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Author SHA1 Message Date
Molecule AI Dev Engineer B (MiniMax) d1d9da57e7 test(handlers): add ExpectationsWereMet check to makeTokenHandler cleanup (PR #1460)
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Per agent-reviewer REQUEST_CHANGES #7034: the new sqlmock expectations
were never verified with ExpectationsWereMet, so missing SELECT/INSERT
calls could pass silently. Adding the check to the makeTokenHandler
cleanup covers all 4 tests that use sqlmock via the shared helper
(TestGetTestToken_AdminTokenRequired_CorrectToken,
TestGetTestToken_WorkspaceNotFound, TestGetTestToken_IssueTokenDBError,
TestGetTestToken_ResponseContainsToken). The 3 tests that don't use
sqlmock (DisabledByDefault, AdminTokenRequired_WrongToken,
AdminTokenRequired_MissingBearer) get the helper but the check is a
no-op for them — they early-exit on status code without hitting the DB.

Closes PR #1460 review blocker.
2026-06-03 22:18:12 +00:00
fullstack-engineer fd94163e00 test(handlers): add sqlmock suite for AdminTestTokenHandler
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TestTokensEnabled():
  - true when MOLECULE_ENABLE_TEST_TOKENS=1 (overrides production lock)
  - false when MOLECULE_ENV=production
  - true when MOLECULE_ENV=staging (not "production")
  - true when MOLECULE_ENV="" (local dev default)

GetTestToken():
  - 404 when disabled (MOLECULE_ENV=production)
  - 401 when ADMIN_TOKEN set but wrong/missing
  - 200 + auth_token when admin token correct
  - 404 when workspace not found
  - 500 when token issue DB fails

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-18 00:39:25 +00:00
devops-engineer 231dfcf523 Merge pull request '[P0][release-blocker] fix(handlers): detach executeDelegation ctx from HTTP request (regression ce2db75f, internal#497/#498)' (#1446) from fix/a2a-delegation-detached-ctx-canceled-internal-497 into staging
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2026-05-17 22:52:56 +00:00
core-be e740ffe23f fix(handlers): detach executeDelegation ctx from HTTP request — A2A delegation P0 (regression ce2db75f, internal#497)
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A2A peer_agent delegation delivery has been 100% broken fleet-wide since
2026-05-12. Delegate() ran the fire-and-forget executeDelegation goroutine
on c.Request.Context(); the handler returns HTTP 202 immediately, which
cancels that context, so every DB op + proxy call in the detached
goroutine failed `context canceled` the instant the response was written.
lookupDeliveryMode swallowed the resulting error and silently defaulted to
push, skipping the poll-mode short-circuit that writes the a2a_receive
inbox row — so poll-mode peers (e.g. hongming-pc) never received messages
and push-mode peers hit the #190-style self-echo timeouts. Introduced by
ce2db75f ("handlers: pass cancellable context through executeDelegation").

Primary fix (delegation.go): derive the goroutine context via
context.WithTimeout(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), 30*time.Minute). WithoutCancel
detaches request cancellation/deadline while preserving all ctx values
(trace/correlation/tenant ids the proxy + broadcaster read). This is the
established pattern in this package (a2a_proxy.go:850,
a2a_proxy_helpers.go:525, registry.go:822); the 30m budget matches the
pre-ce2db75f internal budget and the proxy's own agent-dispatch ceiling.

Secondary fix, surgical (a2a_proxy_helpers.go + a2a_proxy.go), RFC#497
fail-closed theme: lookupDeliveryMode no longer swallows a *context*
error (context.Canceled / context.DeadlineExceeded) into a silent push
default — it propagates so the caller fails closed with a structured 503.
Scope deliberately narrowed to ctx errors only: generic DB errors retain
the long-standing documented fail-open-to-push contract (loud + recoverable
502/SSRF/restart, unlike the silent poll drop), so checkWorkspaceBudget's
intentional fail-open and the existing suite are unaffected. Widening
further is an RFC#497 follow-up, not part of this P0.

Regression tests:
- TestDelegate_DetachedContext_SurvivesRequestCancellation: detached ctx
  outlives request cancellation AND preserves parent values + deadline.
- TestLookupDeliveryMode_ContextCanceled_FailsClosed: ctx-cancelled
  delivery-mode read returns an error, never push.
- TestProxyA2A_PollMode_FailsClosedToPush: legacy non-ctx-DB-error
  fail-open-to-push contract preserved.

Full workspace-server/internal/handlers package suite passes (go test
-count=1), go build ./... and go vet clean.

Refs: internal#497, regression ce2db75f

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-17 15:15:44 -07:00
devops-engineer 283ebd5b47 Merge pull request 'fix(canvas): make Settings→Secrets reveal honest (value is write-only)' (#1421) from fix/secrets-reveal-anthropic-internal into staging
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2026-05-17 17:32:30 +00:00
core-be 0d6b61bfff fix(canvas): make Settings→Secrets reveal honest (value is write-only)
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The eye/RevealToggle in SecretRow was a dead affordance: it flipped a
local `revealed` boolean but the row always rendered `masked_value` and
never consumed it, so nothing was ever revealed. RevealToggle renders an
eye-WITH-SLASH when revealed=true, so a clicked row looked "active" while
showing nothing — read by users as "this doesnt work" (reported on
CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN / Anthropic group).

Root cause is not Anthropic/OAuth/category-specific and not a server
4xx/5xx: secret values are write-only from the browser by design — the
server List handler "Never exposes values", there is no per-secret
decrypt route, and the only decrypted path (GET /secrets/values) is bulk
+ token-gated for remote agents and never called by canvas. The client
has no plaintext-fetch function. Reveal is architecturally impossible
without a deliberate security regression (out of scope).

Fix: remove the dead toggle (+ its local state / auto-hide effect) and
show a static write-only indicator (lock + explanatory title). Edit
(rotate/replace) and Delete are unaffected and independent of reveal.

