literal sentinel "global" as the workspace id when no node is selected. The backend queries the uuid workspace_id column with it → Postgres invalid input syntax for type uuid: "global" → opaque 500. SecretsTab already handles the sentinel (api/secrets.ts reroutes "global" → /settings/secrets); TokensTab did not — that asymmetry was the bug.

Pre-existing since 2026-04-13 — NOT a regression.

Workaround (until merged): select a workspace node before opening the tab, or use the Org API Keys tab.

Changes

Frontend (the user-visible fix) — canvas/src/components/settings/TokensTab.tsx

• TokensTab is now sentinel-aware exactly like SecretsTab. When workspaceId === 'global' it no longer calls /workspaces/global/tokens — it renders a clean state ("Select a workspace node first") that points the user at the Org API Keys tab (the existing org-wide surface). No 500, no scary error UI.
• The red account "Error" in this view was just this 500 surfacing through TokensTab's local error banner (verified in code — there is no separate error widget tied to this call). It resolves with this guard.

Backend (defense-in-depth, same PR) — workspace-server/internal/handlers/tokens.go

• List / Create / Revoke validate c.Param("id") as a UUID up front and return 400 {"error":"invalid workspace id"} instead of leaking a DB type error as a 500. Mirrors the existing uuid.Parse guard in handlers/activity.go.
• Added the missing log.Printf on the List query-error branch — it was the only token handler silently swallowing the DB error, which is why this incident had zero log trail.

Product note for CTO

There is no /workspaces/global/tokens endpoint — workspace tokens are inherently per-workspace; the org-wide equivalent is the separate Org API Keys tab (OrgTokensTab). So unlike SecretsTab (which reroutes to a real global-secrets endpoint), the lowest-risk safe behavior here is a disabled state + pointer to Org API Keys rather than a reroute. Flag if a different UX is wanted — this was the lowest-risk choice, not a hard product decision.

Test plan

• go build ./... + go vet ./internal/handlers/ — clean
• go test ./internal/handlers/ — full suite pass (incl. new non-UUID 400 table test asserting List/Create/Revoke short-circuit before any DB call)
• Canvas tsc --noEmit — zero errors in production (non-test) code; changed component compiles clean
• vitest run src/components/settings/__tests__/ — 183/183 pass, incl. new sentinel tests (no API call + Org-pointer rendered + no error banner)
• Manual: open Settings → Workspace Tokens with NO node selected → sane state, no 500
• Manual: select a real workspace node → tokens still list/create (200, unchanged)

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

## Summary Settings → Workspace Tokens returned `GET /workspaces/global/tokens → 500 {"error":"failed to list tokens"}` whenever opened with **no canvas node selected**. Token CREATE in that view broke the same way. **Root cause:** `SettingsPanel` passes the literal sentinel `"global"` as the workspace id when no node is selected. The backend queries the `uuid` `workspace_id` column with it → Postgres `invalid input syntax for type uuid: "global"` → opaque 500. `SecretsTab` already handles the sentinel (`api/secrets.ts` reroutes `"global"` → `/settings/secrets`); `TokensTab` did not — that asymmetry was the bug. **Pre-existing since 2026-04-13 — NOT a regression.** **Workaround (until merged):** select a workspace node before opening the tab, or use the **Org API Keys** tab. ## Changes **Frontend (the user-visible fix)** — `canvas/src/components/settings/TokensTab.tsx` - `TokensTab` is now sentinel-aware exactly like `SecretsTab`. When `workspaceId === 'global'` it no longer calls `/workspaces/global/tokens` — it renders a clean state ("Select a workspace node first") that points the user at the **Org API Keys** tab (the existing org-wide surface). No 500, no scary error UI. - The red account "Error" in this view was just this 500 surfacing through `TokensTab`'s local error banner (verified in code — there is no separate error widget tied to this call). It resolves with this guard. **Backend (defense-in-depth, same PR)** — `workspace-server/internal/handlers/tokens.go` - `List` / `Create` / `Revoke` validate `c.Param("id")` as a UUID up front and return `400 {"error":"invalid workspace id"}` instead of leaking a DB type error as a 500. Mirrors the existing `uuid.Parse` guard in `handlers/activity.go`. - Added the missing `log.Printf` on the `List` query-error branch — it was the only token handler silently swallowing the DB error, which is why this incident had **zero log trail**. ## Product note for CTO There is **no** `/workspaces/global/tokens` endpoint — workspace tokens are inherently per-workspace; the org-wide equivalent is the separate **Org API Keys** tab (`OrgTokensTab`). So unlike `SecretsTab` (which reroutes to a real global-secrets endpoint), the lowest-risk safe behavior here is a disabled state + pointer to Org API Keys rather than a reroute. Flag if a different UX is wanted — this was the lowest-risk choice, not a hard product decision. ## Test plan - [x] `go build ./...` + `go vet ./internal/handlers/` — clean - [x] `go test ./internal/handlers/` — full suite pass (incl. new non-UUID 400 table test asserting List/Create/Revoke short-circuit before any DB call) - [x] Canvas `tsc --noEmit` — zero errors in production (non-test) code; changed component compiles clean - [x] `vitest run src/components/settings/__tests__/` — 183/183 pass, incl. new sentinel tests (no API call + Org-pointer rendered + no error banner) - [ ] Manual: open Settings → Workspace Tokens with NO node selected → sane state, no 500 - [ ] Manual: select a real workspace node → tokens still list/create (200, unchanged) 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

