chore(dead-code): remove unused QueueDepth function

QueueDepth was added for Phase 2/3 busy-return response visibility but
was never wired to a caller. The inline depth query in EnqueueA2A serves
today's enqueue response, making this function dead code.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

.gitea/scripts/review-refire-status.sh

@@ -13,20 +13,26 @@ set -euo pipefail
 OWNER="${REPO%%/*}"
 NAME="${REPO##*/}"
 API="https://${GITEA_HOST}/api/v1"
-CONTEXT="${TEAM}-review / approved (pull_request)"
+# Branch-protection requires the (pull_request_target) context variant.
+# The refire path must post the EXACT BP-required name so the gate flips.
+CONTEXT="${TEAM}-review / approved (pull_request_target)"
 TARGET_URL="https://${GITEA_HOST}/${OWNER}/${NAME}/pulls/${PR_NUMBER}"
 
 authfile=$(mktemp)
+post_authfile=$(mktemp)
 prfile=$(mktemp)
 postfile=$(mktemp)
 # shellcheck disable=SC2329 # invoked by EXIT trap
 cleanup() {
-  rm -f "$authfile" "$prfile" "$postfile"
+  rm -f "$authfile" "$post_authfile" "$prfile" "$postfile"
 }
 trap cleanup EXIT
 
-chmod 600 "$authfile"
+chmod 600 "$authfile" "$post_authfile"
 printf 'header = "Authorization: token %s"\n' "$GITEA_TOKEN" > "$authfile"
+# STATUS_POST_TOKEN is narrow-scoped write:repository for explicit status POST.
+# Falls back to GITEA_TOKEN for backward compatibility (e.g. local test).
+printf 'header = "Authorization: token %s"\n' "${STATUS_POST_TOKEN:-$GITEA_TOKEN}" > "$post_authfile"
 
 code=$(curl -sS -o "$prfile" -w '%{http_code}' -K "$authfile" \
   "${API}/repos/${OWNER}/${NAME}/pulls/${PR_NUMBER}")
@@ -68,7 +74,7 @@ body=$(jq -nc \
   '{state:$state, context:$context, description:$description, target_url:$target_url}')
 
 code=$(curl -sS -o "$postfile" -w '%{http_code}' -X POST \
-  -K "$authfile" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
+  -K "$post_authfile" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
   -d "$body" \
   "${API}/repos/${OWNER}/${NAME}/statuses/${head_sha}")
 if [ "$code" != "200" ] && [ "$code" != "201" ]; then

.gitea/scripts/tests/test_gate_review_auto_fire.py

@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+"""Regression test #765 — gate auto-fire on real qa/security APPROVED review.
+
+Validates the structural configuration of qa-review.yml and security-review.yml
+so that a real team-member APPROVED review fires the workflow and POSTs the
+exact branch-protection-required context name. This is the test #2020's
+stale-context failure would have caught.
+"""
+
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import yaml
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
+
+
+def load_workflow(name: str) -> dict:
+    with (ROOT / "workflows" / name).open() as f:
+        return yaml.safe_load(f)
+
+
+def _job_guard_string(workflow: dict) -> str:
+    """Return the raw job-level `if:` string for the single job."""
+    jobs = workflow["jobs"]
+    # Both qa-review and security-review have exactly one job named "approved".
+    job = jobs["approved"]
+    return str(job.get("if", ""))
+
+
+def _post_step(workflow: dict) -> dict:
+    """Return the explicit POST /statuses step from the job steps list."""
+    jobs = workflow["jobs"]
+    steps = jobs["approved"]["steps"]
+    for step in steps:
+        name = step.get("name", "")
+        if "Post required status context" in name:
+            return step
+    raise AssertionError("No explicit POST status step found")
+
+
+class TestQaReviewDirectTrigger:
+    def test_trigger_is_pull_request_review_submitted(self):
+        wf = load_workflow("qa-review.yml")
+        # PyYAML parses bare 'on' as boolean True.
+        on = wf[True]
+        assert "pull_request_review" in on, (
+            "qa-review must trigger on pull_request_review"
+        )
+        types = on["pull_request_review"].get("types", [])
+        assert "submitted" in types, (
+            "pull_request_review must include 'submitted' type"
+        )
+
+    def test_job_guard_requires_approved_state(self):
+        wf = load_workflow("qa-review.yml")
+        guard = _job_guard_string(wf)
+        assert "github.event.review.state == 'APPROVED'" in guard, (
+            "job guard must check review.state for 'APPROVED'"
+        )
+        assert "github.event.review.state == 'approved'" in guard, (
+            "job guard must check review.state for 'approved' (case fallback per #2135)"
+        )
+
+    def test_post_step_uses_status_post_token(self):
+        wf = load_workflow("qa-review.yml")
+        post = _post_step(wf)
+        env = post.get("env", {})
+        assert env.get("GITEA_TOKEN") == "${{ secrets.STATUS_POST_TOKEN }}", (
+            "POST step must use STATUS_POST_TOKEN for write-scoped status POST"
+        )
+
+    def test_post_step_context_name_exact(self):
+        """The context POSTed must byte-match the branch-protection requirement."""
+        wf = load_workflow("qa-review.yml")
+        post = _post_step(wf)
+        run = post.get("run", "")
+        assert '"qa-review / approved (pull_request_target)"' in run, (
+            "POST step must emit exact BP-required context name"
+        )
+
+
+class TestSecurityReviewDirectTrigger:
+    def test_trigger_is_pull_request_review_submitted(self):
+        wf = load_workflow("security-review.yml")
+        # PyYAML parses bare 'on' as boolean True.
+        on = wf[True]
+        assert "pull_request_review" in on, (
+            "security-review must trigger on pull_request_review"
+        )
+        types = on["pull_request_review"].get("types", [])
+        assert "submitted" in types, (
+            "pull_request_review must include 'submitted' type"
+        )
+
+    def test_job_guard_requires_approved_state(self):
+        wf = load_workflow("security-review.yml")
+        guard = _job_guard_string(wf)
+        assert "github.event.review.state == 'APPROVED'" in guard, (
+            "job guard must check review.state for 'APPROVED'"
+        )
+        assert "github.event.review.state == 'approved'" in guard, (
+            "job guard must check review.state for 'approved' (case fallback per #2135)"
+        )
+
+    def test_post_step_uses_status_post_token(self):
+        wf = load_workflow("security-review.yml")
+        post = _post_step(wf)
+        env = post.get("env", {})
+        assert env.get("GITEA_TOKEN") == "${{ secrets.STATUS_POST_TOKEN }}", (
+            "POST step must use STATUS_POST_TOKEN for write-scoped status POST"
+        )
+
+    def test_post_step_context_name_exact(self):
+        """The context POSTed must byte-match the branch-protection requirement."""
+        wf = load_workflow("security-review.yml")
+        post = _post_step(wf)
+        run = post.get("run", "")
+        assert '"security-review / approved (pull_request_target)"' in run, (
+            "POST step must emit exact BP-required context name"
+        )
+
+
+class TestRefireScriptContextName:
+    """review-refire-status.sh must emit the BP-required (pull_request_target) context."""
+
+    def test_refire_script_context_is_pull_request_target(self):
+        script = ROOT / "scripts" / "review-refire-status.sh"
+        content = script.read_text()
+        assert 'CONTEXT="${TEAM}-review / approved (pull_request_target)"' in content, (
+            "refire script CONTEXT must be the exact BP-required (pull_request_target) variant"
+        )
+        assert 'approved (pull_request)"' not in content, (
+            "refire script must NOT post bare (pull_request) context"
+        )
+
+
+class TestRefireTokenSeparation:
+    """The /qa-recheck + /security-recheck backstop must also use STATUS_POST_TOKEN."""
+
+    def _refire_step(self, workflow_name: str, step_name_keyword: str) -> dict:
+        wf = load_workflow(workflow_name)
+        jobs = wf["jobs"]
+        steps = jobs["review-refire"]["steps"]
+        for step in steps:
+            name = step.get("name", "")
+            if step_name_keyword in name:
+                return step
+        raise AssertionError(f"No refire step matching {step_name_keyword!r}")
+
+    def test_qa_refire_uses_status_post_token(self):
+        step = self._refire_step("sop-checklist.yml", "Refire qa-review")
+        env = step.get("env", {})
+        assert env.get("STATUS_POST_TOKEN") == "${{ secrets.STATUS_POST_TOKEN }}", (
+            "qa refire must receive STATUS_POST_TOKEN env var"
+        )
+        # Evaluator stays on read token
+        assert "SOP_TIER_CHECK_TOKEN" in env.get("GITEA_TOKEN", "") or "GITHUB_TOKEN" in env.get("GITEA_TOKEN", ""), (
+            "qa refire evaluator must stay on read-scoped token"
+        )
+
+    def test_security_refire_uses_status_post_token(self):
+        step = self._refire_step("sop-checklist.yml", "Refire security-review")
+        env = step.get("env", {})
+        assert env.get("STATUS_POST_TOKEN") == "${{ secrets.STATUS_POST_TOKEN }}", (
+            "security refire must receive STATUS_POST_TOKEN env var"
+        )
+        assert "SOP_TIER_CHECK_TOKEN" in env.get("GITEA_TOKEN", "") or "GITHUB_TOKEN" in env.get("GITEA_TOKEN", ""), (
+            "security refire evaluator must stay on read-scoped token"
+        )

.gitea/workflows/qa-review.yml

@@ -9,19 +9,19 @@
 #   Triggers on:
 #     - `pull_request_target`: opened, synchronize, reopened
 #         → initial status posts when PR opens / re-pushes
-#     - `pull_request_review_approved`
+#     - `pull_request_review` types: [submitted]
 #         → re-evaluate when a team member submits an APPROVE review so
 #           the gate flips immediately (no wait for the next push or
-#           slash-command). Gitea Actions uses the specific event name
-#           `pull_request_review_approved` (not the GitHub-style
-#           `pull_request_review` catch-all). Verified via Gitea source
-#           code audit (go-gitea/gitea main, modules/webhook/type.go +
-#           services/actions/notifier.go). The event payload carries
-#           `review.type="pull_request_review_approved"`; there is no
-#           `review.state` field. Branch-protection requires the
-#           `(pull_request_target)` context variant, so the
-#           pull_request_review_approved path EXPLICITLY POSTS the
-#           required context via the API. Trust boundary preserved
+#           slash-command). Verified live: sop-tier-check.yml uses this
+#           same event and provably fires (produces
+#           `sop-tier-check / tier-check (pull_request_review)` contexts).
+#           The job-level `if:` guard checks
+#           `github.event.review.state == 'APPROVED' || 'approved'` so
+#           only APPROVE reviews run the evaluator; COMMENT and
+#           REQUEST_CHANGES are skipped at the job level.
+#           Branch-protection requires the `(pull_request_target)`
+#           context variant, so the review-event path EXPLICITLY POSTS
+#           the required context via the API. Trust boundary preserved
 #           (BASE ref, no PR-head).
 #     - comment refires are handled by `sop-checklist.yml` review-refire job
 #         → `/qa-recheck` slash-command re-evaluates this gate.
@@ -97,7 +97,8 @@ name: qa-review
 on:
   pull_request_target:
     types: [opened, synchronize, reopened]
-  pull_request_review_approved:
+  pull_request_review:
+    types: [submitted]
 
 permissions:
   contents: read
@@ -114,7 +115,8 @@ jobs:
     # Comment-triggered refires live in sop-checklist.yml review-refire job.
     if: |
       github.event_name == 'pull_request_target' ||
-      github.event_name == 'pull_request_review_approved'
+      (github.event_name == 'pull_request_review' &&
+       (github.event.review.state == 'APPROVED' || github.event.review.state == 'approved'))
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
       - name: Privilege check (A1.1 — INFORMATIONAL log only, NOT a gate)
@@ -174,8 +176,8 @@ jobs:
           REVIEW_CHECK_STRICT: '0'
         run: bash .gitea/scripts/review-check.sh
 
-      - name: Post required status context on pull_request_review_approved
-        # Gitea Actions auto-publishes (pull_request_review_approved) context
+      - name: Post required status context on pull_request_review
+        # Gitea Actions auto-publishes (pull_request_review) context
         # for this event, but branch-protection requires (pull_request_target).
         # We explicitly POST the BP-required context so the gate flips.
         # Trust boundary: same BASE-ref script result, no PR-head code.
@@ -185,7 +187,7 @@ jobs:
         # for the explicit status POST. Evaluator step stays on
         # SOP_TIER_CHECK_TOKEN (read-only) per deliberate security
         # separation: eval computes, POST writes, never the same cred.
-        if: github.event_name == 'pull_request_review_approved' && always()
+        if: github.event_name == 'pull_request_review' && always()
         env:
           GITEA_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.STATUS_POST_TOKEN }}
           GITEA_HOST: git.moleculesai.app
@@ -211,10 +213,10 @@ jobs:
 
           if [ "$EVAL_OUTCOME" = "success" ]; then
             status_state="success"
-            description="Approved via pull_request_review_approved trigger"
+            description="Approved via pull_request_review trigger"
           else
             status_state="failure"
-            description="Review check failed via pull_request_review_approved trigger"
+            description="Review check failed via pull_request_review trigger"
           fi
 
           body=$(jq -nc \

.gitea/workflows/security-review.yml

@@ -7,24 +7,25 @@
 # See `qa-review.yml` header for the full A1-α / A1.1 / A4 / A5 design
 # rationale; everything below is identical in shape.
 #
-# A1-α addendum (internal#760): `pull_request_review_approved` trigger
-# added so the security gate flips immediately when a team member submits
-# an APPROVE review. Gitea Actions uses the specific event name
-# `pull_request_review_approved` (not the GitHub-style `pull_request_review`
-# catch-all). Verified via Gitea source code audit (go-gitea/gitea main,
-# modules/webhook/type.go + services/actions/notifier.go). The event
-# payload carries `review.type="pull_request_review_approved"`; there is
-# no `review.state` field. Branch-protection requires the
-# `(pull_request_target)` context variant, so the
-# pull_request_review_approved path EXPLICITLY POSTS the required context
-# via the API. Trust boundary preserved (BASE ref, no PR-head).
+# A1-α addendum (internal#760): review-event trigger added so the security
+# gate flips immediately when a team member submits an APPROVE review.
+# Uses `pull_request_review` types: [submitted] — verified live via
+# sop-tier-check.yml which provably fires this event (produces
+# `sop-tier-check / tier-check (pull_request_review)` contexts).
+# The job-level `if:` guard checks
+# `github.event.review.state == 'APPROVED' || 'approved'` so only APPROVE
+# reviews run the evaluator; COMMENT and REQUEST_CHANGES are skipped at
+# the job level. Branch-protection requires the `(pull_request_target)`
+# context variant, so the review-event path EXPLICITLY POSTS the required
+# context via the API. Trust boundary preserved (BASE ref, no PR-head).
 
 name: security-review
 
 on:
   pull_request_target:
     types: [opened, synchronize, reopened]
-  pull_request_review_approved:
+  pull_request_review:
+    types: [submitted]
 
 permissions:
   contents: read
@@ -41,7 +42,8 @@ jobs:
     # Comment-triggered refires live in sop-checklist.yml review-refire job.
     if: |
       github.event_name == 'pull_request_target' ||
-      github.event_name == 'pull_request_review_approved'
+      (github.event_name == 'pull_request_review' &&
+       (github.event.review.state == 'APPROVED' || github.event.review.state == 'approved'))
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
       - name: Privilege check (A1.1 — INFORMATIONAL log only, NOT a gate)
@@ -87,8 +89,8 @@ jobs:
           REVIEW_CHECK_STRICT: '0'
         run: bash .gitea/scripts/review-check.sh
 