Refs: internal#490; sibling Secrets/Tokens fixes PR #1415 + #1420
(referenced in triage as internal#210 / internal#211). Does not touch
the agent-error path (internal#212).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-17 07:25:23 -07:00
9 changed files with 407 additions and 378 deletions
+19 -23
View File
@@ -3,16 +3,24 @@ import { useState, useCallback, useRef, useEffect } from 'react';
import type { Secret, SecretGroup } from '@/types/secrets';
import { useSecretsStore } from '@/stores/secrets-store';
import { StatusBadge } from '@/components/ui/StatusBadge';
import { RevealToggle } from '@/components/ui/RevealToggle';
import { KeyValueField } from '@/components/ui/KeyValueField';
import { ValidationHint } from '@/components/ui/ValidationHint';
import { TestConnectionButton } from '@/components/ui/TestConnectionButton';
import { validateSecretValue } from '@/lib/validation/secret-formats';
import { SERVICES } from '@/lib/services';
const AUTO_HIDE_MS = 30_000;
const VALIDATION_DEBOUNCE_MS = 400;
// Secret values are write-only from the browser: the server List endpoint
// "Never exposes values", there is no per-secret decrypt route, and the
// only decrypted path (GET /secrets/values) is bulk + token-gated for
// remote agents. The old eye/RevealToggle was a dead affordance — it
// flipped its own icon but could never reveal anything, which read as
// "this doesn't work" (esp. once clicked → eye-with-slash). We show an
// honest static indicator instead; rotation is via Edit.
const WRITE_ONLY_TITLE =
'Value is write-only and cannot be revealed — use Edit to replace/rotate it';
interface SecretRowProps {
secret: Secret;
workspaceId: string;
@@ -31,28 +39,12 @@ export function SecretRow({ secret, workspaceId }: SecretRowProps) {
const setSecretStatus = useSecretsStore((s) => s.setSecretStatus);
const isEditing = editingKey === secret.name;
const [revealed, setRevealed] = useState(false);
const [editValue, setEditValue] = useState('');
const [validationError, setValidationError] = useState<string | null>(null);
const [isSaving, setIsSaving] = useState(false);
const [saveError, setSaveError] = useState<string | null>(null);
const debounceRef = useRef<ReturnType<typeof setTimeout>>(undefined);
const editBtnRef = useRef<HTMLButtonElement>(null);
const revealTimerRef = useRef<ReturnType<typeof setTimeout>>(undefined);
// Auto-hide revealed value after 30s
useEffect(() => {
if (revealed) {
clearTimeout(revealTimerRef.current);
revealTimerRef.current = setTimeout(() => setRevealed(false), AUTO_HIDE_MS);
return () => clearTimeout(revealTimerRef.current);
}
}, [revealed]);
// Reset revealed state when panel closes (session-only)
useEffect(() => {
return () => setRevealed(false);
}, []);
// Debounced validation
useEffect(() => {
@@ -133,11 +125,15 @@ export function SecretRow({ secret, workspaceId }: SecretRowProps) {
{secret.masked_value}
</span>
<div className="secret-row__actions">
<RevealToggle
revealed={revealed}
onToggle={() => setRevealed((r) => !r)}
label={`Toggle reveal ${secret.name}`}
/>
<span
data-testid="write-only-indicator"
className="secret-row__write-only"
role="img"
aria-label={`${secret.name} value is write-only and cannot be revealed; use Edit to replace it`}
title={WRITE_ONLY_TITLE}
>
🔒
</span>
<StatusBadge status={secret.status} />
<button
type="button"
@@ -138,14 +138,54 @@ describe("SecretRow — display mode", () => {
expect(document.querySelector('[role="row"]')).toBeTruthy();
});
it("has Reveal, Copy, Edit, Delete buttons", () => {
it("has Copy, Edit, Delete buttons", () => {
render(<SecretRow secret={GITHUB_SECRET} workspaceId="ws-1" />);
expect(screen.getByTestId("reveal-toggle")).toBeTruthy();
expect(screen.getByRole("button", { name: /copy/i })).toBeTruthy();
expect(screen.getByRole("button", { name: /edit/i })).toBeTruthy();
expect(screen.getByRole("button", { name: /delete/i })).toBeTruthy();
});
// Regression: the reveal/eye control was a dead affordance. Clicking it
// flipped its own icon (eye → eye-with-slash) but never revealed the value,
// because secret values are write-only from the browser (server List
// "Never exposes values"; there is no per-secret decrypt endpoint and the
// client has no plaintext-fetch function). The honest fix removes the
// toggle and shows a static "write-only / cannot be revealed" indicator.
// See internal tracking issue + internal#210/#211.
it("does NOT render a reveal/eye toggle (values are write-only)", () => {
render(<SecretRow secret={GITHUB_SECRET} workspaceId="ws-1" />);
expect(screen.queryByTestId("reveal-toggle")).toBeNull();
expect(
screen.queryByRole("button", { name: /toggle reveal/i }),
).toBeNull();
});
it("shows a write-only indicator explaining the value cannot be revealed", () => {
render(<SecretRow secret={ANTHROPIC_SECRET} workspaceId="ws-1" />);
const indicator = screen.getByTestId("write-only-indicator");
expect(indicator).toBeTruthy();
// Affordance must be honest: explain it cannot be revealed and that
// Edit is the rotate path. It must not be a clickable button.
const title = indicator.getAttribute("title") ?? "";
expect(title.toLowerCase()).toMatch(/write-only|cannot be revealed/);
expect(indicator.tagName).not.toBe("BUTTON");
});
it("write-only indicator is present for the Anthropic/OAuth-token row too", () => {
// The reported bug singled out CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN (anthropic group);
// the fix is group-agnostic — every row gets the same honest affordance.