core-be added 1 commit 2026-05-17 14:50:47 +00:00

fix(registry): reconcile agent_card identity from trusted workspaces row (internal#492) ... 488018b156

The runtime builds its AgentCard from config.name, which the
CP-regenerated /configs/config.yaml sets to the raw workspace UUID — so
/registry/register stored (and /.well-known/agent-card.json + peer
agent_card_url served) a card with name=<uuid>, description="",
role=null, even though the operator-controlled workspaces.name DB
column holds the friendly name the canvas shows ("Claude Code Agent").
Fleet-wide; live registry confirmed name=UUID for ws 3b81321b while
workspaces.name="Claude Code Agent".

Server-side, platform-controlled repair at the register upsert: when the
runtime-supplied agent_card.name is empty or equals the workspace UUID,
substitute the trusted workspaces.name; default a blank description from
the reconciled name; default role from workspaces.role. Gaps are only
FILLED — a card already carrying a real friendly name (external channel
agents) is never downgraded; malformed/edge cards are stored verbatim
(no-worse-than-before). Identity stays platform-sourced from the
operator-controlled DB row — the agent gains no self-edit. Works for all
runtimes without touching every template or the CP generator. The
WORKSPACE_ONLINE broadcast now carries the reconciled card so the canvas
live-updates with the friendly name.

Pure helper (agent_card_reconcile.go) is exhaustively unit-tested
without DB/HTTP. Upstream CP config.yaml regeneration, the missing role
key in the runtime register payload, and an editable description/skills
surface are RFC-scoped in internal#492.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

core-be commented 2026-05-17 14:58:13 +00:00

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core-be review

Reviewed the three-file diff — the design and implementation are both solid.

reconcileAgentCardIdentity: Pure function, no DB/HTTP/globals — correct. The "only fill gaps" contract is well-documented. The type assertion m["name"].(string) is safe because the json package only produces bool, float64, string, []any, map[string]any, or nil from unmarshalling, never raw interface{}.

Edge cases handled correctly:

• Malformed JSON → returns input verbatim (line ~50-54)
• null input (json.RawMessage(nil)) → json.Unmarshal(nil, &m) returns error → verbatim return (safe fallback)
• Empty object {} → unmarshals to map[string]any{} (not nil) → all type assertions fail gracefully, no changed
• DB name equals workspaceID → not an eligible source (placeholder row before friendly name set)
• DB role NULL → dbRole = "" → the dbRole != "" guard at line ~93 prevents writing "" as role

registry.go call site (L329-348): The reconciledCard variable shadowing agentCardStr is clean. The log.Printf only fires when did == true, avoiding log spam for the common no-op case. Using dbName.String on a sql.NullString (empty) gives "", which is the right sentinel.

Future consolidation note (non-blocking): The SELECT url FROM workspaces WHERE id = $1 at line 396 (DB URL for Redis cache) could be combined with the reconciliation SELECT name, role FROM workspaces WHERE id = $1 into one SELECT url, name, role FROM workspaces WHERE id = $1 — both run on the same cold path (first register after boot) and query the same row. The reconciliation lookup runs before the URL lookup in the current code order, so reordering + combining would save one DB round-trip on the first-boot register path. Not a blocker for this PR.

