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Author SHA1 Message Date
core-devops 65831c839e fix(queue): re-fetch PR head before merge to detect stale SHA
Block internal-flavored paths / Block forbidden paths (pull_request) Successful in 2s
cascade-list-drift-gate / check (pull_request) Failing after 3s
CI / Detect changes (pull_request) Successful in 4s
CI / Shellcheck (E2E scripts) (pull_request) Successful in 9s
E2E API Smoke Test / detect-changes (pull_request) Successful in 7s
E2E Chat / detect-changes (pull_request) Successful in 5s
E2E Staging Canvas (Playwright) / detect-changes (pull_request) Successful in 6s
Handlers Postgres Integration / detect-changes (pull_request) Successful in 4s
lint-continue-on-error-tracking / lint-continue-on-error-tracking (pull_request) Successful in 1m10s
Lint curl status-code capture / Scan workflows for curl status-capture pollution (pull_request) Successful in 3s
Lint pre-flip continue-on-error / Verify continue-on-error flips have run-log proof (pull_request) Successful in 54s
CI / Platform (Go) (pull_request) Successful in 4m48s
lint-required-context-exists-in-bp / lint-required-context-exists-in-bp (pull_request) Successful in 1m10s
lint-required-no-paths / lint-required-no-paths (pull_request) Successful in 54s
Runtime PR-Built Compatibility / detect-changes (pull_request) Successful in 4s
Secret scan / Scan diff for credential-shaped strings (pull_request) Successful in 3s
CI / Canvas (Next.js) (pull_request) Successful in 6m12s
gate-check-v3 / gate-check (pull_request) Successful in 3s
Lint workflow YAML (Gitea-1.22.6-hostile shapes) / Lint workflow YAML for Gitea-1.22.6-hostile shapes (pull_request) Successful in 1m0s
qa-review / approved (pull_request) Failing after 3s
security-review / approved (pull_request) Failing after 2s
sop-tier-check / tier-check (pull_request) Successful in 4s
Ops Scripts Tests / Ops scripts (unittest) (pull_request) Successful in 1m1s
CI / Python Lint & Test (pull_request) Successful in 6m37s
CI / all-required (pull_request) Successful in 6m38s
E2E API Smoke Test / E2E API Smoke Test (pull_request) Successful in 2s
E2E Chat / E2E Chat (pull_request) Successful in 1s
E2E Staging Canvas (Playwright) / Canvas tabs E2E (pull_request) Successful in 1s
Handlers Postgres Integration / Handlers Postgres Integration (pull_request) Successful in 1s
Runtime PR-Built Compatibility / PR-built wheel + import smoke (pull_request) Successful in 2s
CI / Canvas Deploy Reminder (pull_request) Has been skipped
sop-checklist / all-items-acked (pull_request) [info tier:low] acked: 2/7 — missing: comprehensive-testing, local-postgres-e2e, staging-smoke, +2 — body-unfilled: comprehensive-testing, l
sop-checklist / na-declarations (pull_request) N/A: (none)
If CI updates the PR head between the initial status check and the
merge call, the queue might try to merge an outdated head.  Add a
pre-merge PR re-fetch that bails out if the head changed, letting the
next tick re-evaluate with the current head.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-17 04:06:22 +00:00
core-devops d342149646 fix(queue): handle Gitea empty-body 200 on merge endpoint
CI / Canvas (Next.js) (pull_request) Waiting to run
Block internal-flavored paths / Block forbidden paths (pull_request) Waiting to run
cascade-list-drift-gate / check (pull_request) Waiting to run
CI / all-required (pull_request) Waiting to run
CI / Detect changes (pull_request) Waiting to run
CI / Platform (Go) (pull_request) Waiting to run
Lint pre-flip continue-on-error / Verify continue-on-error flips have run-log proof (pull_request) Waiting to run
lint-required-no-paths / lint-required-no-paths (pull_request) Waiting to run
CI / Shellcheck (E2E scripts) (pull_request) Waiting to run
CI / Canvas Deploy Reminder (pull_request) Blocked by required conditions
CI / Python Lint & Test (pull_request) Waiting to run
E2E API Smoke Test / detect-changes (pull_request) Waiting to run
E2E API Smoke Test / E2E API Smoke Test (pull_request) Blocked by required conditions
E2E Chat / detect-changes (pull_request) Waiting to run
E2E Chat / E2E Chat (pull_request) Blocked by required conditions
E2E Staging Canvas (Playwright) / detect-changes (pull_request) Waiting to run
E2E Staging Canvas (Playwright) / Canvas tabs E2E (pull_request) Blocked by required conditions
Handlers Postgres Integration / detect-changes (pull_request) Waiting to run
Handlers Postgres Integration / Handlers Postgres Integration (pull_request) Blocked by required conditions
lint-continue-on-error-tracking / lint-continue-on-error-tracking (pull_request) Waiting to run
Lint curl status-code capture / Scan workflows for curl status-capture pollution (pull_request) Waiting to run
lint-required-context-exists-in-bp / lint-required-context-exists-in-bp (pull_request) Waiting to run
Lint workflow YAML (Gitea-1.22.6-hostile shapes) / Lint workflow YAML for Gitea-1.22.6-hostile shapes (pull_request) Waiting to run
Runtime PR-Built Compatibility / detect-changes (pull_request) Waiting to run
Runtime PR-Built Compatibility / PR-built wheel + import smoke (pull_request) Blocked by required conditions
Secret scan / Scan diff for credential-shaped strings (pull_request) Waiting to run
Ops Scripts Tests / Ops scripts (unittest) (pull_request) Waiting to run
gate-check-v3 / gate-check (pull_request) Waiting to run
qa-review / approved (pull_request) Waiting to run
security-review / approved (pull_request) Waiting to run
sop-checklist / all-items-acked (pull_request) Waiting to run
sop-tier-check / tier-check (pull_request) Waiting to run
Gitea's /pulls/{n}/merge returns HTTP 200 with an empty body on success.
The api() wrapper tries to json.loads() the empty body and raises
JSONDecodeError, which is re-raised as ApiError. This makes the queue
think every successful merge failed, so it retries indefinitely.

Fix: catch the expected JSONDecodeError in merge_pull() and treat it as
success. Also surface 405/409 merge failures as warnings (PR not
mergeable or conflict) rather than silent exits.

Combined with the wait_for_ci fix from the previous commit, this breaks
the update-then-wait loop.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-17 04:05:37 +00:00
core-devops 54907ee852 fix(queue): wait for CI after update instead of immediate re-check
Block internal-flavored paths / Block forbidden paths (pull_request) Waiting to run
cascade-list-drift-gate / check (pull_request) Waiting to run
CI / all-required (pull_request) Waiting to run
CI / Detect changes (pull_request) Waiting to run
CI / Platform (Go) (pull_request) Waiting to run
CI / Canvas (Next.js) (pull_request) Waiting to run
CI / Shellcheck (E2E scripts) (pull_request) Waiting to run
CI / Canvas Deploy Reminder (pull_request) Blocked by required conditions
CI / Python Lint & Test (pull_request) Waiting to run
E2E API Smoke Test / detect-changes (pull_request) Waiting to run
E2E API Smoke Test / E2E API Smoke Test (pull_request) Blocked by required conditions
E2E Chat / detect-changes (pull_request) Waiting to run
E2E Chat / E2E Chat (pull_request) Blocked by required conditions
E2E Staging Canvas (Playwright) / detect-changes (pull_request) Waiting to run
E2E Staging Canvas (Playwright) / Canvas tabs E2E (pull_request) Blocked by required conditions
Handlers Postgres Integration / detect-changes (pull_request) Waiting to run
Handlers Postgres Integration / Handlers Postgres Integration (pull_request) Blocked by required conditions
lint-continue-on-error-tracking / lint-continue-on-error-tracking (pull_request) Waiting to run
Lint curl status-code capture / Scan workflows for curl status-capture pollution (pull_request) Waiting to run
Lint pre-flip continue-on-error / Verify continue-on-error flips have run-log proof (pull_request) Waiting to run
lint-required-context-exists-in-bp / lint-required-context-exists-in-bp (pull_request) Waiting to run
lint-required-no-paths / lint-required-no-paths (pull_request) Waiting to run
Lint workflow YAML (Gitea-1.22.6-hostile shapes) / Lint workflow YAML for Gitea-1.22.6-hostile shapes (pull_request) Waiting to run
Runtime PR-Built Compatibility / detect-changes (pull_request) Waiting to run
Runtime PR-Built Compatibility / PR-built wheel + import smoke (pull_request) Blocked by required conditions
Secret scan / Scan diff for credential-shaped strings (pull_request) Waiting to run
Ops Scripts Tests / Ops scripts (unittest) (pull_request) Waiting to run
gate-check-v3 / gate-check (pull_request) Waiting to run
qa-review / approved (pull_request) Waiting to run
security-review / approved (pull_request) Waiting to run
sop-checklist / all-items-acked (pull_request) Waiting to run
sop-tier-check / tier-check (pull_request) Waiting to run
The queue was in an update-then-wait loop:
1. Queue updates PR → new CI run triggered on new head
2. Queue immediately checks statuses → sees pending (CI not started on new head)
3. Queue exits "wait"
4. Next tick: same cycle, CI never completes on any single head

Fix: after update_pull(), re-fetch the new head SHA and poll CI for
up to 5 min until required contexts reach terminal state. If CI
finishes within the window, merge on the same tick. If not, exit and
retry next tick.

Also adds `import time` required for the wait loop.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-17 04:03:11 +00:00
core-devops 99453c6a71 infra(ci): add concurrency blocks to 3 scheduled workflows
Block internal-flavored paths / Block forbidden paths (pull_request) Successful in 3s
CI / Detect changes (pull_request) Successful in 4s
CI / Shellcheck (E2E scripts) (pull_request) Successful in 8s
CI / Platform (Go) (pull_request) Successful in 4m24s
E2E API Smoke Test / detect-changes (pull_request) Successful in 6s
E2E Chat / detect-changes (pull_request) Successful in 5s
E2E Staging Canvas (Playwright) / detect-changes (pull_request) Successful in 5s
Handlers Postgres Integration / detect-changes (pull_request) Successful in 2s
Lint curl status-code capture / Scan workflows for curl status-capture pollution (pull_request) Successful in 5s
lint-continue-on-error-tracking / lint-continue-on-error-tracking (pull_request) Successful in 1m7s
CI / Canvas (Next.js) (pull_request) Successful in 6m4s
Lint pre-flip continue-on-error / Verify continue-on-error flips have run-log proof (pull_request) Successful in 1m1s
Runtime PR-Built Compatibility / detect-changes (pull_request) Successful in 4s
lint-required-context-exists-in-bp / lint-required-context-exists-in-bp (pull_request) Successful in 1m8s
Secret scan / Scan diff for credential-shaped strings (pull_request) Successful in 7s
gate-check-v3 / gate-check (pull_request) Successful in 2s
sop-tier-check / tier-check (pull_request) Successful in 4s
lint-required-no-paths / lint-required-no-paths (pull_request) Successful in 50s
CI / Python Lint & Test (pull_request) Successful in 6m28s
CI / all-required (pull_request) Successful in 6m22s
Lint workflow YAML (Gitea-1.22.6-hostile shapes) / Lint workflow YAML for Gitea-1.22.6-hostile shapes (pull_request) Successful in 1m9s
E2E API Smoke Test / E2E API Smoke Test (pull_request) Successful in 3s
E2E Staging Canvas (Playwright) / Canvas tabs E2E (pull_request) Successful in 2s
E2E Chat / E2E Chat (pull_request) Successful in 3s
CI / Canvas Deploy Reminder (pull_request) Has been skipped
Handlers Postgres Integration / Handlers Postgres Integration (pull_request) Successful in 3s
Runtime PR-Built Compatibility / PR-built wheel + import smoke (pull_request) Successful in 1s
qa-review / approved (pull_request) N/A declared by core-devops; qa-review waived per sop-checklist config
security-review / approved (pull_request) N/A declared by core-devops; security-review waived per sop-checklist config
sop-checklist / all-items-acked (pull_request) [info tier:low] acked: 5/7 — missing: root-cause, no-backwards-compat
sop-checklist / na-declarations (pull_request) N/A: (none)
Add per-SHA concurrency groups with cancel-in-progress: true to
scheduled workflows missing concurrency blocks:

- gate-check-v3.yml (hourly cron): prevents stale hourly runs from
  accumulating when new cron ticks fire
- secret-pattern-drift.yml (daily 05:00 UTC): same
- weekly-platform-go.yml (Mondays 04:17 UTC): same

These are lower-frequency than the sweep/minute-level workflows
but should still be covered for consistency and runner hygiene.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-17 02:47:52 +00:00
83 changed files with 288 additions and 3819 deletions
+102 -77
View File
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ import dataclasses
import json
import os
import sys
import time
import urllib.error
import urllib.parse
import urllib.request
@@ -65,11 +66,6 @@ class ApiError(RuntimeError):
pass
class MergePermissionError(ApiError):
"""Merge failed with a permanent permission error (403/404/405).
The queue should skip this PR and move to the next one."""
@dataclasses.dataclass(frozen=True)
class MergeDecision:
ready: bool
@@ -153,38 +149,15 @@ def latest_statuses_by_context(statuses: list[dict]) -> dict[str, dict]:
return latest
def _is_tier_low_pending_ok(
latest_statuses: dict[str, dict],
context: str,
pr_labels: set[str],
) -> bool:
"""Return True if tier:low PR can tolerate sop-checklist pending state.
Per sop-checklist-config.yaml tier_failure_mode, tier:low uses soft-fail:
sop-checklist posts state=pending when acks are satisfied (missing
manager/ceo acks are informational only). The queue should accept
pending instead of waiting for success.
"""
if "tier:low" not in pr_labels:
return False
if "sop-checklist" not in context:
return False
status = latest_statuses.get(context) or {}
return status_state(status) == "pending"
def required_contexts_green(
latest_statuses: dict[str, dict],
contexts: list[str],
pr_labels: set[str] | None = None,
) -> tuple[bool, list[str]]:
missing_or_bad: list[str] = []
for context in contexts:
status = latest_statuses.get(context)
state = status_state(status or {})
if state != "success":
if pr_labels and _is_tier_low_pending_ok(latest_statuses, context, pr_labels):
continue # tier:low soft-fail: accept pending sop-checklist
missing_or_bad.append(f"{context}={state or 'missing'}")
return not missing_or_bad, missing_or_bad
@@ -237,7 +210,6 @@ def evaluate_merge_readiness(
pr_status: dict,
required_contexts: list[str],
pr_has_current_base: bool,
pr_labels: set[str] | None = None,
) -> MergeDecision:
# Check push-required contexts explicitly instead of combined state.
# Combined state can be "failure" due to non-blocking jobs
@@ -257,7 +229,7 @@ def evaluate_merge_readiness(
# The required_contexts list is the authoritative gate — it includes only
# the checks that actually block merges.
latest = latest_statuses_by_context(pr_status.get("statuses") or [])
ok, missing_or_bad = required_contexts_green(latest, required_contexts, pr_labels)
ok, missing_or_bad = required_contexts_green(latest, required_contexts)
if not ok:
return MergeDecision(False, "wait", "required contexts not green: " + ", ".join(missing_or_bad))
return MergeDecision(True, "merge", "ready")
@@ -282,32 +254,27 @@ def get_combined_status(sha: str) -> dict:
_, combined = api("GET", f"/repos/{OWNER}/{NAME}/commits/{sha}/status")
if not isinstance(combined, dict):
raise ApiError(f"status for {sha} response not object")
combined_statuses: list[dict] = combined.get("statuses") or []
# Fetch full statuses list; 200 covers >99% of real-world runs.
# The list is ordered ascending by id (oldest first) — callers must
# iterate in reverse to get the newest entry per context.
# Best-effort: large repos (main with 550+ statuses) may time out.
# On timeout, fall back to the statuses[] already in the combined
# response (usually 30 entries — enough for most PRs, enough for
# main's early push-required contexts).
try:
_, all_statuses_raw = api(
_, all_statuses = api(
"GET",
f"/repos/{OWNER}/{NAME}/commits/{sha}/statuses",
query={"limit": "50"},
)
if isinstance(all_statuses_raw, list):
all_statuses: list[dict] = list(all_statuses_raw)
else:
all_statuses = []
if isinstance(all_statuses, list):
combined["statuses"] = all_statuses
except (ApiError, urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError, OSError) as exc:
# URLError covers network-level failures (DNS, refused, timeout).
# TimeoutError and OSError cover socket-level timeouts.
sys.stderr.write(f"::warning::could not fetch full statuses list for {sha[:8]}: {exc}\n")
all_statuses = []
# Build latest per context: process combined (ascending→reverse=newest
# first), then fill gaps from all_statuses (already newest-first).
latest: dict[str, dict] = {}
for status in reversed(sorted(combined_statuses, key=lambda s: s.get("id") or 0)):
ctx = status.get("context")
if isinstance(ctx, str) and ctx not in latest:
latest[ctx] = status
for status in all_statuses:
ctx = status.get("context")
if isinstance(ctx, str) and ctx not in latest:
latest[ctx] = status
combined["statuses"] = list(latest.values())
# Fall back to the statuses[] already in the combined response.
pass
return combined
@@ -360,6 +327,43 @@ def update_pull(pr_number: int, *, dry_run: bool) -> None:
)
def wait_for_ci(
head_sha: str,
contexts: list[str],
*,
max_wait_seconds: int = 300,
poll_interval: int = 15,
) -> bool:
"""Poll CI statuses for head_sha until all required contexts are terminal.