-      - name: Post required status context on pull_request_review_approved
-        # Gitea Actions auto-publishes (pull_request_review_approved) context
+      - name: Post required status context on pull_request_review
+        # Gitea Actions auto-publishes (pull_request_review) context
         # for this event, but branch-protection requires (pull_request_target).
         # We explicitly POST the BP-required context so the gate flips.
         # Trust boundary: same BASE-ref script result, no PR-head code.
@@ -98,7 +100,7 @@ jobs:
         # for the explicit status POST. Evaluator step stays on
         # SOP_TIER_CHECK_TOKEN (read-only) per deliberate security
         # separation: eval computes, POST writes, never the same cred.
-        if: github.event_name == 'pull_request_review_approved' && always()
+        if: github.event_name == 'pull_request_review' && always()
         env:
           GITEA_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.STATUS_POST_TOKEN }}
           GITEA_HOST: git.moleculesai.app
@@ -124,10 +126,10 @@ jobs:
 
           if [ "$EVAL_OUTCOME" = "success" ]; then
             status_state="success"
-            description="Approved via pull_request_review_approved trigger"
+            description="Approved via pull_request_review trigger"
           else
             status_state="failure"
-            description="Review check failed via pull_request_review_approved trigger"
+            description="Review check failed via pull_request_review trigger"
           fi
 
           body=$(jq -nc \

.gitea/workflows/sop-checklist.yml

@@ -179,10 +179,10 @@ jobs:
       - name: Refire qa-review status
         if: steps.classify.outputs.run_qa == 'true'
         env:
-          # RFC_324_TEAM_READ_TOKEN is read-only (team membership read scope only).
-          # review-refire-status.sh POSTs to /statuses — requires write scope.
-          # SOP_TIER_CHECK_TOKEN carries write:repository + write:issue + read:organization.
+          # Evaluator (review-check.sh + GET /pulls) stays on read-scoped token.
           GITEA_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.SOP_TIER_CHECK_TOKEN || secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+          # Explicit POST /statuses uses narrow-scoped write:repository token.
+          STATUS_POST_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.STATUS_POST_TOKEN }}
           GITEA_HOST: git.moleculesai.app
           REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
           PR_NUMBER: ${{ github.event.issue.number }}
@@ -198,10 +198,10 @@ jobs:
       - name: Refire security-review status
         if: steps.classify.outputs.run_security == 'true'
         env:
-          # RFC_324_TEAM_READ_TOKEN is read-only (team membership read scope only).
-          # review-refire-status.sh POSTs to /statuses — requires write scope.
-          # SOP_TIER_CHECK_TOKEN carries write:repository + write:issue + read:organization.
+          # Evaluator (review-check.sh + GET /pulls) stays on read-scoped token.
           GITEA_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.SOP_TIER_CHECK_TOKEN || secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+          # Explicit POST /statuses uses narrow-scoped write:repository token.
+          STATUS_POST_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.STATUS_POST_TOKEN }}
           GITEA_HOST: git.moleculesai.app
           REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
           PR_NUMBER: ${{ github.event.issue.number }}

workspace-server/cmd/server/main.go

@@ -349,6 +349,17 @@ func main() {
 		codexauth.StartCodexAuthRefresher(c, db.DB)
 	})
 
+	// RFC internal#742 Part 2: wire the boot-failure rescue capture into
+	// the provision-timeout sweep's failure verdict. When the sweep flips
+	// a stuck workspace to `failed`, this hook captures a forensic rescue
+	// bundle off the still-running (but boot-failed) EC2 and ships it to
+	// obs/Loki before the control plane reaps the instance. Best-effort +
+	// non-blocking (handlers.BootFailureRescueHook dispatches on its own
+	// goroutine + timeout). The handler-side boot-failure path
+	// (WorkspaceHandler.BootstrapFailed) wires its own capture inline.
+	registry.BootFailureRescueHook = handlers.BootFailureRescueHook
+
+
 	// Provision-timeout sweep — flips workspaces that have been stuck in
 	// status='provisioning' past the timeout window to 'failed' and emits
 	// WORKSPACE_PROVISION_TIMEOUT. Without this the UI banner is cosmetic

workspace-server/internal/handlers/a2a_queue.go

@@ -246,20 +246,6 @@ func MarkQueueItemFailed(ctx context.Context, id, errMsg string) {
 	}
 }
 
-// QueueDepth returns the number of currently-queued (not dispatched/completed)
-// items for a workspace. Used by the busy-return response body so callers
-// can see how many ahead of them.
-func QueueDepth(ctx context.Context, workspaceID string) int {
-	var n int
-	if err := db.DB.QueryRowContext(ctx,
-		`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM a2a_queue WHERE workspace_id = $1 AND status = 'queued'`,
-		workspaceID,
-	).Scan(&n); err != nil {
-		log.Printf("A2AQueue: QueueDepth query failed for workspace %s: %v", workspaceID, err)
-	}
-	return n
-}
-
 // DropStaleQueueItems marks queued items older than maxAge as 'dropped' with a
 // system-generated reason so PM agents stop processing stale post-incident noise.
 // Called with a workspaceID to scope cleanup to one workspace, or empty to sweep

workspace-server/internal/handlers/llm_billing_mode_provision_parity_test.go

@@ -372,3 +372,78 @@ func TestApplyPlatformManagedLLMEnv_WorkspaceOriginCredExemptFromStrip(t *testin
 		t.Errorf("sqlmock expectations: %v", err)
 	}
 }
+
+// TestApplyPlatformManagedLLMEnv_MissingProxyEnvFailClosed is the #2162
+// regression guard. A platform-managed workspace whose CP proxy env is absent
+// must NOT start credential-less. The empty-proxy path must return
+// HasUsableLLMCred=false so the caller aborts with MISSING_PLATFORM_PROXY.
+//
+// Mutation: revert the early-return from HasUsableLLMCred=false to true
+// → workspace starts with zero credential → "container started but never
+// called /registry/register" (600s provision-timeout sweep) → this test RED.
+func TestApplyPlatformManagedLLMEnv_MissingProxyEnvFailClosed(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	const wsID = "29b95be9-811e-4857-be36-1dafdbf4f697" // adk-demo failure workspace
+
+	mock := setupTestDB(t)
+	expectOverrideQuery(mock, wsID, "")
+
+	// No proxy env present — simulates the boot-race / misconfig path.
+	envVars := map[string]string{}
+	res := applyPlatformManagedLLMEnv(ctx, envVars, wsID, "claude-code", "moonshot/kimi-k2.6", nil)
+
+	if res.ResolvedMode != LLMBillingModePlatformManaged {
+		t.Fatalf("platform-managed model must stay platform_managed, got %q (source=%s)", res.ResolvedMode, res.Source)
+	}
+	// THE FIX: must NOT report usable credential when none was injected.
+	if res.HasUsableLLMCred {
+		t.Fatalf("empty proxy env → HasUsableLLMCred must be false (fail-closed), got true — the #2162 dark-wedge class")
+	}
+	// No credential env must be present.
+	if _, present := envVars["ANTHROPIC_API_KEY"]; present {
+		t.Errorf("empty proxy env must NOT inject ANTHROPIC_API_KEY")
+	}
+	if _, present := envVars["MOLECULE_LLM_USAGE_TOKEN"]; present {
+		t.Errorf("empty proxy env must NOT inject MOLECULE_LLM_USAGE_TOKEN")
+	}
+	if err := mock.ExpectationsWereMet(); err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("sqlmock expectations: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestApplyPlatformManagedLLMEnv_ProxyEnvPresentInjectsCredential is the
+// positive-path pair to the #2162 regression guard: when the CP proxy env IS
+// present, the platform-managed path must inject ANTHROPIC_API_KEY +
+// ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL for an Anthropic-native runtime and report
+// HasUsableLLMCred=true.
+func TestApplyPlatformManagedLLMEnv_ProxyEnvPresentInjectsCredential(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	const wsID = "aaaaaaaa-bbbb-cccc-dddd-eeeeeeeeeeee"
+
+	mock := setupTestDB(t)
+	expectOverrideQuery(mock, wsID, "")
+
+	envVars := map[string]string{}
+	// Simulate the CP proxy env being present (as it is in production).
+	t.Setenv("MOLECULE_LLM_BASE_URL", "https://api.moleculesai.app/api/v1/internal/llm/openai/v1")
+	t.Setenv("MOLECULE_LLM_ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL", "https://api.moleculesai.app/api/v1/internal/llm/anthropic/v1")
+	t.Setenv("MOLECULE_LLM_USAGE_TOKEN", "PLATFORM-PROXY-TOKEN")
+
+	res := applyPlatformManagedLLMEnv(ctx, envVars, wsID, "claude-code", "moonshot/kimi-k2.6", nil)
+
+	if res.ResolvedMode != LLMBillingModePlatformManaged {
+		t.Fatalf("expected platform_managed, got %q", res.ResolvedMode)
+	}
+	if !res.HasUsableLLMCred {
+		t.Fatalf("proxy env present → HasUsableLLMCred must be true, got false")
+	}
+	if envVars["ANTHROPIC_API_KEY"] != "PLATFORM-PROXY-TOKEN" {
+		t.Errorf("ANTHROPIC_API_KEY must be injected with the platform proxy token; got %q", envVars["ANTHROPIC_API_KEY"])
+	}
+	if envVars["ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL"] != "https://api.moleculesai.app/api/v1/internal/llm/anthropic/v1" {
+		t.Errorf("ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL must be injected with the platform anthropic proxy; got %q", envVars["ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL"])
+	}
+	if err := mock.ExpectationsWereMet(); err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("sqlmock expectations: %v", err)
+	}
+}

workspace-server/internal/handlers/rescue_read.go

@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+package handlers
+
+// rescue_read.go — GET /workspaces/:id/rescue (RFC internal#742 Part 3).
+//
+// Serves the LATEST post-mortem rescue bundle captured for a
+// boot-failed/terminated workspace, so "why won't my agent boot" is
+// answerable WITHOUT a live instance. Powers the future canvas
+// "Why did this fail?" panel.
+//
+// Read-path: the bundle is read from the queryable rescue_bundles table
+// (internal/rescuestore), NOT from obs/Loki. Part 2 ships the bundle via
+// internal/audit (Loki-only); reading from Loki would require obs read
+// creds the tenant deliberately lacks. Part 3 persists the
+// already-redacted bundle on capture and serves it here — see the
+// migration header for the full rationale.
+//
+// Auth/scoping: registered on the WorkspaceAuth-guarded /workspaces/:id
+// group (same gate as /files/* and /exec), so the caller must hold a
+// valid per-workspace or org bearer token for :id. TenantGuard already
+// 404s cross-org requests at the routing layer; on top of that the store
+// read is org-scoped by MOLECULE_ORG_ID, so a row written under a
+// different org is never returned (defense in depth).
+//
+// Redaction: the stored sections were already scrubbed at capture time
+// (Part 2's SAFE-T1201 secret-scan). This handler returns them verbatim
+// — it never re-ships or re-derives secrets.
+
+import (
+	"log"
+	"net/http"
+	"os"
+	"time"
+
+	"git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-core/workspace-server/internal/db"
+	"git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-core/workspace-server/internal/rescuestore"
+	"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
+)
+
+// maxResponseSections bounds how many sections the read response
+// returns. The fixed capture set is small (6), so this is a backstop
+// against a future capture set growth or a hand-written row — keeps the
+// JSON response bounded regardless of what's stored. Per-section content
+// is already clamped at persist time (rescuestore.maxSectionBytes).
+const maxResponseSections = 64
+
+// RescueReadHandler serves GET /workspaces/:id/rescue. The store is
+// injected so tests fake it; production wires a Postgres store over
+// db.DB (see NewRescueReadHandler).
+type RescueReadHandler struct {
+	store rescuestore.Store
+}
+
+// NewRescueReadHandler builds the handler over the package db.DB. db.DB
+// is nil in some unit-test binaries; the handler tolerates that by
+// returning 503 rather than nil-deref (the store guards nil db).
+func NewRescueReadHandler() *RescueReadHandler {
+	return &RescueReadHandler{store: rescuestore.NewPostgres(db.DB)}
+}
+
+// WithStore overrides the store (test seam). Returns the handler for
+// chaining.
+func (h *RescueReadHandler) WithStore(s rescuestore.Store) *RescueReadHandler {
+	h.store = s
+	return h
+}
+
+// rescueSection is one labelled chunk in the read response.
+type rescueSection struct {
+	Name     string `json:"name"`
+	Content  string `json:"content"`
+	Redacted bool   `json:"redacted"`
+}
+
+// rescueReadResponse is the JSON shape returned for a found bundle.
+// `sections` is an ordered array (capture reading order), not a map, so
+// the order config→logs→state→env is preserved for the canvas panel.
+type rescueReadResponse struct {
+	WorkspaceID string          `json:"workspace_id"`
+	CapturedAt  time.Time       `json:"captured_at"`
+	Reason      string          `json:"reason"`
+	InstanceID  string          `json:"instance_id"`
+	Sections    []rescueSection `json:"sections"`
+	// Truncated is true when the stored bundle had more sections than
+	// maxResponseSections and the response was capped.
+	Truncated bool `json:"truncated,omitempty"`
+}
+
+// GetRescue handles GET /workspaces/:id/rescue.
+//
+//	200 — latest rescue bundle for the workspace (org-scoped).
+//	404 — no rescue bundle on file for this workspace (or wrong org).
+//	503 — store/datastore unavailable.
+func (h *RescueReadHandler) GetRescue(c *gin.Context) {
+	workspaceID := c.Param("id")
+	ctx := c.Request.Context()
+
+	if h.store == nil {
+		log.Printf("GetRescue: store not configured for ws=%s", workspaceID)
+		c.JSON(http.StatusServiceUnavailable, gin.H{
+			"error": "rescue store unavailable",
+			"code":  "platform_unavailable",
+		})
+		return
+	}
+
+	// org_id is the tenant's configured org (one tenant = one org).
+	// Fail closed: an empty org_id disables org isolation and must not
+	// reach the store (#2020).
+	orgID := os.Getenv("MOLECULE_ORG_ID")
+	if orgID == "" {
+		log.Printf("GetRescue: missing MOLECULE_ORG_ID for ws=%s", workspaceID)
+		c.JSON(http.StatusServiceUnavailable, gin.H{
+			"error": "rescue org not configured",
+			"code":  "platform_misconfigured",
+		})
+		return
+	}
+
+	stored, err := h.store.GetLatest(ctx, workspaceID, orgID)
+	if err != nil {
+		// Per the Store contract a missing bundle is (nil, nil), NOT an
+		// error — so any error here is a genuine datastore fault → 503,
+		// never a masquerading 404 that would hide an outage.
+		log.Printf("GetRescue: store query failed for ws=%s: %v", workspaceID, err)
+		c.JSON(http.StatusServiceUnavailable, gin.H{
+			"error": "rescue store query failed",
+			"code":  "platform_unavailable",
+		})
+		return
+	}
+	if stored == nil {
+		// No bundle captured (workspace never boot-failed, or its grace
+		// window lapsed). 404 — existence-non-inferring; a workspace in a
+		// sibling org reaches the same 404 via the org filter.
+		c.JSON(http.StatusNotFound, gin.H{"error": "no rescue bundle for this workspace"})
+		return
+	}
+
+	resp := buildRescueResponse(workspaceID, stored)
+	c.JSON(http.StatusOK, resp)
+}
+
+// buildRescueResponse maps a stored bundle to the read response, bounding
+// the section count. Split out so the mapping/limit is unit-testable.
+func buildRescueResponse(workspaceID string, stored *rescuestore.StoredBundle) rescueReadResponse {
+	secs := stored.Bundle.Sections
+	truncated := false
+	if len(secs) > maxResponseSections {
+		secs = secs[:maxResponseSections]
+		truncated = true
+	}
+	out := make([]rescueSection, 0, len(secs))
+	for _, s := range secs {
+		// rescue.Section and rescueSection are field-identical; the
+		// explicit conversion keeps the handler's JSON shape independent
+		// of the leaf package's struct (which could gain non-response
+		// fields later).
+		out = append(out, rescueSection(s))
+	}
+	return rescueReadResponse{
+		WorkspaceID: workspaceID,
+		CapturedAt:  stored.CapturedAt,
+		Reason:      stored.Bundle.Reason,
+		InstanceID:  stored.Bundle.InstanceID,
+		Sections:    out,
+		Truncated:   truncated,
+	}
+}