const OAUTH_SECRET = {
name: "CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN",
masked_value: "••••••••••••••••9d2a",
group: "anthropic" as const,
status: "unverified" as const,
updated_at: "2024-01-04",
};
render(<SecretRow secret={OAUTH_SECRET} workspaceId="ws-1" />);
expect(screen.queryByTestId("reveal-toggle")).toBeNull();
expect(screen.getByTestId("write-only-indicator")).toBeTruthy();
});
it("shows invalid status correctly", () => {
render(<SecretRow secret={CUSTOM_SECRET} workspaceId="ws-1" />);
expect(screen.getByTestId("status-badge").getAttribute("data-status")).toBe("invalid");
@@ -399,7 +399,21 @@ func (h *WorkspaceHandler) proxyA2ARequest(ctx context.Context, workspaceID stri
// (no Do(), no maybeMarkContainerDead). The response is a synthetic
// {status:"queued"} envelope so the caller (canvas, another workspace)
// knows delivery is acknowledged but pending consumption.
if lookupDeliveryMode(ctx, workspaceID) == models.DeliveryModePoll {
deliveryMode, deliveryModeErr := lookupDeliveryMode(ctx, workspaceID)
if deliveryModeErr != nil {
// internal#497 fail-closed: a real DB/context error on the
// delivery-mode read MUST NOT silently fall through to the push
// dispatch path — that is exactly what silently misrouted every
// poll-mode peer for 5 days under the ce2db75f regression. Surface
// a structured error so the delegation is marked failed (loud +
// retryable) instead of dispatched to the wrong path.
log.Printf("ProxyA2A: delivery-mode lookup failed for %s: %v — failing closed", workspaceID, deliveryModeErr)
return 0, nil, &proxyA2AError{
Status: http.StatusServiceUnavailable,
Response: gin.H{"error": "delivery-mode lookup failed; refusing to dispatch to avoid silent misrouting"},
}
}
if deliveryMode == models.DeliveryModePoll {
if logActivity {
h.logA2AReceiveQueued(ctx, workspaceID, callerID, body, a2aMethod)
}
@@ -468,40 +468,64 @@ func parseUsageFromA2AResponse(body []byte) (inputTokens, outputTokens int64) {
return 0, 0
}
// lookupDeliveryMode returns the workspace's delivery_mode. On any DB
// error or missing row it returns DeliveryModePush — the fail-closed
// default. "Closed" here means "fall back to today's behavior (synchronous
// dispatch)" rather than "fall back to drop the request silently into
// activity_logs where the agent might never see it." A poll-mode workspace
// that briefly reads as push will get its A2A request dispatched to the
// stored URL (or a 502 if no URL); a push-mode workspace that briefly
// reads as poll would get its request silently queued with no dispatch.
// The first failure is loud + recoverable; the second is silent.
// lookupDeliveryMode returns the workspace's delivery_mode.
//
// internal#497 / RFC#497 fail-closed (SURGICAL scope): the *specific*
// failure mode that hid the ce2db75f regression for 5 days is now
// propagated instead of silently swallowed — a CONTEXT error
// (context.Canceled / context.DeadlineExceeded). Under ce2db75f the
// detached delegation goroutine ran on a cancelled request context, every
// `SELECT delivery_mode` failed `context canceled`, this function returned
// push, the poll-mode short-circuit in proxyA2ARequest was skipped, and
// poll-mode peers (e.g. an operator laptop on molecule-mcp-claude-channel)
// silently never got their a2a_receive inbox row. A transient,
// systematic-once-triggered context cancellation became permanent
// invisible misrouting. Returning that error lets the caller fail loud
// (mark the delegation failed) instead of mis-dispatching.
//
// Scope is deliberately narrow: only ctx errors propagate. Other DB
// errors retain the long-standing documented "fall back to push (today's
// synchronous behavior)" contract — that path is loud + recoverable
// (502 / SSRF reject / restart), unlike the silent poll-mode drop, and
// the surrounding proxy (incl. the sibling checkWorkspaceBudget) is
// intentionally built around that fail-open-to-push behavior. Widening
// further is an RFC#497 follow-up, not part of this P0 fix.
//
// A genuinely *absent* configuration is NOT an error and still resolves to
// push (the safe synchronous default): sql.ErrNoRows, a NULL/empty column,
// or an unrecognised value all return (push, nil).
//
// The function is intentionally lookup-only — it never mutates the row.
// The register handler (registry.go) is the only writer for delivery_mode.
//
// See #2339 PR 1 for the column + register-flow side; this is the
// proxy-side read used for the short-circuit in proxyA2ARequest.
func lookupDeliveryMode(ctx context.Context, workspaceID string) string {
func lookupDeliveryMode(ctx context.Context, workspaceID string) (string, error) {
var mode sql.NullString
err := db.DB.QueryRowContext(ctx,
`SELECT delivery_mode FROM workspaces WHERE id = $1`, workspaceID,
).Scan(&mode)
if err != nil {
if !errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
log.Printf("ProxyA2A: lookupDeliveryMode(%s) failed (%v) — defaulting to push", workspaceID, err)
// internal#497: a context cancellation/deadline MUST NOT be
// swallowed into a silent push default — that is the exact 5-day
// silent-misrouting vector. Propagate so the caller fails closed.
if errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) || errors.Is(err, context.DeadlineExceeded) {
log.Printf("ProxyA2A: lookupDeliveryMode(%s) context error (%v) — failing closed (NOT defaulting to push)", workspaceID, err)
return "", err
}
return models.DeliveryModePush
if !errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
log.Printf("ProxyA2A: lookupDeliveryMode(%s) failed (%v) — defaulting to push (non-ctx DB error; legacy fail-open-to-push contract)", workspaceID, err)
}
return models.DeliveryModePush, nil
}
if !mode.Valid || mode.String == "" {
return models.DeliveryModePush
return models.DeliveryModePush, nil
}
if !models.IsValidDeliveryMode(mode.String) {
log.Printf("ProxyA2A: workspace %s has invalid delivery_mode=%q — defaulting to push", workspaceID, mode.String)
return models.DeliveryModePush
return models.DeliveryModePush, nil
}
return mode.String
return mode.String, nil
}
// logA2AReceiveQueued records a poll-mode "queued" A2A receive into
@@ -2228,12 +2228,18 @@ func TestProxyA2A_PushMode_NoShortCircuit(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestProxyA2A_PollMode_FailsClosedToPush verifies the safety contract:
// a DB error reading delivery_mode must default to push (the existing
// behavior), NOT poll. Failing to push means a poll-mode workspace
// briefly attempts a real dispatch — visible failure (502 / SSRF
// rejection / restart cascade), not a silent drop into activity_logs
// where the agent might never look. Loud > silent, recoverable > lost.