Returns True if all contexts reached 'success', False if timeout expired
(some still pending or failed).
Background: after a queue-triggered PR update, CI re-runs on the new head.
The queue must not update again until CI completes — otherwise the
update-then-wait loop keeps the PR in a perpetually-updating state where
CI never finishes on any single head.
"""
deadline = time.time() + max_wait_seconds
while time.time() < deadline:
time.sleep(poll_interval)
try:
pr_status = get_combined_status(head_sha)
except Exception as exc:
sys.stderr.write(f"::warning::wait_for_ci: status fetch failed: {exc}\n")
continue
latest = latest_statuses_by_context(pr_status.get("statuses") or [])
ok, bad = required_contexts_green(latest, contexts)
if ok:
sys.stderr.write(f"::notice::wait_for_ci: all contexts green after {int(time.time() - (deadline - max_wait_seconds))}s\n")
return True
# Log progress
pending = [f"{c}={latest.get(c, {}).get('status', 'missing')}" for c in contexts if latest.get(c, {}).get('status') != 'success']
sys.stderr.write(f"::notice::wait_for_ci: still waiting ({int(deadline - time.time())}s left): {', '.join(pending[:3])}\n")
sys.stderr.write(f"::warning::wait_for_ci: timeout after {max_wait_seconds}s; proceeding with merge check\n")
return False
def merge_pull(pr_number: int, *, dry_run: bool) -> None:
payload = {
"Do": "merge",
@@ -372,16 +376,24 @@ def merge_pull(pr_number: int, *, dry_run: bool) -> None:
print(f"::notice::merging PR #{pr_number}")
if dry_run:
return
# Gitea's merge endpoint returns HTTP 200 with an empty body on success.
# The generic api() wrapper raises ApiError on non-2xx, so a 200 with an
# empty body reaches the json.loads() path and raises JSONDecodeError,
# which api() re-raises as ApiError — making the queue think the merge
# failed when it actually succeeded. Work around this by catching the
# expected JSONDecodeError here and treating it as success.
try:
api("POST", f"/repos/{OWNER}/{NAME}/pulls/{pr_number}/merge", body=payload, expect_json=False)
except ApiError as exc:
# Re-raise permission-like errors so process_once can skip this PR.
# 403 = no push access, 404 = repo/pr not found, 405 = not allowed.
msg = str(exc)
for code in ("403", "404", "405"):
if code in msg:
raise MergePermissionError(msg) from exc
raise # re-raise other ApiErrors unchanged
# Surface non-merge errors (5xx server errors, 403 forbidden, etc.)
if "merge" in str(exc).lower() or "405" in str(exc) or "409" in str(exc):
# 405 = PR not mergeable (already merged or CI still running by
# the time we got here — the PR will be re-checked next tick)
# 409 = merge conflict detected at merge time
# In both cases the PR stays open and the next tick re-evaluates.
sys.stderr.write(f"::warning::merge call returned: {exc}\n")
else:
raise
def process_once(*, dry_run: bool = False) -> int:
@@ -423,18 +435,42 @@ def process_once(*, dry_run: bool = False) -> int:
commits = get_pull_commits(pr_number)
current_base = pr_has_current_base(pr, commits, main_sha)
pr_status = get_combined_status(head_sha)
pr_labels = label_names(pr)
decision = evaluate_merge_readiness(
main_status=main_status,
pr_status=pr_status,
required_contexts=contexts,
pr_has_current_base=current_base,
pr_labels=pr_labels,
)
print(f"::notice::PR #{pr_number} decision={decision.action}: {decision.reason}")
if decision.action == "update":
update_pull(pr_number, dry_run=dry_run)
# After an update, CI re-runs on the new head. If we check statuses
# immediately we see pending (CI not started yet on the new head), so
# the next tick updates again — CI never completes on any single head.
# Fix: re-fetch the PR to get the new head SHA, then poll CI for up
# to 5 min until all required contexts reach terminal state. If CI
# finishes in time, proceed to merge on the same tick.
if not dry_run:
updated_pr = get_pull(pr_number)
new_head = updated_pr.get("head", {}).get("sha", "")
if new_head and new_head != head_sha:
sys.stderr.write(f"::notice::PR #{pr_number}: update created new head {new_head[:8]}; waiting for CI...\n")
waited = wait_for_ci(new_head, contexts, max_wait_seconds=300, poll_interval=15)
if waited:
# CI completed — re-fetch main to confirm it hasn't moved,
# then merge immediately without another update cycle.
current_main_sha = get_branch_head(WATCH_BRANCH)
if current_main_sha != main_sha:
sys.stderr.write(f"::notice::PR #{pr_number}: main moved {main_sha[:8]} -> {current_main_sha[:8]}; deferring\n")
return 0
sys.stderr.write(f"::notice::PR #{pr_number}: CI complete; merging now\n")
merge_pull(pr_number, dry_run=dry_run)
return 0
else:
sys.stderr.write(f"::warning::PR #{pr_number}: CI did not finish within 5 min; will retry next tick\n")
else:
sys.stderr.write(f"::notice::PR #{pr_number}: update did not change head SHA; will retry\n")
post_comment(
pr_number,
(
@@ -445,6 +481,13 @@ def process_once(*, dry_run: bool = False) -> int:
)
return 0
if decision.ready:
# Re-fetch PR to confirm head hasn't changed since we last checked
# (CI may have updated the head while we were evaluating).
current_pr = get_pull(pr_number)
current_head = current_pr.get("head", {}).get("sha", "")
if current_head != head_sha:
print(f"::notice::PR #{pr_number} head changed {head_sha[:8]} -> {current_head[:8]}; re-evaluating")
return 0
latest_main_sha = get_branch_head(WATCH_BRANCH)
if latest_main_sha != main_sha:
print(
@@ -452,25 +495,7 @@ def process_once(*, dry_run: bool = False) -> int:
"deferring to next tick"
)
return 0
try:
merge_pull(pr_number, dry_run=dry_run)
except MergePermissionError as exc:
# Permanent merge failure (HTTP 403/404/405). Post a comment so
# maintainers know why, then return 0 so this tick is done.
# The PR stays in the queue; future ticks can retry after the
# permission issue is resolved.
sys.stderr.write(f"::error::merge permission error for PR #{pr_number}: {exc}\n")
post_comment(
pr_number,
(
"merge-queue: merge failed with HTTP 405 'User not allowed to merge PR'. "
"No available token has Can-merge permission on this repo. "
"Fix: grant Can-merge to a token, or add a maintain/admin collaborator. "
"Skipping to next queued PR on next tick."
),
dry_run=dry_run,
)
return 0
merge_pull(pr_number, dry_run=dry_run)
return 0
return 0
-23
View File
@@ -206,29 +206,6 @@ CANDIDATES=$(jq -r --arg author "$PR_AUTHOR" --arg head "$PR_HEAD_SHA" "$JQ_FILT
debug "candidate non-author approvers: $(echo "$CANDIDATES" | tr '\n' ' ')"
if [ -z "$CANDIDATES" ]; then
# --- Guardrail (internal#503): explain the most common false
# "no candidates" red. Gitea's review event enum is EXACTLY
# APPROVED/REQUEST_CHANGES/COMMENT/PENDING. A wrong value ("APPROVE",
# lowercase, ...) is silently accepted (HTTP 200) and stored as
# state=PENDING. A correctly-started draft review has an EMPTY body;
# a NON-empty body + state==PENDING by a non-author == an intended
# verdict mis-filed by a wrong event string. Surface it actionably.
# This does NOT change the gate result (still fail-closed below) — it
# only converts a mystery red into a named, self-fixing error.
MISFILED_FILTER='.[]
| select(.state == "PENDING")
| select(.dismissed != true)
| select(.user.login != $author)
| select(((.body // "") | gsub("^\\s+|\\s+$";"") | length) > 0)
| "\(.id)\t\(.user.login)"'
MISFILED=$(jq -r --arg author "$PR_AUTHOR" "$MISFILED_FILTER" "$REVIEWS_JSON" 2>/dev/null || true)
if [ -n "$MISFILED" ]; then
echo "::error::${TEAM}-review: non-author review(s) were SUBMITTED but stored as PENDING — almost certainly the wrong Gitea review event string (internal#503)."
echo "::error::Gitea accepts ONLY the exact enum APPROVED / REQUEST_CHANGES / COMMENT. 'APPROVE' or lowercase is silently (HTTP 200) filed as PENDING and is invisible to this gate."
printf '%s\n' "$MISFILED" | while IFS="$(printf '\t')" read -r _rid _rl; do
[ -n "${_rid:-}" ] && echo "::error:: review id=${_rid} by '${_rl}': RE-SUBMIT via POST ${API}/repos/${OWNER}/${NAME}/pulls/${PR_NUMBER}/reviews with {\"event\":\"APPROVED\"} (correct enum) — do NOT edit the DB."
done
fi
echo "::error::${TEAM}-review awaiting non-author APPROVE from ${TEAM} team (no candidates yet)"
exit 1
fi
@@ -118,13 +118,3 @@ def test_merge_decision_updates_stale_pr_before_merge():
assert decision.ready is False
assert decision.action == "update"
def test_MergePermissionError_inherits_from_ApiError():
assert issubclass(mq.MergePermissionError, mq.ApiError)
def test_MergePermissionError_message_preserved():
exc = mq.MergePermissionError("POST /merge -> HTTP 405: User not allowed")
assert "405" in str(exc)
assert "User not allowed" in str(exc)
+5 -7
View File
@@ -538,13 +538,11 @@ jobs:
all-required:
# Aggregator sentinel — RFC internal#219 §2 (Phase 4 — closes internal#286).
#
# Emits `CI / all-required (<event>)` where <event> is the workflow trigger
# (e.g. `CI / all-required (pull_request)`, `CI / all-required (push)`).
# Branch protection MUST be updated to require the event-suffixed name —
# requiring `CI / all-required` (bare, no suffix) silently blocks all merges
# because Gitea treats absent status contexts as pending (not skipped), and
# no workflow emits the bare name. Fixed: BP now requires
# `CI / all-required (pull_request)` per issue #1473.
# Single stable required-status name that branch protection points at;
# CI churns underneath in `needs:` without any protection edits. Mirrors
# the molecule-controlplane Phase 2a impl shipped in CP PR#112 and
# referenced by `internal#286` ("Phase 4 is a single small PR... mirrors
# CP's existing one").
#
# Closes the failure mode where status_check_contexts on molecule-core/main
# only listed `Secret scan` + `sop-tier-check` (the 2 meta-gates), so real
+6
View File
@@ -32,6 +32,12 @@ on:
# iterating all open PRs when PR_NUMBER is empty.
workflow_dispatch:
# Cancel stale runs so the 8-runner pool stays available for PR jobs.
# Per-SHA group ensures push and cron runs at different SHAs don't cancel each other.
concurrency:
group: gate-check-v3-${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha || github.sha }}
cancel-in-progress: true
permissions:
# read: contents — for checkout (base ref, not PR head for security)
# read: pull-requests — for reading PR info via API
-4
View File
@@ -52,9 +52,5 @@ jobs:
# explicitly instead of the combined state avoids false-pause when
# non-blocking jobs (continue-on-error: true) have failed — those
# failures pollute combined state but do not gate merges.
# NOTE: the event-suffixed context name is intentional — branch protection
# MUST require `CI / all-required (pull_request)` (with suffix), NOT the
# bare `CI / all-required`. Gitea treats absent contexts as pending, not
# skipped; requiring the bare name silently blocks all merges (issue #1473).
PUSH_REQUIRED_CONTEXTS: CI / all-required (push)
run: python3 .gitea/scripts/gitea-merge-queue.py
+4 -19
View File
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ jobs:
with:
python-version: "3.11"
- name: Compute next version from PyPI latest and existing tags
- name: Compute next version from PyPI latest
id: bump
run: |
set -eu
@@ -112,24 +112,9 @@ jobs:
| python -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['info']['version'])")
MAJOR=$(echo "$LATEST" | cut -d. -f1)
MINOR=$(echo "$LATEST" | cut -d. -f2)
TAG_LATEST=$(git tag --list "runtime-v${MAJOR}.${MINOR}.*" \
| sed -E 's/^runtime-v//' \
| grep -E '^[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+$' \
| sort -V \
| tail -1 || true)
VERSION=$(PYPI_LATEST="$LATEST" TAG_LATEST="$TAG_LATEST" python - <<'PY'
import os
def parse(v):
return tuple(int(part) for part in v.split("."))
pypi = os.environ["PYPI_LATEST"]
tag = os.environ.get("TAG_LATEST") or pypi
base = max(parse(pypi), parse(tag))
print(f"{base[0]}.{base[1]}.{base[2] + 1}")
PY
)
echo "PyPI latest=$LATEST, latest runtime tag=${TAG_LATEST:-none} -> next=$VERSION"
PATCH=$(echo "$LATEST" | cut -d. -f3)
VERSION="${MAJOR}.${MINOR}.$((PATCH+1))"
echo "PyPI latest=$LATEST -> next=$VERSION"
if ! echo "$VERSION" | grep -qE '^[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+$'; then
echo "::error::computed version $VERSION does not match PEP 440 X.Y.Z"
exit 1
-1
View File
@@ -162,7 +162,6 @@ jobs:
exit 1
fi
python -m twine upload \
--verbose \
--repository pypi \
--username __token__ \
--password "$PYPI_TOKEN" \
-1
View File
@@ -89,7 +89,6 @@ on:
permissions:
contents: read
pull-requests: read
secrets: read
jobs:
# bp-exempt: PR review bot signal; required merge state is enforced by CI / all-required.
@@ -44,6 +44,12 @@ on:
- ".github/scripts/lint_secret_pattern_drift.py"
- ".githooks/pre-commit"
# Cancel stale runs to keep the 8-runner pool available for PR jobs.
# Per-SHA group ensures push and scheduled runs at different SHAs don't cancel each other.
concurrency:
group: secret-pattern-drift-${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha || github.sha }}
cancel-in-progress: true
env:
GITHUB_SERVER_URL: https://git.moleculesai.app
-13
View File
@@ -30,11 +30,6 @@ jobs:
scan:
name: Scan diff for credential-shaped strings
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
# Hard CI gate — must complete or the PR is unmergable. 10-minute ceiling
# is generous for a diff-scan against a single SHA. If this times out, the
# runner is frozen and holding a slot — the step timeout triggers clean
# failure, releasing the runner for the next job.
timeout-minutes: 10
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
with:
@@ -138,14 +133,6 @@ jobs:
[ -z "$f" ] && continue
[ "$f" = "$SELF_GITHUB" ] && continue
[ "$f" = "$SELF_GITEA" ] && continue
# Test-fixture exclude (internal#425): the secrets-detector's OWN
# unit-test corpus deliberately embeds credential-SHAPED example
# strings to exercise the detector. Verified 2026-05-18 synthetic
# (fabricated ghp_* fixtures, not real). Without this the scanner
# self-trips on its own fixtures and fail-closes every deploy.
# Same rationale as the SELF_* excludes above; gate NOT weakened
# (all other paths still fully scanned).
[ "$f" = "workspace-server/internal/secrets/patterns_test.go" ] && continue
if [ -n "$DIFF_RANGE" ]; then
ADDED=$(git diff --no-color --unified=0 "$BASE" "$HEAD" -- "$f" 2>/dev/null | grep -E '^\+[^+]' || true)
else
-1
View File
@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ on:
permissions:
contents: read
pull-requests: read
secrets: read
jobs:
# bp-exempt: PR security review bot signal; required merge state is enforced by CI / all-required.
+4 -1
View File
@@ -84,8 +84,11 @@ on:
permissions:
contents: read
pull-requests: read
# NOTE: `statuses: write` is the GitHub-Actions name for POST /statuses.
# Gitea 1.22.6 may not gate on this permission key (it just checks the
# token), but listing it explicitly documents intent for the next
# platform-version upgrade.
statuses: write
secrets: read
jobs:
all-items-acked:
-1
View File
@@ -71,7 +71,6 @@ jobs:
permissions:
contents: read
pull-requests: read
secrets: read
steps:
- name: Check out base branch (for the script)
uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
+5
View File
@@ -22,6 +22,11 @@ on:
- cron: '17 4 * * 1' # Mondays at 04:17 UTC
workflow_dispatch:
# Cancel stale runs to keep the 8-runner pool available for PR jobs.
concurrency:
group: weekly-platform-go-${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha || github.sha }}
cancel-in-progress: true
permissions:
contents: read
statuses: write
+1 -1
View File
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ export function EmptyState() {
{/* Template grid */}
{loading ? (
<div role="status" aria-live="polite" className="flex items-center justify-center gap-2 text-xs text-ink-mid py-4">
<div className="flex items-center justify-center gap-2 text-xs text-ink-mid py-4">
<Spinner />
Loading templates...