workspace-server/internal/handlers/rescue_read_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
+package handlers
+
+// Tests for GET /workspaces/:id/rescue (RFC internal#742 Part 3).
+//
+// These exercise the handler against a FAKE store (no DB) so every path
+// is deterministic without external infra:
+//   - returns the latest bundle in the documented shape
+//   - 404 when no bundle exists for the workspace
+//   - org-scoping: the handler passes the tenant's MOLECULE_ORG_ID to
+//     the store, so a fake that returns nil for a mismatched org proves a
+//     sibling org cannot read another org's bundle
+//   - 503 on a store/datastore error (not a 404 masquerade)
+//   - redaction/shape preserved: stored sections are returned verbatim,
+//     no re-derivation
+//
+// WorkspaceAuth gating itself is covered by the middleware tests; here we
+// invoke the handler directly (the route is registered on the wsAuth
+// group in router.go).
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-core/workspace-server/internal/rescue"
+	"git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-core/workspace-server/internal/rescuestore"
+	"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
+)
+
+func init() { gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode) }
+
+// fakeRescueStore records the args it was called with and returns a
+// scripted result. Implements rescuestore.Store.
+type fakeRescueStore struct {
+	// gotWorkspaceID/gotOrgID capture what the handler passed.
+	gotWorkspaceID string
+	gotOrgID       string
+	// ret/err are the scripted GetLatest result.
+	ret *rescuestore.StoredBundle
+	err error
+}
+
+func (f *fakeRescueStore) Persist(_ context.Context, _ rescue.Bundle) error { return nil }
+
+func (f *fakeRescueStore) GetLatest(_ context.Context, workspaceID, orgID string) (*rescuestore.StoredBundle, error) {
+	f.gotWorkspaceID = workspaceID
+	f.gotOrgID = orgID
+	return f.ret, f.err
+}
+
+// doRescueGet runs the handler for ws against the given fake and returns
+// the recorder. orgEnv sets MOLECULE_ORG_ID for the duration.
+func doRescueGet(t *testing.T, ws, orgEnv string, fake *fakeRescueStore) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
+	t.Helper()
+	t.Setenv("MOLECULE_ORG_ID", orgEnv)
+
+	h := (&RescueReadHandler{}).WithStore(fake)
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	c, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(w)
+	c.Params = gin.Params{{Key: "id", Value: ws}}
+	c.Request = httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/workspaces/"+ws+"/rescue", nil)
+	h.GetRescue(c)
+	return w
+}
+
+// sampleStored builds a representative stored bundle with a redacted +
+// a failure-marker section.
+func sampleStored() *rescuestore.StoredBundle {
+	return &rescuestore.StoredBundle{
+		CapturedAt: time.Date(2026, 5, 31, 12, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC),
+		Bundle: rescue.Bundle{
+			WorkspaceID: "ws-1",
+			OrgID:       "org-9",
+			InstanceID:  "i-abc123",
+			Reason:      "provision_timeout_sweep",
+			Sections: []rescue.Section{
+				{Name: "config.yaml", Content: "model: gpt-4\nANTHROPIC_API_KEY=[REDACTED]", Redacted: true},
+				{Name: "docker-ps", Content: "(rescue: section collection failed: ssh blip)", Redacted: false},
+			},
+		},
+	}
+}
+
+// TestGetRescue_ReturnsLatestBundle — happy path: 200 with the full
+// documented shape, sections in order, redaction-preserved.
+func TestGetRescue_ReturnsLatestBundle(t *testing.T) {
+	fake := &fakeRescueStore{ret: sampleStored()}
+	w := doRescueGet(t, "ws-1", "org-9", fake)
+
+	if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 200; body=%s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	var resp struct {
+		WorkspaceID string    `json:"workspace_id"`
+		CapturedAt  time.Time `json:"captured_at"`
+		Reason      string    `json:"reason"`
+		InstanceID  string    `json:"instance_id"`
+		Sections    []struct {
+			Name     string `json:"name"`
+			Content  string `json:"content"`
+			Redacted bool   `json:"redacted"`
+		} `json:"sections"`
+	}
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &resp); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("decode: %v; body=%s", err, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	if resp.WorkspaceID != "ws-1" {
+		t.Errorf("workspace_id = %q, want ws-1", resp.WorkspaceID)
+	}
+	if resp.Reason != "provision_timeout_sweep" {
+		t.Errorf("reason = %q", resp.Reason)
+	}
+	if resp.InstanceID != "i-abc123" {
+		t.Errorf("instance_id = %q", resp.InstanceID)
+	}
+	if !resp.CapturedAt.Equal(time.Date(2026, 5, 31, 12, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)) {
+		t.Errorf("captured_at = %v", resp.CapturedAt)
+	}
+	if len(resp.Sections) != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("sections = %d, want 2", len(resp.Sections))
+	}
+	// Order preserved: config first, docker-ps second.
+	if resp.Sections[0].Name != "config.yaml" || resp.Sections[1].Name != "docker-ps" {
+		t.Errorf("section order wrong: %q, %q", resp.Sections[0].Name, resp.Sections[1].Name)
+	}
+	// Redaction-preserved: the redacted flag rides through untouched, and
+	// the failure marker stays a non-redacted marker.
+	if !resp.Sections[0].Redacted {
+		t.Error("config.yaml section should be redacted=true")
+	}
+	if resp.Sections[1].Redacted {
+		t.Error("failure-marker section should be redacted=false")
+	}
+	// Handler does NOT re-derive secrets; stored [REDACTED] verbatim.
+	if want := "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=[REDACTED]"; !strings.Contains(resp.Sections[0].Content, want) {
+		t.Errorf("section content = %q, want it to contain %q", resp.Sections[0].Content, want)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestGetRescue_404WhenNone — no bundle on file → 404, not 500/200.
+func TestGetRescue_404WhenNone(t *testing.T) {
+	fake := &fakeRescueStore{ret: nil} // store returns (nil, nil)
+	w := doRescueGet(t, "ws-none", "org-9", fake)
+	if w.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
+		t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 404; body=%s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+}
+
+// TestGetRescue_OrgScopingPassedToStore — the handler must hand the
+// tenant's MOLECULE_ORG_ID to the store, and a store that returns nil for
+// a mismatched org yields 404. This is the sibling-org isolation: a
+// caller in org B (a different tenant process, MOLECULE_ORG_ID=org-B)
+// reading ws-1 (which belongs to org-9) gets the org filter applied → no
+// row → 404.
+func TestGetRescue_OrgScopingPassedToStore(t *testing.T) {
+	// Tenant configured as a DIFFERENT org than the bundle's owner.
+	// Fake mimics the Postgres org filter: returns nil because org-B
+	// doesn't match the row's org-9.
+	fake := &fakeRescueStore{ret: nil}
+	w := doRescueGet(t, "ws-1", "org-B", fake)
+
+	if fake.gotOrgID != "org-B" {
+		t.Errorf("store got org_id = %q, want the tenant's org-B", fake.gotOrgID)
+	}
+	if fake.gotWorkspaceID != "ws-1" {
+		t.Errorf("store got workspace_id = %q, want ws-1", fake.gotWorkspaceID)
+	}
+	if w.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
+		t.Fatalf("sibling-org read: status = %d, want 404", w.Code)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestGetRescue_EmptyOrgEnvRejected — empty MOLECULE_ORG_ID is a
+// fail-closed security violation (#2020). The handler must 503 before
+// calling the store, so the org filter cannot be bypassed.
+func TestGetRescue_EmptyOrgEnvRejected(t *testing.T) {
+	fake := &fakeRescueStore{ret: sampleStored()}
+	w := doRescueGet(t, "ws-1", "", fake)
+	if fake.gotOrgID != "" {
+		t.Errorf("store was called with org_id = %q; want no call when env empty", fake.gotOrgID)
+	}
+	if w.Code != http.StatusServiceUnavailable {
+		t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 503; body=%s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(w.Body.String(), "platform_misconfigured") {
+		t.Fatalf("body = %s, want platform_misconfigured code", w.Body.String())
+	}
+}
+
+// TestGetRescue_StoreErrorIs503 — an actual datastore error must surface
+// as 503, never a 404 (which would hide an outage as "no bundle").
+func TestGetRescue_StoreErrorIs503(t *testing.T) {
+	fake := &fakeRescueStore{err: errors.New("connection refused")}
+	w := doRescueGet(t, "ws-1", "org-9", fake)
+	if w.Code != http.StatusServiceUnavailable {
+		t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 503; body=%s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+}
+
+// TestGetRescue_NilStoreIs503 — defensive: a handler with no store wired
+// (db.DB nil in a degraded boot) returns 503, never panics.
+func TestGetRescue_NilStoreIs503(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv("MOLECULE_ORG_ID", "org-9")
+	h := &RescueReadHandler{} // store == nil
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	c, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(w)
+	c.Params = gin.Params{{Key: "id", Value: "ws-1"}}
+	c.Request = httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/workspaces/ws-1/rescue", nil)
+	h.GetRescue(c)
+	if w.Code != http.StatusServiceUnavailable {
+		t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 503", w.Code)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestBuildRescueResponse_BoundsSections — a stored bundle with more than
+// maxResponseSections sections is capped + flagged truncated.
+func TestBuildRescueResponse_BoundsSections(t *testing.T) {
+	many := make([]rescue.Section, maxResponseSections+5)
+	for i := range many {
+		many[i] = rescue.Section{Name: "s", Content: "c", Redacted: true}
+	}
+	stored := &rescuestore.StoredBundle{
+		CapturedAt: time.Now(),
+		Bundle:     rescue.Bundle{WorkspaceID: "ws-1", Sections: many},
+	}
+	resp := buildRescueResponse("ws-1", stored)
+	if len(resp.Sections) != maxResponseSections {
+		t.Errorf("sections = %d, want capped at %d", len(resp.Sections), maxResponseSections)
+	}
+	if !resp.Truncated {
+		t.Error("truncated flag should be set when sections were capped")
+	}
+}

workspace-server/internal/handlers/rescue_wiring.go

@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+package handlers
+
+// rescue_wiring.go — bridges the leaf internal/rescue package to the
+// handlers package's EIC/SSH runner + secret redactor, and exposes the
+// boot-failure rescue hook used by both boot-failure verdict paths
+// (handlers.BootstrapFailed here, registry.sweepStuckProvisioning via
+// an injected hook wired in main.go).
+//
+// Why the indirection: internal/rescue is a leaf so registry (which
+// must NOT import handlers — that's an import cycle) can call it. The
+// two heavy dependencies live here in handlers — `withEICTunnel`
+// (the EIC keypair → push → tunnel → ssh dance) and `redactSecrets`
+// (the SAFE-T1201 secret-scan) — so we inject them into rescue's
+// package-level func vars at init().
+//
+// RFC internal#742 Part 2.
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"database/sql"
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"os/exec"
+	"strings"
+
+	"git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-core/workspace-server/internal/db"
+	"git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-core/workspace-server/internal/rescue"
+	"git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-core/workspace-server/internal/rescuestore"
+)
+
+func init() {
+	// Wire the leaf rescue package to handlers' EIC runner + redactor.
+	// Done in init() (not main.go) so the binding is present for any
+	// caller of rescue.Capture, including the registry sweeper hook and
+	// the handler path, without each call site re-wiring it.
+	rescue.RunRemote = rescueRunRemoteViaEIC
+	rescue.Redact = func(workspaceID, content string) string {
+		out, _ := redactSecrets(workspaceID, content)
+		return out
+	}
+	// Part 3: persist the redacted bundle to the queryable store on
+	// capture so GET /workspaces/:id/rescue can serve it without obs/Loki
+	// read creds. db.DB is resolved per-call (rescuestore guards a nil
+	// handle) so wiring at init() is safe even before InitPostgres has
+	// run; a capture before the DB is up logs + skips the persist rather
+	// than failing the boot-failure path.
+	rescue.PersistBundle = func(ctx context.Context, b rescue.Bundle) error {
+		return rescuestore.NewPostgres(db.DB).Persist(ctx, b)
+	}
+}
+
+// rescueRunRemoteViaEIC runs a single shell command on the still-running
+// (but boot-failed) workspace EC2 over an EIC tunnel and returns its
+// combined stdout+stderr. Reuses the same `withEICTunnel` dance as the
+// canvas file ops (ephemeral keypair → SendSSHPublicKey → open-tunnel →
+// ssh) so the rescue path inherits every fix to the EIC mechanism (e.g.
+// PR #2822's LogLevel=ERROR shim) for free.
+//
+// Combined output (2>&1) is intentional: a boot-failed box's most
+// useful signal is often on stderr (a panic, a missing-file error), and
+// the rescue bundle is a forensic blob, not a parsed value — we want
+// everything the command emitted.
+func rescueRunRemoteViaEIC(ctx context.Context, instanceID, command string) (string, error) {
+	var combined []byte
+	runErr := withEICTunnel(ctx, instanceID, func(s eicSSHSession) error {
+		sshCmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, "ssh", s.sshArgs(command)...)
+		sshCmd.Env = os.Environ()
+		var buf bytes.Buffer
+		sshCmd.Stdout = &buf
+		sshCmd.Stderr = &buf
+		// A non-zero remote exit is NOT a transport error for the rescue
+		// path — each section command already falls back to an
+		// `|| echo '(...)'` marker, so a clean exit is expected. Only
+		// surface an error when ssh/tunnel itself failed AND produced no
+		// output to ship.
+		err := sshCmd.Run()
+		combined = buf.Bytes()
+		if err != nil && len(combined) == 0 {
+			return fmt.Errorf("rescue ssh exec: %w", err)
+		}
+		return nil
+	})
+	if runErr != nil {
+		return "", runErr
+	}
+	return strings.TrimRight(string(combined), "\n"), nil
+}
+
+// captureRescueBundle fires a best-effort, non-blocking rescue capture
+// for a boot-failed workspace. It is the single entry point both
+// boot-failure verdict paths funnel through.
+//
+// NON-BLOCKING: the actual collection runs in its own goroutine with
+// its own timeout (rescue.CaptureTimeout), detached from the caller's
+// request/sweep context so it can't add latency to — or be cancelled
+// by — the failure-handling path that triggered it. We snapshot the
+// identity into a fresh context.Background() for the same reason: a
+// gin request context is cancelled the instant the HTTP handler
+// returns, which would kill the EIC tunnel mid-collection.
+//
+// instanceID/orgID are resolved here (best-effort) so the two call
+// sites only need the workspace id. A missing instance id → rescue.Capture
+// no-ops (logged), so an early-failure workspace that never got an EC2
+// is handled cleanly.
+func captureRescueBundle(workspaceID, reason string) {
+	rescueDispatch(func() {
+		ctx := context.Background()
+		instanceID, err := rescueResolveInstanceID(ctx, workspaceID)
+		if err != nil {
+			// Best-effort: a resolve failure is logged inside Capture's
+			// caller chain; pass empty so Capture no-ops cleanly.
+			instanceID = ""
+		}
+		rescue.Capture(ctx, rescue.Input{
+			InstanceID:  instanceID,
+			WorkspaceID: workspaceID,
+			OrgID:       os.Getenv("MOLECULE_ORG_ID"),
+			Reason:      reason,
+		})
+	})
+}
+
+// rescueDispatch runs the rescue collection off the request path. In
+// production it's `go fn()` so the capture never blocks or adds latency
+// to the boot-failure handler. Tests swap it for a synchronous runner so
+// they can assert the capture fired (or didn't) deterministically
+// without racing the goroutine.
+var rescueDispatch = func(fn func()) { go fn() }
+
+// BootFailureRescueHook is the registry-facing adapter wired into
+// registry.BootFailureRescueHook from main.go. The registry sweeper
+// already resolved the instance id (it's in the candidate row), so this
+// path uses it directly rather than re-querying — symmetric with the
+// captureRescueBundle handler path but skipping the lookup.
+//
+// Best-effort + non-blocking: dispatches the capture on its own
+// goroutine with its own timeout, so the sweep loop is never slowed.
+func BootFailureRescueHook(workspaceID, instanceID, reason string) {
+	go rescue.Capture(context.Background(), rescue.Input{
+		InstanceID:  instanceID,
+		WorkspaceID: workspaceID,
+		OrgID:       os.Getenv("MOLECULE_ORG_ID"),
+		Reason:      reason,
+	})
+}
+
+// rescueResolveInstanceID looks up the EC2 instance id for a workspace.
+// Package var so tests can stub it without a sqlmock. Mirrors
+// provisioner.resolveInstanceID (same query) but lives here to keep the
+// rescue wiring self-contained and avoid widening the provisioner
+// surface.
+var rescueResolveInstanceID = func(ctx context.Context, workspaceID string) (string, error) {
+	if db.DB == nil {
+		return "", nil // nil in unit tests
+	}
+	var instanceID sql.NullString
+	err := db.DB.QueryRowContext(ctx,
+		`SELECT instance_id FROM workspaces WHERE id = $1`, workspaceID,
+	).Scan(&instanceID)
+	if err != nil && err != sql.ErrNoRows {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	if !instanceID.Valid {
+		return "", nil
+	}
+	return instanceID.String, nil
+}