// TestProxyA2A_PollMode_FailsClosedToPush verifies the LEGACY safety
// contract is PRESERVED for non-context DB errors: a generic DB error
// reading delivery_mode still defaults to push (today's behavior), NOT
// poll. Failing to push means a poll-mode workspace briefly attempts a
// real dispatch — visible failure (502 / SSRF rejection / restart
// cascade), not a silent drop into activity_logs where the agent might
// never look. Loud > silent, recoverable > lost.
//
// internal#497 narrows the fail-closed change to *context* errors only
// (the actual ce2db75f regression vector); generic DB errors keep this
// long-standing fail-open-to-push contract. The ctx-error fail-closed is
// covered by TestLookupDeliveryMode_ContextCanceled_FailsClosed.
func TestProxyA2A_PollMode_FailsClosedToPush(t *testing.T) {
mock := setupTestDB(t)
setupTestRedis(t) // empty Redis — forces resolveAgentURL DB lookup
@@ -2244,7 +2250,8 @@ func TestProxyA2A_PollMode_FailsClosedToPush(t *testing.T) {
expectBudgetCheck(mock, wsID)
// lookupDeliveryMode hits a transient DB error → must default push.
// lookupDeliveryMode hits a generic (non-context) DB error → must
// still default push (legacy contract preserved by internal#497).
mock.ExpectQuery("SELECT delivery_mode FROM workspaces WHERE id").
WithArgs(wsID).
WillReturnError(sql.ErrConnDone)
@@ -2268,7 +2275,7 @@ func TestProxyA2A_PollMode_FailsClosedToPush(t *testing.T) {
var resp map[string]interface{}
_ = json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &resp)
if resp["status"] == "queued" {
t.Errorf("DB error on delivery_mode lookup silently queued the request — must fail-closed-to-push, got body: %s", w.Body.String())
t.Errorf("generic DB error on delivery_mode lookup silently queued the request — must fail-open-to-push, got body: %s", w.Body.String())
}
}
@@ -2277,6 +2284,37 @@ func TestProxyA2A_PollMode_FailsClosedToPush(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestLookupDeliveryMode_ContextCanceled_FailsClosed is the internal#497
// regression test for the SECONDARY defect. It pins the exact invariant
// that hid the ce2db75f regression for 5 days: when the delivery_mode read
// fails because the context was cancelled (precisely what happened in the
// detached delegation goroutine running on a returned request context),
// lookupDeliveryMode MUST return an error and MUST NOT silently return
// "push". Returning push there is what skipped the poll-mode short-circuit
// and silently dropped 100% of poll-mode peer deliveries.
//
// A pre-cancelled context makes QueryRowContext fail with
// context.Canceled deterministically — no DB rows are mocked because the
// query never reaches a result.
func TestLookupDeliveryMode_ContextCanceled_FailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
mock := setupTestDB(t)
// The query fails on the cancelled ctx before matching; provide a
// permissive expectation so sqlmock doesn't complain about the attempt.
mock.ExpectQuery("SELECT delivery_mode FROM workspaces WHERE id").
WillReturnError(context.Canceled)
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
cancel() // simulate the HTTP handler having returned (request ctx dead)
mode, err := lookupDeliveryMode(ctx, "ws-poll-peer")
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("internal#497 regression: lookupDeliveryMode swallowed a context error and returned mode=%q with nil err — this is the exact 5-day silent-misrouting vector", mode)
}
if mode == models.DeliveryModePush {
t.Errorf("internal#497 regression: context error must NOT default to push (got mode=%q)", mode)
}
}
// ==================== a2aClient ResponseHeaderTimeout config ====================
func TestA2AClientResponseHeaderTimeout(t *testing.T) {
@@ -2,224 +2,212 @@ package handlers
import (
"database/sql"
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"os"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/DATA-DOG/go-sqlmock"
"github.com/Molecule-AI/molecule-monorepo/platform/internal/db"
"github.com/Molecule-AI/molecule-monorepo/platform/internal/wsauth"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
)
func newTestTokenRequest(workspaceID string) (*httptest.ResponseRecorder, *gin.Context) {
// Valid UUID used throughout.
const wsToken = "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000030"
// ---------- TestTokensEnabled ----------
func TestTokensEnabled_EnvFlagTrue(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("MOLECULE_ENABLE_TEST_TOKENS", "1")
t.Setenv("MOLECULE_ENV", "production")
if !TestTokensEnabled() {
t.Error("expected true when MOLECULE_ENABLE_TEST_TOKENS=1")
}
}
func TestTokensEnabled_ProductionEnv(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("MOLECULE_ENABLE_TEST_TOKENS", "")
t.Setenv("MOLECULE_ENV", "production")
if TestTokensEnabled() {
t.Error("expected false when MOLECULE_ENV=production")
}
}
func TestTokensEnabled_StagingEnv(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("MOLECULE_ENABLE_TEST_TOKENS", "")
t.Setenv("MOLECULE_ENV", "staging")
if !TestTokensEnabled() {
t.Error("expected true when MOLECULE_ENV=staging")
}
}
func TestTokensEnabled_EmptyEnv(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("MOLECULE_ENABLE_TEST_TOKENS", "")
t.Setenv("MOLECULE_ENV", "")
if !TestTokensEnabled() {
t.Error("expected true when MOLECULE_ENV is empty (local dev default)")
}
}
// ---------- GetTestToken ----------
func makeTokenHandler(t *testing.T) (*AdminTestTokenHandler, sqlmock.Sqlmock, func()) {
t.Helper()
mockDB, mock, err := sqlmock.New()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to create sqlmock: %v", err)
}
prevDB := db.DB
db.DB = mockDB
return NewAdminTestTokenHandler(), mock, func() {
// Per agent-reviewer #7034: missing ExpectationsWereMet lets
// tests pass silently when the handler skips an expected
// SELECT/INSERT. Verify in cleanup so the failure is loud.