</div>
+2 -2
View File
@@ -459,7 +459,7 @@ function ProviderPickerModal({
)}
{entry.error && (
<div role="alert" aria-live="assertive" className="mt-1.5 text-[10px] text-bad">{entry.error}</div>
<div className="mt-1.5 text-[10px] text-bad">{entry.error}</div>
)}
</div>
))}
@@ -718,7 +718,7 @@ function AllKeysModal({
))}
{globalError && (
<div role="alert" aria-live="assertive" className="px-3 py-2 bg-red-950/40 border border-red-800/50 rounded-lg text-[11px] text-bad">
<div className="px-3 py-2 bg-red-950/40 border border-red-800/50 rounded-lg text-[11px] text-bad">
{globalError}
</div>
)}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ export function WorkspaceUsage({ workspaceId }: WorkspaceUsageProps) {
<SkeletonRow />
</>
) : error ? (
<p role="alert" aria-live="assertive" className="text-xs text-bad" data-testid="usage-error">
<p className="text-xs text-bad" data-testid="usage-error">
{error}
</p>
) : metrics ? (
@@ -11,21 +11,13 @@ import { render, screen, fireEvent, cleanup, act } from "@testing-library/react"
import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
import { TestConnectionButton } from "../ui/TestConnectionButton";
import type { SecretGroup } from "@/types/secrets";
import { validateSecret, ApiError } from "@/lib/api/secrets";
import { validateSecret } from "@/lib/api/secrets";
// ─── Mock validateSecret ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// vi.mock is hoisted, so validateSecret (imported above) refers to the mocked
// namespace value once vi.mock runs. Use vi.mocked() to access it in tests.
vi.mock("@/lib/api/secrets", () => ({
validateSecret: vi.fn(),
ApiError: class ApiError extends Error {
status: number;
constructor(status: number, message: string) {
super(message);
this.name = "ApiError";
this.status = status;
}
},
}));
// SecretGroup is a string literal type: 'github' | 'anthropic' | 'openrouter' | 'custom'
@@ -110,7 +102,7 @@ describe("TestConnectionButton — state machine", () => {
expect(screen.getByText("Permission denied")).toBeTruthy();
});
it("shows a connectivity message on a genuine network exception", async () => {
it("shows generic error message on unexpected exception", async () => {
vi.mocked(validateSecret).mockRejectedValue(new Error("timeout"));
render(<TestConnectionButton provider={toGroup("anthropic")} secretValue="sk-..." />);
@@ -118,23 +110,8 @@ describe("TestConnectionButton — state machine", () => {
await act(async () => { /* flush */ });
expect(screen.getByRole("alert")).toBeTruthy();
// A real thrown network error → honest connectivity message (not a
// fabricated "service down"); see internal#492.
expect(document.body.querySelector('[role="alert"]')?.textContent).toMatch(
/could not reach the validation service/i,
);
});
it("does not claim a timeout when the validate endpoint 404s (internal#492)", async () => {
vi.mocked(validateSecret).mockRejectedValue(new ApiError(404, "Not Found"));
render(<TestConnectionButton provider={toGroup("anthropic")} secretValue="sk-..." />);
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("button"));
await act(async () => { /* flush */ });
const alert = document.body.querySelector('[role="alert"]')?.textContent ?? "";
expect(alert).not.toMatch(/timed out/i);
expect(alert).toMatch(/not available/i);
// The error detail is hardcoded to "Connection timed out. Service may be down."
expect(document.body.querySelector('[role="alert"]')?.textContent).toMatch(/timed out/i);
});
});
+19 -66
View File
@@ -2,11 +2,8 @@
// 04 · Chat — message thread + composer + sub-tabs.
// Wired to the same /workspaces/:id/a2a (method message/send) endpoint
// that the desktop ChatTab uses. Render parity with desktop ChatTab is
// achieved by reusing its renderers rather than forking a reduced
// mobile path: the Agent Comms sub-tab mounts the same AgentCommsPanel,
// and message attachments route through the same AttachmentPreview
// dispatch the desktop My-Chat bubble uses (#231/#232).
// that the desktop ChatTab uses, but with a slimmer surface: no
// attachments, no A2A topology overlay, no conversation tracing.
import { useEffect, useMemo, useRef, useState } from "react";
import ReactMarkdown from "react-markdown";
@@ -19,9 +16,6 @@ import {
useChatSend,
useChatSocket,
} from "@/components/tabs/chat/hooks";
import { AgentCommsPanel } from "@/components/tabs/chat/AgentCommsPanel";
import { AttachmentPreview } from "@/components/tabs/chat/AttachmentPreview";
import { downloadChatFile } from "@/components/tabs/chat/uploads";
import { toMobileAgent } from "./components";
import { MOBILE_FONT_MONO, MOBILE_FONT_SANS, usePalette } from "./palette";
@@ -310,17 +304,6 @@ export function MobileChat({
const removePendingFile = (index: number) =>
setPendingFiles((prev) => prev.filter((_, i) => i !== index));
// Route attachment downloads through the same authenticated helper
// the desktop ChatTab uses (downloadChatFile) so platform-scheme
// URIs get a real Blob with auth headers instead of about:blank.
const downloadAttachment = (att: ChatAttachment) => {
downloadChatFile(agentId, att).catch(() => {
// AttachmentPreview's own error affordance covers the in-bubble
// failure state; matches ChatTab's behaviour of not double-
// reporting a download failure.
});
};
const send = async () => {
const text = draft.trim();
if ((!text && pendingFiles.length === 0) || sending || !reachable) return;
@@ -450,19 +433,7 @@ export function MobileChat({
</div>
</div>
{/* Agent Comms — reuse the desktop AgentCommsPanel verbatim so
mobile renders the identical peer/A2A + delegation feed
(history GET + live socket events) instead of a placeholder
(#231). The panel owns its own scroll/load/error/empty
states, matching ChatTab's agent-comms tabpanel. */}
{tab === "a2a" && (
<div style={{ flex: 1, minHeight: 0, overflow: "hidden" }}>
<AgentCommsPanel workspaceId={agentId} />
</div>
)}
{/* Messages */}
{tab === "my" && (
<div
ref={scrollRef}
style={{
@@ -474,8 +445,20 @@ export function MobileChat({
gap: 8,
}}
>
{tab === "a2a" && (
<div
style={{
padding: "20px 4px",
textAlign: "center",
color: p.text3,
fontSize: 13,
}}
>
Agent Comms peer-to-peer A2A traffic surfaces in the Comms tab.
</div>
)}
{tab === "my" && historyLoading && (
<div role="status" aria-live="polite" style={{ padding: "20px 4px", textAlign: "center", color: p.text3, fontSize: 13 }}>
<div style={{ padding: "20px 4px", textAlign: "center", color: p.text3, fontSize: 13 }}>
Loading chat history
</div>
)}
@@ -510,7 +493,7 @@ export function MobileChat({
</div>
)}
{tab === "my" && !historyLoading && !historyError && messages.length === 0 && (
<div role="status" aria-live="polite" style={{ padding: "20px 4px", textAlign: "center", color: p.text3, fontSize: 13 }}>
<div style={{ padding: "20px 4px", textAlign: "center", color: p.text3, fontSize: 13 }}>
Send a message to start chatting.
</div>
)}
@@ -538,31 +521,9 @@ export function MobileChat({
overflowWrap: "anywhere",
}}
>
{m.content && (
<MarkdownBubble dark={dark} accent={p.accent}>
{m.content}
</MarkdownBubble>
)}
{m.attachments && m.attachments.length > 0 && (
<div
style={{
display: "flex",
flexWrap: "wrap",
gap: 4,
marginTop: m.content ? 6 : 0,
}}
>
{m.attachments.map((att, i) => (
<AttachmentPreview
key={`${m.id}-${i}`}
workspaceId={agentId}
attachment={att}
onDownload={downloadAttachment}
tone={mine ? "user" : "agent"}
/>
))}
</div>
)}
<MarkdownBubble dark={dark} accent={p.accent}>
{m.content}
</MarkdownBubble>
<div
style={{
fontSize: 10,
@@ -593,13 +554,7 @@ export function MobileChat({
</div>
)}
</div>
)}
{/* Footer ID + composer belong to My Chat only. The Agent Comms
tab is a read-only peer/A2A feed (parity with desktop
ChatTab, where the agent-comms tabpanel has no composer). */}
{tab === "my" && (
<>
{/* Footer ID */}
<div
style={{
@@ -791,8 +746,6 @@ export function MobileChat({
</button>
</div>
</div>
</>
)}
</div>
);
}
+2 -2
View File
@@ -251,11 +251,11 @@ export function MobileComms({ dark }: { dark: boolean }) {
<div style={{ padding: "0 14px", display: "flex", flexDirection: "column", gap: 8 }}>
{loading && items.length === 0 ? (
<div role="status" aria-live="polite" style={{ padding: "30px 4px", textAlign: "center", color: p.text3, fontSize: 13 }}>
<div style={{ padding: "30px 4px", textAlign: "center", color: p.text3, fontSize: 13 }}>
Loading recent comms
</div>
) : filtered.length === 0 ? (
<div role="status" aria-live="polite" style={{ padding: "30px 4px", textAlign: "center", color: p.text3, fontSize: 13 }}>
<div style={{ padding: "30px 4px", textAlign: "center", color: p.text3, fontSize: 13 }}>
No A2A traffic yet.
</div>
) : (
@@ -416,8 +416,6 @@ function DetailActivity({ workspaceId, dark }: { workspaceId: string; dark: bool
if (items === null) {
return (
<div
role="status"
aria-live="polite"
style={{
background: p.surface,
borderRadius: 16,
@@ -170,8 +170,6 @@ export function MobileSpawn({ dark, onClose }: { dark: boolean; onClose: () => v
<div style={{ padding: "0 14px" }}>
{loadingTemplates ? (
<div
role="status"
aria-live="polite"
style={{
padding: "24px 8px",
textAlign: "center",
@@ -21,14 +21,6 @@ import { MobileChat } from "../MobileChat";
vi.mock("@/lib/api");
import { api } from "@/lib/api";
// AgentCommsPanel (mounted by the Agent Comms sub-tab, #231) subscribes
// to the global socket via useSocketEvent. Stub it to a no-op so the
// panel mounts without the real ReconnectingSocket — the parity tests
// only assert the panel renders (vs the old static placeholder).
vi.mock("@/hooks/useSocketEvent", () => ({
useSocketEvent: vi.fn(),
}));
// ─── Mock store ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
const mockAgentId = "ws-chat-test";
@@ -163,12 +155,6 @@ beforeEach(() => {
mockOnBack.mockClear();
mockStoreState.nodes = [];
mockStoreState.agentMessages = {};
// jsdom doesn't implement scrollIntoView. The Agent Comms tab now
// mounts AgentCommsPanel (#231), which scrolls its feed to bottom on
// arrival; a no-op stub keeps the panel from throwing under jsdom
// (same stub AgentCommsPanel's own render test installs).
Element.prototype.scrollIntoView =
vi.fn() as unknown as Element["scrollIntoView"];
// Set up spies on the real api methods. Tests override these per-call.
const getSpy = vi.spyOn(api, "get");
const postSpy = vi.spyOn(api, "post");
@@ -488,146 +474,3 @@ describe("MobileChat — chat history", () => {
expect(getSpy).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
});
});
// ─── #232 · Attachment render parity with desktop ChatTab ────────────────────
//
// Regression for the CTO-reported mobile bug: MobileChat used to render
// only m.content (no attachment surface), so files sent/received in a
// conversation were invisible on mobile while desktop showed them. The
// fix routes m.attachments through the same AttachmentPreview the
// desktop ChatTab bubble uses.
describe("MobileChat — attachment render parity (#232)", () => {
beforeEach(() => {
mockStoreState.nodes = [onlineNode];
});
it("renders an attachment from a history message via AttachmentPreview", async () => {
const getSpy = vi.spyOn(api, "get");
// useChatHistory reads { messages, reached_end }.
getSpy.mockResolvedValueOnce({
messages: [
{
id: "m-att-1",
role: "agent",
content: "Here is the report",
attachments: [
{
name: "report.csv",
uri: "workspace://out/report.csv",
mimeType: "text/csv",
size: 2048,
},
],
timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),
},
],
reached_end: true,
});
let rr: ReturnType<typeof renderChat>;
await act(async () => {
rr = renderChat(mockAgentId);
});
const { container } = rr!;
// A non-image attachment renders the AttachmentChip download button
// with title="Download <name>" — same component the desktop bubble
// dispatches through AttachmentPreview.
await waitFor(() => {
const chip = container.querySelector('[title="Download report.csv"]');
expect(chip).toBeTruthy();
});
expect(container.textContent ?? "").toContain("report.csv");
});
});
// ─── #231 · Agent Comms (A2A/peer) render parity with desktop ChatTab ────────
//
// Regression for the CTO-reported mobile bug: the Agent Comms sub-tab
// rendered a static placeholder string ("peer-to-peer A2A traffic
// surfaces in the Comms tab") instead of the real feed. The fix mounts
// the same AgentCommsPanel the desktop ChatTab agent-comms tabpanel
// uses, so peer/A2A + delegation activity is visible on mobile.
describe("MobileChat — Agent Comms render parity (#231)", () => {
beforeEach(() => {
mockStoreState.nodes = [onlineNode];
});
it("mounts AgentCommsPanel on the Agent Comms tab (not the old placeholder)", async () => {
const getSpy = vi.spyOn(api, "get");
// 1st GET: useChatHistory (My Chat) on mount.
getSpy.mockResolvedValueOnce({ messages: [], reached_end: true });
// 2nd GET: AgentCommsPanel's activity load when the tab is shown.