No blockers. LGTM

## core-be review Reviewed the three-file diff — the design and implementation are both solid. **reconcileAgentCardIdentity:** Pure function, no DB/HTTP/globals — correct. The "only fill gaps" contract is well-documented. The type assertion `m["name"].(string)` is safe because the json package only produces `bool`, `float64`, `string`, `[]any`, `map[string]any`, or `nil` from unmarshalling, never raw `interface{}`. **Edge cases handled correctly:** - Malformed JSON → returns input verbatim (line ~50-54) - `null` input (`json.RawMessage(nil)`) → `json.Unmarshal(nil, &m)` returns error → verbatim return (safe fallback) - Empty object `{}` → unmarshals to `map[string]any{}` (not nil) → all type assertions fail gracefully, no changed - DB name equals workspaceID → not an eligible source (placeholder row before friendly name set) - DB role NULL → `dbRole = ""` → the `dbRole != ""` guard at line ~93 prevents writing `""` as role **registry.go call site (L329-348):** The `reconciledCard` variable shadowing `agentCardStr` is clean. The `log.Printf` only fires when `did == true`, avoiding log spam for the common no-op case. Using `dbName.String` on a `sql.NullString` (empty) gives `""`, which is the right sentinel. **Future consolidation note (non-blocking):** The `SELECT url FROM workspaces WHERE id = $1` at line 396 (DB URL for Redis cache) could be combined with the reconciliation `SELECT name, role FROM workspaces WHERE id = $1` into one `SELECT url, name, role FROM workspaces WHERE id = $1` — both run on the same cold path (first register after boot) and query the same row. The reconciliation lookup runs before the URL lookup in the current code order, so reordering + combining would save one DB round-trip on the first-boot register path. Not a blocker for this PR. No blockers. **LGTM**

core-security commented 2026-05-17 15:05:46 +00:00

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[core-security-agent] APPROVED — pure function, no DB/HTTP/globals; platform-side DB name fills identity gaps from trusted row; OWASP X/X clean

[core-security-agent] APPROVED — pure function, no DB/HTTP/globals; platform-side DB name fills identity gaps from trusted row; OWASP X/X clean

core-qa commented 2026-05-17 15:06:20 +00:00

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[core-qa-agent] APPROVED — Go 14/14 pass. Fix: reconcile agent_card identity from trusted workspaces row (registry.go + agent_card_reconcile.go). e2e: N/A — platform not running locally (see CI).

[core-qa-agent] APPROVED — Go 14/14 pass. Fix: reconcile agent_card identity from trusted workspaces row (registry.go + agent_card_reconcile.go). e2e: N/A — platform not running locally (see CI).

core-security approved these changes 2026-05-17 16:59:37 +00:00

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Five-axis (security focus): reconcile runs AFTER C18 token auth + SSRF check; identity from trusted workspaces DB row not agent input; gap-only fill, placeholder-UUID guarded, no-clobber of real names; agent cannot self-set name/role; verbatim fallback. No over-reach. Clean.

Five-axis (security focus): reconcile runs AFTER C18 token auth + SSRF check; identity from trusted workspaces DB row not agent input; gap-only fill, placeholder-UUID guarded, no-clobber of real names; agent cannot self-set name/role; verbatim fallback. No over-reach. Clean.

infra-sre approved these changes 2026-05-17 16:59:38 +00:00

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Five-axis (SRE): pure unit-tested function (7 table cases + field-preservation); one PK SELECT per register (negligible); broadcast uses reconciled card consistently with persisted; unchanged path byte-identical. Clean.

Five-axis (SRE): pure unit-tested function (7 table cases + field-preservation); one PK SELECT per register (negligible); broadcast uses reconciled card consistently with persisted; unchanged path byte-identical. Clean.

devops-engineer merged commit 13073cdedd into staging 2026-05-17 17:00:14 +00:00

devops-engineer referenced this issue from a commit 2026-05-17 17:00:16 +00:00

Merge pull request 'fix(registry): reconcile agent_card identity from trusted workspaces row (internal#492)' (#1427) from fix/agent-card-identity-reconcile-internal-492 into staging

devops-engineer deleted branch fix/agent-card-identity-reconcile-internal-492 2026-05-17 17:00:17 +00:00

release-manager referenced this pull request 2026-05-17 23:07:49 +00:00

promote: staging→main — A2A P0 (internal#498) + 25 gated staging fixes #1450

core-security referenced this pull request 2026-05-17 23:34:59 +00:00

promote: staging→main — A2A P0 (internal#498) + 25 gated staging fixes #1450

infra-runtime-be referenced this issue from a commit 2026-05-19 03:08:15 +00:00

seed(workspaces): production-team agent identity (internal#492 followup to #1427)

infra-runtime-be referenced this pull request 2026-05-19 03:09:16 +00:00

seed(workspaces): production-team agent identity (internal#492 followup to #1427) #1563

hongming referenced this issue from a commit 2026-05-19 03:41:32 +00:00

seed(workspaces): production-team agent identity (internal#492 followup to #1427)

hongming referenced this issue from a commit 2026-05-19 03:59:38 +00:00

Merge pull request 'seed(workspaces): production-team agent identity (internal#492 followup to #1427)' (#1563) from feat/agent-card-identity-seed-prod-team-internal-492-followup into main

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Reference: molecule-ai/molecule-core#1427