if err := mock.ExpectationsWereMet(); err != nil {
t.Errorf("sqlmock expectations not met: %v", err)
}
db.DB = prevDB
mockDB.Close()
}
}
func getTestToken(t *testing.T, h *AdminTestTokenHandler, workspaceID string, adminToken string) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
t.Helper()
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
c, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(w)
c.Params = gin.Params{{Key: "id", Value: workspaceID}}
c.Request = httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/admin/workspaces/"+workspaceID+"/test-token", nil)
return w, c
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/admin/workspaces/"+workspaceID+"/test-token", nil)
if adminToken != "" {
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+adminToken)
}
c.Request = req
h.GetTestToken(c)
return w
}
func TestAdminTestToken_HiddenInProduction(t *testing.T) {
setupTestDB(t)
t.Setenv("MOLECULE_ENV", "production")
func TestGetTestToken_DisabledByDefault(t *testing.T) {
// Set MOLECULE_ENV=production to simulate a locked-down environment.
t.Setenv("MOLECULE_ENABLE_TEST_TOKENS", "")
h := NewAdminTestTokenHandler()
w, c := newTestTokenRequest("ws-1")
h.GetTestToken(c)
if w.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
t.Fatalf("expected 404 in production, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
func TestAdminTestToken_EnabledViaFlagEvenInProd(t *testing.T) {
mock := setupTestDB(t)
t.Setenv("MOLECULE_ENV", "production")
t.Setenv("MOLECULE_ENABLE_TEST_TOKENS", "1")
mock.ExpectQuery("SELECT id FROM workspaces WHERE id =").
WithArgs("ws-1").
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"id"}).AddRow("ws-1"))
mock.ExpectExec("INSERT INTO workspace_auth_tokens").
WillReturnResult(sqlmock.NewResult(0, 1))
h := NewAdminTestTokenHandler()
w, c := newTestTokenRequest("ws-1")
h.GetTestToken(c)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
func TestAdminTestToken_WorkspaceNotFound(t *testing.T) {
mock := setupTestDB(t)
t.Setenv("MOLECULE_ENV", "development")
mock.ExpectQuery("SELECT id FROM workspaces WHERE id =").
WithArgs("missing").
WillReturnError(sqlErrNoRows())
h := NewAdminTestTokenHandler()
w, c := newTestTokenRequest("missing")
h.GetTestToken(c)
w := getTestToken(t, h, wsToken, "")
if w.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
t.Fatalf("expected 404 for missing workspace, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
t.Errorf("expected 404 when disabled, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
func TestAdminTestToken_HappyPath_TokenValidates(t *testing.T) {
mock := setupTestDB(t)
t.Setenv("MOLECULE_ENV", "development")
mock.ExpectQuery("SELECT id FROM workspaces WHERE id =").
WithArgs("ws-1").
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"id"}).AddRow("ws-1"))
// Capture the hash inserted by IssueToken so we can replay it on Validate.
var capturedHash []byte
mock.ExpectExec("INSERT INTO workspace_auth_tokens").
WithArgs("ws-1", sqlmock.AnyArg(), sqlmock.AnyArg()).
WillReturnResult(sqlmock.NewResult(0, 1))
func TestGetTestToken_AdminTokenRequired_WrongToken(t *testing.T) {
// Set up: tokens enabled, ADMIN_TOKEN set, but request uses wrong token.
t.Setenv("MOLECULE_ENABLE_TEST_TOKENS", "1")
t.Setenv("MOLECULE_ENV", "production")
os.Setenv("ADMIN_TOKEN", "correct-secret")
defer os.Unsetenv("ADMIN_TOKEN")
h := NewAdminTestTokenHandler()
w, c := newTestTokenRequest("ws-1")
h.GetTestToken(c)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
var resp struct {
AuthToken string `json:"auth_token"`
WorkspaceID string `json:"workspace_id"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &resp); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("bad json: %v", err)
}
if resp.AuthToken == "" {
t.Fatal("expected non-empty auth_token")
}
if resp.WorkspaceID != "ws-1" {
t.Errorf("expected workspace_id ws-1, got %q", resp.WorkspaceID)
}
if len(resp.AuthToken) < 32 {
t.Errorf("token looks too short: %d chars", len(resp.AuthToken))
}
// Now simulate ValidateToken lookup using the same DB — prove the token
// can be validated by feeding its sha256 back through ExpectedArgs.
// (We stub the SELECT rather than re-reading capturedHash since sqlmock
// doesn't capture live args; the important invariant is that the issued
// token passes ValidateToken given a matching hash row exists.)
_ = capturedHash
mock.ExpectQuery("SELECT t\\.id, t\\.workspace_id.*FROM workspace_auth_tokens t.*JOIN workspaces").
WithArgs(sqlmock.AnyArg()).
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"id", "workspace_id"}).AddRow("tok-1", "ws-1"))
mock.ExpectExec("UPDATE workspace_auth_tokens SET last_used_at").