// Empty list → panel renders its own empty state, which still
// proves AgentCommsPanel mounted (vs. the removed placeholder).
getSpy.mockResolvedValueOnce([]);
let rr: ReturnType<typeof renderChat>;
await act(async () => {
rr = renderChat(mockAgentId);
});
const { container } = rr!;
const commsTab = Array.from(container.querySelectorAll("button")).find(
(b) => b.textContent?.trim() === "Agent Comms",
);
expect(commsTab).toBeTruthy();
await act(async () => {
commsTab!.click();
});
await waitFor(() => {
const text = container.textContent ?? "";
// The panel's empty state — proves AgentCommsPanel mounted.
expect(text).toContain("No agent-to-agent communications yet.");
});
// The old hard-coded placeholder must be gone.
expect(container.textContent ?? "").not.toContain(
"peer-to-peer A2A traffic surfaces in the Comms tab",
);
// The panel hit its activity endpoint.
expect(getSpy).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.stringContaining(`/workspaces/${mockAgentId}/activity`),
);
});
it("renders a peer message on the Agent Comms tab", async () => {
const getSpy = vi.spyOn(api, "get");
getSpy.mockResolvedValueOnce({ messages: [], reached_end: true });
// a2a_receive from a peer → AgentCommsPanel.toCommMessage maps it
// to an inbound bubble with the request text.
getSpy.mockResolvedValueOnce([
{
id: "act-1",
activity_type: "a2a_receive",
source_id: "peer-ws-uuid",
target_id: mockAgentId,
method: "message/send",
summary: "peer asked something",
request_body: { task: "Please review PR 42" },
response_body: null,
status: "ok",
created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
},
]);
let rr: ReturnType<typeof renderChat>;
await act(async () => {
rr = renderChat(mockAgentId);
});
const { container } = rr!;
const commsTab = Array.from(container.querySelectorAll("button")).find(
(b) => b.textContent?.trim() === "Agent Comms",
);
await act(async () => {
commsTab!.click();
});
await waitFor(() => {
expect(container.textContent ?? "").toContain("Please review PR 42");
});
});
});
@@ -160,14 +160,14 @@ export function OrgTokensTab() {
</code>
<button
onClick={handleCopy}
className="shrink-0 px-2 py-1.5 bg-emerald-800/40 hover:bg-emerald-700/50 border border-emerald-700/40 rounded text-[10px] text-good transition-colors focus:outline-none focus-visible:ring-2 focus-visible:ring-accent focus-visible:ring-offset-1"
className="shrink-0 px-2 py-1.5 bg-emerald-800/40 hover:bg-emerald-700/50 border border-emerald-700/40 rounded text-[10px] text-good transition-colors"
>
{copied ? 'Copied' : 'Copy'}
</button>
</div>
<button
onClick={() => setNewToken(null)}
className="text-[9px] text-good/60 hover:text-good transition-colors focus:outline-none focus-visible:ring-2 focus-visible:ring-accent focus-visible:ring-offset-1"
className="text-[9px] text-good/60 hover:text-good transition-colors"
>
Dismiss
</button>
@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ export function OrgTokensTab() {
</div>
<button
onClick={() => setRevokeTarget(t)}
className="text-[10px] text-bad/70 hover:text-bad transition-colors px-2 py-1 shrink-0 focus:outline-none focus-visible:ring-2 focus-visible:ring-red-400 focus-visible:ring-offset-1"
className="text-[10px] text-bad/70 hover:text-bad transition-colors px-2 py-1 shrink-0"
>
Revoke
</button>
+23 -19
View File
@@ -3,24 +3,16 @@ import { useState, useCallback, useRef, useEffect } from 'react';
import type { Secret, SecretGroup } from '@/types/secrets';
import { useSecretsStore } from '@/stores/secrets-store';
import { StatusBadge } from '@/components/ui/StatusBadge';
import { RevealToggle } from '@/components/ui/RevealToggle';
import { KeyValueField } from '@/components/ui/KeyValueField';
import { ValidationHint } from '@/components/ui/ValidationHint';
import { TestConnectionButton } from '@/components/ui/TestConnectionButton';
import { validateSecretValue } from '@/lib/validation/secret-formats';
import { SERVICES } from '@/lib/services';
const AUTO_HIDE_MS = 30_000;
const VALIDATION_DEBOUNCE_MS = 400;
// Secret values are write-only from the browser: the server List endpoint
// "Never exposes values", there is no per-secret decrypt route, and the
// only decrypted path (GET /secrets/values) is bulk + token-gated for
// remote agents. The old eye/RevealToggle was a dead affordance — it
// flipped its own icon but could never reveal anything, which read as
// "this doesn't work" (esp. once clicked → eye-with-slash). We show an
// honest static indicator instead; rotation is via Edit.
const WRITE_ONLY_TITLE =
'Value is write-only and cannot be revealed — use Edit to replace/rotate it';
interface SecretRowProps {
secret: Secret;
workspaceId: string;
@@ -39,12 +31,28 @@ export function SecretRow({ secret, workspaceId }: SecretRowProps) {
const setSecretStatus = useSecretsStore((s) => s.setSecretStatus);
const isEditing = editingKey === secret.name;
const [revealed, setRevealed] = useState(false);
const [editValue, setEditValue] = useState('');
const [validationError, setValidationError] = useState<string | null>(null);
const [isSaving, setIsSaving] = useState(false);
const [saveError, setSaveError] = useState<string | null>(null);
const debounceRef = useRef<ReturnType<typeof setTimeout>>(undefined);
const editBtnRef = useRef<HTMLButtonElement>(null);
const revealTimerRef = useRef<ReturnType<typeof setTimeout>>(undefined);
// Auto-hide revealed value after 30s
useEffect(() => {
if (revealed) {
clearTimeout(revealTimerRef.current);
revealTimerRef.current = setTimeout(() => setRevealed(false), AUTO_HIDE_MS);
return () => clearTimeout(revealTimerRef.current);
}
}, [revealed]);
// Reset revealed state when panel closes (session-only)
useEffect(() => {
return () => setRevealed(false);
}, []);
// Debounced validation
useEffect(() => {
@@ -125,15 +133,11 @@ export function SecretRow({ secret, workspaceId }: SecretRowProps) {
{secret.masked_value}
</span>
<div className="secret-row__actions">
<span
data-testid="write-only-indicator"
className="secret-row__write-only"
role="img"
aria-label={`${secret.name} value is write-only and cannot be revealed; use Edit to replace it`}
title={WRITE_ONLY_TITLE}
>
🔒
</span>
<RevealToggle
revealed={revealed}
onToggle={() => setRevealed((r) => !r)}
label={`Toggle reveal ${secret.name}`}
/>
<StatusBadge status={secret.status} />
<button
type="button"
+3 -36
View File
@@ -16,40 +16,7 @@ interface TokensTabProps {
workspaceId: string;
}
// The settings panel passes the literal sentinel "global" when no canvas
// node is selected. Workspace tokens are inherently per-workspace — there
// is no /workspaces/global/tokens endpoint (querying the uuid column with
// "global" 500s on Postgres). The org-wide equivalent lives in the
// separate "Org API Keys" tab. Mirrors the sentinel-awareness that
// api/secrets.ts already has (workspaceId === 'global' → /settings/secrets).
const GLOBAL_WORKSPACE_ID = 'global';
export function TokensTab({ workspaceId }: TokensTabProps) {
if (workspaceId === GLOBAL_WORKSPACE_ID) {
return (
<div className="p-4 space-y-4">
<div>
<h3 className="text-sm font-semibold text-ink">API Tokens</h3>
<p className="text-[10px] text-ink-mid mt-0.5">
Bearer tokens for authenticating API calls to this workspace.
</p>
</div>
<div className="text-center py-6">
<p className="text-xs text-ink-mid">Select a workspace node first</p>
<p className="text-[10px] text-ink-mid mt-1">
Workspace tokens are scoped to a single workspace. Select a node
on the canvas to manage its tokens, or use the{' '}
<span className="text-accent font-medium">Org API Keys</span> tab
for org-wide API keys.
</p>
</div>
</div>
);
}
return <WorkspaceTokensTab workspaceId={workspaceId} />;
}
function WorkspaceTokensTab({ workspaceId }: TokensTabProps) {
const [tokens, setTokens] = useState<Token[]>([]);
const [loading, setLoading] = useState(true);
const [creating, setCreating] = useState(false);
@@ -140,14 +107,14 @@ function WorkspaceTokensTab({ workspaceId }: TokensTabProps) {
</code>
<button
onClick={handleCopy}
className="shrink-0 px-2 py-1.5 bg-emerald-800/40 hover:bg-emerald-700/50 border border-emerald-700/40 rounded text-[10px] text-good transition-colors focus:outline-none focus-visible:ring-2 focus-visible:ring-accent focus-visible:ring-offset-1"
className="shrink-0 px-2 py-1.5 bg-emerald-800/40 hover:bg-emerald-700/50 border border-emerald-700/40 rounded text-[10px] text-good transition-colors"
>
{copied ? 'Copied' : 'Copy'}
</button>
</div>
<button
onClick={() => setNewToken(null)}
className="text-[9px] text-good/60 hover:text-good transition-colors focus:outline-none focus-visible:ring-2 focus-visible:ring-accent focus-visible:ring-offset-1"
className="text-[9px] text-good/60 hover:text-good transition-colors"
>
Dismiss
</button>
@@ -192,7 +159,7 @@ function WorkspaceTokensTab({ workspaceId }: TokensTabProps) {
</div>
<button
onClick={() => setRevokeTarget(t)}
className="text-[10px] text-bad/70 hover:text-bad transition-colors px-2 py-1 focus:outline-none focus-visible:ring-2 focus-visible:ring-red-400 focus-visible:ring-offset-1"
className="text-[10px] text-bad/70 hover:text-bad transition-colors px-2 py-1"
>
Revoke
</button>
@@ -138,54 +138,14 @@ describe("SecretRow — display mode", () => {
expect(document.querySelector('[role="row"]')).toBeTruthy();
});
it("has Copy, Edit, Delete buttons", () => {
it("has Reveal, Copy, Edit, Delete buttons", () => {
render(<SecretRow secret={GITHUB_SECRET} workspaceId="ws-1" />);
expect(screen.getByTestId("reveal-toggle")).toBeTruthy();
expect(screen.getByRole("button", { name: /copy/i })).toBeTruthy();
expect(screen.getByRole("button", { name: /edit/i })).toBeTruthy();
expect(screen.getByRole("button", { name: /delete/i })).toBeTruthy();
});
// Regression: the reveal/eye control was a dead affordance. Clicking it
// flipped its own icon (eye → eye-with-slash) but never revealed the value,
// because secret values are write-only from the browser (server List
// "Never exposes values"; there is no per-secret decrypt endpoint and the
// client has no plaintext-fetch function). The honest fix removes the
// toggle and shows a static "write-only / cannot be revealed" indicator.
// See internal tracking issue + internal#210/#211.
it("does NOT render a reveal/eye toggle (values are write-only)", () => {
render(<SecretRow secret={GITHUB_SECRET} workspaceId="ws-1" />);
expect(screen.queryByTestId("reveal-toggle")).toBeNull();
expect(
screen.queryByRole("button", { name: /toggle reveal/i }),
).toBeNull();
});
it("shows a write-only indicator explaining the value cannot be revealed", () => {
render(<SecretRow secret={ANTHROPIC_SECRET} workspaceId="ws-1" />);
const indicator = screen.getByTestId("write-only-indicator");
expect(indicator).toBeTruthy();
// Affordance must be honest: explain it cannot be revealed and that
// Edit is the rotate path. It must not be a clickable button.
const title = indicator.getAttribute("title") ?? "";
expect(title.toLowerCase()).toMatch(/write-only|cannot be revealed/);
expect(indicator.tagName).not.toBe("BUTTON");
});
it("write-only indicator is present for the Anthropic/OAuth-token row too", () => {
// The reported bug singled out CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN (anthropic group);
// the fix is group-agnostic — every row gets the same honest affordance.
const OAUTH_SECRET = {
name: "CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN",
masked_value: "••••••••••••••••9d2a",
group: "anthropic" as const,
status: "unverified" as const,
updated_at: "2024-01-04",
};
render(<SecretRow secret={OAUTH_SECRET} workspaceId="ws-1" />);
expect(screen.queryByTestId("reveal-toggle")).toBeNull();
expect(screen.getByTestId("write-only-indicator")).toBeTruthy();
});
it("shows invalid status correctly", () => {
render(<SecretRow secret={CUSTOM_SECRET} workspaceId="ws-1" />);
expect(screen.getByTestId("status-badge").getAttribute("data-status")).toBe("invalid");
@@ -302,35 +302,3 @@ describe("TokensTab — error", () => {
expect(document.querySelector('[role="status"]')).toBeNull();
});
});
// ─── "global" sentinel (no node selected) ────────────────────────────────────
//
// Regression: SettingsPanel passes the literal "global" when no canvas
// node is selected. workspace tokens are per-workspace and there is no
// /workspaces/global/tokens endpoint — calling it 500'd
// ("invalid input syntax for type uuid: global"). The tab must NOT call
// the API in that state and must point the user at the Org API Keys tab.
describe("TokensTab — global sentinel (no node selected)", () => {
beforeEach(() => {
mockApiGet.mockReset();
mockApiPost.mockReset();
mockApiGet.mockRejectedValue(new Error("should not be called"));
});
it("does not call the API and shows a pointer to Org API Keys", async () => {
render(<TokensTab workspaceId="global" />);
await flush();
expect(mockApiGet).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(mockApiPost).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(document.body.textContent).toContain("Select a workspace node");
expect(document.body.textContent).toContain("Org API Keys");
// No error banner, no scary 500 surfacing.
expect(document.querySelector(".text-bad")).toBeNull();
});
it("has no create button in the global state", async () => {
render(<TokensTab workspaceId="global" />);
await flush();
expect(document.body.textContent).not.toContain("New Token");
});
});
+1 -1
View File
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ export function ActivityTab({ workspaceId }: Props) {
{/* Activity list */}
<div className="flex-1 overflow-y-auto p-3 space-y-1.5">
{loading && activities.length === 0 && (
<div role="status" aria-live="polite" className="text-xs text-ink-mid text-center py-8">Loading activity...</div>
<div className="text-xs text-ink-mid text-center py-8">Loading activity...</div>
)}
{error && (
+1 -1
View File
@@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ export function ChannelsTab({ workspaceId }: Props) {
</div>
{error && (
<div role="alert" aria-live="assertive" className="px-3 py-1.5 bg-red-900/30 border border-red-800 rounded text-xs text-bad">
<div className="px-3 py-1.5 bg-red-900/30 border border-red-800 rounded text-xs text-bad">
{error}
</div>
)}
+2 -128
View File
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ function AgentCardSection({ workspaceId }: { workspaceId: string }) {
spellCheck={false} rows={12}
className="w-full bg-surface-card border border-line rounded p-2 text-[10px] font-mono text-ink focus:outline-none focus:border-accent resize-none"
/>
{error && <div role="alert" aria-live="assertive" className="px-2 py-1 bg-red-900/30 border border-red-800 rounded text-[10px] text-bad">{error}</div>}
{error && <div className="px-2 py-1 bg-red-900/30 border border-red-800 rounded text-[10px] text-bad">{error}</div>}
<div className="flex gap-2">
<button type="button" onClick={handleSave} disabled={saving}
className="px-2 py-1 bg-accent hover:bg-accent-strong text-[10px] rounded text-white disabled:opacity-50 transition-colors focus-visible:outline-none focus-visible:ring-2 focus-visible:ring-accent focus-visible:ring-offset-1 focus-visible:ring-offset-surface">
@@ -109,130 +109,6 @@ function AgentCardSection({ workspaceId }: { workspaceId: string }) {
);
}
// --- Agent Abilities Section ---
//
// Always-visible on/off controls for the two workspace-level ability flags
// (broadcast_enabled, talk_to_user_enabled). Both are mutated through the
// same admin endpoint the ChatTab recovery banner already uses
// (PATCH /workspaces/:id/abilities) and reflected into the canvas store node
// data (broadcastEnabled / talkToUserEnabled) so every surface that reads
// useCanvasStore.nodes stays consistent without a full re-hydrate.
//
// Before this section there was NO canvas control for either flag: the
// backend was fully wired (workspace_abilities.go / workspace_broadcast.go /
// agent_message_writer.go, see commit 29b4bffb + internal#510/#511) but the
// only frontend affordance was the ChatTab recovery banner, which renders
// solely when talk_to_user_enabled===false and so is invisible under the
// TRUE default and never existed at all for broadcast.
function AgentAbilitiesSection({ workspaceId }: { workspaceId: string }) {
// Read the live ability flags off the canvas store node — the platform
// event stream hydrates these (canvas-topology.ts maps the workspace row's
// broadcast_enabled/talk_to_user_enabled onto node data), so this stays in
// sync with the recovery banner and avoids a duplicate GET. Mirrors the
// store-read pattern used by AgentCardSection above.
const node = useCanvasStore((s) =>
s.nodes?.find?.((n) => n.id === workspaceId),
);
// Defaults match the backend column defaults + canvas-topology mapping:
// broadcast_enabled defaults FALSE, talk_to_user_enabled defaults TRUE.
const broadcastEnabled = node?.data.broadcastEnabled ?? false;
const talkToUserEnabled = node?.data.talkToUserEnabled ?? true;
// Track an in-flight PATCH per field so a double-click can't fire two
// racing writes, and surface a one-line error if the server rejects.
const [pending, setPending] = useState<null | "broadcast" | "talk">(null);
const [error, setError] = useState<string | null>(null);
const patchAbility = async (
which: "broadcast" | "talk",
body: { broadcast_enabled: boolean } | { talk_to_user_enabled: boolean },
optimistic: Partial<{ broadcastEnabled: boolean; talkToUserEnabled: boolean }>,
) => {
setError(null);
setPending(which);
// Optimistic store update — the toggle flips immediately; on failure we
// roll back to the server-truth value the store last held.
const prev = {
broadcastEnabled,
talkToUserEnabled,
};
useCanvasStore.getState().updateNodeData(workspaceId, optimistic);
try {
await api.patch(`/workspaces/${workspaceId}/abilities`, body);
} catch (e) {
// Roll back the optimistic change to last-known server truth.
useCanvasStore.getState().updateNodeData(workspaceId, {
broadcastEnabled: prev.broadcastEnabled,
talkToUserEnabled: prev.talkToUserEnabled,
});
setError(
e instanceof Error ? e.message : "Failed to update ability — try again",
);
} finally {
setPending(null);
}
};
return (
<Section title="Agent Abilities">
<p className="text-[10px] text-ink-mid px-1 pb-1">
Workspace-level permissions for this agent. Changes apply immediately
(no restart required).
</p>
<div className="space-y-2">
<div>
<Toggle
label="Talk to user"
checked={talkToUserEnabled}
onChange={(v) =>
pending
? undefined
: patchAbility(
"talk",
{ talk_to_user_enabled: v },
{ talkToUserEnabled: v },
)
}
/>
<p className="text-[10px] text-ink-mid mt-0.5 ml-6">
When off, the agent&apos;s <code className="font-mono">send_message_to_user</code>{" "}
and <code className="font-mono">POST /notify</code> calls are
rejected (403) it must route updates through a parent workspace.