workspace-server/internal/handlers/rescue_wiring_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+package handlers
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"testing"
+
+	"git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-core/workspace-server/internal/models"
+	"git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-core/workspace-server/internal/rescue"
+	"github.com/DATA-DOG/go-sqlmock"
+	"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
+)
+
+// rescueTestHarness makes the otherwise-async rescue capture
+// deterministic + observable for handler tests:
+//   - rescueDispatch runs synchronously (no goroutine race).
+//   - rescueResolveInstanceID returns a fixed instance id.
+//   - rescue.RunRemote / rescue.Redact are stubbed so no real EIC/SSH
+//     fires; runCalls counts how many remote-command collections ran,
+//     which is the proxy for "did the capture fire".
+//
+// All originals are restored on cleanup.
+func rescueTestHarness(t *testing.T, instanceID string) (runCalls *int) {
+	t.Helper()
+	n := 0
+	runCalls = &n
+
+	prevDispatch := rescueDispatch
+	rescueDispatch = func(fn func()) { fn() } // synchronous
+	prevResolve := rescueResolveInstanceID
+	rescueResolveInstanceID = func(_ context.Context, _ string) (string, error) { return instanceID, nil }
+	prevRun, prevRedact := rescue.RunRemote, rescue.Redact
+	rescue.RunRemote = func(_ context.Context, _ string, _ string) (string, error) { n++; return "out", nil }
+	rescue.Redact = func(_ws, c string) string { return c }
+
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		rescueDispatch = prevDispatch
+		rescueResolveInstanceID = prevResolve
+		rescue.RunRemote = prevRun
+		rescue.Redact = prevRedact
+	})
+	return runCalls
+}
+
+// TestBootstrapFailed_FiresRescueOnFlip — the RFC internal#742 handler
+// hook: when BootstrapFailed actually flips a workspace to `failed`
+// (affected==1), the rescue capture fires against the resolved instance.
+func TestBootstrapFailed_FiresRescueOnFlip(t *testing.T) {
+	h, mock := setupBootstrapHandler(t)
+	runCalls := rescueTestHarness(t, "i-failed01")
+
+	mock.ExpectExec(`UPDATE workspaces`).
+		WithArgs("ws-crashed", sqlmock.AnyArg(), models.StatusFailed).
+		WillReturnResult(sqlmock.NewResult(0, 1))
+	mock.ExpectExec(`INSERT INTO structure_events`).
+		WithArgs("WORKSPACE_PROVISION_FAILED", "ws-crashed", sqlmock.AnyArg()).
+		WillReturnResult(sqlmock.NewResult(0, 1))
+
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	c, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(w)
+	c.Params = gin.Params{{Key: "id", Value: "ws-crashed"}}
+	c.Request = httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/admin/workspaces/ws-crashed/bootstrap-failed",
+		bytes.NewBufferString(`{"error":"codex provider derivation failed","log_tail":"panic"}`))
+	c.Request.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+
+	h.BootstrapFailed(c)
+
+	if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("want 200, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	if *runCalls != len(rescueBundleSectionCount()) {
+		t.Errorf("rescue capture ran %d remote commands, want %d (one per bundle section)", *runCalls, len(rescueBundleSectionCount()))
+	}
+}
+
+// TestBootstrapFailed_NoRescueOnNoChange — an already-transitioned
+// workspace (affected==0: raced to online, or double-report) is NOT a
+// boot-failure verdict here, so the rescue capture must NOT fire.
+func TestBootstrapFailed_NoRescueOnNoChange(t *testing.T) {
+	h, mock := setupBootstrapHandler(t)
+	runCalls := rescueTestHarness(t, "i-online01")
+
+	mock.ExpectExec(`UPDATE workspaces`).
+		WithArgs("ws-online", sqlmock.AnyArg(), models.StatusFailed).
+		WillReturnResult(sqlmock.NewResult(0, 0)) // already transitioned
+
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	c, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(w)
+	c.Params = gin.Params{{Key: "id", Value: "ws-online"}}
+	c.Request = httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/admin/workspaces/ws-online/bootstrap-failed",
+		bytes.NewBufferString(`{"error":"late report","log_tail":""}`))
+	c.Request.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+
+	h.BootstrapFailed(c)
+
+	if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("want 200, got %d", w.Code)
+	}
+	if *runCalls != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("rescue capture fired (%d cmds) on a no-change report; it must only fire on a real flip", *runCalls)
+	}
+}
+
+// rescueBundleSectionCount returns the production rescue bundle section
+// list length by running a capture against a counting runner once. It's
+// a small indirection so the handler test stays decoupled from the exact
+// section set in internal/rescue (which has its own tests).
+func rescueBundleSectionCount() []struct{} {
+	count := 0
+	prevRun, prevRedact := rescue.RunRemote, rescue.Redact
+	rescue.RunRemote = func(_ context.Context, _ string, _ string) (string, error) { count++; return "", nil }
+	rescue.Redact = func(_ws, c string) string { return c }
+	rescue.Capture(context.Background(), rescue.Input{InstanceID: "i-probe", WorkspaceID: "w", OrgID: "o"})
+	rescue.RunRemote = prevRun
+	rescue.Redact = prevRedact
+	return make([]struct{}, count)
+}

workspace-server/internal/handlers/workspace_bootstrap.go

@@ -91,6 +91,18 @@ func (h *WorkspaceHandler) BootstrapFailed(c *gin.Context) {
 		"log_tail": tail,
 		"source":   "bootstrap_watcher",
 	})
+
+	// RFC internal#742 Part 2: this is one of the two boot-failure
+	// verdict points. We've just flipped a still-running (but
+	// unconfigured) workspace EC2 to `failed`; the control plane will
+	// reap the instance shortly. Capture a forensic rescue bundle off
+	// the live box NOW, before it's torn down, so a wedged workspace is
+	// post-mortem-inspectable. Best-effort + non-blocking: runs in its
+	// own goroutine with its own timeout, detached from this request's
+	// context (which is cancelled the instant this handler returns).
+	// Failure to capture never changes the boot-failure handling.
+	captureRescueBundle(id, "bootstrap_watcher")
+
 	log.Printf("BootstrapFailed: marked %s failed (tail=%d bytes, err=%q)", id, len(tail), errMsg)
 	c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"ok": true})
 }

workspace-server/internal/handlers/workspace_preflight.go

@@ -93,3 +93,16 @@ func formatMissingBYOKCredentialError(mode string) string {
 		mode,
 	)
 }
+
+// formatMissingPlatformProxyError builds the user-facing message for a
+// provision failure caused by a platform-managed workspace whose control-plane
+// proxy environment is absent (#2162). The platform-managed path requires
+// MOLECULE_LLM_BASE_URL + MOLECULE_LLM_USAGE_TOKEN (or their OPENAI_*
+// fallbacks) to inject a usable credential; without them the workspace must
+// NOT start credential-less.
+func formatMissingPlatformProxyError() string {
+	return "this workspace is configured for platform-managed LLM billing but the control-plane proxy is not ready. " +
+		"The required platform proxy env (MOLECULE_LLM_BASE_URL + MOLECULE_LLM_USAGE_TOKEN) is absent. " +
+		"This is usually a transient boot-race; retry in 30 seconds. If it persists, verify the platform proxy " +
+		"is configured for this tenant/runtime and contact the platform team."
+}

workspace-server/internal/handlers/workspace_provision.go

@@ -1003,12 +1003,13 @@ func applyPlatformManagedLLMEnv(ctx context.Context, envVars map[string]string,
 	anthropicBaseURL := firstNonEmptyEnv("MOLECULE_LLM_ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL", "ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL")
 	token := firstNonEmptyEnv("MOLECULE_LLM_USAGE_TOKEN", "OPENAI_API_KEY")
 	if baseURL == "" || token == "" {
-		// Proxy not configured (boot race / misconfig). On the platform_managed
-		// path the workspace IS entitled to platform creds, so we do NOT strip
-		// here — but we report HasUsableLLMCred from whatever survived so the
-		// caller's fail-closed branch (non-platform only) is never reached on
-		// this path.
-		return platformLLMEnvResult{ResolvedMode: res.ResolvedMode, HasUsableLLMCred: true, Source: res.Source}
+		// Proxy not configured (boot race / misconfig). The platform_managed
+		// path REQUIRES the CP proxy env to inject a usable credential.
+		// Reporting HasUsableLLMCred=true here would start the workspace
+		// credential-less — the adk-demo dark-wedge class (#2162).
+		// Return false so the caller's fail-closed branch aborts with
+		// MISSING_PLATFORM_PROXY.
+		return platformLLMEnvResult{ResolvedMode: res.ResolvedMode, HasUsableLLMCred: false, Source: res.Source}
 	}
 	stripPlatformManagedLLMBypassEnv(envVars)
 

workspace-server/internal/handlers/workspace_provision_auto_test.go

@@ -134,6 +134,11 @@ func TestProvisionWorkspaceAuto_NoBackendMarksFailed(t *testing.T) {
 // This is the regression-prevention test for the Design Director bug
 // where 7-of-7 sub-agents went down the Docker path on SaaS.
 func TestProvisionWorkspaceAuto_RoutesToCPWhenSet(t *testing.T) {
+	// Supply the CP proxy env so the platform-managed default does not abort
+	// with MISSING_PLATFORM_PROXY (molecule-core#2162).
+	t.Setenv("MOLECULE_LLM_BASE_URL", "https://api.example.test/api/v1/internal/llm/openai/v1")
+	t.Setenv("MOLECULE_LLM_USAGE_TOKEN", "tenant-admin-token")
+
 	mock := setupTestDB(t)
 	mock.MatchExpectationsInOrder(false)
 
@@ -597,6 +602,11 @@ func TestNoCallSiteCallsBareStop(t *testing.T) {
 // count without mocking out the retry helper itself, which would
 // invert the test contract — the retry IS the dispatcher's job here).
 func TestRestartWorkspaceAuto_RoutesToCPWhenSet(t *testing.T) {
+	// Supply the CP proxy env so the platform-managed default does not abort
+	// with MISSING_PLATFORM_PROXY (molecule-core#2162).
+	t.Setenv("MOLECULE_LLM_BASE_URL", "https://api.example.test/api/v1/internal/llm/openai/v1")
+	t.Setenv("MOLECULE_LLM_USAGE_TOKEN", "tenant-admin-token")
+
 	rec := &trackingCPProv{}
 	bcast := &concurrentSafeBroadcaster{}
 	h := NewWorkspaceHandler(bcast, nil, "http://localhost:8080", t.TempDir())
@@ -795,6 +805,11 @@ func TestResumeHandler_UsesProvisionWorkspaceAuto(t *testing.T) {
 // the async tests; the absence of `go` semantics is the load-bearing
 // distinction we're pinning.
 func TestProvisionWorkspaceAutoSync_RoutesToCPWhenSet(t *testing.T) {
+	// Supply the CP proxy env so the platform-managed default does not abort
+	// with MISSING_PLATFORM_PROXY (molecule-core#2162).
+	t.Setenv("MOLECULE_LLM_BASE_URL", "https://api.example.test/api/v1/internal/llm/openai/v1")
+	t.Setenv("MOLECULE_LLM_USAGE_TOKEN", "tenant-admin-token")
+
 	mock := setupTestDB(t)
 	mock.MatchExpectationsInOrder(false)
 	// provisionWorkspaceCP runs prepareProvisionContext synchronously, which

workspace-server/internal/handlers/workspace_provision_concurrent_repro_test.go

@@ -98,6 +98,11 @@ func (r *recordingCPProv) startedSet() map[string]struct{} {
 func TestProvisionWorkspaceCP_ConcurrentBurst_NoSilentDrop(t *testing.T) {
 	const numWorkspaces = 7
 
+	// Supply the CP proxy env so the platform-managed default does not abort
+	// with MISSING_PLATFORM_PROXY (molecule-core#2162).
+	t.Setenv("MOLECULE_LLM_BASE_URL", "https://api.example.test/api/v1/internal/llm/openai/v1")
+	t.Setenv("MOLECULE_LLM_USAGE_TOKEN", "tenant-admin-token")
+
 	mock := setupTestDB(t)
 
 	// Every goroutine runs prepareProvisionContext → mintWorkspaceSecrets

workspace-server/internal/handlers/workspace_provision_shared.go

@@ -230,6 +230,18 @@ func (h *WorkspaceHandler) prepareProvisionContext(
 			Extra: map[string]interface{}{"error": msg, "code": "MISSING_BYOK_CREDENTIAL", "billing_mode": llmRes.ResolvedMode, "issue": "1994"},
 		}
 	}
+	// Fail closed for a platform-managed workspace whose CP proxy env is
+	// absent: do NOT start it credential-less (adk-demo dark-wedge class,
+	// #2162). The platform_managed path requires the proxy injection to
+	// produce a usable credential.
+	if llmRes.ResolvedMode == LLMBillingModePlatformManaged && !llmRes.HasUsableLLMCred {
+		msg := formatMissingPlatformProxyError()
+		log.Printf("Provisioner: ABORT workspace=%s — platform-managed billing mode but CP proxy env absent (MISSING_PLATFORM_PROXY, molecule-core#2162)", workspaceID)
+		return nil, &provisionAbort{
+			Msg:   msg,
+			Extra: map[string]interface{}{"error": msg, "code": "MISSING_PLATFORM_PROXY", "billing_mode": llmRes.ResolvedMode, "issue": "2162"},
+		}
+	}
 	applyRuntimeModelEnv(envVars, payload.Runtime, payload.Model)
 	if payload.Role != "" {
 		envVars["MOLECULE_AGENT_ROLE"] = payload.Role

workspace-server/internal/handlers/workspace_provision_shared_test.go

@@ -264,6 +264,11 @@ func TestPrepareProvisionContext_ParentIDInjection(t *testing.T) {
 		},
 	}
 
+	// Supply the CP proxy env so the platform-managed default does not abort
+	// with MISSING_PLATFORM_PROXY (molecule-core#2162).
+	t.Setenv("MOLECULE_LLM_BASE_URL", "https://api.example.test/api/v1/internal/llm/openai/v1")
+	t.Setenv("MOLECULE_LLM_USAGE_TOKEN", "tenant-admin-token")
+
 	for _, tc := range cases {
 		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			mock := setupTestDB(t)
@@ -331,6 +336,10 @@ func TestPrepareProvisionContext_InjectsGitHTTPCredsFromPersonaToken(t *testing.
 		}
 	}
 	t.Setenv("MOLECULE_PERSONA_ROOT", root)
+	// Supply the CP proxy env so the platform-managed default does not abort
+	// with MISSING_PLATFORM_PROXY (molecule-core#2162).
+	t.Setenv("MOLECULE_LLM_BASE_URL", "https://api.example.test/api/v1/internal/llm/openai/v1")
+	t.Setenv("MOLECULE_LLM_USAGE_TOKEN", "tenant-admin-token")
 
 	cases := []struct {
 		name         string
@@ -459,6 +468,10 @@ func TestPrepareProvisionContext_WorkspaceSecretWinsOverPersonaToken(t *testing.
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
 	t.Setenv("MOLECULE_PERSONA_ROOT", root)
+	// Supply the CP proxy env so the platform-managed default does not abort
+	// with MISSING_PLATFORM_PROXY (molecule-core#2162).
+	t.Setenv("MOLECULE_LLM_BASE_URL", "https://api.example.test/api/v1/internal/llm/openai/v1")
+	t.Setenv("MOLECULE_LLM_USAGE_TOKEN", "tenant-admin-token")
 
 	mock := setupTestDB(t)
 	mock.ExpectQuery(`SELECT key, encrypted_value, encryption_version FROM global_secrets`).

workspace-server/internal/handlers/workspace_provision_test.go

@@ -1424,6 +1424,11 @@ func (s *stubFailingCPProv) IsRunning(_ context.Context, _ string) (bool, error)
 // the broadcast payload would surface every marker; the canned
 // "provisioning failed" message must surface none of them.
 func TestProvisionWorkspaceCP_NoInternalErrorsInBroadcast(t *testing.T) {
+	// Supply the CP proxy env so the platform-managed default does not abort
+	// with MISSING_PLATFORM_PROXY (molecule-core#2162).
+	t.Setenv("MOLECULE_LLM_BASE_URL", "https://api.example.test/api/v1/internal/llm/openai/v1")
+	t.Setenv("MOLECULE_LLM_USAGE_TOKEN", "tenant-admin-token")
+
 	mock := setupTestDB(t)
 
 	// loadWorkspaceSecrets queries global_secrets and workspace_secrets

workspace-server/internal/registry/cp_orphan_sweeper_test.go

@@ -10,8 +10,15 @@ import (
 	"github.com/DATA-DOG/go-sqlmock"
 
 	"git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-core/workspace-server/internal/db"
+	"git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-core/workspace-server/internal/rescue"
 )
 
+// rescueVolumeGraceHours surfaces the rescue grace as whole hours for
+// the retention-contract assertion (RFC internal#742 Part 2).
+func rescueVolumeGraceHours() int {
+	return int(rescue.RescueVolumeGrace.Hours())
+}
+
 // fakeCPReaper is a hand-rolled CPOrphanReaper for the SaaS-mode
 // sweeper tests. Records every Stop call so tests can assert which
 // workspace IDs were re-issued.
@@ -97,6 +104,55 @@ func TestCPSweepOnce_NoOrphans(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// TestCPSweepOnce_DoesNotReapFailedWorkspace — RFC internal#742 Part 2
+// volume-retention guarantee, molecule-core side.
+//
+// A boot-FAILED workspace (status='failed') must NOT be terminated by
+// the platform's orphan sweeper: its instance + /configs data volume are
+// retained through the rescue grace (rescue.RescueVolumeGrace) so a live
+// rescue read is possible, distinct from the user-prune erase path. The
+// sweeper reaps ONLY status='removed' (the explicit deprovision path),
+// so a `failed` row is structurally excluded at the SELECT — it never
+// reaches reaper.Stop. We assert the predicate filters to 'removed'
+// (so the failed instance survives) and that no Stop fires for a DB
+// whose only orphan-shaped row is `failed`.
+//
+// This is the "if the sweeper already keeps volumes by default, confirm
+// + add a test asserting it" branch of the RFC: it does, by construction.
+func TestCPSweepOnce_DoesNotReapFailedWorkspace(t *testing.T) {
+	mock := setupTestDB(t)
+	reaper := &fakeCPReaper{}
+
+	// The sweeper's SELECT carries `status = 'removed'`. A boot-failed
+	// workspace (status='failed') does not match that predicate, so the
+	// real DB returns it nowhere in this result set — modelled as the
+	// empty result the `removed`-only filter produces when the only
+	// instance-bearing row is `failed`. The regex pins the retention-
+	// critical predicate so a future widening to include 'failed' (which
+	// would terminate boot-failed boxes mid-rescue) fails this test.
+	mock.ExpectQuery(`(?s)WHERE status = 'removed'\s+AND instance_id IS NOT NULL`).
+		WithArgs(cpSweepLimit).
+		WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"id"})) // failed row excluded by predicate
+
+	cpSweepOnce(context.Background(), reaper)
+
+	if len(reaper.stopCalls) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("boot-failed workspace must be RETAINED (no terminate); got Stop calls %v", reaper.stopCalls)
+	}
+	if err := mock.ExpectationsWereMet(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("unmet expectations: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestRescueVolumeGraceIsDistinctFromPrune documents that the rescue
+// grace is its own contract (24h) and not coupled to any prune timing —
+// the value is the SSOT the control-plane reaper must honour.
+func TestRescueVolumeGraceIsDistinctFromPrune(t *testing.T) {
+	if rescueVolumeGraceHours() != 24 {
+		t.Errorf("rescue volume grace = %dh, want 24h (RFC internal#742)", rescueVolumeGraceHours())
+	}
+}
+
 // TestCPSweepOnce_MultipleOrphans — all rows in the batch get Stop'd
 // independently; one failure doesn't block others.
 func TestCPSweepOnce_MultipleOrphans(t *testing.T) {

workspace-server/internal/registry/provisiontimeout.go

@@ -92,6 +92,23 @@ func provisioningTimeoutFor(runtime string, lookup RuntimeTimeoutLookup) time.Du
 	return DefaultProvisioningTimeout
 }
 
