harden(org-external): token via http.extraHeader, .complete cache marker, ref '..' deny, naming cleanup #107

Merged

claude-ceo-assistant merged 1 commits from fix/external-resolver-hardening into staging 2026-05-08 13:04:00 +00:00

Conversation 0 Commits 1 Files Changed 3 +211 -48

1 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
claude-ceo-assistant	c72d0a5383	harden(org-external): token via http.extraHeader, .complete cache marker, ref '..' deny, naming cleanup ... Self-review of molecule-core PR #105 + #106 (the !external resolver chain) surfaced 3 real correctness/security gaps and 2 readability nits. Fixes all four in one PR since they're the same file's hardening. (1) TOKEN LEAKAGE — fixed Before: gitFetcher built clone URLs with auth in userinfo (https://oauth2:TOKEN@host/repo.git). Two leak paths: a. Token persisted in cloned repo's .git/config b. Token could appear in clone error output captured via cmd.CombinedOutput() After: clone URL has no userinfo (https://host/repo.git). Auth is layered on via -c http.extraHeader=Authorization: token ... which sends the header per-request without persisting. Plus a redactToken() pass over any error string before it surfaces in fmt.Errorf, as belt-and-braces. Tradeoff: token now visible in 'ps aux' for the duration of the git child process (same as before via env var), but no longer in any persistent state. (2) CACHE-VALIDITY FOOTGUN — fixed Before: cache-hit was 'cacheDir/.git exists'. A clone interrupted after .git was created but before content finished writing would leave a partially-written cache that subsequent imports treated as hit, returning stale/incomplete content forever (no self-heal). After: cache-hit also requires a .complete marker file written only AFTER successful clone+rename. Partially-written cache is treated as cache-miss and re-fetched cleanly (after RemoveAll on the partial dir to avoid blocking the new clone's mkdir). (3) REF '..' DENY — fixed Before: safeRefPattern '^[a-zA-Z0-9_./-]+$' allowed '..' as a substring. Git itself rejects most refs containing '..', but defense-in-depth says don't depend on the downstream tool's validation when sanitizing input at the boundary. After: explicit strings.Contains(ref.Ref, '..') check. (4) NAMING CLEANUP — fixed Before: rewriteFilesDirAndIncludes() — name claims to rewrite !include scalars but doesn't (we removed that during PR-A development; double-prefix bug). Misleading for readers. After: rewriteFilesDir(). Docstring updated to explicitly explain why !include paths are NOT rewritten (relative to subDir, naturally inside cache). Also: removed unused buildAuthedURL() (replaced by buildExternalCloneURL + authConfigArgs split), removed unused shortHash() helper (replaced by os.MkdirTemp), removed unused crypto/sha1 + encoding/hex + fmt imports, removed stray '_ = fmt.Sprint' line in integration test. NEW TESTS - TestGitFetcher_RejectsRefWithDoubleDot (defense-in-depth on ref input) - TestGitFetcher_CacheValidatedByCompleteMarker (partial cache → re-fetch) VERIFIED LOCALLY 2026-05-08 Full ./internal/handlers/ suite: ok (7.8s, 14 external-resolver tests + all existing tests). Two new tests cover the two new behaviors. Refs: internal#77 — extraction RFC molecule-core#105 (resolver), #106 (tests) — original implementation Hongming code-review-and-quality skill invocation 2026-05-08 + 'fix all'	2026-05-08 05:54:54 -07:00