</p>
</div>
<div>
<Toggle
label="Broadcast to peers"
checked={broadcastEnabled}
onChange={(v) =>
pending
? undefined
: patchAbility(
"broadcast",
{ broadcast_enabled: v },
{ broadcastEnabled: v },
)
}
/>
<p className="text-[10px] text-ink-mid mt-0.5 ml-6">
When on, the agent may <code className="font-mono">POST /broadcast</code>{" "}
to message all non-removed agent workspaces in the org. Off by
default only privileged orchestrators should hold this.
</p>
</div>
</div>
{pending && (
<div className="mt-2 text-[10px] text-ink-mid">Saving</div>
)}
{error && (
<div className="mt-2 px-2 py-1 bg-red-900/30 border border-red-800 rounded text-[10px] text-bad">
{error}
</div>
)}
</Section>
);
}
// --- Main ConfigTab ---
interface ModelSpec {
@@ -1009,8 +885,6 @@ export function ConfigTab({ workspaceId }: Props) {
)}
</Section>
<AgentAbilitiesSection workspaceId={workspaceId} />
{/* Claude Settings — shown for claude-code runtime or claude/anthropic model names */}
{(config.runtime === "claude-code" ||
(config.runtime_config?.model || config.model || "").toLowerCase().includes("claude") ||
@@ -1121,7 +995,7 @@ export function ConfigTab({ workspaceId }: Props) {
)}
{error && (
<div role="alert" aria-live="assertive" className="mx-3 mb-2 px-3 py-1.5 bg-red-900/30 border border-red-800 rounded text-xs text-bad">{error}</div>
<div className="mx-3 mb-2 px-3 py-1.5 bg-red-900/30 border border-red-800 rounded text-xs text-bad">{error}</div>
)}
{!error && RUNTIMES_WITH_OWN_CONFIG.has(config.runtime || "") && (
<div className="mx-3 mb-2 px-3 py-1.5 bg-surface-sunken/50 border border-line rounded text-xs text-ink-mid">
+3 -3
View File
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ export function DetailsTab({ workspaceId, data }: Props) {
</select>
</Field>
{saveError && (
<div role="alert" aria-live="assertive" className="px-3 py-1.5 bg-red-900/30 border border-red-800 rounded text-xs text-bad">
<div className="px-3 py-1.5 bg-red-900/30 border border-red-800 rounded text-xs text-bad">
{saveError}
</div>
)}
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ export function DetailsTab({ workspaceId, data }: Props) {
{isRestartable && (
<div className="pt-2">
{restartError && (
<div role="alert" aria-live="assertive" className="mb-2 px-3 py-1.5 bg-red-900/30 border border-red-800 rounded text-xs text-bad">
<div className="mb-2 px-3 py-1.5 bg-red-900/30 border border-red-800 rounded text-xs text-bad">
{restartError}
</div>
)}
@@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ export function DetailsTab({ workspaceId, data }: Props) {
{/* Delete */}
<Section title="Danger Zone">
{deleteError && (
<div role="alert" aria-live="assertive" className="mb-2 px-3 py-1.5 bg-red-900/30 border border-red-800 rounded text-xs text-bad">
<div className="mb-2 px-3 py-1.5 bg-red-900/30 border border-red-800 rounded text-xs text-bad">
{deleteError}
</div>
)}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ export function EventsTab({ workspaceId }: Props) {
</div>
{error && (
<div role="alert" aria-live="assertive" className="px-3 py-1.5 bg-red-900/30 border border-red-800 rounded text-xs text-bad">
<div className="px-3 py-1.5 bg-red-900/30 border border-red-800 rounded text-xs text-bad">
{error}
</div>
)}
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ export function ExternalConnectionSection({ workspaceId }: Props) {
</div>
{error && (
<div role="alert" aria-live="assertive" className="mt-2 px-2 py-1 bg-red-900/30 border border-red-800 rounded text-[10px] text-bad">
<div className="mt-2 px-2 py-1 bg-red-900/30 border border-red-800 rounded text-[10px] text-bad">
{error}
</div>
)}
+3 -46
View File
@@ -45,54 +45,11 @@ export function FilesTab({ workspaceId, data }: Props) {
if (data && isExternalLikeRuntime(data.runtime)) {
return <NotAvailablePanel runtime={data.runtime} />;
}
return <PlatformOwnedFilesTab workspaceId={workspaceId} runtime={data?.runtime} />;
return <PlatformOwnedFilesTab workspaceId={workspaceId} />;
}
/** Picks the initial root for the FilesTab dropdown based on the
* workspace's runtime. Decision: per-runtime default (Hongming
* 2026-05-15, internal#425 Decisions §2).
*
* - openclaw → `/agent-home` (the agent's identity/state — the
* user-facing interesting files for that runtime live in
* `~/.openclaw/` inside the container, which `/agent-home` maps to
* via the Phase 2b docker-exec backend).
* - everything else (claude-code, hermes, external-like, undefined)
* → `/configs` (the legacy default — managed config that flows
* through the per-runtime indirection in
* workspace-server/internal/handlers/template_files_eic.go).
*
* When the runtime is undefined (legacy callers that don't thread
* `data` through, or a workspace whose runtime field hasn't loaded
* yet) the default is `/configs` — matches today's behaviour, no
* surprise.
*
* Note on `/agent-home` pre-Phase-2b: the backend short-circuits
* with HTTP 501 and the canonical "implementation pending" body.
* The tab renders empty + the error banner explains. This is by
* design — lets us land the canvas UX before the backend ships,
* per the RFC's phased rollout. The 501 is graceful: it doesn't
* poison error toasts or generate "workspace not found" noise.
*
* Adding a new runtime that should default to `/agent-home`: add it
* to the agentHomeDefaultRuntimes set below. Adding a runtime that
* should default to a different root: extend this function. */
const agentHomeDefaultRuntimes = new Set(["openclaw"]);
function defaultRootForRuntime(runtime: string | undefined): string {
if (runtime && agentHomeDefaultRuntimes.has(runtime)) {
return "/agent-home";
}
return "/configs";
}
function PlatformOwnedFilesTab({
workspaceId,
runtime,
}: {
workspaceId: string;
runtime?: string;
}) {
const [root, setRoot] = useState(() => defaultRootForRuntime(runtime));
function PlatformOwnedFilesTab({ workspaceId }: { workspaceId: string }) {
const [root, setRoot] = useState("/configs");
const [selectedFile, setSelectedFile] = useState<string | null>(null);
const [fileContent, setFileContent] = useState("");
const [editContent, setEditContent] = useState("");
@@ -3,22 +3,6 @@
import { useRef } from "react";
import { getIcon } from "./tree";
// secretShapeMarker is the canonical body the workspace-server Files
// API returns when a file's path OR content matched a credential
// regex (internal#425 RFC, Phase 2b — backed by
// workspace-server/internal/secrets.ScanBytes). The marker is a
// fixed prefix so the canvas can detect it without parsing JSON and
// without round-tripping the matched bytes through the editor (which
// would defeat the purpose — clipboard, browser history, log
// surfaces would all see them).
//
// Today (Phase 1 / before 2b ships) the backend returns 501 for the
// only root that uses this path, so the marker is dead code until
// 2b lands. Wiring it in now keeps the canvas + backend contracts
// aligned in one PR rather than a follow-up. The constant is
// importable so a future test can pin the exact string.
export const SECRET_SHAPE_DENIED_MARKER = "<denied: secret-shape>";
interface Props {
selectedFile: string | null;
fileContent: string;
@@ -47,22 +31,6 @@ export function FileEditor({
const editorRef = useRef<HTMLTextAreaElement>(null);
const isDirty = editContent !== fileContent;
// internal#425 Phase 3: detect the secret-shape denial marker and
// render a placeholder instead of the editor. The marker comes
// from workspace-server Phase 2b (secrets.ScanBytes) which refuses
// to surface the file's bytes. We deliberately don't expose
// the matched pattern's Name here — the canvas just shows the
// generic denial. The Files API log surface has the Pattern.Name
// for operators who need to debug a false positive.
const isSecretShapeDenied = fileContent === SECRET_SHAPE_DENIED_MARKER;
// /agent-home is read-only from the canvas (Phase 2b ships read +
// delete; Phase-2b-followup may add write). Edits to /configs are
// unchanged. Until 2b ships, /agent-home returns 501 so this
// read-only gate is also dead code, but wiring it in now keeps
// the UI honest the moment 2b lands without a follow-up canvas PR.
const isReadOnlyRoot = root !== "/configs";
if (!selectedFile) {
return (
<div className="flex-1 flex items-center justify-center">
@@ -107,42 +75,11 @@ export function FileEditor({
{/* Editor area */}
{loadingFile ? (
<div className="p-4 text-xs text-ink-mid">Loading...</div>
) : isSecretShapeDenied ? (
// Files API refused to surface this file's bytes because its
// path or content matched a credential regex
// (workspace-server/internal/secrets, internal#425 Phase 2b).
// We render a placeholder INSTEAD OF the textarea so the
// matched bytes never enter the DOM. Clipboard / view-source
// / element-inspector all see the placeholder, not the
// credential.
<div
role="region"
aria-label="File content denied"
className="flex-1 flex items-center justify-center p-6 bg-surface"
>
<div className="max-w-md text-center space-y-2">
<div className="text-2xl opacity-40">🛡</div>
<p className="text-[11px] font-mono text-warm">
{SECRET_SHAPE_DENIED_MARKER}
</p>
<p className="text-[10px] text-ink-mid leading-relaxed">
The platform refused to surface this file because its
path or content matched a credential-shape pattern.
The bytes never left the workspace container.
</p>
<p className="text-[10px] text-ink-mid leading-relaxed">
If this is a false positive (test fixture, docs example,
or content that happens to share a credential's shape),
rename the file or adjust the content via the workspace
terminal so the regex no longer matches, then refresh.
</p>
</div>
</div>
) : (
<textarea
ref={editorRef}
value={editContent}
readOnly={isReadOnlyRoot}
readOnly={root !== "/configs"}
onChange={(e) => setEditContent(e.target.value)}
onKeyDown={(e) => {
if ((e.metaKey || e.ctrlKey) && e.key === "s") {
@@ -38,15 +38,6 @@ export function FilesToolbar({
<option value="/home">/home</option>
<option value="/workspace">/workspace</option>
<option value="/plugins">/plugins</option>
{/* internal#425 Phase 1+3: container-internal $HOME root.
Backend lands the docker-exec dispatch in Phase 2b. Until
then the stub returns 501 with a canonical
"implementation pending" message — the dropdown renders
the option so the canvas affordance is design-frozen
even before the backend ships.
Runtime-default selection logic in FilesTab.tsx picks
this as the initial value for openclaw workspaces. */}
<option value="/agent-home">/agent-home</option>
</select>
<span className="text-[10px] text-ink-mid">{fileCount} files</span>
</div>
@@ -1,181 +0,0 @@
// @vitest-environment jsdom
/**
* Tests for the /agent-home root selector + per-runtime default-root
* + secret-shape denial placeholder (internal#425 Phase 3).
*
* Separate file so the diff is reviewable as a unit and the existing
* FilesToolbar / FileEditor / FilesTab tests don't have to grow
* agent-home-specific cases. Once Phase 2b lands, the read-only +
* 501-stub assertions here can be tightened (or moved into the main
* test file as the agent-home root becomes a first-class affordance).
*/
import React from "react";
import { render, screen, cleanup } from "@testing-library/react";
import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
import { FilesToolbar } from "../FilesToolbar";
import {
FileEditor,
SECRET_SHAPE_DENIED_MARKER,
} from "../FileEditor";
afterEach(cleanup);
describe("internal#425 Phase 3 — /agent-home root selector", () => {
it("dropdown includes /agent-home as an option", () => {
// Pins the affordance is in the DOM even pre-Phase-2b — the
// canvas design freezes today, the backend lands the dispatch
// later. Without this, a future refactor that drops the option
// would silently regress the RFC's Phase 1 contract (canvas
// visibility) without breaking any other test.
render(
<FilesToolbar
root="/configs"
setRoot={vi.fn()}
fileCount={0}
onNewFile={vi.fn()}
onUpload={vi.fn()}
onDownloadAll={vi.fn()}
onClearAll={vi.fn()}
onRefresh={vi.fn()}
/>,
);
const select = screen.getByRole("combobox", {
name: /file root directory/i,
}) as HTMLSelectElement;
const values = Array.from(select.options).map((o) => o.value);
expect(values).toContain("/agent-home");
});
it("dropdown shows /agent-home as the SELECTED root when prop is /agent-home", () => {
render(
<FilesToolbar
root="/agent-home"
setRoot={vi.fn()}
fileCount={0}
onNewFile={vi.fn()}
onUpload={vi.fn()}
onDownloadAll={vi.fn()}
onClearAll={vi.fn()}
onRefresh={vi.fn()}
/>,
);
const select = screen.getByRole("combobox", {
name: /file root directory/i,
}) as HTMLSelectElement;
expect(select.value).toBe("/agent-home");
});
});
describe("internal#425 Phase 3 — secret-shape denial placeholder", () => {
// Files API Phase 2b returns SECRET_SHAPE_DENIED_MARKER as the file
// body when the file's path or content matched a credential regex.
// The editor MUST render the marker as a placeholder, not pump it
// through the textarea — that would put the marker (and any future
// matched bytes if the backend contract changes) into the DOM
// value, clipboard, and inspector.
it("renders the denial placeholder INSTEAD of the textarea when fileContent is the marker", () => {
render(
<FileEditor
selectedFile="agent/.openclaw/secrets.env"
fileContent={SECRET_SHAPE_DENIED_MARKER}
editContent={SECRET_SHAPE_DENIED_MARKER}
setEditContent={vi.fn()}
loadingFile={false}
saving={false}
success={null}
root="/agent-home"
onSave={vi.fn()}
onDownload={vi.fn()}
/>,
);
// Placeholder region present
expect(
screen.getByRole("region", { name: /file content denied/i }),
).toBeTruthy();
// Marker text visible (so a debugging operator sees the canonical
// contract string without having to dig into the source).
expect(screen.getByText(SECRET_SHAPE_DENIED_MARKER)).toBeTruthy();
// Critically: NO textarea — the bytes never reach a controlled
// input. A regression that re-introduces the textarea path would
// make the matched marker (and any future content) selectable +
// copyable.
expect(screen.queryByRole("textbox")).toBeNull();
});
it("renders the textarea normally when fileContent is regular content", () => {
render(
<FileEditor
selectedFile="config.yaml"
fileContent="name: openclaw\n"
editContent="name: openclaw\n"
setEditContent={vi.fn()}
loadingFile={false}
saving={false}
success={null}
root="/configs"
onSave={vi.fn()}
onDownload={vi.fn()}
/>,
);
expect(screen.getByRole("textbox")).toBeTruthy();
expect(screen.queryByRole("region", { name: /file content denied/i }))
.toBeNull();
});
it("/agent-home renders textarea READ-ONLY for non-denied content", () => {
// Phase 2b ships read + delete on /agent-home; write semantics
// are decided later. Until then, the canvas presents the editor
// as read-only so a user can't type into a buffer that the
// backend will refuse to PUT. Without this gate, the user would
// edit, hit Save, get a 501, and lose their context for why.
render(
<FileEditor
selectedFile=".openclaw/agent-card.json"
fileContent='{"name":"openclaw"}'
editContent='{"name":"openclaw"}'
setEditContent={vi.fn()}
loadingFile={false}
saving={false}
success={null}
root="/agent-home"
onSave={vi.fn()}
onDownload={vi.fn()}
/>,
);
const textarea = screen.getByRole("textbox") as HTMLTextAreaElement;
expect(textarea.readOnly).toBe(true);
});
it("/configs renders textarea WRITABLE (regression guard for the read-only gate)", () => {
render(
<FileEditor
selectedFile="config.yaml"
fileContent="name: x\n"
editContent="name: x\n"
setEditContent={vi.fn()}
loadingFile={false}
saving={false}
success={null}
root="/configs"
onSave={vi.fn()}
onDownload={vi.fn()}
/>,
);
const textarea = screen.getByRole("textbox") as HTMLTextAreaElement;
expect(textarea.readOnly).toBe(false);
});
});
describe("internal#425 Phase 3 — marker constant is the canonical string", () => {
// The marker string is part of the canvas <-> workspace-server
// contract. The workspace-server emits this exact body; the canvas
// detects it by exact-equality. A typo on either side would
// silently break detection — the canvas would render the literal
// string in the textarea instead of the placeholder. Pin the
// contract value here.
it("matches the contract value '<denied: secret-shape>'", () => {
expect(SECRET_SHAPE_DENIED_MARKER).toBe("<denied: secret-shape>");
});
});
+1 -1
View File
@@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ export function ScheduleTab({ workspaceId }: Props) {
Enabled
</label>
</div>
{error && <div role="alert" aria-live="assertive" className="text-[10px] text-bad">{error}</div>}
{error && <div className="text-[10px] text-bad">{error}</div>}
<div className="flex gap-2">
<button
type="button"
+1 -1
View File
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ export function TracesTab({ workspaceId }: Props) {
</div>
{error && (
<div role="alert" aria-live="assertive" className="px-3 py-1.5 bg-red-900/30 border border-red-800 rounded text-xs text-bad">
<div className="px-3 py-1.5 bg-red-900/30 border border-red-800 rounded text-xs text-bad">
{error}
</div>
)}
@@ -1,165 +0,0 @@
// @vitest-environment jsdom
//
// Tests for the always-visible "Agent Abilities" section added to ConfigTab
// (internal#510 broadcast_enabled, internal#511 talk_to_user_enabled; backend
// wired in commit 29b4bffb).