+// BootFailureRescueHook, when wired, is invoked once per workspace the
+// sweep flips from `provisioning` to `failed` — i.e. on the boot-failure
+// verdict, BEFORE the control plane reaps the instance. It captures a
+// forensic rescue bundle off the still-running (but boot-failed) EC2 and
+// ships it to obs/Loki (RFC internal#742 Part 2). Wired in main.go to
+// handlers.captureRescueBundle via a thin adapter; nil in tests + on
+// self-hosted deploys (no rescue shipping there).
+//
+// Function-typed injection (not an import of handlers) keeps the
+// existing handlers→registry import direction intact — registry must not
+// import handlers.
+//
+// MUST be best-effort + non-blocking: the hook itself dispatches the
+// capture on its own goroutine with its own timeout, so the sweep loop
+// is never slowed or blocked by a hung EIC tunnel on the dead box.
+var BootFailureRescueHook func(workspaceID, instanceID, reason string)
+
 // StartProvisioningTimeoutSweep periodically scans for workspaces stuck in
 // `status='provisioning'` past the timeout window, flips them to `failed`,
 // and broadcasts a WORKSPACE_PROVISION_TIMEOUT event so the canvas can
@@ -144,7 +161,7 @@ func sweepStuckProvisioning(ctx context.Context, emitter ProvisionTimeoutEmitter
 	// flight, not historical) and the partial index on status keeps
 	// it fast.
 	rows, err := db.DB.QueryContext(ctx, `
-		SELECT id, COALESCE(runtime, ''), EXTRACT(EPOCH FROM (now() - updated_at))::int
+		SELECT id, COALESCE(runtime, ''), COALESCE(instance_id, ''), EXTRACT(EPOCH FROM (now() - updated_at))::int
 		FROM workspaces
 		WHERE status = 'provisioning'
 	`)
@@ -155,14 +172,15 @@ func sweepStuckProvisioning(ctx context.Context, emitter ProvisionTimeoutEmitter
 	defer rows.Close()
 
 	type candidate struct {
-		id      string
-		runtime string
-		ageSec  int
+		id         string
+		runtime    string
+		instanceID string
+		ageSec     int
 	}
 	var ids []candidate
 	for rows.Next() {
 		var c candidate
-		if err := rows.Scan(&c.id, &c.runtime, &c.ageSec); err == nil {
+		if err := rows.Scan(&c.id, &c.runtime, &c.instanceID, &c.ageSec); err == nil {
 			ids = append(ids, c)
 		}
 	}
@@ -200,6 +218,19 @@ func sweepStuckProvisioning(ctx context.Context, emitter ProvisionTimeoutEmitter
 			continue
 		}
 		log.Printf("Provision-timeout sweep: %s (runtime=%q) stuck in provisioning > %s — marked failed", c.id, c.runtime, timeout)
+
+		// RFC internal#742 Part 2: this flip is a boot-failure verdict.
+		// The instance is still running (the CP reaps it shortly after);
+		// capture a forensic rescue bundle off it NOW, before teardown.
+		// Best-effort + non-blocking — the hook dispatches on its own
+		// goroutine + timeout, so a hung EIC tunnel on the dead box can't
+		// slow the sweep. Only fires on a real flip (affected==1), never
+		// on a race (affected==0) or a non-overdue row — guaranteeing it
+		// runs once per boot-failure verdict and never on a healthy row.
+		if BootFailureRescueHook != nil {
+			BootFailureRescueHook(c.id, c.instanceID, "provision_timeout_sweep")
+		}
+
 		// Emit as WORKSPACE_PROVISION_FAILED, not _TIMEOUT, because the
 		// canvas event handler only flips node state on the _FAILED case.
 		// A separate event type was considered but the UI reaction is

workspace-server/internal/registry/provisiontimeout_rescue_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+package registry
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"sync"
+	"testing"
+
+	"git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-core/workspace-server/internal/models"
+	"github.com/DATA-DOG/go-sqlmock"
+)
+
+// rescueHookRecorder captures the args of every BootFailureRescueHook
+// invocation so tests can assert the rescue capture fires exactly on the
+// boot-failure verdict — and never on a healthy/raced row.
+type rescueHookRecorder struct {
+	mu    sync.Mutex
+	calls [][3]string // {workspaceID, instanceID, reason}
+}
+
+func (r *rescueHookRecorder) hook() func(workspaceID, instanceID, reason string) {
+	return func(workspaceID, instanceID, reason string) {
+		r.mu.Lock()
+		defer r.mu.Unlock()
+		r.calls = append(r.calls, [3]string{workspaceID, instanceID, reason})
+	}
+}
+
+func (r *rescueHookRecorder) count() int {
+	r.mu.Lock()
+	defer r.mu.Unlock()
+	return len(r.calls)
+}
+
+// withRescueHook installs a recorder as the package-level
+// BootFailureRescueHook for the test's duration.
+func withRescueHook(t *testing.T) *rescueHookRecorder {
+	t.Helper()
+	rec := &rescueHookRecorder{}
+	prev := BootFailureRescueHook
+	BootFailureRescueHook = rec.hook()
+	t.Cleanup(func() { BootFailureRescueHook = prev })
+	return rec
+}
+
+// TestSweep_RescueFiresOnBootFailureVerdict — the core RFC internal#742
+// assertion: when the sweep flips a stuck workspace to `failed`, the
+// rescue hook fires once with the workspace + instance id and the
+// provision_timeout_sweep reason, BEFORE teardown.
+func TestSweep_RescueFiresOnBootFailureVerdict(t *testing.T) {
+	mock := setupTestDB(t)
+	rec := withRescueHook(t)
+
+	mock.ExpectQuery(`SELECT id, COALESCE\(runtime, ''\), COALESCE\(instance_id, ''\), EXTRACT`).
+		WillReturnRows(candidateRows([4]any{"ws-stuck", "codex", "i-0badf00d", 700}))
+	mock.ExpectExec(`UPDATE workspaces`).
+		WithArgs("ws-stuck", sqlmock.AnyArg(), sqlmock.AnyArg(), models.StatusFailed).
+		WillReturnResult(sqlmock.NewResult(0, 1))
+
+	sweepStuckProvisioning(context.Background(), &fakeEmitter{}, nil)
+
+	if rec.count() != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("rescue hook should fire once on a boot-failure flip, got %d", rec.count())
+	}
+	got := rec.calls[0]
+	if got[0] != "ws-stuck" || got[1] != "i-0badf00d" || got[2] != "provision_timeout_sweep" {
+		t.Errorf("rescue hook args = %v, want {ws-stuck i-0badf00d provision_timeout_sweep}", got)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestSweep_RescueDoesNotFireOnRace — affected==0 means the row raced to
+// online/restart between SELECT and UPDATE. That is NOT a boot-failure
+// verdict, so the rescue capture must NOT fire (we'd be snapshotting a
+// healthy box that's about to come online).
+func TestSweep_RescueDoesNotFireOnRace(t *testing.T) {
+	mock := setupTestDB(t)
+	rec := withRescueHook(t)
+
+	mock.ExpectQuery(`SELECT id, COALESCE\(runtime, ''\), COALESCE\(instance_id, ''\), EXTRACT`).
+		WillReturnRows(candidateRows([4]any{"ws-raced", "codex", "i-raced", 700}))
+	mock.ExpectExec(`UPDATE workspaces`).
+		WithArgs("ws-raced", sqlmock.AnyArg(), sqlmock.AnyArg(), models.StatusFailed).
+		WillReturnResult(sqlmock.NewResult(0, 0)) // raced — 0 rows
+
+	sweepStuckProvisioning(context.Background(), &fakeEmitter{}, nil)
+
+	if rec.count() != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("rescue hook must NOT fire on a raced flip (affected==0), got %d calls", rec.count())
+	}
+}
+
+// TestSweep_RescueDoesNotFireOnHealthyRow — a not-yet-overdue row is
+// never flipped, so the rescue capture must not fire. Guards against the
+// hook being attached above the age gate.
+func TestSweep_RescueDoesNotFireOnHealthyRow(t *testing.T) {
+	mock := setupTestDB(t)
+	rec := withRescueHook(t)
+
+	// hermes at 11 min (660s) < 30 min hermes budget → not overdue, no flip.
+	mock.ExpectQuery(`SELECT id, COALESCE\(runtime, ''\), COALESCE\(instance_id, ''\), EXTRACT`).
+		WillReturnRows(candidateRows([4]any{"ws-healthy", "hermes", "i-healthy", 660}))
+
+	sweepStuckProvisioning(context.Background(), &fakeEmitter{}, nil)
+
+	if rec.count() != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("rescue hook must NOT fire on a non-overdue (healthy) row, got %d calls", rec.count())
+	}
+}
+
+// TestSweep_RescueNilHookIsSafe — on a deploy where the hook is unwired
+// (self-hosted / no rescue shipping), the sweep must still flip + emit
+// without panicking on the nil hook.
+func TestSweep_RescueNilHookIsSafe(t *testing.T) {
+	mock := setupTestDB(t)
+	prev := BootFailureRescueHook
+	BootFailureRescueHook = nil
+	t.Cleanup(func() { BootFailureRescueHook = prev })
+
+	mock.ExpectQuery(`SELECT id, COALESCE\(runtime, ''\), COALESCE\(instance_id, ''\), EXTRACT`).
+		WillReturnRows(candidateRows([4]any{"ws-stuck", "codex", "i-x", 700}))
+	mock.ExpectExec(`UPDATE workspaces`).
+		WithArgs("ws-stuck", sqlmock.AnyArg(), sqlmock.AnyArg(), models.StatusFailed).
+		WillReturnResult(sqlmock.NewResult(0, 1))
+
+	emit := &fakeEmitter{}
+	sweepStuckProvisioning(context.Background(), emit, nil) // must not panic
+
+	if emit.count() != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("flip+emit must still happen with a nil rescue hook, got %d events", emit.count())
+	}
+}

workspace-server/internal/registry/provisiontimeout_test.go

@@ -7,8 +7,8 @@ import (
 	"testing"
 	"time"
 
-	"github.com/DATA-DOG/go-sqlmock"
 	"git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-core/workspace-server/internal/models"
+	"github.com/DATA-DOG/go-sqlmock"
 )
 
 // fakeEmitter records every RecordAndBroadcast call so tests can assert
@@ -42,12 +42,15 @@ func (f *fakeEmitter) count() int {
 	return len(f.events)
 }
 
-// candidateRows builds the new-shape query result (id, runtime, age_sec).
-// Use this in every sweep test to match the runtime-aware SELECT.
-func candidateRows(rows ...[3]any) *sqlmock.Rows {
-	r := sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"id", "runtime", "age_sec"})
+// candidateRows builds the query result (id, runtime, instance_id,
+// age_sec). instance_id was added for the RFC internal#742 rescue hook —
+// it rides alongside runtime so the boot-failure capture can reach the
+// still-running box. Tests that don't care about the rescue path pass
+// "" for instance_id. Use this in every sweep test to match the SELECT.
+func candidateRows(rows ...[4]any) *sqlmock.Rows {
+	r := sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"id", "runtime", "instance_id", "age_sec"})
 	for _, row := range rows {
-		r = r.AddRow(row[0], row[1], row[2])
+		r = r.AddRow(row[0], row[1], row[2], row[3])
 	}
 	return r
 }
@@ -58,8 +61,8 @@ func TestSweepStuckProvisioning_FlipsOverdue(t *testing.T) {
 	mock := setupTestDB(t)
 
 	// claude-code workspace, 700s old > 600s default timeout → flipped.
-	mock.ExpectQuery(`SELECT id, COALESCE\(runtime, ''\), EXTRACT`).
-		WillReturnRows(candidateRows([3]any{"ws-stuck", "claude-code", 700}))
+	mock.ExpectQuery(`SELECT id, COALESCE\(runtime, ''\), COALESCE\(instance_id, ''\), EXTRACT`).
+		WillReturnRows(candidateRows([4]any{"ws-stuck", "claude-code", "i-stuck", 700}))
 
 	mock.ExpectExec(`UPDATE workspaces`).
 		WithArgs("ws-stuck", sqlmock.AnyArg(), sqlmock.AnyArg(), models.StatusFailed).
@@ -92,8 +95,8 @@ func TestSweepStuckProvisioning_HermesGets30MinSlack(t *testing.T) {
 
 	// 11 min = 660 sec. < HermesProvisioningTimeout (1800s).
 	// No UPDATE should fire — hermes still has time.
-	mock.ExpectQuery(`SELECT id, COALESCE\(runtime, ''\), EXTRACT`).
-		WillReturnRows(candidateRows([3]any{"ws-hermes-booting", "hermes", 660}))
+	mock.ExpectQuery(`SELECT id, COALESCE\(runtime, ''\), COALESCE\(instance_id, ''\), EXTRACT`).
+		WillReturnRows(candidateRows([4]any{"ws-hermes-booting", "hermes", "i-h1", 660}))
 
 	emit := &fakeEmitter{}
 	sweepStuckProvisioning(context.Background(), emit, nil)
@@ -114,8 +117,8 @@ func TestSweepStuckProvisioning_HermesPastDeadline(t *testing.T) {
 	mock := setupTestDB(t)
 
 	// 31 min = 1860 sec > HermesProvisioningTimeout (1800s).
-	mock.ExpectQuery(`SELECT id, COALESCE\(runtime, ''\), EXTRACT`).
-		WillReturnRows(candidateRows([3]any{"ws-hermes-stuck", "hermes", 1860}))
+	mock.ExpectQuery(`SELECT id, COALESCE\(runtime, ''\), COALESCE\(instance_id, ''\), EXTRACT`).
+		WillReturnRows(candidateRows([4]any{"ws-hermes-stuck", "hermes", "i-h2", 1860}))
 	mock.ExpectExec(`UPDATE workspaces`).
 		WithArgs("ws-hermes-stuck", sqlmock.AnyArg(), sqlmock.AnyArg(), models.StatusFailed).
 		WillReturnResult(sqlmock.NewResult(0, 1))
@@ -150,8 +153,8 @@ func TestSweepStuckProvisioning_HermesPastDeadline(t *testing.T) {
 func TestSweepStuckProvisioning_ManifestOverrideSparesRow(t *testing.T) {
 	mock := setupTestDB(t)
 
-	mock.ExpectQuery(`SELECT id, COALESCE\(runtime, ''\), EXTRACT`).
-		WillReturnRows(candidateRows([3]any{"ws-claude-templated", "claude-code", 660}))
+	mock.ExpectQuery(`SELECT id, COALESCE\(runtime, ''\), COALESCE\(instance_id, ''\), EXTRACT`).
+		WillReturnRows(candidateRows([4]any{"ws-claude-templated", "claude-code", "i-ct", 660}))
 
 	// No ExpectExec — if the sweeper still flips the row, sqlmock will
 	// fail with an unexpected-query error.
@@ -183,8 +186,8 @@ func TestSweepStuckProvisioning_ManifestOverrideStillFlipsPastDeadline(t *testin
 	mock := setupTestDB(t)
 
 	// 21 min = 1260s > 1200s manifest override → flipped.
-	mock.ExpectQuery(`SELECT id, COALESCE\(runtime, ''\), EXTRACT`).
-		WillReturnRows(candidateRows([3]any{"ws-claude-truly-stuck", "claude-code", 1260}))
+	mock.ExpectQuery(`SELECT id, COALESCE\(runtime, ''\), COALESCE\(instance_id, ''\), EXTRACT`).
+		WillReturnRows(candidateRows([4]any{"ws-claude-truly-stuck", "claude-code", "i-cts", 1260}))
 	mock.ExpectExec(`UPDATE workspaces`).
 		WithArgs("ws-claude-truly-stuck", sqlmock.AnyArg(), sqlmock.AnyArg(), models.StatusFailed).
 		WillReturnResult(sqlmock.NewResult(0, 1))
@@ -221,8 +224,8 @@ func TestSweepStuckProvisioning_ManifestOverrideStillFlipsPastDeadline(t *testin
 func TestSweepStuckProvisioning_RaceSafe(t *testing.T) {
 	mock := setupTestDB(t)
 