WillReturnResult(sqlmock.NewResult(0, 1))
if err := wsauth.ValidateToken(c.Request.Context(), db.DB, "ws-1", resp.AuthToken); err != nil {
t.Errorf("issued token failed to validate: %v", err)
}
}
func sqlErrNoRows() error { return sql.ErrNoRows }
// TestAdminTestToken_AdminTokenRequired_NoHeader pins the IDOR-fix (#112):
// when ADMIN_TOKEN is set, calls without an Authorization header MUST 401.
// Pre-fix, the route accepted any bearer that matched a live org token,
// allowing cross-org test-token minting. The current code uses
// subtle.ConstantTimeCompare against ADMIN_TOKEN explicitly. This test
// pins that no-header == 401 so a regression that re-enabled the AdminAuth
// fallback would fail loudly.
func TestAdminTestToken_AdminTokenRequired_NoHeader(t *testing.T) {
setupTestDB(t)
t.Setenv("MOLECULE_ENV", "development")
t.Setenv("ADMIN_TOKEN", "the-admin-secret")
h := NewAdminTestTokenHandler()
w, c := newTestTokenRequest("ws-1")
h.GetTestToken(c)
w := getTestToken(t, h, wsToken, "wrong-token")
if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Fatalf("expected 401 with ADMIN_TOKEN set + no Authorization, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
t.Errorf("expected 401, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
// TestAdminTestToken_AdminTokenRequired_WrongHeader pins that a non-matching
// bearer is rejected. Critical for #112 — an attacker presenting any other
// org's token must NOT pass.
func TestAdminTestToken_AdminTokenRequired_WrongHeader(t *testing.T) {
setupTestDB(t)
t.Setenv("MOLECULE_ENV", "development")
t.Setenv("ADMIN_TOKEN", "the-admin-secret")
func TestGetTestToken_AdminTokenRequired_MissingBearer(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("MOLECULE_ENABLE_TEST_TOKENS", "1")
t.Setenv("MOLECULE_ENV", "production")
os.Setenv("ADMIN_TOKEN", "correct-secret")
defer os.Unsetenv("ADMIN_TOKEN")
h := NewAdminTestTokenHandler()
w, c := newTestTokenRequest("ws-1")
c.Request.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer wrong-token")
h.GetTestToken(c)
w := getTestToken(t, h, wsToken, "")
if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Fatalf("expected 401 with wrong Authorization, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
t.Errorf("expected 401 when bearer missing, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
// TestAdminTestToken_AdminTokenRequired_CorrectHeader pins the success
// path through the ADMIN_TOKEN gate. Together with the no-header + wrong-
// header pair, this proves the gate distinguishes correct from incorrect
// rather than (e.g.) erroring on every request.
func TestAdminTestToken_AdminTokenRequired_CorrectHeader(t *testing.T) {
mock := setupTestDB(t)
t.Setenv("MOLECULE_ENV", "development")
t.Setenv("ADMIN_TOKEN", "the-admin-secret")
func TestGetTestToken_AdminTokenRequired_CorrectToken(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("MOLECULE_ENABLE_TEST_TOKENS", "1")
t.Setenv("MOLECULE_ENV", "production")
os.Setenv("ADMIN_TOKEN", "correct-secret")
defer os.Unsetenv("ADMIN_TOKEN")
mock.ExpectQuery("SELECT id FROM workspaces WHERE id =").
WithArgs("ws-1").
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"id"}).AddRow("ws-1"))
mock.ExpectExec("INSERT INTO workspace_auth_tokens").
_, mock, cleanup := makeTokenHandler(t)
defer cleanup()
mock.ExpectQuery(`SELECT id FROM workspaces WHERE id = \$1`).
WithArgs(wsToken).
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"id"}).AddRow(wsToken))
// IssueToken returns a token — we just need to verify the query ran.
mock.ExpectExec(`INSERT INTO workspace_auth_tokens`).
WillReturnResult(sqlmock.NewResult(0, 1))
h := NewAdminTestTokenHandler()
w, c := newTestTokenRequest("ws-1")
c.Request.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer the-admin-secret")
h.GetTestToken(c)
w := getTestToken(t, h, wsToken, "correct-secret")
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200 with correct ADMIN_TOKEN, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
if err := mock.ExpectationsWereMet(); err != nil {
t.Errorf("sqlmock expectations not met — INSERT into workspace_auth_tokens did not run, suggesting the gate short-circuited the success path: %v", err)
t.Errorf("expected 200, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
// TestAdminTestToken_AdminTokenEmpty_GateBypassedSafely pins that when
// ADMIN_TOKEN is unset (typical local-dev setup), the explicit gate is
// bypassed and the route works without an Authorization header. This is
// the same code path the existing TestAdminTestToken_EnabledViaFlagEvenInProd
// exercises, but pinned explicitly so a future refactor that conflates
// "ADMIN_TOKEN unset" with "always 401" gets caught immediately.
func TestAdminTestToken_AdminTokenEmpty_GateBypassedSafely(t *testing.T) {
mock := setupTestDB(t)
t.Setenv("MOLECULE_ENV", "development")
t.Setenv("ADMIN_TOKEN", "")
func TestGetTestToken_WorkspaceNotFound(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("MOLECULE_ENABLE_TEST_TOKENS", "1")
t.Setenv("MOLECULE_ENV", "production")
// ADMIN_TOKEN not set — no auth header required.
mock.ExpectQuery("SELECT id FROM workspaces WHERE id =").
WithArgs("ws-1").
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"id"}).AddRow("ws-1"))
mock.ExpectExec("INSERT INTO workspace_auth_tokens").
_, mock, cleanup := makeTokenHandler(t)
defer cleanup()
mock.ExpectQuery(`SELECT id FROM workspaces WHERE id = \$1`).
WithArgs(wsToken).
WillReturnError(sql.ErrNoRows)
h := NewAdminTestTokenHandler()
w := getTestToken(t, h, wsToken, "")
if w.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
t.Errorf("expected 404 for missing workspace, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
func TestGetTestToken_IssueTokenDBError(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("MOLECULE_ENABLE_TEST_TOKENS", "1")
t.Setenv("MOLECULE_ENV", "production")
_, mock, cleanup := makeTokenHandler(t)
defer cleanup()
mock.ExpectQuery(`SELECT id FROM workspaces WHERE id = \$1`).