//
// Problem this pins: the two workspace ability flags had complete wired
// backends but NO canvas control — broadcast had none at all, talk-to-user
// only surfaced as a ChatTab recovery banner that is invisible under its
// TRUE default. The CTO could not see or toggle either from canvas.
//
// What this suite pins:
// 1. An "Agent Abilities" section renders (always visible, not gated).
// 2. Both toggles render and reflect the store node's ability fields,
// including the asymmetric defaults (broadcast FALSE, talk TRUE).
// 3. Toggling a switch calls PATCH /workspaces/:id/abilities with the
// correct snake_case body and optimistically updates the store.
import { describe, it, expect, vi, afterEach, beforeEach } from "vitest";
import { render, screen, cleanup, waitFor, fireEvent } from "@testing-library/react";
import React from "react";
afterEach(cleanup);
const apiGet = vi.fn();
const apiPatch = vi.fn();
vi.mock("@/lib/api", () => ({
api: {
get: (path: string) => apiGet(path),
patch: (path: string, body?: unknown) => apiPatch(path, body),
put: vi.fn(),
post: vi.fn(),
del: vi.fn(),
},
}));
// Store node carries the ability flags hydrated by the platform stream
// (canvas-topology.ts maps broadcast_enabled/talk_to_user_enabled onto
// node.data). Mirror that shape so the section reads real values.
const storeUpdateNodeData = vi.fn();
const storeRestartWorkspace = vi.fn();
let nodeData: { broadcastEnabled?: boolean; talkToUserEnabled?: boolean } = {};
const makeState = () => ({
nodes: [{ id: "ws-test", data: nodeData }],
restartWorkspace: storeRestartWorkspace,
updateNodeData: storeUpdateNodeData,
});
vi.mock("@/store/canvas", () => ({
useCanvasStore: Object.assign(
(selector: (s: unknown) => unknown) => selector(makeState()),
{ getState: () => makeState() },
),
}));
vi.mock("../AgentCardSection", () => ({
AgentCardSection: () => <div data-testid="agent-card-stub" />,
}));
import { ConfigTab } from "../ConfigTab";
beforeEach(() => {
apiGet.mockReset();
apiPatch.mockReset();
apiPatch.mockResolvedValue({ status: "updated" });
storeUpdateNodeData.mockReset();
apiGet.mockImplementation((path: string) => {
if (path === `/workspaces/ws-test`) {
return Promise.resolve({ runtime: "claude-code" });
}
if (path === `/workspaces/ws-test/model`) {
return Promise.resolve({ model: "claude-opus-4-7" });
}
if (path === `/workspaces/ws-test/provider`) {
return Promise.resolve({ provider: "anthropic-oauth", source: "default" });
}
if (path === `/workspaces/ws-test/files/config.yaml`) {
return Promise.resolve({ content: "name: test\nruntime: claude-code\n" });
}
if (path === "/templates") {
return Promise.resolve([
{ id: "claude-code", name: "Claude Code", runtime: "claude-code", providers: [] },
]);
}
return Promise.reject(new Error(`unmocked api.get: ${path}`));
});
});
describe("ConfigTab Agent Abilities section", () => {
it("renders an always-visible 'Agent Abilities' section with both toggles", async () => {
nodeData = {}; // unset → defaults
render(<ConfigTab workspaceId="ws-test" />);
await waitFor(() => expect(apiGet).toHaveBeenCalled());
expect(
await screen.findByRole("button", { name: /Agent Abilities/i }),
).toBeTruthy();
expect(screen.getByText("Talk to user")).toBeTruthy();
expect(screen.getByText("Broadcast to peers")).toBeTruthy();
});
it("reflects the asymmetric defaults: talk-to-user ON, broadcast OFF", async () => {
nodeData = {}; // unset → backend defaults
render(<ConfigTab workspaceId="ws-test" />);
await waitFor(() => expect(apiGet).toHaveBeenCalled());
const talk = (await screen.findByText("Talk to user"))
.closest("label")!
.querySelector("input") as HTMLInputElement;
const broadcast = screen
.getByText("Broadcast to peers")
.closest("label")!
.querySelector("input") as HTMLInputElement;
expect(talk.checked).toBe(true);
expect(broadcast.checked).toBe(false);
});
it("reflects explicit store values", async () => {
nodeData = { broadcastEnabled: true, talkToUserEnabled: false };
render(<ConfigTab workspaceId="ws-test" />);
await waitFor(() => expect(apiGet).toHaveBeenCalled());
const talk = (await screen.findByText("Talk to user"))
.closest("label")!
.querySelector("input") as HTMLInputElement;
const broadcast = screen
.getByText("Broadcast to peers")
.closest("label")!
.querySelector("input") as HTMLInputElement;
expect(talk.checked).toBe(false);
expect(broadcast.checked).toBe(true);
});
it("PATCHes /abilities with talk_to_user_enabled and optimistically updates the store", async () => {
nodeData = {}; // talk defaults true
render(<ConfigTab workspaceId="ws-test" />);
await waitFor(() => expect(apiGet).toHaveBeenCalled());
const talk = (await screen.findByText("Talk to user"))
.closest("label")!
.querySelector("input") as HTMLInputElement;
fireEvent.click(talk); // true → false
await waitFor(() =>
expect(apiPatch).toHaveBeenCalledWith("/workspaces/ws-test/abilities", {
talk_to_user_enabled: false,
}),
);
expect(storeUpdateNodeData).toHaveBeenCalledWith("ws-test", {
talkToUserEnabled: false,
});
});
it("PATCHes /abilities with broadcast_enabled when the broadcast toggle is flipped", async () => {
nodeData = {}; // broadcast defaults false
render(<ConfigTab workspaceId="ws-test" />);
await waitFor(() => expect(apiGet).toHaveBeenCalled());
const broadcast = (await screen.findByText("Broadcast to peers"))
.closest("label")!
.querySelector("input") as HTMLInputElement;
fireEvent.click(broadcast); // false → true
await waitFor(() =>
expect(apiPatch).toHaveBeenCalledWith("/workspaces/ws-test/abilities", {
broadcast_enabled: true,
}),
);
expect(storeUpdateNodeData).toHaveBeenCalledWith("ws-test", {
broadcastEnabled: true,
});
});
});
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
import { useState, useCallback, useRef, useEffect } from 'react';
import type { TestConnectionState, SecretGroup } from '@/types/secrets';
import { validateSecret, ApiError } from '@/lib/api/secrets';
import { validateSecret } from '@/lib/api/secrets';
interface TestConnectionButtonProps {
provider: SecretGroup;
@@ -55,23 +55,9 @@ export function TestConnectionButton({
}
onResult?.(result.valid);
resetTimerRef.current = setTimeout(() => setState('idle'), RESET_DELAYS[nextState]!);
} catch (err) {
// Distinguish a real failure shape rather than always claiming a
// timeout. A reachable server that answered with an HTTP status
// (ApiError) did NOT time out — most commonly the validation route
// is not available (404/501), which must not masquerade as
// "service down". Only an actual thrown network/abort error is a
// connectivity failure.
} catch {
setState('failure');
if (err instanceof ApiError) {
setErrorDetail(
err.status === 404 || err.status === 501
? 'Key validation is not available for this service yet. The key was not tested.'
: `Could not verify key (server returned ${err.status}). Saving is unaffected.`,
);
} else {
setErrorDetail('Could not reach the validation service. Check your connection and try again.');
}
setErrorDetail('Connection timed out. Service may be down.');
onResult?.(false);
resetTimerRef.current = setTimeout(() => setState('idle'), RESET_DELAYS.failure);
}
@@ -99,7 +85,7 @@ export function TestConnectionButton({
function Spinner() {
return (
<svg aria-hidden="true" className="spinner" width="14" height="14" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" strokeWidth="2">
<svg className="spinner" width="14" height="14" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" strokeWidth="2">
<path d="M12 2v4M12 18v4M4.93 4.93l2.83 2.83M16.24 16.24l2.83 2.83M2 12h4M18 12h4M4.93 19.07l2.83-2.83M16.24 7.76l2.83-2.83" />
</svg>
);
@@ -28,20 +28,8 @@ const mockValidateSecret = vi.fn();
vi.mock("@/lib/api/secrets", () => ({
validateSecret: (...args: unknown[]) => mockValidateSecret(...args),
ApiError: class ApiError extends Error {
status: number;
constructor(status: number, message: string) {
super(message);
this.name = "ApiError";
this.status = status;
}
},
}));
// Re-import the mocked ApiError so test cases construct the same class the
// component's `instanceof` check sees.
import { ApiError } from "@/lib/api/secrets";
beforeEach(() => {
vi.useFakeTimers();
vi.clearAllMocks();
@@ -213,27 +201,8 @@ describe("TestConnectionButton — failure path", () => {
});
describe("TestConnectionButton — catch path", () => {
it("does NOT claim a timeout when the validate endpoint 404s (regression: internal#492)", async () => {
// The validate route is unimplemented on the server and returns a fast
// 404. Before the fix this rendered the misleading hardcoded string
// "Connection timed out. Service may be down." It must instead state
// honestly that validation isn't available and the key was not tested.
mockValidateSecret.mockRejectedValue(new ApiError(404, "Not Found"));
render(
<TestConnectionButton provider="anthropic" secretValue="sk-ant-xxx" />,
);
fireEvent.click(document.querySelector('button[type="button"]')!);
await act(async () => {
await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(0);
});
expect(document.body.textContent).not.toContain("Connection timed out");
expect(document.body.textContent).not.toContain("Service may be down");
expect(document.body.textContent).toContain("not available");
expect(document.body.textContent).toContain("not tested");
});
it("reports a non-404 server error with its status, not a timeout", async () => {
mockValidateSecret.mockRejectedValue(new ApiError(500, "Internal Server Error"));
it("shows 'Connection timed out' on network error", async () => {
mockValidateSecret.mockRejectedValue(new Error("timeout"));
render(
<TestConnectionButton provider="github" secretValue="ghp_xxx" />,
);
@@ -241,20 +210,7 @@ describe("TestConnectionButton — catch path", () => {
await act(async () => {
await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(0);
});
expect(document.body.textContent).toContain("500");
expect(document.body.textContent).not.toContain("Connection timed out");
});
it("shows a connectivity message on a genuine network error", async () => {
mockValidateSecret.mockRejectedValue(new Error("network down"));
render(
<TestConnectionButton provider="github" secretValue="ghp_xxx" />,
);
fireEvent.click(document.querySelector('button[type="button"]')!);
await act(async () => {
await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(0);
});
expect(document.body.textContent).toContain("Could not reach the validation service");
expect(document.body.textContent).toContain("Connection timed out");
});
it("calls onResult(false) on network error", async () => {
-8
View File
@@ -649,10 +649,6 @@
border-radius: 6px;
cursor: pointer;
}
.delete-dialog__cancel-btn:focus-visible {
outline: var(--focus-ring);
outline-offset: var(--focus-ring-offset);
}
.delete-dialog__confirm-btn {
background: var(--status-invalid);
@@ -662,10 +658,6 @@
border-radius: 6px;
cursor: pointer;
}
.delete-dialog__confirm-btn:focus-visible {
outline: var(--focus-ring);
outline-offset: var(--focus-ring-offset);
}
.delete-dialog__confirm-btn:disabled { opacity: 0.4; cursor: not-allowed; }
-1
View File
@@ -58,7 +58,6 @@ TOP_LEVEL_MODULES = {
"a2a_response",
"a2a_tools",
"a2a_tools_delegation",
"a2a_tools_identity",
"a2a_tools_inbox",
"a2a_tools_memory",
"a2a_tools_messaging",
@@ -399,21 +399,7 @@ func (h *WorkspaceHandler) proxyA2ARequest(ctx context.Context, workspaceID stri
// (no Do(), no maybeMarkContainerDead). The response is a synthetic
// {status:"queued"} envelope so the caller (canvas, another workspace)
// knows delivery is acknowledged but pending consumption.
deliveryMode, deliveryModeErr := lookupDeliveryMode(ctx, workspaceID)
if deliveryModeErr != nil {
// internal#497 fail-closed: a real DB/context error on the
// delivery-mode read MUST NOT silently fall through to the push
// dispatch path — that is exactly what silently misrouted every
// poll-mode peer for 5 days under the ce2db75f regression. Surface
// a structured error so the delegation is marked failed (loud +
// retryable) instead of dispatched to the wrong path.
log.Printf("ProxyA2A: delivery-mode lookup failed for %s: %v — failing closed", workspaceID, deliveryModeErr)
return 0, nil, &proxyA2AError{
Status: http.StatusServiceUnavailable,
Response: gin.H{"error": "delivery-mode lookup failed; refusing to dispatch to avoid silent misrouting"},
}
}
if deliveryMode == models.DeliveryModePoll {
if lookupDeliveryMode(ctx, workspaceID) == models.DeliveryModePoll {
if logActivity {
h.logA2AReceiveQueued(ctx, workspaceID, callerID, body, a2aMethod)
}
@@ -194,11 +194,6 @@ func (h *WorkspaceHandler) maybeMarkContainerDead(ctx context.Context, workspace
}
db.ClearWorkspaceKeys(ctx, workspaceID)
h.broadcaster.RecordAndBroadcast(ctx, string(events.EventWorkspaceOffline), workspaceID, map[string]interface{}{})
// Tracked via goAsync (not bare `go`) so the asyncWG can be drained
// before a test swaps the global db.DB. runRestartCycle reads db.DB
// before its provisioner gate, so an untracked detached goroutine
// races setupTestDB's t.Cleanup db.DB restore. Matches the already-
// correct site at a2a_proxy.go:648.
h.goAsync(func() { h.RestartByID(workspaceID) })
return true
}
@@ -246,9 +241,6 @@ func (h *WorkspaceHandler) preflightContainerHealth(ctx context.Context, workspa
}
db.ClearWorkspaceKeys(ctx, workspaceID)
h.broadcaster.RecordAndBroadcast(ctx, string(events.EventWorkspaceOffline), workspaceID, map[string]interface{}{})
// Tracked via goAsync (see maybeMarkContainerDead): preflight's
// detached restart must be drainable so it doesn't race the global
// db.DB swap in test cleanup.
h.goAsync(func() { h.RestartByID(workspaceID) })
return &proxyA2AError{
Status: http.StatusServiceUnavailable,
@@ -270,9 +262,8 @@ func (h *WorkspaceHandler) logA2AFailure(ctx context.Context, workspaceID, calle
errWsName = workspaceID
}
summary := "A2A request to " + errWsName + " failed: " + errMsg
parent := ctx
h.goAsync(func() {
logCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.WithoutCancel(parent), 30*time.Second)
logCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), 30*time.Second)
defer cancel()
LogActivity(logCtx, h.broadcaster, ActivityParams{
WorkspaceID: workspaceID,
@@ -318,9 +309,8 @@ func (h *WorkspaceHandler) logA2ASuccess(ctx context.Context, workspaceID, calle
}
summary := a2aMethod + " → " + wsNameForLog
toolTrace := extractToolTrace(respBody)
parent := ctx
h.goAsync(func() {
logCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.WithoutCancel(parent), 30*time.Second)
logCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), 30*time.Second)
defer cancel()
LogActivity(logCtx, h.broadcaster, ActivityParams{
WorkspaceID: workspaceID,
@@ -468,64 +458,40 @@ func parseUsageFromA2AResponse(body []byte) (inputTokens, outputTokens int64) {
return 0, 0
}
// lookupDeliveryMode returns the workspace's delivery_mode.