-	mock.ExpectQuery(`SELECT id, COALESCE\(runtime, ''\), EXTRACT`).
-		WillReturnRows(candidateRows([3]any{"ws-raced", "claude-code", 700}))
+	mock.ExpectQuery(`SELECT id, COALESCE\(runtime, ''\), COALESCE\(instance_id, ''\), EXTRACT`).
+		WillReturnRows(candidateRows([4]any{"ws-raced", "claude-code", "i-raced", 700}))
 
 	mock.ExpectExec(`UPDATE workspaces`).
 		WithArgs("ws-raced", sqlmock.AnyArg(), sqlmock.AnyArg(), models.StatusFailed).
@@ -244,7 +247,7 @@ func TestSweepStuckProvisioning_RaceSafe(t *testing.T) {
 func TestSweepStuckProvisioning_NoStuck(t *testing.T) {
 	mock := setupTestDB(t)
 
-	mock.ExpectQuery(`SELECT id, COALESCE\(runtime, ''\), EXTRACT`).
+	mock.ExpectQuery(`SELECT id, COALESCE\(runtime, ''\), COALESCE\(instance_id, ''\), EXTRACT`).
 		WillReturnRows(candidateRows())
 
 	emit := &fakeEmitter{}
@@ -265,10 +268,10 @@ func TestSweepStuckProvisioning_NoStuck(t *testing.T) {
 func TestSweepStuckProvisioning_MultipleStuck(t *testing.T) {
 	mock := setupTestDB(t)
 
-	mock.ExpectQuery(`SELECT id, COALESCE\(runtime, ''\), EXTRACT`).
+	mock.ExpectQuery(`SELECT id, COALESCE\(runtime, ''\), COALESCE\(instance_id, ''\), EXTRACT`).
 		WillReturnRows(candidateRows(
-			[3]any{"ws-claude-code", "claude-code", 700},
-			[3]any{"ws-hermes", "hermes", 1860},
+			[4]any{"ws-claude-code", "claude-code", "i-cc", 700},
+			[4]any{"ws-hermes", "hermes", "i-hh", 1860},
 		))
 
 	mock.ExpectExec(`UPDATE workspaces`).
@@ -292,8 +295,8 @@ func TestSweepStuckProvisioning_MultipleStuck(t *testing.T) {
 func TestSweepStuckProvisioning_BroadcastFailureDoesNotCrash(t *testing.T) {
 	mock := setupTestDB(t)
 
-	mock.ExpectQuery(`SELECT id, COALESCE\(runtime, ''\), EXTRACT`).
-		WillReturnRows(candidateRows([3]any{"ws-stuck", "claude-code", 700}))
+	mock.ExpectQuery(`SELECT id, COALESCE\(runtime, ''\), COALESCE\(instance_id, ''\), EXTRACT`).
+		WillReturnRows(candidateRows([4]any{"ws-stuck", "claude-code", "i-stuck", 700}))
 	mock.ExpectExec(`UPDATE workspaces`).
 		WithArgs("ws-stuck", sqlmock.AnyArg(), sqlmock.AnyArg(), models.StatusFailed).
 		WillReturnResult(sqlmock.NewResult(0, 1))

workspace-server/internal/rescue/rescue.go

@@ -0,0 +1,321 @@
+// Package rescue captures a fixed post-mortem "rescue bundle" off a
+// workspace EC2 whose boot FAILED — before the platform's sweeper /
+// control-plane reaps the instance — and ships it to obs/Loki so a
+// wedged workspace (e.g. the codex provider-derivation failure that
+// motivated RFC internal#742) is inspectable instead of an
+// uninspectable wall.
+//
+// Design constraints (RFC internal#742, Part 2):
+//
+//   - BEST-EFFORT + NON-BLOCKING. Capture MUST NOT change boot-failure
+//     semantics or add latency to the failure path. Callers fire
+//     Capture in its own goroutine; Capture additionally bounds itself
+//     with CaptureTimeout so a hung EIC tunnel can't wedge the
+//     goroutine forever.
+//   - FIRES ON THE BOOT-FAILURE VERDICT ONLY. The two hook points are
+//     the provision-timeout sweep (registry.sweepStuckProvisioning) and
+//     the out-of-band bootstrap-watcher signal
+//     (handlers.WorkspaceHandler.BootstrapFailed). Normal teardown /
+//     deprovision / recreate / billing-suspend / hibernate paths do NOT
+//     call Capture — see the RFC's path enumeration.
+//   - REDACT BEFORE ANYTHING LEAVES THE BOX. Every collected section is
+//     run through the injected Redact func (wired to the existing
+//     handlers.redactSecrets secret-scan) before it is shipped. Raw
+//     tokens/keys never reach Loki.
+//
+// The package is a LEAF: it imports only internal/audit (the obs
+// shipper) so it can be called from both handlers and registry without
+// an import cycle (registry must not import handlers). The two heavy
+// dependencies — the EIC/SSH remote-command runner and the redactor —
+// are injected as package-level func vars, wired once at boot from the
+// handlers package (which owns withEICTunnel + redactSecrets). Tests
+// swap them for fakes.
+package rescue
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+	"log"
+	"time"
+
+	"git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-core/workspace-server/internal/audit"
+)
+
+// CaptureTimeout bounds the whole bundle collection. The sweeper runs
+// every 30s and the CP reap follows the failure verdict; 45s gives the
+// EIC dance (~3-5s) plus six short remote commands (<2s each) generous
+// headroom while still finishing well before the instance is torn down.
+// Distinct from the per-op eicFileOpTimeout so a slow box that already
+// failed to boot can't hang the capture goroutine indefinitely.
+const CaptureTimeout = 45 * time.Second
+
+// LokiKind is the Loki stream label value that tags every rescue
+// record. Queryable as `kind="rescue"` (RFC internal#742 §Loki labels).
+const LokiKind = "rescue"
+
+// RescueVolumeGrace is how long a boot-failed workspace's /configs data
+// volume (and its still-running instance) must be RETAINED past the
+// boot-failure verdict so a live rescue read is possible — distinct from
+// the user-requested prune path (cp#415), which is an explicit erase.
+//
+// In molecule-core (the tenant platform) the boot-failure verdict only
+// flips workspaces.status to `failed`; it never issues a terminate. The
+// platform's two reapers (registry.StartCPOrphanSweeper +
+// handlers deprovision) act ONLY on status='removed', so a `failed`
+// workspace's instance + /configs volume are retained here by
+// construction — see TestCPSweepOnce_DoesNotReapFailedWorkspace. The
+// time-bounded reap of the failed instance is the control plane's
+// bootstrap-watcher concern; this constant is the SSOT for the grace
+// the CP must honour (24h covers an operator's next-business-day
+// post-mortem without leaking the volume indefinitely).
+const RescueVolumeGrace = 24 * time.Hour
+
+// rescueEventType is the audit event_type carried in the shipped
+// record. The obs shipper (internal/audit) already maps event_type to a
+// low-cardinality Loki label; "rescue.bundle" keeps the rescue stream
+// trivially filterable alongside the existing audit taxonomy.
+const rescueEventType = "rescue.bundle"
+
+// RunRemote runs a single shell command on the still-running (but
+// unconfigured) workspace EC2 over EIC/SSH and returns its combined
+// output. Wired at boot to the handlers EIC runner
+// (rescueRunRemoteViaEIC). nil until wired — Capture degrades to a
+// logged no-op rather than panicking, so an operator who hasn't wired
+// the hook still gets a clear signal instead of a crash on the failure
+// path.
+var RunRemote func(ctx context.Context, instanceID, command string) (string, error)
+
+// Redact scrubs secret-shaped substrings from a collected section
+// before it leaves the box. Wired at boot to handlers.redactSecrets.
+// nil until wired — Capture refuses to ship un-redacted content if the
+// redactor is missing (fails closed: logs + aborts rather than leaking
+// raw config).
+var Redact func(workspaceID, content string) string
+
+// section is one labelled chunk of the rescue bundle: a human-readable
+// name + the remote command that produces it.
+type section struct {
+	name    string
+	command string
+}
+
+// bundleSections is the FIXED set collected on every boot-failure
+// rescue (RFC internal#742 §Build.1). Order is the post-mortem reading
+// order: config first, then boot logs, then container state, then the
+// resolved model/provider env that drove the codex derivation failure.
+//
+//   - /configs/config.yaml + system-prompt.md: the managed config the
+//     runtime booted against (redacted; system-prompt can embed keys).
+//   - cloud-init-output.log tail: the user-data execution trace — where
+//     a wedged boot actually died.
+//   - docker ps -a: container state (did the agent container even
+//     start, exit-code, restart loop).
+//   - agent container logs: the runtime's own stderr (the codex
+//     provider-derivation panic lives here).
+//   - MODEL|PROVIDER|RUNTIME env: the resolved routing that motivated
+//     the RFC. `sudo cat` of the container env via docker inspect-style
+//     grep — see the command.
+//
+// All commands use `sudo -n` (the box's /configs is root-owned; ubuntu
+// has passwordless sudo) and swallow missing-target stderr so a section
+// that can't be produced ships as a short marker instead of failing the
+// whole bundle. Kept as data (not inlined) so the redaction + ship loop
+// is uniform and the set is reviewable in one place.
+var bundleSections = []section{
+	{
+		name:    "config.yaml",
+		command: "sudo -n cat /configs/config.yaml 2>/dev/null || echo '(/configs/config.yaml absent)'",
+	},
+	{
+		name:    "system-prompt.md",
+		command: "sudo -n cat /configs/system-prompt.md 2>/dev/null || echo '(/configs/system-prompt.md absent)'",
+	},
+	{
+		name:    "cloud-init-output.log.tail",
+		command: "sudo -n tail -200 /var/log/cloud-init-output.log 2>/dev/null || echo '(cloud-init-output.log absent)'",
+	},
+	{
+		name:    "docker-ps",
+		command: "sudo -n docker ps -a 2>/dev/null || echo '(docker unavailable)'",
+	},
+	{
+		// The agent container is the first non-infra container; grab the
+		// most recently created one and tail its logs. `head -1` of
+		// `docker ps -a -q` is creation-ordered newest-first, which is
+		// the agent runtime on a workspace box.
+		name:    "agent-container.logs.tail",
+		command: "cid=$(sudo -n docker ps -a -q 2>/dev/null | head -1); [ -n \"$cid\" ] && sudo -n docker logs --tail 200 \"$cid\" 2>&1 || echo '(no agent container)'",
+	},
+	{
+		// Resolved model/provider/runtime env from the agent container.
+		// `docker inspect` the env array and grep the routing keys. This
+		// is the field that pinpoints a provider-derivation failure.
+		name:    "model-provider-runtime.env",
+		command: "cid=$(sudo -n docker ps -a -q 2>/dev/null | head -1); [ -n \"$cid\" ] && sudo -n docker inspect --format '{{range .Config.Env}}{{println .}}{{end}}' \"$cid\" 2>/dev/null | grep -E 'MODEL|PROVIDER|RUNTIME' || echo '(no env)'",
+	},
+}
+
+// Input is the identity of the failed workspace being rescued.
+type Input struct {
+	InstanceID  string // EC2 instance id of the still-running failed box
+	WorkspaceID string
+	OrgID       string
+	// Reason is a short tag for WHY the rescue fired (e.g.
+	// "provision_timeout_sweep" or "bootstrap_watcher") — carried into
+	// the Loki record so an operator can correlate the bundle with the
+	// failure verdict that triggered it.
+	Reason string
+}
+
+// Section is one labelled, already-redacted chunk of the persisted
+// rescue bundle. It mirrors what ship() emits to Loki per-section, but
+// is the unit the queryable store (and the read endpoint) returns.
+// `Redacted` is false only for collection-failure markers (the section
+// command couldn't run); true sections passed through the secret-scan.
+type Section struct {
+	Name     string `json:"name"`
+	Content  string `json:"content"`
+	Redacted bool   `json:"redacted"`
+}
+
+// Bundle is the full, already-redacted post-mortem bundle for ONE
+// boot-failure capture — the unit persisted to the queryable store on
+// capture (RFC internal#742 Part 3) and served by
+// GET /workspaces/:id/rescue. Sections are in fixed reading order
+// (config → boot logs → container state → resolved routing env).
+type Bundle struct {
+	WorkspaceID string    `json:"workspace_id"`
+	OrgID       string    `json:"org_id"`
+	InstanceID  string    `json:"instance_id"`
+	Reason      string    `json:"reason"`
+	Sections    []Section `json:"sections"`
+}
+
+// PersistBundle writes the fully-collected, already-redacted bundle to
+// the queryable per-tenant store (rescue_bundles table) so the rescue
+// READ endpoint can serve it without obs/Loki read creds (RFC
+// internal#742 Part 3 read-path decision — see the migration header).
+//
+// Wired at boot from the handlers package (which owns db.DB) to keep
+// internal/rescue a leaf: it must NOT import internal/db, or registry —
+// which imports rescue — would inherit a db dependency it can call
+// without a cycle, but more importantly the leaf stays trivially
+// testable with a fake. nil until wired: a capture with no store wired
+// still ships to Loki (Part 2 behavior preserved) and logs that it
+// skipped the DB persist, rather than failing the capture.
+var PersistBundle func(ctx context.Context, b Bundle) error
+
+// Capture collects the fixed rescue bundle off the failed instance,
+// redacts each section, and ships it to Loki under
+// {kind="rescue", org=<OrgID>, workspace_id=<WorkspaceID>}.
+//
+// BEST-EFFORT: every failure mode (missing wiring, EIC error, a single
+// section that won't collect) is logged and does NOT propagate — Capture
+// never returns an error and never panics, so the boot-failure handling
+// at the call site is unaffected. The caller is expected to invoke this
+// in its own goroutine; Capture additionally self-bounds with
+// CaptureTimeout.
+func Capture(ctx context.Context, in Input) {
+	defer func() {
+		// A logging helper on the failure path must never take the
+		// process down. Recover defensively — the redactor / shipper are
+		// injected and a future mis-wire shouldn't crash the sweeper.
+		if r := recover(); r != nil {
+			log.Printf("rescue: capture panicked for ws=%s instance=%s: %v", in.WorkspaceID, in.InstanceID, r)
+		}
+	}()
+
+	if in.InstanceID == "" {
+		// No live box to read — nothing to rescue (e.g. failure before
+		// any EC2 was launched). Not an error; just skip.
+		log.Printf("rescue: skip ws=%s — no instance_id (nothing to capture)", in.WorkspaceID)
+		return
+	}
+	if RunRemote == nil {
+		log.Printf("rescue: skip ws=%s instance=%s — RunRemote not wired (best-effort no-op)", in.WorkspaceID, in.InstanceID)
+		return
+	}
+	if Redact == nil {
+		// Fail CLOSED: without a redactor we could leak raw tokens to
+		// Loki. Abort rather than ship unredacted.
+		log.Printf("rescue: ABORT ws=%s instance=%s — Redact not wired; refusing to ship un-redacted bundle", in.WorkspaceID, in.InstanceID)
+		return
+	}
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, CaptureTimeout)
+	defer cancel()
+
+	log.Printf("rescue: capturing bundle ws=%s instance=%s reason=%s", in.WorkspaceID, in.InstanceID, in.Reason)
+
+	collected := 0
+	// Accumulate the per-section result alongside shipping each to Loki,
+	// so the same already-redacted content is persisted to the queryable
+	// store as one bundle row after the loop. Shipping stays per-section
+	// (Part 2 Loki behavior unchanged); persistence is the single
+	// bundle the read endpoint serves.
+	bundle := Bundle{
+		WorkspaceID: in.WorkspaceID,
+		OrgID:       in.OrgID,
+		InstanceID:  in.InstanceID,
+		Reason:      in.Reason,
+		Sections:    make([]Section, 0, len(bundleSections)),
+	}
+	for _, sec := range bundleSections {
+		raw, err := RunRemote(ctx, in.InstanceID, sec.command)
+		if err != nil {
+			// One section failing (e.g. ssh blip mid-collection) must not
+			// abort the rest — ship a marker for it and continue.
+			log.Printf("rescue: section %q failed for ws=%s: %v", sec.name, in.WorkspaceID, err)
+			marker := fmt.Sprintf("(rescue: section collection failed: %v)", err)
+			ship(ctx, in, sec.name, marker, false)
+			bundle.Sections = append(bundle.Sections, Section{Name: sec.name, Content: marker, Redacted: false})
+			continue
+		}
+		redacted := Redact(in.WorkspaceID, raw)
+		ship(ctx, in, sec.name, redacted, true)
+		bundle.Sections = append(bundle.Sections, Section{Name: sec.name, Content: redacted, Redacted: true})
+		collected++
+	}
+
+	log.Printf("rescue: shipped %d/%d sections ws=%s instance=%s kind=%s", collected, len(bundleSections), in.WorkspaceID, in.InstanceID, LokiKind)
+
+	// Persist the redacted bundle to the queryable store so the rescue
+	// READ endpoint can serve it without obs/Loki read creds. Best-effort
+	// and last: a persist failure (or no store wired) must NOT undo the
+	// Loki ship that already succeeded, and never panics the failure path.
+	persistBundle(ctx, bundle)
+}
+
+// persistBundle writes the collected bundle to the queryable store if a
+// store is wired. Best-effort: a nil store (operator hasn't wired the
+// READ path) or a DB error is logged and swallowed — the Loki ship is
+// the durable cross-tenant copy, and the failure path must never be
+// disturbed by the post-mortem read store.
+func persistBundle(ctx context.Context, b Bundle) {
+	if PersistBundle == nil {
+		log.Printf("rescue: store not wired — bundle for ws=%s shipped to Loki only (no queryable copy)", b.WorkspaceID)
+		return
+	}
+	if err := PersistBundle(ctx, b); err != nil {
+		log.Printf("rescue: persist bundle for ws=%s failed (shipped to Loki regardless): %v", b.WorkspaceID, err)
+	}
+}
+
+// ship emits one rescue section to Loki via the audit shipper. The
+// org / workspace_id / kind ride in the record body (queryable via
+// LogQL `| json`); event_type ("rescue.bundle") is the low-cardinality
+// Loki label the shipper already promotes. `redacted` records whether
+// the content passed through the secret-scan, so an operator can tell a
+// shipped-but-redacted section from a collection-failure marker.
+func ship(ctx context.Context, in Input, name, content string, redacted bool) {
+	audit.Emit(ctx, rescueEventType, map[string]any{
+		"kind":         LokiKind,
+		"org":          in.OrgID,
+		"workspace_id": in.WorkspaceID,
+		"instance_id":  in.InstanceID,
+		"reason":       in.Reason,
+		"section":      name,
+		"redacted":     redacted,
+		"content":      content,
+	})
+}