WithArgs(wsToken).
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"id"}).AddRow(wsToken))
// IssueToken fails.
mock.ExpectExec(`INSERT INTO workspace_auth_tokens`).
WillReturnError(sql.ErrConnDone)
h := NewAdminTestTokenHandler()
w := getTestToken(t, h, wsToken, "")
if w.Code != http.StatusInternalServerError {
t.Errorf("expected 500 on token issue failure, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
func TestGetTestToken_ResponseContainsToken(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("MOLECULE_ENABLE_TEST_TOKENS", "1")
t.Setenv("MOLECULE_ENV", "production")
_, mock, cleanup := makeTokenHandler(t)
defer cleanup()
mock.ExpectQuery(`SELECT id FROM workspaces WHERE id = \$1`).
WithArgs(wsToken).
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"id"}).AddRow(wsToken))
mock.ExpectExec(`INSERT INTO workspace_auth_tokens`).
WillReturnResult(sqlmock.NewResult(0, 1))
h := NewAdminTestTokenHandler()
w, c := newTestTokenRequest("ws-1")
// Note: NO Authorization header — the gate is unset, so this MUST work.
h.GetTestToken(c)
w := getTestToken(t, h, wsToken, "")
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200 with ADMIN_TOKEN empty + no Authorization, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
t.Errorf("expected 200, got %d", w.Code)
}
body := w.Body.String()
if !(strings.Contains(body, "auth_token") && strings.Contains(body, wsToken)) {
t.Errorf("expected auth_token in response body, got: %s", body)
}
}
@@ -162,8 +162,32 @@ func (h *DelegationHandler) Delegate(c *gin.Context) {
},
})
// Fire-and-forget: send A2A in background goroutine
go h.executeDelegation(ctx, sourceID, body.TargetID, delegationID, a2aBody)
// Fire-and-forget: send A2A in a background goroutine.
//
// internal#497 — the goroutine MUST NOT inherit the HTTP request's
// cancellation. `ctx` here is c.Request.Context(); the handler returns
// 202 a few lines below, which cancels that context immediately. Before
// this fix (regression ce2db75f) executeDelegation ran on the
// request-scoped ctx, so every DB op + proxy call in the detached
// goroutine failed `context canceled` the instant the 202 was written.
// That silently broke 100% of A2A peer delegations fleet-wide since
// 2026-05-12 (poll-mode peers never got their a2a_receive inbox row;
// lookupDeliveryMode swallowed the ctx error and defaulted to push).
//
// context.WithoutCancel detaches cancellation/deadline while PRESERVING
// all context values (trace/correlation/tenant ids that proxyA2ARequest
// and the broadcaster read off ctx) — this is the established pattern in
// this package (a2a_proxy.go:850, a2a_proxy_helpers.go:525,
// registry.go:822). The 30-minute ceiling matches the prior internal
// budget executeDelegation used before ce2db75f and the proxy's own
// absolute agent-dispatch ceiling (a2a_proxy.go forwardCtx).
delegationCtx, cancelDelegation := context.WithTimeout(
context.WithoutCancel(ctx), 30*time.Minute,
)
go func() {
defer cancelDelegation()
h.executeDelegation(delegationCtx, sourceID, body.TargetID, delegationID, a2aBody)
}()
// Broadcast event so canvas shows delegation in real-time
h.broadcaster.RecordAndBroadcast(ctx, string(events.EventDelegationSent), sourceID, map[string]interface{}{
@@ -16,6 +16,65 @@ import (
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
)
// ---------- internal#497 regression: detached goroutine ctx must outlive the handler ----------
// TestDelegate_DetachedContext_SurvivesRequestCancellation pins the
// load-bearing invariant that regression ce2db75f violated: the context
// handed to executeDelegation in the fire-and-forget goroutine must NOT be
// cancelled when the HTTP handler returns 202 (which cancels
// c.Request.Context()). Before the fix, executeDelegation ran on the
// request-scoped ctx, so every DB op + proxy call failed `context
// canceled` the instant the 202 was written — silently breaking 100% of
// A2A peer delegations fleet-wide since 2026-05-12.
//
// This test asserts the exact ctx-derivation contract used by Delegate
// (context.WithoutCancel(parent) + a timeout budget): the derived context
// (a) stays alive after the parent is cancelled, and (b) still carries
// parent values (trace/correlation/tenant ids the downstream proxy +
// broadcaster read off ctx). It is intentionally DB-free and fast.
func TestDelegate_DetachedContext_SurvivesRequestCancellation(t *testing.T) {
type ctxKey string
const traceKey ctxKey = "trace-id"
// Simulate c.Request.Context() carrying a correlation value.
parent, cancelParent := context.WithCancel(
context.WithValue(context.Background(), traceKey, "trace-abc-123"),
)
// Exact derivation Delegate uses for the detached goroutine.
delegationCtx, cancelDelegation := context.WithTimeout(
context.WithoutCancel(parent), 30*time.Minute,
)
defer cancelDelegation()
// The HTTP handler "returns 202" → request context is cancelled.
cancelParent()
if err := parent.Err(); err == nil {
t.Fatal("precondition: parent context should be cancelled after the handler returns")
}
// (a) Cancellation MUST NOT propagate to the detached context.
select {
case <-delegationCtx.Done():
t.Fatalf("regression: detached delegation ctx was cancelled by the handler returning (err=%v) — executeDelegation would fail every DB op with `context canceled`", delegationCtx.Err())
default:
// alive — correct
}
// (b) Parent values MUST still be readable (WithoutCancel preserves
// values; trace/correlation/tenant ids the proxy + broadcaster use).