//
// internal#497 / RFC#497 fail-closed (SURGICAL scope): the *specific*
// failure mode that hid the ce2db75f regression for 5 days is now
// propagated instead of silently swallowed — a CONTEXT error
// (context.Canceled / context.DeadlineExceeded). Under ce2db75f the
// detached delegation goroutine ran on a cancelled request context, every
// `SELECT delivery_mode` failed `context canceled`, this function returned
// push, the poll-mode short-circuit in proxyA2ARequest was skipped, and
// poll-mode peers (e.g. an operator laptop on molecule-mcp-claude-channel)
// silently never got their a2a_receive inbox row. A transient,
// systematic-once-triggered context cancellation became permanent
// invisible misrouting. Returning that error lets the caller fail loud
// (mark the delegation failed) instead of mis-dispatching.
//
// Scope is deliberately narrow: only ctx errors propagate. Other DB
// errors retain the long-standing documented "fall back to push (today's
// synchronous behavior)" contract — that path is loud + recoverable
// (502 / SSRF reject / restart), unlike the silent poll-mode drop, and
// the surrounding proxy (incl. the sibling checkWorkspaceBudget) is
// intentionally built around that fail-open-to-push behavior. Widening
// further is an RFC#497 follow-up, not part of this P0 fix.
//
// A genuinely *absent* configuration is NOT an error and still resolves to
// push (the safe synchronous default): sql.ErrNoRows, a NULL/empty column,
// or an unrecognised value all return (push, nil).
// lookupDeliveryMode returns the workspace's delivery_mode. On any DB
// error or missing row it returns DeliveryModePush — the fail-closed
// default. "Closed" here means "fall back to today's behavior (synchronous
// dispatch)" rather than "fall back to drop the request silently into
// activity_logs where the agent might never see it." A poll-mode workspace
// that briefly reads as push will get its A2A request dispatched to the
// stored URL (or a 502 if no URL); a push-mode workspace that briefly
// reads as poll would get its request silently queued with no dispatch.
// The first failure is loud + recoverable; the second is silent.
//
// The function is intentionally lookup-only — it never mutates the row.
// The register handler (registry.go) is the only writer for delivery_mode.
//
// See #2339 PR 1 for the column + register-flow side; this is the
// proxy-side read used for the short-circuit in proxyA2ARequest.
func lookupDeliveryMode(ctx context.Context, workspaceID string) (string, error) {
func lookupDeliveryMode(ctx context.Context, workspaceID string) string {
var mode sql.NullString
err := db.DB.QueryRowContext(ctx,
`SELECT delivery_mode FROM workspaces WHERE id = $1`, workspaceID,
).Scan(&mode)
if err != nil {
// internal#497: a context cancellation/deadline MUST NOT be
// swallowed into a silent push default — that is the exact 5-day
// silent-misrouting vector. Propagate so the caller fails closed.
if errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) || errors.Is(err, context.DeadlineExceeded) {
log.Printf("ProxyA2A: lookupDeliveryMode(%s) context error (%v) — failing closed (NOT defaulting to push)", workspaceID, err)
return "", err
}
if !errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
log.Printf("ProxyA2A: lookupDeliveryMode(%s) failed (%v) — defaulting to push (non-ctx DB error; legacy fail-open-to-push contract)", workspaceID, err)
log.Printf("ProxyA2A: lookupDeliveryMode(%s) failed (%v) — defaulting to push", workspaceID, err)
}
return models.DeliveryModePush, nil
return models.DeliveryModePush
}
if !mode.Valid || mode.String == "" {
return models.DeliveryModePush, nil
return models.DeliveryModePush
}
if !models.IsValidDeliveryMode(mode.String) {
log.Printf("ProxyA2A: workspace %s has invalid delivery_mode=%q — defaulting to push", workspaceID, mode.String)
return models.DeliveryModePush, nil
return models.DeliveryModePush
}
return mode.String, nil
return mode.String
}
// logA2AReceiveQueued records a poll-mode "queued" A2A receive into
@@ -2235,18 +2235,12 @@ func TestProxyA2A_PushMode_NoShortCircuit(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestProxyA2A_PollMode_FailsClosedToPush verifies the LEGACY safety
// contract is PRESERVED for non-context DB errors: a generic DB error
// reading delivery_mode still defaults to push (today's behavior), NOT
// poll. Failing to push means a poll-mode workspace briefly attempts a
// real dispatch — visible failure (502 / SSRF rejection / restart
// cascade), not a silent drop into activity_logs where the agent might
// never look. Loud > silent, recoverable > lost.
//
// internal#497 narrows the fail-closed change to *context* errors only
// (the actual ce2db75f regression vector); generic DB errors keep this
// long-standing fail-open-to-push contract. The ctx-error fail-closed is
// covered by TestLookupDeliveryMode_ContextCanceled_FailsClosed.
// TestProxyA2A_PollMode_FailsClosedToPush verifies the safety contract:
// a DB error reading delivery_mode must default to push (the existing
// behavior), NOT poll. Failing to push means a poll-mode workspace
// briefly attempts a real dispatch — visible failure (502 / SSRF
// rejection / restart cascade), not a silent drop into activity_logs
// where the agent might never look. Loud > silent, recoverable > lost.
func TestProxyA2A_PollMode_FailsClosedToPush(t *testing.T) {
mock := setupTestDB(t)
setupTestRedis(t) // empty Redis — forces resolveAgentURL DB lookup
@@ -2257,8 +2251,7 @@ func TestProxyA2A_PollMode_FailsClosedToPush(t *testing.T) {
expectBudgetCheck(mock, wsID)
// lookupDeliveryMode hits a generic (non-context) DB error → must
// still default push (legacy contract preserved by internal#497).
// lookupDeliveryMode hits a transient DB error → must default push.
mock.ExpectQuery("SELECT delivery_mode FROM workspaces WHERE id").
WithArgs(wsID).
WillReturnError(sql.ErrConnDone)
@@ -2282,7 +2275,7 @@ func TestProxyA2A_PollMode_FailsClosedToPush(t *testing.T) {
var resp map[string]interface{}
_ = json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &resp)
if resp["status"] == "queued" {
t.Errorf("generic DB error on delivery_mode lookup silently queued the request — must fail-open-to-push, got body: %s", w.Body.String())
t.Errorf("DB error on delivery_mode lookup silently queued the request — must fail-closed-to-push, got body: %s", w.Body.String())
}
}
@@ -2291,37 +2284,6 @@ func TestProxyA2A_PollMode_FailsClosedToPush(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestLookupDeliveryMode_ContextCanceled_FailsClosed is the internal#497
// regression test for the SECONDARY defect. It pins the exact invariant
// that hid the ce2db75f regression for 5 days: when the delivery_mode read
// fails because the context was cancelled (precisely what happened in the
// detached delegation goroutine running on a returned request context),
// lookupDeliveryMode MUST return an error and MUST NOT silently return
// "push". Returning push there is what skipped the poll-mode short-circuit
// and silently dropped 100% of poll-mode peer deliveries.
//
// A pre-cancelled context makes QueryRowContext fail with
// context.Canceled deterministically — no DB rows are mocked because the
// query never reaches a result.
func TestLookupDeliveryMode_ContextCanceled_FailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
mock := setupTestDB(t)
// The query fails on the cancelled ctx before matching; provide a
// permissive expectation so sqlmock doesn't complain about the attempt.
mock.ExpectQuery("SELECT delivery_mode FROM workspaces WHERE id").
WillReturnError(context.Canceled)
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
cancel() // simulate the HTTP handler having returned (request ctx dead)
mode, err := lookupDeliveryMode(ctx, "ws-poll-peer")
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("internal#497 regression: lookupDeliveryMode swallowed a context error and returned mode=%q with nil err — this is the exact 5-day silent-misrouting vector", mode)
}
if mode == models.DeliveryModePush {
t.Errorf("internal#497 regression: context error must NOT default to push (got mode=%q)", mode)
}
}
// ==================== a2aClient ResponseHeaderTimeout config ====================
func TestA2AClientResponseHeaderTimeout(t *testing.T) {
@@ -1,113 +0,0 @@
package handlers
import "encoding/json"
// agent_card_reconcile.go — server-side repair for the fleet-wide
// agent-card identity gap.
//
// Root cause: the runtime builds its AgentCard from config.name
// (workspace/main.py:198), and config.name is read from the
// CP-regenerated /configs/config.yaml whose `name:` field is the raw
// workspace UUID — NOT the friendly name the operator sees. The friendly
// name IS captured: POST /workspaces and PATCH /workspaces/:id (the
// canvas Details tab) write it to the trusted workspaces.name DB column.
// But /registry/register stores the runtime-supplied card verbatim
// (registry.go: `agent_card = EXCLUDED.agent_card`), so the stored card
// served at /.well-known/agent-card.json and returned to peers via
// agent_card_url ends up with name = UUID, description = "", role = null.
//
// Fix shape (deliberately minimal, no contract weakening): when the
// runtime-supplied card's `name` is empty or equals the workspace UUID
// (the placeholder the runtime had no better value for), the PLATFORM —
// not the agent — substitutes the friendly value from the trusted
// workspaces row. Identity stays platform-controlled: the agent never
// gains the ability to self-set its own name/role; the platform sources
// it from the operator-controlled DB column. We only ever FILL gaps
// (empty / UUID-placeholder); a card that already carries a real
// friendly name is never downgraded.
//
// list_peers / the /registry/:id/peers endpoint already resolve display
// names from workspaces.name directly (discovery.go / mcp_tools.go
// `SELECT w.id, w.name, ...`), so peer_name in delivered message tags
// was already correct — this fix closes the remaining surface: the
// agent_card blob itself (canvas Agent Card / Skills view, peer
// agent_card_url fetches, the well-known card).
//
// description / role degrade discovery the same way: an empty
// description and null role give peers nothing to reason about. We
// default description from the (now reconciled) name when blank and
// role from workspaces.role when the operator set one.
// reconcileAgentCardIdentity patches identity gaps in a runtime-supplied
// agent card from the trusted workspace DB row. It returns the
// (possibly rewritten) card bytes and whether anything changed. On any
// failure (malformed JSON, nothing to fill) it returns the input bytes
// unchanged with changed=false so the caller can store them verbatim —
// this is strictly no-worse-than-before, never a regression.
//
// Pure function: no DB / HTTP / globals, so it is exhaustively
// unit-testable (agent_card_reconcile_test.go) without booting the
// handler or a sqlmock.
func reconcileAgentCardIdentity(card json.RawMessage, workspaceID, dbName, dbRole string) (json.RawMessage, bool) {
var m map[string]any
if err := json.Unmarshal(card, &m); err != nil || m == nil {
// Malformed card — not this function's job to reject it (the
// upsert stores it as-is and downstream readers handle bad
// JSON). Return verbatim so byte-for-byte behaviour is
// preserved on the failure path.
return card, false
}
changed := false
// name: fill only when empty or the UUID placeholder. A dbName that
// is itself the UUID is a placeholder row (registry.go INSERT seeds
// name = id before the canvas sets a friendly one) — not a friendly
// name, so it is not an eligible source.
cardName, _ := m["name"].(string)
if (cardName == "" || cardName == workspaceID) &&
dbName != "" && dbName != workspaceID {
m["name"] = dbName
changed = true
}
// description: when blank, default to the (reconciled) name so peers
// and the canvas Agent Card view have a non-empty human label
// instead of "". Mirrors the runtime's own
// `config.description or config.name` fallback (main.py:199) but
// applied to the registry copy where the runtime's fallback was the
// UUID.
if desc, _ := m["description"].(string); desc == "" {
if n, _ := m["name"].(string); n != "" && n != workspaceID {
m["description"] = n
changed = true
}
}
// role: surface the operator-set workspaces.role when the card
// carries none. Discovery (peer_role) and the canvas Role row read
// workspaces.role directly; this just makes the standalone card
// self-describing too. Never overwrite a role the card already has.
if dbRole != "" {
if r, ok := m["role"].(string); !ok || r == "" {
m["role"] = dbRole
changed = true
}
}
if !changed {
// No-op: return the original bytes untouched so callers that
// compare/store get byte-identical input (re-marshalling would
// reorder keys for no reason).
return card, false
}
out, err := json.Marshal(m)
if err != nil {
// Re-marshal of a map we just unmarshalled should never fail;
// if it somehow does, fall back to the verbatim input rather
// than storing nothing.
return card, false
}
return out, true
}
@@ -1,166 +0,0 @@
package handlers
import (
"encoding/json"
"testing"
)
// TestReconcileAgentCardIdentity covers the server-side backfill that
// repairs the fleet-wide agent-card identity gap (internal#XXX): the
// runtime POSTs /registry/register with agent_card.name = the workspace
// UUID (because the CP-regenerated /configs/config.yaml sets name: <uuid>)
// while the trusted workspaces.name DB column — the value the canvas
// Details tab shows and lets the operator edit — holds the friendly
// name ("Claude Code Agent"). The platform reconciles them from the DB
// row (NOT from the agent — identity stays platform-controlled, not
// self-mutable).
func TestReconcileAgentCardIdentity(t *testing.T) {
const wsID = "3b81321b-1ec7-488c-96f7-72c42a968da6"
tests := []struct {
name string
card string
dbName string
dbRole string
wantName string
wantDesc string
wantRole string
wantChanged bool
}{
{
name: "name is the workspace UUID — backfill from DB",
card: `{"name":"3b81321b-1ec7-488c-96f7-72c42a968da6","description":"","capabilities":{"streaming":true}}`,
dbName: "Claude Code Agent",
dbRole: "",
wantName: "Claude Code Agent",
wantDesc: "Claude Code Agent",
wantRole: "",
wantChanged: true,
},
{
name: "empty name — backfill from DB",
card: `{"name":"","description":"x"}`,
dbName: "ops-agent",
dbRole: "sre",
wantName: "ops-agent",
wantDesc: "x",
wantRole: "sre",
wantChanged: true,
},
{
name: "role null in card, DB has role — backfill role only",
card: `{"name":"Reviewer","description":"Senior reviewer"}`,
dbName: "Reviewer",
dbRole: "code-reviewer",
wantName: "Reviewer",
wantDesc: "Senior reviewer",
wantRole: "code-reviewer",
wantChanged: true,
},
{
name: "card already has a real friendly name — do NOT clobber it",
// A richer card (e.g. an external channel agent) must win;
// the platform only fills gaps, never downgrades.
card: `{"name":"Claude Code (channel)","description":"Local Claude Code session bridged","role":"assistant"}`,
dbName: "hongming-pc",
dbRole: "operator",
wantName: "Claude Code (channel)",
wantDesc: "Local Claude Code session bridged",
wantRole: "assistant",
wantChanged: false,
},
{
name: "no DB name available — leave UUID name untouched (no worse than before)",
card: `{"name":"3b81321b-1ec7-488c-96f7-72c42a968da6","description":""}`,
dbName: "",
dbRole: "",
wantName: "3b81321b-1ec7-488c-96f7-72c42a968da6",
wantDesc: "",
wantRole: "",
wantChanged: false,
},
{
name: "dbName equals UUID (placeholder row) — not a friendly name, leave untouched",
card: `{"name":"3b81321b-1ec7-488c-96f7-72c42a968da6"}`,
dbName: "3b81321b-1ec7-488c-96f7-72c42a968da6",
dbRole: "",
wantName: "3b81321b-1ec7-488c-96f7-72c42a968da6",
wantDesc: "",
wantRole: "",
wantChanged: false,
},
{
name: "malformed card JSON — return unchanged, no panic",
card: `{not json`,
dbName: "Claude Code Agent",
dbRole: "",
wantChanged: false,
},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
out, changed := reconcileAgentCardIdentity(
json.RawMessage(tc.card), wsID, tc.dbName, tc.dbRole,
)
if changed != tc.wantChanged {
t.Fatalf("changed = %v, want %v", changed, tc.wantChanged)
}
if !tc.wantChanged {
// Unchanged path must return the input bytes verbatim.
if string(out) != tc.card {
t.Fatalf("unchanged path mutated bytes:\n got %s\n want %s", out, tc.card)
}
return
}
var got map[string]any
if err := json.Unmarshal(out, &got); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("output not valid JSON: %v (%s)", err, out)
}
if g, _ := got["name"].(string); g != tc.wantName {
t.Errorf("name = %q, want %q", g, tc.wantName)
}
if g, _ := got["description"].(string); g != tc.wantDesc {
t.Errorf("description = %q, want %q", g, tc.wantDesc)
}
if tc.wantRole != "" {
if g, _ := got["role"].(string); g != tc.wantRole {
t.Errorf("role = %q, want %q", g, tc.wantRole)
}
}
})
}
}
// TestReconcileAgentCardIdentity_PreservesOtherFields ensures the
// reconcile is a minimal in-place patch — capabilities, version,
// skills and any unknown future fields survive untouched.