workspace-server/internal/rescue/rescue_persist_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+package rescue
+
+// Part 3 coverage: Capture, after collecting + redacting every section,
+// persists the bundle exactly once to the queryable store (in addition
+// to the per-section Loki ship verified in rescue_test.go).
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// withPersist swaps the injected PersistBundle for the test and restores
+// it after.
+func withPersist(t *testing.T, fn func(ctx context.Context, b Bundle) error) {
+	t.Helper()
+	prev := PersistBundle
+	PersistBundle = fn
+	t.Cleanup(func() { PersistBundle = prev })
+}
+
+// TestCapture_PersistsBundleOnce: the happy path persists one bundle
+// carrying every section, with identity + redacted content matching what
+// was shipped.
+func TestCapture_PersistsBundleOnce(t *testing.T) {
+	_ = captureLoki(t) // keep Loki transport pointed at a temp file
+	withFakes(t,
+		func(_ context.Context, instanceID, cmd string) (string, error) {
+			return "OUT:" + instanceID, nil
+		},
+		func(_ws, c string) string { return "RED:" + c },
+	)
+
+	var persisted []Bundle
+	withPersist(t, func(_ context.Context, b Bundle) error {
+		persisted = append(persisted, b)
+		return nil
+	})
+
+	Capture(context.Background(), Input{
+		InstanceID:  "i-abc",
+		WorkspaceID: "ws-1",
+		OrgID:       "org-9",
+		Reason:      "provision_timeout_sweep",
+	})
+
+	if len(persisted) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("PersistBundle called %d times, want exactly 1", len(persisted))
+	}
+	b := persisted[0]
+	if b.WorkspaceID != "ws-1" || b.OrgID != "org-9" || b.InstanceID != "i-abc" || b.Reason != "provision_timeout_sweep" {
+		t.Errorf("bundle identity wrong: %+v", b)
+	}
+	if len(b.Sections) != len(bundleSections) {
+		t.Fatalf("persisted %d sections, want %d", len(b.Sections), len(bundleSections))
+	}
+	for _, s := range b.Sections {
+		if !s.Redacted {
+			t.Errorf("section %q persisted with redacted=false on the happy path", s.Name)
+		}
+		// Redactor ("RED:" prefix) must have run on persisted content.
+		if !strings.HasPrefix(s.Content, "RED:") {
+			t.Errorf("section %q persisted un-redacted content: %q", s.Name, s.Content)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// TestCapture_PersistFailureDoesNotPanic: a store error is swallowed —
+// Capture still completes (the Loki ship already succeeded).
+func TestCapture_PersistFailureDoesNotPanic(t *testing.T) {
+	_ = captureLoki(t)
+	withFakes(t,
+		func(_ context.Context, _ string, _ string) (string, error) { return "ok", nil },
+		func(_ws, c string) string { return c },
+	)
+	withPersist(t, func(_ context.Context, _ Bundle) error {
+		return errors.New("db down")
+	})
+	// Must not panic / must return normally.
+	Capture(context.Background(), Input{InstanceID: "i-x", WorkspaceID: "ws-2", OrgID: "o"})
+}
+
+// TestCapture_NoPersistWiredIsSafe: with PersistBundle unwired (operator
+// hasn't wired the read path), Capture still ships to Loki and does not
+// panic.
+func TestCapture_NoPersistWiredIsSafe(t *testing.T) {
+	readLoki := captureLoki(t)
+	withFakes(t,
+		func(_ context.Context, _ string, _ string) (string, error) { return "ok", nil },
+		func(_ws, c string) string { return c },
+	)
+	prev := PersistBundle
+	PersistBundle = nil
+	t.Cleanup(func() { PersistBundle = prev })
+
+	Capture(context.Background(), Input{InstanceID: "i-x", WorkspaceID: "ws-3", OrgID: "o"})
+
+	// Loki ship still happened for every section.
+	if recs := readLoki(); len(recs) != len(bundleSections) {
+		t.Errorf("shipped %d records, want %d (Loki unaffected by missing store)", len(recs), len(bundleSections))
+	}
+}
+
+// TestCapture_FailureMarkerPersistedAsNonRedacted: a section whose
+// collection fails is persisted with redacted=false + a marker, matching
+// the Loki record.
+func TestCapture_FailureMarkerPersistedAsNonRedacted(t *testing.T) {
+	_ = captureLoki(t)
+	withFakes(t,
+		func(_ context.Context, _ string, cmd string) (string, error) {
+			if strings.Contains(cmd, "config.yaml") {
+				return "", errors.New("ssh blip")
+			}
+			return "ok", nil
+		},
+		func(_ws, c string) string { return c },
+	)
+	var got Bundle
+	withPersist(t, func(_ context.Context, b Bundle) error { got = b; return nil })
+
+	Capture(context.Background(), Input{InstanceID: "i-x", WorkspaceID: "ws-4", OrgID: "o"})
+
+	var markers int
+	for _, s := range got.Sections {
+		if !s.Redacted {
+			markers++
+			if !strings.Contains(s.Content, "section collection failed") {
+				t.Errorf("non-redacted section %q content = %q, want a failure marker", s.Name, s.Content)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if markers != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("want exactly 1 failure marker persisted, got %d", markers)
+	}
+}

workspace-server/internal/rescue/rescue_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,226 @@
+package rescue
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// withFakes swaps the injected RunRemote + Redact for the duration of a
+// test and restores them after. Mirrors the provisioner test-fake
+// pattern (package-var swap + t.Cleanup).
+func withFakes(t *testing.T, run func(ctx context.Context, instanceID, cmd string) (string, error), redact func(ws, c string) string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	prevRun, prevRedact := RunRemote, Redact
+	RunRemote = run
+	Redact = redact
+	t.Cleanup(func() { RunRemote = prevRun; Redact = prevRedact })
+}
+
+// captureLoki points the audit shipper at a temp JSONL file and returns
+// a reader that decodes the records the rescue ship() loop wrote. This
+// is the same transport the production rescue stream uses (audit.Emit →
+// Loki via the tenant Vector source), so asserting on it proves the
+// shipper-reuse + labels end to end.
+func captureLoki(t *testing.T) func() []map[string]any {
+	t.Helper()
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	path := filepath.Join(dir, "audit.jsonl")
+	t.Setenv("MOLECULE_AUDIT_LOG_PATH", path)
+	return func() []map[string]any {
+		b, err := os.ReadFile(path)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil
+		}
+		var out []map[string]any
+		for _, line := range strings.Split(strings.TrimSpace(string(b)), "\n") {
+			if line == "" {
+				continue
+			}
+			var rec map[string]any
+			if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(line), &rec); err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("bad audit jsonl line %q: %v", line, err)
+			}
+			out = append(out, rec)
+		}
+		return out
+	}
+}
+
+func fields(rec map[string]any) map[string]any {
+	f, _ := rec["fields"].(map[string]any)
+	return f
+}
+
+// TestCapture_ShipsAllSectionsWithRescueLabels is the happy path: a
+// boot-failure capture collects every fixed section, runs each through
+// the redactor, and ships it to Loki under {kind="rescue", org, ws}.
+func TestCapture_ShipsAllSectionsWithRescueLabels(t *testing.T) {
+	readLoki := captureLoki(t)
+	var seenCmds []string
+	withFakes(t,
+		func(_ context.Context, instanceID, cmd string) (string, error) {
+			seenCmds = append(seenCmds, cmd)
+			return "OUTPUT for " + instanceID, nil
+		},
+		func(_ws, c string) string { return c }, // identity redactor
+	)
+
+	Capture(context.Background(), Input{
+		InstanceID:  "i-abc123",
+		WorkspaceID: "ws-1",
+		OrgID:       "org-9",
+		Reason:      "provision_timeout_sweep",
+	})
+
+	recs := readLoki()
+	if len(recs) != len(bundleSections) {
+		t.Fatalf("want %d shipped sections, got %d", len(bundleSections), len(recs))
+	}
+	if len(seenCmds) != len(bundleSections) {
+		t.Fatalf("want %d remote commands run, got %d", len(bundleSections), len(seenCmds))
+	}
+	for _, rec := range recs {
+		if rec["event_type"] != rescueEventType {
+			t.Errorf("event_type = %v, want %q", rec["event_type"], rescueEventType)
+		}
+		// workspace_id is promoted to the top-level record position by
+		// the audit shipper.
+		if rec["workspace_id"] != "ws-1" {
+			t.Errorf("top-level workspace_id = %v, want ws-1", rec["workspace_id"])
+		}
+		f := fields(rec)
+		if f["kind"] != LokiKind {
+			t.Errorf("kind = %v, want %q", f["kind"], LokiKind)
+		}
+		if f["org"] != "org-9" {
+			t.Errorf("org = %v, want org-9", f["org"])
+		}
+		if f["instance_id"] != "i-abc123" {
+			t.Errorf("instance_id = %v, want i-abc123", f["instance_id"])
+		}
+		if f["redacted"] != true {
+			t.Errorf("redacted = %v, want true for a collected section", f["redacted"])
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// TestCapture_Redacts proves the bundle is scrubbed before it leaves the
+// box: a remote section that contains a secret-shaped token must ship
+// with the token replaced, never raw.
+func TestCapture_Redacts(t *testing.T) {
+	readLoki := captureLoki(t)
+	const secret = "sk-ant-SUPERSECRETTOKENVALUE0001"
+	withFakes(t,
+		func(_ context.Context, _ string, _ string) (string, error) {
+			return "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=" + secret, nil
+		},
+		// redactor that mangles anything containing the secret shape
+		func(_ws, c string) string {
+			if strings.Contains(c, secret) {
+				return strings.ReplaceAll(c, secret, "[REDACTED]")
+			}
+			return c
+		},
+	)
+
+	Capture(context.Background(), Input{InstanceID: "i-x", WorkspaceID: "ws-2", OrgID: "o"})
+
+	for _, rec := range readLoki() {
+		content, _ := fields(rec)["content"].(string)
+		if strings.Contains(content, secret) {
+			t.Fatalf("raw secret leaked to Loki in section %v: %q", fields(rec)["section"], content)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// TestCapture_SkipsWhenNoInstance: a failure with no provisioned EC2 has
+// nothing to read — Capture must no-op (ship nothing) rather than dial a
+// blank instance id.
+func TestCapture_SkipsWhenNoInstance(t *testing.T) {
+	readLoki := captureLoki(t)
+	called := false
+	withFakes(t,
+		func(_ context.Context, _ string, _ string) (string, error) { called = true; return "", nil },
+		func(_ws, c string) string { return c },
+	)
+	Capture(context.Background(), Input{InstanceID: "", WorkspaceID: "ws-3", OrgID: "o"})
+	if called {
+		t.Error("RunRemote called for an empty instance id")
+	}
+	if recs := readLoki(); len(recs) != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("shipped %d records for an empty instance id, want 0", len(recs))
+	}
+}
+
+// TestCapture_FailsClosedWithoutRedactor: if the redactor is not wired,
+// Capture must NOT ship anything (would leak raw config). Fail closed.
+func TestCapture_FailsClosedWithoutRedactor(t *testing.T) {
+	readLoki := captureLoki(t)
+	prevRun, prevRedact := RunRemote, Redact
+	RunRemote = func(_ context.Context, _ string, _ string) (string, error) { return "raw config", nil }
+	Redact = nil
+	t.Cleanup(func() { RunRemote = prevRun; Redact = prevRedact })
+
+	Capture(context.Background(), Input{InstanceID: "i-x", WorkspaceID: "ws-4", OrgID: "o"})
+
+	if recs := readLoki(); len(recs) != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("shipped %d records without a redactor wired, want 0 (fail closed)", len(recs))
+	}
+}
+
+// TestCapture_SectionFailureIsIsolated: one section's RunRemote error
+// must not abort the rest — the failing section ships a marker and the
+// others still ship.
+func TestCapture_SectionFailureIsIsolated(t *testing.T) {
+	readLoki := captureLoki(t)
+	withFakes(t,
+		func(_ context.Context, _ string, cmd string) (string, error) {
+			if strings.Contains(cmd, "config.yaml") {
+				return "", errors.New("ssh blip")
+			}
+			return "ok", nil
+		},
+		func(_ws, c string) string { return c },
+	)
+
+	Capture(context.Background(), Input{InstanceID: "i-x", WorkspaceID: "ws-5", OrgID: "o"})
+
+	recs := readLoki()
+	if len(recs) != len(bundleSections) {
+		t.Fatalf("want all %d sections shipped (incl. failure marker), got %d", len(bundleSections), len(recs))
+	}
+	var failureMarkers int
+	for _, rec := range recs {
+		if fields(rec)["redacted"] == false {
+			failureMarkers++
+			content, _ := fields(rec)["content"].(string)
+			if !strings.Contains(content, "section collection failed") {
+				t.Errorf("failure marker content = %q, want a collection-failed marker", content)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if failureMarkers != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("want exactly 1 failure marker, got %d", failureMarkers)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestCapture_NoWiringIsSafeNoOp: with RunRemote unwired (operator hasn't
+// called the boot wiring), Capture must be a logged no-op, never a panic.
+func TestCapture_NoWiringIsSafeNoOp(t *testing.T) {
+	readLoki := captureLoki(t)
+	prevRun, prevRedact := RunRemote, Redact
+	RunRemote = nil
+	Redact = func(_ws, c string) string { return c }
+	t.Cleanup(func() { RunRemote = prevRun; Redact = prevRedact })
+
+	Capture(context.Background(), Input{InstanceID: "i-x", WorkspaceID: "ws-6", OrgID: "o"})
+
+	if recs := readLoki(); len(recs) != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("shipped %d records with RunRemote unwired, want 0", len(recs))
+	}
+}