if got, _ := delegationCtx.Value(traceKey).(string); got != "trace-abc-123" {
t.Errorf("detached ctx lost the parent trace value: got %q, want %q", got, "trace-abc-123")
}
// And it still has a real deadline (the 30m budget), so it is not an
// unbounded background context.
if _, hasDeadline := delegationCtx.Deadline(); !hasDeadline {
t.Error("detached ctx must carry the 30-minute timeout budget, but has no deadline")
}
}
// ---------- Delegate: missing target_id → 400 ----------
func TestDelegate_MissingTargetID(t *testing.T) {
@@ -1,12 +1,8 @@
package handlers
import (
"crypto/tls"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
)
// TestExternalTemplates_NoMoleculeOrgIDPlaceholder pins the invariant
@@ -122,153 +118,3 @@ func TestExternalTemplates_NoBrokenMoleculeAIGitHubURLs(t *testing.T) {
}
}
}
// =============================================================================
// BuildExternalConnectionPayload
// =============================================================================
func TestBuildExternalConnectionPayload_HappyPath(t *testing.T) {
payload := BuildExternalConnectionPayload(
"https://platform.example.com/",
"ws-123",
"tok-secret-abc",
)
if payload["workspace_id"] != "ws-123" {
t.Errorf("workspace_id = %v; want ws-123", payload["workspace_id"])
}
if payload["platform_url"] != "https://platform.example.com" {
t.Errorf("platform_url = %v; want https://platform.example.com", payload["platform_url"])
}
if payload["auth_token"] != "tok-secret-abc" {
t.Errorf("auth_token = %v; want tok-secret-abc", payload["auth_token"])
}
if payload["registry_endpoint"] != "https://platform.example.com/registry/register" {
t.Errorf("registry_endpoint = %v", payload["registry_endpoint"])
}
if payload["heartbeat_endpoint"] != "https://platform.example.com/registry/heartbeat" {
t.Errorf("heartbeat_endpoint = %v", payload["heartbeat_endpoint"])
}
}
func TestBuildExternalConnectionPayload_TrailingSlashStripped(t *testing.T) {
// TrimSuffix only removes one trailing slash; multiple slashes stay.
// This is intentional — the function documents this behavior.
payload := BuildExternalConnectionPayload(
"https://platform.example.com/",
"ws-456",
"tok",
)
if payload["platform_url"] != "https://platform.example.com" {
t.Errorf("platform_url = %v; single trailing slash should be stripped", payload["platform_url"])
}
if payload["registry_endpoint"] != "https://platform.example.com/registry/register" {
t.Errorf("registry_endpoint should not have double slash")
}
}
func TestBuildExternalConnectionPayload_EmptyAuthToken(t *testing.T) {
// Empty token is valid for "show instructions again" read-only path
payload := BuildExternalConnectionPayload(
"https://platform.example.com",
"ws-789",
"",
)
if payload["workspace_id"] != "ws-789" {
t.Errorf("workspace_id = %v", payload["workspace_id"])
}
if payload["auth_token"] != "" {
t.Errorf("auth_token = %v; want empty string", payload["auth_token"])
}
}
func TestBuildExternalConnectionPayload_SnippetsStamped(t *testing.T) {
payload := BuildExternalConnectionPayload(
"https://platform.example.com",
"ws-test",
"tok-test",
)
for _, key := range []string{
"curl_register_template",
"python_snippet",
"claude_code_channel_snippet",
"universal_mcp_snippet",
"hermes_channel_snippet",
"codex_snippet",
"openclaw_snippet",
"kimi_snippet",
} {
v, ok := payload[key].(string)
if !ok {
t.Errorf("%s is not a string", key)
continue
}
if strings.Contains(v, "{{PLATFORM_URL}}") {
t.Errorf("%s still contains unsubstituted {{PLATFORM_URL}}", key)
}
if strings.Contains(v, "{{WORKSPACE_ID}}") {
t.Errorf("%s still contains unsubstituted {{WORKSPACE_ID}}", key)
}
// Should contain the stamped values
if !strings.Contains(v, "https://platform.example.com") {
t.Errorf("%s does not contain stamped platform URL", key)
}
if !strings.Contains(v, "ws-test") {
t.Errorf("%s does not contain stamped workspace ID", key)
}
}
}
// =============================================================================
// externalPlatformURL
// =============================================================================
func TestExternalPlatformURL_EnvVarTakesPrecedence(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("EXTERNAL_PLATFORM_URL", "https://external.example.com")
c, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(httptest.NewRecorder())
c.Request = httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/", nil)
got := externalPlatformURL(c)
if got != "https://external.example.com" {
t.Errorf("got %q; want EXTERNAL_PLATFORM_URL value", got)
}
}
func TestExternalPlatformURL_XForwardedProtoAndHost(t *testing.T) {
c, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(httptest.NewRecorder())
c.Request = httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/", nil)
c.Request.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Proto", "https")
c.Request.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-Host", "tenant.example.com")
got := externalPlatformURL(c)
if got != "https://tenant.example.com" {
t.Errorf("got %q; want https://tenant.example.com", got)
}
}
func TestExternalPlatformURL_HTTPSNoHeaders(t *testing.T) {
c, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(httptest.NewRecorder())
c.Request = httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/", nil)
c.Request.Host = "platform.example.com"
// TLS set → https scheme (regardless of host)
c.Request.TLS = &tls.ConnectionState{}
got := externalPlatformURL(c)
if got != "https://platform.example.com" {
t.Errorf("got %q; want https://platform.example.com (TLS set)", got)
}
}
func TestExternalPlatformURL_HTTPNoTLS(t *testing.T) {
c, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(httptest.NewRecorder())
c.Request = httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/", nil)
c.Request.Host = "localhost:8080"
// TLS nil → http
c.Request.TLS = nil
got := externalPlatformURL(c)
if got != "http://localhost:8080" {
t.Errorf("got %q; want http://localhost:8080", got)
}
}