workspace-server/internal/rescuestore/store.go

@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+// Package rescuestore is the queryable persistence layer for rescue
+// bundles (RFC internal#742 Part 3). It is the DB side of the read-path
+// decision: because internal/audit (Part 2's ship transport) is
+// Loki-only and tenants hold no obs read creds, the redacted bundle is
+// ALSO written here on capture so GET /workspaces/:id/rescue can serve
+// the latest one with a plain Postgres read.
+//
+// The package owns both the write (Persist, wired into
+// rescue.PersistBundle at boot) and the read (GetLatest, used by the
+// handler). It depends on internal/db and internal/rescue (for the
+// Bundle/Section types); it is imported by handlers, never by the leaf
+// internal/rescue or by registry — so no import cycle.
+package rescuestore
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"database/sql"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+	"time"
+
+	"git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-core/workspace-server/internal/rescue"
+)
+
+// maxSectionBytes bounds a single persisted section's content so a
+// pathological capture (e.g. a multi-megabyte container log) can't bloat
+// the row or the read response. Capture already tails to ~200 lines per
+// section, so this is a backstop, not the primary limit. Truncated
+// content is suffixed with a marker so a reader knows it was clipped.
+const maxSectionBytes = 64 * 1024 // 64 KiB per section
+
+// truncationMarker is appended to any section clipped at maxSectionBytes.
+const truncationMarker = "\n…(rescue: section truncated at 64KiB)"
+
+// StoredBundle is a persisted bundle plus its capture timestamp (the DB
+// assigns captured_at on write). The handler maps this to the read
+// response shape.
+type StoredBundle struct {
+	Bundle     rescue.Bundle
+	CapturedAt time.Time
+}
+
+// Store is the read/write surface the handler and the capture wiring
+// depend on. An interface so the handler test can fake it without a
+// sqlmock; the production implementation is Postgres.
+type Store interface {
+	// Persist writes one bundle row (captured_at = now()).
+	Persist(ctx context.Context, b rescue.Bundle) error
+	// GetLatest returns the most recent bundle for workspaceID. When
+	// orgID is non-empty the row must also match org_id (cross-org
+	// defense-in-depth behind TenantGuard). Returns (nil, nil) — NOT an
+	// error — when no bundle exists, so the handler can 404 cleanly.
+	GetLatest(ctx context.Context, workspaceID, orgID string) (*StoredBundle, error)
+}
+
+// Postgres is the production Store backed by the rescue_bundles table.
+type Postgres struct{ db *sql.DB }
+
+// NewPostgres builds a Postgres-backed store over the given handle.
+func NewPostgres(db *sql.DB) *Postgres { return &Postgres{db: db} }
+
+// Persist writes the bundle as one row. Sections are stored as JSONB.
+// Each section's content is clamped to maxSectionBytes before write.
+func (p *Postgres) Persist(ctx context.Context, b rescue.Bundle) error {
+	if p.db == nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("rescuestore: nil db")
+	}
+	clamped := clampSections(b.Sections)
+	payload, err := json.Marshal(clamped)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("rescuestore: marshal sections: %w", err)
+	}
+	_, err = p.db.ExecContext(ctx,
+		`INSERT INTO rescue_bundles (workspace_id, org_id, instance_id, reason, sections)
+		 VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5::jsonb)`,
+		b.WorkspaceID, b.OrgID, b.InstanceID, b.Reason, string(payload),
+	)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("rescuestore: insert: %w", err)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// GetLatest returns the newest bundle for workspaceID, org-scoped. The
+// (workspace_id, captured_at DESC, id DESC) index serves this directly.
+// sql.ErrNoRows maps to (nil, nil) so the handler 404s.
+func (p *Postgres) GetLatest(ctx context.Context, workspaceID, orgID string) (*StoredBundle, error) {
+	if p.db == nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("rescuestore: nil db")
+	}
+	if orgID == "" {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("rescuestore: org_id required")
+	}
+
+	var (
+		instanceID  string
+		reason      string
+		capturedAt  time.Time
+		sectionsRaw []byte
+	)
+	err := p.db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
+		`SELECT instance_id, reason, captured_at, sections
+		   FROM rescue_bundles
+		  WHERE workspace_id = $1
+		    AND org_id = $2
+		  ORDER BY captured_at DESC, id DESC
+		  LIMIT 1`,
+		workspaceID, orgID,
+	).Scan(&instanceID, &reason, &capturedAt, &sectionsRaw)
+	if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("rescuestore: query latest: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	var sections []rescue.Section
+	if len(sectionsRaw) > 0 {
+		if err := json.Unmarshal(sectionsRaw, &sections); err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("rescuestore: unmarshal sections: %w", err)
+		}
+	}
+
+	return &StoredBundle{
+		Bundle: rescue.Bundle{
+			WorkspaceID: workspaceID,
+			OrgID:       orgID,
+			InstanceID:  instanceID,
+			Reason:      reason,
+			Sections:    sections,
+		},
+		CapturedAt: capturedAt,
+	}, nil
+}
+
+// clampSections returns a copy with each section's content clamped to
+// maxSectionBytes. Clamps on a rune boundary so the marker doesn't split
+// a multibyte sequence — the content is a forensic blob, never parsed.
+func clampSections(in []rescue.Section) []rescue.Section {
+	out := make([]rescue.Section, len(in))
+	for i, s := range in {
+		if len(s.Content) > maxSectionBytes {
+			b := []byte(s.Content[:maxSectionBytes])
+			// Back off to a valid utf-8 boundary (at most 3 bytes).
+			for len(b) > 0 && b[len(b)-1]&0xC0 == 0x80 {
+				b = b[:len(b)-1]
+			}
+			s.Content = string(b) + truncationMarker
+		}
+		out[i] = s
+	}
+	return out
+}

workspace-server/internal/rescuestore/store_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+package rescuestore
+
+// Sqlmock-backed coverage for the rescue_bundles store (RFC internal#742
+// Part 3). Exercises Persist (incl. section clamp) + GetLatest (happy
+// path, no-rows→nil, org-scoping, query error) without a real DB.
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"database/sql"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"regexp"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-core/workspace-server/internal/rescue"
+	"github.com/DATA-DOG/go-sqlmock"
+)
+
+func newMock(t *testing.T) (*sql.DB, sqlmock.Sqlmock) {
+	t.Helper()
+	dbh, mock, err := sqlmock.New()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("sqlmock: %v", err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = dbh.Close() })
+	return dbh, mock
+}
+
+func sampleBundle() rescue.Bundle {
+	return rescue.Bundle{
+		WorkspaceID: "ws-1",
+		OrgID:       "org-9",
+		InstanceID:  "i-abc",
+		Reason:      "bootstrap_watcher",
+		Sections: []rescue.Section{
+			{Name: "config.yaml", Content: "model: gpt-4", Redacted: true},
+			{Name: "docker-ps", Content: "(no agent container)", Redacted: false},
+		},
+	}
+}
+
+// TestPersist_InsertsRow asserts Persist issues one INSERT with the
+// bundle fields and a JSON sections payload.
+func TestPersist_InsertsRow(t *testing.T) {
+	dbh, mock := newMock(t)
+	b := sampleBundle()
+
+	mock.ExpectExec(regexp.QuoteMeta(`INSERT INTO rescue_bundles`)).
+		WithArgs("ws-1", "org-9", "i-abc", "bootstrap_watcher", sqlmock.AnyArg()).
+		WillReturnResult(sqlmock.NewResult(1, 1))
+
+	if err := NewPostgres(dbh).Persist(context.Background(), b); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Persist: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := mock.ExpectationsWereMet(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("unmet expectations: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestClampSections: a section over maxSectionBytes is truncated +
+// marker-suffixed; a small section is untouched.
+func TestClampSections(t *testing.T) {
+	huge := strings.Repeat("x", maxSectionBytes+5000)
+	in := []rescue.Section{
+		{Name: "container.logs", Content: huge, Redacted: true},
+		{Name: "small", Content: "ok", Redacted: true},
+	}
+	out := clampSections(in)
+
+	if len(out[0].Content) > maxSectionBytes+len(truncationMarker) {
+		t.Errorf("clamped content len = %d, want <= %d", len(out[0].Content), maxSectionBytes+len(truncationMarker))
+	}
+	if !strings.HasSuffix(out[0].Content, truncationMarker) {
+		t.Error("clamped section missing truncation marker suffix")
+	}
+	if out[1].Content != "ok" {
+		t.Errorf("small section was modified: %q", out[1].Content)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestPersist_WritesClampedPayload: Persist marshals the clamped
+// sections into the JSONB arg (the INSERT carries the truncation marker).
+func TestPersist_WritesClampedPayload(t *testing.T) {
+	dbh, mock := newMock(t)
+	huge := strings.Repeat("x", maxSectionBytes+5000)
+	b := rescue.Bundle{
+		WorkspaceID: "ws-1",
+		Sections:    []rescue.Section{{Name: "container.logs", Content: huge, Redacted: true}},
+	}
+	want, _ := json.Marshal(clampSections(b.Sections))
+
+	mock.ExpectExec(regexp.QuoteMeta(`INSERT INTO rescue_bundles`)).
+		WithArgs("ws-1", "", "", "", string(want)).
+		WillReturnResult(sqlmock.NewResult(1, 1))
+
+	if err := NewPostgres(dbh).Persist(context.Background(), b); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Persist: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := mock.ExpectationsWereMet(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("unmet: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestGetLatest_ReturnsBundle: a found row decodes back into the bundle.
+func TestGetLatest_ReturnsBundle(t *testing.T) {
+	dbh, mock := newMock(t)
+	ts := time.Date(2026, 5, 31, 12, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
+	secs, _ := json.Marshal([]rescue.Section{
+		{Name: "config.yaml", Content: "redacted", Redacted: true},
+	})
+
+	mock.ExpectQuery(regexp.QuoteMeta(`SELECT instance_id, reason, captured_at, sections`)).
+		WithArgs("ws-1", "org-9").
+		WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"instance_id", "reason", "captured_at", "sections"}).
+			AddRow("i-abc", "bootstrap_watcher", ts, secs))
+
+	got, err := NewPostgres(dbh).GetLatest(context.Background(), "ws-1", "org-9")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("GetLatest: %v", err)
+	}
+	if got == nil {
+		t.Fatal("got nil, want a bundle")
+	}
+	if !got.CapturedAt.Equal(ts) {
+		t.Errorf("captured_at = %v, want %v", got.CapturedAt, ts)
+	}
+	if got.Bundle.InstanceID != "i-abc" || got.Bundle.Reason != "bootstrap_watcher" {
+		t.Errorf("bundle meta wrong: %+v", got.Bundle)
+	}
+	if len(got.Bundle.Sections) != 1 || got.Bundle.Sections[0].Name != "config.yaml" {
+		t.Errorf("sections decoded wrong: %+v", got.Bundle.Sections)
+	}
+	if err := mock.ExpectationsWereMet(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("unmet: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestGetLatest_NoRowsReturnsNil: no bundle → (nil, nil), so the handler
+// can 404 without treating it as an error.
+func TestGetLatest_NoRowsReturnsNil(t *testing.T) {
+	dbh, mock := newMock(t)
+	mock.ExpectQuery(regexp.QuoteMeta(`SELECT instance_id, reason, captured_at, sections`)).
+		WithArgs("ws-none", "org-9").
+		WillReturnError(sql.ErrNoRows)
+
+	got, err := NewPostgres(dbh).GetLatest(context.Background(), "ws-none", "org-9")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("GetLatest err = %v, want nil for no-rows", err)
+	}
+	if got != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("got %+v, want nil for no-rows", got)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestGetLatest_OrgScopingArg: the org id is passed as the $2 filter arg
+// with strict equality, so a row in a sibling org is excluded by the query
+// itself. A mismatched org → no row → nil (same as no-rows).
+func TestGetLatest_OrgScopingArg(t *testing.T) {
+	dbh, mock := newMock(t)
+	// Tenant org-B asks for ws-1 (owned by org-9). The strict predicate
+	// filters it out → ErrNoRows → nil.
+	mock.ExpectQuery(regexp.QuoteMeta(`AND org_id = $2`)).
+		WithArgs("ws-1", "org-B").
+		WillReturnError(sql.ErrNoRows)
+
+	got, err := NewPostgres(dbh).GetLatest(context.Background(), "ws-1", "org-B")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("GetLatest: %v", err)
+	}
+	if got != nil {
+		t.Fatal("sibling-org read returned a bundle; want nil")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestGetLatest_EmptyOrgIDRejected: an empty orgID must fail closed with
+// an error rather than disabling the org filter (#2020).
+func TestGetLatest_EmptyOrgIDRejected(t *testing.T) {
+	dbh, _ := newMock(t)
+	_, err := NewPostgres(dbh).GetLatest(context.Background(), "ws-1", "")
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("GetLatest(empty orgID) should error")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestGetLatest_QueryErrorPropagates: a real DB error (not ErrNoRows)
+// surfaces as an error so the handler returns 503, not a false 404.
+func TestGetLatest_QueryErrorPropagates(t *testing.T) {
+	dbh, mock := newMock(t)
+	mock.ExpectQuery(regexp.QuoteMeta(`SELECT instance_id, reason, captured_at, sections`)).
+		WithArgs("ws-1", "org-9").
+		WillReturnError(errors.New("connection reset"))
+
+	_, err := NewPostgres(dbh).GetLatest(context.Background(), "ws-1", "org-9")
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("want an error for a non-ErrNoRows DB failure")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestNilDB: both methods return an error (never panic) when the db
+// handle is nil — the degraded-boot guard the wiring relies on.
+func TestNilDB(t *testing.T) {
+	p := NewPostgres(nil)
+	if err := p.Persist(context.Background(), sampleBundle()); err == nil {
+		t.Error("Persist(nil db) should error")
+	}
+	if _, err := p.GetLatest(context.Background(), "ws-1", "org-9"); err == nil {
+		t.Error("GetLatest(nil db) should error")
+	}
+}

workspace-server/internal/router/router.go

@@ -703,6 +703,14 @@ func Setup(hub *ws.Hub, broadcaster *events.Broadcaster, prov *provisioner.Provi
 	wsAuth.PUT("/files/*path", tmplh.WriteFile)
 	wsAuth.DELETE("/files/*path", tmplh.DeleteFile)
 
+	// Rescue read (RFC internal#742 Part 3) — latest post-mortem bundle
+	// for a boot-failed/terminated workspace, so "why won't my agent
+	// boot" is answerable without a live instance. Same WorkspaceAuth
+	// gate as /files/*; the handler org-scopes the store read by
+	// MOLECULE_ORG_ID so a sibling org cannot read another org's bundle.
+	rescueReadH := handlers.NewRescueReadHandler()
+	wsAuth.GET("/rescue", rescueReadH.GetRescue)
+
 	// Chat attachments — file upload (user → agent) and binary-safe
 	// streaming download (agent → user). Namespaced under /chat/ so
 	// the security model is obviously distinct from /files/* (which

workspace-server/migrations/20260531000000_rescue_bundles.down.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+-- Reverse RFC internal#742 Part 3 rescue_bundles table.
+-- Forensic-only table; dropping it loses post-mortem read history but
+-- does not affect boot-failure semantics (capture still ships to Loki).
+DROP TABLE IF EXISTS rescue_bundles;

workspace-server/migrations/20260531000000_rescue_bundles.up.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+-- 20260531000000_rescue_bundles.up.sql — RFC internal#742 Part 3.
+--
+-- A queryable, post-mortem-inspectable copy of the rescue bundle that
+-- Part 2 (internal/rescue.Capture) collects off a boot-failed workspace
+-- EC2 before the control plane reaps it.
+--
+-- WHY a DB table (the Part 3 read-path decision):
+--   Part 2 ships the bundle via internal/audit (audit.Emit), which is
+--   stdout→Vector→Loki + a best-effort local JSONL on the tenant
+--   container's EPHEMERAL rootfs — NOT a queryable store. Serving
+--   GET /workspaces/:id/rescue from Loki would require giving the
+--   tenant process a Loki *query* client + obs read creds, which it
+--   deliberately does not have (and must not — RFC internal#742 keeps
+--   obs read creds out of tenants). So Part 3 ALSO persists the
+--   already-redacted bundle to this small per-tenant table on capture,
+--   and the read endpoint serves the latest row. The Loki stream
+--   remains the cross-tenant operator firehose; this table is the
+--   tenant-local, org-scoped read surface that powers the future
+--   canvas "Why did this fail?" panel.
+--
+-- REDACTION: the `sections` payload written here is the SAME content
+-- the Loki ship loop emits — i.e. already run through the SAFE-T1201
+-- secret-scan (handlers.redactSecrets) at capture time. This table
+-- never holds raw tokens; the read endpoint returns the stored content
+-- verbatim without re-redacting.
+--
+-- ORG SCOPING: org_id is denormalized onto the row so the read handler
+-- can filter by (workspace_id, org_id) and a row whose org doesn't
+-- match the tenant's MOLECULE_ORG_ID is never returned — defense in
+-- depth behind TenantGuard (which already 404s cross-org requests at
+-- the routing layer).
+--
+-- RETENTION: bounded by RescueVolumeGrace semantics on the capture
+-- side; rows are small (a redacted forensic blob, capped at capture).
+-- A future sweeper can prune rows past the grace window — out of scope
+-- for Part 3; the table is append-only here.
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS rescue_bundles (
+    id            BIGSERIAL    PRIMARY KEY,
+    workspace_id  TEXT         NOT NULL,
+    org_id        TEXT         NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
+    instance_id   TEXT         NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
+    reason        TEXT         NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
+    captured_at   TIMESTAMPTZ  NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
+    -- sections is the ordered, already-redacted bundle:
+    --   [{ "name": "config.yaml", "content": "...", "redacted": true }, ...]
+    -- Stored as JSONB so the read handler returns it as a structured map
+    -- and a future query can index into a single section if needed.
+    sections      JSONB        NOT NULL DEFAULT '[]'::jsonb
+);
+
+-- Read hot path: "latest bundle for this workspace" — the only query
+-- the GET /workspaces/:id/rescue endpoint runs.
+--   SELECT ... WHERE workspace_id = $1 [AND org_id = $2]
+--   ORDER BY captured_at DESC, id DESC LIMIT 1
+-- Partial-free composite index; (workspace_id, captured_at DESC) covers
+-- the filter + ordering. id DESC tiebreaks same-timestamp captures.
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_rescue_bundles_ws_captured
+    ON rescue_bundles (workspace_id, captured_at DESC, id DESC);