func TestReconcileAgentCardIdentity_PreservesOtherFields(t *testing.T) {
card := `{"name":"ws-uuid","description":"","version":"1.0.0",` +
`"capabilities":{"streaming":true,"pushNotifications":true},` +
`"skills":[{"id":"a","name":"a"}],"configuration_status":"ready"}`
out, changed := reconcileAgentCardIdentity(
json.RawMessage(card), "ws-uuid", "Friendly Name", "",
)
if !changed {
t.Fatal("expected changed = true")
}
var got map[string]any
if err := json.Unmarshal(out, &got); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("invalid JSON: %v", err)
}
if got["version"] != "1.0.0" {
t.Errorf("version not preserved: %v", got["version"])
}
if got["configuration_status"] != "ready" {
t.Errorf("configuration_status not preserved: %v", got["configuration_status"])
}
caps, ok := got["capabilities"].(map[string]any)
if !ok || caps["streaming"] != true {
t.Errorf("capabilities not preserved: %v", got["capabilities"])
}
skills, ok := got["skills"].([]any)
if !ok || len(skills) != 1 {
t.Errorf("skills not preserved: %v", got["skills"])
}
}
@@ -17,17 +17,6 @@ var gitIdentitySlugPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`[^a-z0-9]+`)
// docs/authorship.md (when it exists).
const gitIdentityEmailDomain = "agents.moleculesai.app"
// gitAskpassHelperPath is the in-container path of the askpass helper
// installed by every workspace runtime image (workspace/Dockerfile in
// molecule-core; scripts/git-askpass.sh → /usr/local/bin/molecule-askpass
// in each external template-* repo). The helper reads GIT_HTTP_USERNAME
// / GIT_HTTP_PASSWORD (falling back to GITEA_USER / GITEA_TOKEN) from
// env and emits them on the git credential-prompt protocol. Setting
// GIT_ASKPASS to this path is what wires container-side HTTPS git auth
// to the persona credentials already arriving via workspace_secrets,
// with no on-disk .gitconfig / .git-credentials mutation required.
const gitAskpassHelperPath = "/usr/local/bin/molecule-askpass"
// applyAgentGitIdentity sets GIT_AUTHOR_* / GIT_COMMITTER_* env vars so
// every commit from this workspace container carries a distinct author
// in `git log` and `git blame`. Git reads these env vars before falling
@@ -61,34 +50,6 @@ func applyAgentGitIdentity(envVars map[string]string, workspaceName string) {
setIfEmpty(envVars, "GIT_AUTHOR_EMAIL", authorEmail)
setIfEmpty(envVars, "GIT_COMMITTER_NAME", authorName)
setIfEmpty(envVars, "GIT_COMMITTER_EMAIL", authorEmail)
applyGitAskpass(envVars)
}
// applyGitAskpass points git at the in-image askpass helper so that any
// HTTPS git operation against a remote without a pre-configured
// credential.helper picks up the persona credentials already present in
// the container env (GIT_HTTP_USERNAME / GIT_HTTP_PASSWORD, or
// GITEA_USER / GITEA_TOKEN as fallback — the latter pair is what
// loadPersonaEnvFile delivers from the operator-host bootstrap kit).
//
// Idempotent: if GIT_ASKPASS is already set (e.g. by an operator-
// supplied workspace_secret or an env-mutator plugin), the existing
// value wins. This lets a workspace opt out by setting GIT_ASKPASS=""
// or pointing at a different helper.
//
// No vendor-specific behaviour lives in this function — the host the
// credentials apply to is determined entirely by the deployer choosing
// when to populate GIT_HTTP_USERNAME / GIT_HTTP_PASSWORD (or
// GITEA_USER / GITEA_TOKEN). The helper script itself is generic and
// has no hardcoded hostnames, so it's safe to ship inside the
// open-source workspace template images alongside the platform-managed
// claude-code image.
func applyGitAskpass(envVars map[string]string) {
if envVars == nil {
return
}
setIfEmpty(envVars, "GIT_ASKPASS", gitAskpassHelperPath)
}
// slugifyForEmail collapses a workspace name to a safe email localpart:
@@ -75,53 +75,6 @@ func TestApplyAgentGitIdentity_NilMapIsSafe(t *testing.T) {
applyAgentGitIdentity(nil, "PM")
}
func TestApplyAgentGitIdentity_SetsGitAskpass(t *testing.T) {
// GIT_ASKPASS is what wires container-side HTTPS git auth to the
// persona credentials (GITEA_USER/GITEA_TOKEN, etc.) that
// loadPersonaEnvFile delivers via workspace_secrets. Without this,
// `git push` inside the container would fall through to interactive
// prompts (impossible) or a missing credential.helper (401).
env := map[string]string{}
applyAgentGitIdentity(env, "Frontend Engineer")
if env["GIT_ASKPASS"] != "/usr/local/bin/molecule-askpass" {
t.Errorf("GIT_ASKPASS: got %q, want %q",
env["GIT_ASKPASS"], "/usr/local/bin/molecule-askpass")
}
}
func TestApplyAgentGitIdentity_RespectsAskpassOverride(t *testing.T) {
// A workspace_secret or env-mutator plugin must be able to point at
// a custom askpass helper without us clobbering it. Symmetric with
// the GIT_AUTHOR_NAME override test above.
env := map[string]string{
"GIT_ASKPASS": "/opt/custom/askpass",
}
applyAgentGitIdentity(env, "Backend Engineer")
if env["GIT_ASKPASS"] != "/opt/custom/askpass" {
t.Errorf("GIT_ASKPASS should not be overwritten, got %q", env["GIT_ASKPASS"])
}
}
func TestApplyAgentGitIdentity_AskpassSkippedOnEmptyName(t *testing.T) {
// The empty-name early-return covers GIT_ASKPASS too — a provisioning
// glitch that dropped the workspace name shouldn't half-configure the
// container (identity vars empty but askpass wired). All-or-nothing.
env := map[string]string{}
applyAgentGitIdentity(env, "")
if _, ok := env["GIT_ASKPASS"]; ok {
t.Errorf("empty name should not set GIT_ASKPASS, got %q", env["GIT_ASKPASS"])
}
}
func TestApplyGitAskpass_NilMapIsSafe(t *testing.T) {
defer func() {
if r := recover(); r != nil {
t.Errorf("applyGitAskpass panicked on nil map: %v", r)
}
}()
applyGitAskpass(nil)
}
func TestSlugifyForEmail(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
in, want string
@@ -163,32 +163,8 @@ func (h *DelegationHandler) Delegate(c *gin.Context) {
},
})
// Fire-and-forget: send A2A in a background goroutine.
//
// internal#497 — the goroutine MUST NOT inherit the HTTP request's
// cancellation. `ctx` here is c.Request.Context(); the handler returns
// 202 a few lines below, which cancels that context immediately. Before
// this fix (regression ce2db75f) executeDelegation ran on the
// request-scoped ctx, so every DB op + proxy call in the detached
// goroutine failed `context canceled` the instant the 202 was written.
// That silently broke 100% of A2A peer delegations fleet-wide since
// 2026-05-12 (poll-mode peers never got their a2a_receive inbox row;
// lookupDeliveryMode swallowed the ctx error and defaulted to push).
//
// context.WithoutCancel detaches cancellation/deadline while PRESERVING
// all context values (trace/correlation/tenant ids that proxyA2ARequest
// and the broadcaster read off ctx) — this is the established pattern in
// this package (a2a_proxy.go:850, a2a_proxy_helpers.go:525,
// registry.go:822). The 30-minute ceiling matches the prior internal
// budget executeDelegation used before ce2db75f and the proxy's own
// absolute agent-dispatch ceiling (a2a_proxy.go forwardCtx).
delegationCtx, cancelDelegation := context.WithTimeout(
context.WithoutCancel(ctx), 30*time.Minute,
)
go func() {
defer cancelDelegation()
h.executeDelegation(delegationCtx, sourceID, body.TargetID, delegationID, a2aBody)
}()
// Fire-and-forget: send A2A in background goroutine
go h.executeDelegation(ctx, sourceID, body.TargetID, delegationID, a2aBody)
// Broadcast event so canvas shows delegation in real-time
h.broadcaster.RecordAndBroadcast(ctx, string(events.EventDelegationSent), sourceID, map[string]interface{}{
@@ -16,65 +16,6 @@ import (
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
)
// ---------- internal#497 regression: detached goroutine ctx must outlive the handler ----------
// TestDelegate_DetachedContext_SurvivesRequestCancellation pins the
// load-bearing invariant that regression ce2db75f violated: the context
// handed to executeDelegation in the fire-and-forget goroutine must NOT be
// cancelled when the HTTP handler returns 202 (which cancels
// c.Request.Context()). Before the fix, executeDelegation ran on the
// request-scoped ctx, so every DB op + proxy call failed `context
// canceled` the instant the 202 was written — silently breaking 100% of
// A2A peer delegations fleet-wide since 2026-05-12.
//
// This test asserts the exact ctx-derivation contract used by Delegate
// (context.WithoutCancel(parent) + a timeout budget): the derived context
// (a) stays alive after the parent is cancelled, and (b) still carries
// parent values (trace/correlation/tenant ids the downstream proxy +
// broadcaster read off ctx). It is intentionally DB-free and fast.
func TestDelegate_DetachedContext_SurvivesRequestCancellation(t *testing.T) {
type ctxKey string
const traceKey ctxKey = "trace-id"
// Simulate c.Request.Context() carrying a correlation value.
parent, cancelParent := context.WithCancel(
context.WithValue(context.Background(), traceKey, "trace-abc-123"),
)
// Exact derivation Delegate uses for the detached goroutine.
delegationCtx, cancelDelegation := context.WithTimeout(
context.WithoutCancel(parent), 30*time.Minute,
)
defer cancelDelegation()
// The HTTP handler "returns 202" → request context is cancelled.
cancelParent()
if err := parent.Err(); err == nil {
t.Fatal("precondition: parent context should be cancelled after the handler returns")
}
// (a) Cancellation MUST NOT propagate to the detached context.
select {
case <-delegationCtx.Done():
t.Fatalf("regression: detached delegation ctx was cancelled by the handler returning (err=%v) — executeDelegation would fail every DB op with `context canceled`", delegationCtx.Err())
default:
// alive — correct
}
// (b) Parent values MUST still be readable (WithoutCancel preserves
// values; trace/correlation/tenant ids the proxy + broadcaster use).
if got, _ := delegationCtx.Value(traceKey).(string); got != "trace-abc-123" {
t.Errorf("detached ctx lost the parent trace value: got %q, want %q", got, "trace-abc-123")
}
// And it still has a real deadline (the 30m budget), so it is not an
// unbounded background context.
if _, hasDeadline := delegationCtx.Deadline(); !hasDeadline {
t.Error("detached ctx must carry the 30-minute timeout budget, but has no deadline")
}
}
// ---------- Delegate: missing target_id → 400 ----------
func TestDelegate_MissingTargetID(t *testing.T) {
@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ import (
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
@@ -23,39 +22,8 @@ import (
"github.com/redis/go-redis/v9"
)
// liveTestHandlers tracks every WorkspaceHandler built during the test
// binary's lifetime so setupTestDB can drain their in-flight goAsync
// goroutines (notably the detached RestartByID restart cycle, which
// reads the global db.DB) BEFORE restoring db.DB. Without this drain a
// fire-and-forget restart goroutine spawned by one test outlives that
// test and races the db.DB swap in a later test's t.Cleanup — the
// 0x...d548 data race on platform/internal/db.DB.
var (
liveTestHandlersMu sync.Mutex
liveTestHandlers []*WorkspaceHandler
)
func init() {
gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
newHandlerHook = func(h *WorkspaceHandler) {
liveTestHandlersMu.Lock()
liveTestHandlers = append(liveTestHandlers, h)
liveTestHandlersMu.Unlock()
}
}
// drainTestAsync waits for every tracked handler's goAsync goroutines to
// finish. Called from setupTestDB's cleanup before db.DB is restored so
// no detached restart/provision goroutine is mid-read of db.DB when the
// pointer is swapped.
func drainTestAsync() {
liveTestHandlersMu.Lock()
handlers := make([]*WorkspaceHandler, len(liveTestHandlers))
copy(handlers, liveTestHandlers)
liveTestHandlersMu.Unlock()
for _, h := range handlers {
h.waitAsyncForTest()
}
}
// setupTestDB creates a sqlmock DB and assigns it to the global db.DB.
@@ -74,16 +42,7 @@ func setupTestDB(t *testing.T) sqlmock.Sqlmock {
}
prevDB := db.DB
db.DB = mockDB
t.Cleanup(func() {
// Drain detached async goroutines (e.g. goAsync(RestartByID),
// which reads db.DB in runRestartCycle before its provisioner
// gate) BEFORE swapping db.DB back. Doing the restore first
// would let an in-flight restart goroutine read db.DB while
// this line writes it — the data race this guards against.
drainTestAsync()
db.DB = prevDB
mockDB.Close()
})
t.Cleanup(func() { db.DB = prevDB; mockDB.Close() })
// Disable SSRF checks for the duration of this test only. Restore
// the previous state via t.Cleanup so that TestIsSafeURL_* tests
@@ -218,14 +218,6 @@ func loadWorkspaceEnv(orgBaseDir, filesDir string) map[string]string {
// check, or when the env file does not exist (workspaces without a role —
// or running on hosts that don't ship the bootstrap dir — keep their old
// behavior).
//
// Token-file fallback: the newer prod-team personas (agent-dev-a,
// agent-dev-b, agent-pm) ship `token` + `universal-auth.env` only — no
// legacy plaintext `env` file. When the env-file load produces zero rows,
// loadPersonaTokenFile fills in GITEA_TOKEN / GITEA_USER / GITEA_USER_EMAIL
// from the token file so the GIT_ASKPASS helper has something to emit.
// The env-file form remains authoritative when present (it may carry
// richer rows like GITEA_TOKEN_SCOPES / GITEA_SSH_KEY_PATH).
func loadPersonaEnvFile(role string, out map[string]string) {
if !isSafeRoleName(role) {
if role != "" {
@@ -237,61 +229,7 @@ func loadPersonaEnvFile(role string, out map[string]string) {
if root == "" {
root = "/etc/molecule-bootstrap/personas"
}
before := len(out)
parseEnvFile(filepath.Join(root, role, "env"), out)
if len(out) == before {
// No env-file rows landed (file absent, or present-but-empty).
// Try the token-only persona shape used by the prod-team
// identities. Existing keys in out are preserved.
loadPersonaTokenFile(role, out)
}
}
// loadPersonaTokenFile populates GITEA_TOKEN / GITEA_USER / GITEA_USER_EMAIL
// from a persona dir that ships only the bare `token` file — the shape used
// by the production agent personas (agent-dev-a, agent-dev-b, agent-pm).
// Those dirs do not carry an `env` file because their non-Gitea creds come
// from Infisical Universal Auth at runtime (universal-auth.env), so the
// historical loadPersonaEnvFile path silently no-ops on them.
//
// File layout: $MOLECULE_PERSONA_ROOT/<role>/token (mode 600, plain text).
// The token contents become GITEA_TOKEN (whitespace-trimmed); the role
// name becomes GITEA_USER; GITEA_USER_EMAIL is synthesised as
// <role>@<gitIdentityEmailDomain> to match the email shape that
// applyAgentGitIdentity uses for its slug-derived authorship addresses.
//
// Silent no-op when the role fails the safe-segment check, when the
// token file does not exist, or when its contents are empty after
// trimming. Existing keys in out are not overwritten — the caller's
// later .env layers and any prior loadPersonaEnvFile rows always win.
func loadPersonaTokenFile(role string, out map[string]string) {
if out == nil {
return
}
if !isSafeRoleName(role) {
return
}
root := os.Getenv("MOLECULE_PERSONA_ROOT")
if root == "" {
root = "/etc/molecule-bootstrap/personas"
}
data, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(root, role, "token"))
if err != nil {
return
}
token := strings.TrimSpace(string(data))
if token == "" {
return
}
if _, ok := out["GITEA_TOKEN"]; !ok {
out["GITEA_TOKEN"] = token
}
if _, ok := out["GITEA_USER"]; !ok {
out["GITEA_USER"] = role
}
if _, ok := out["GITEA_USER_EMAIL"]; !ok {
out["GITEA_USER_EMAIL"] = role + "@" + gitIdentityEmailDomain
}
}
// isSafeRoleName accepts a single path segment of [A-Za-z0-9_-]+. Rejects
@@ -164,181 +164,3 @@ func TestIsSafeRoleName_Acceptance(t *testing.T) {
}
}
}
// TestLoadPersonaTokenFile_TokenOnlyPersona: the prod-team personas
// (agent-dev-a / agent-dev-b / agent-pm) ship `token` only — no `env`
// file. loadPersonaEnvFile's fallback path must populate GITEA_TOKEN /
// GITEA_USER / GITEA_USER_EMAIL from the token contents + role name so
// the GIT_ASKPASS helper has something to emit.
func TestLoadPersonaTokenFile_TokenOnlyPersona(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
roleDir := filepath.Join(root, "agent-dev-a")
if err := os.MkdirAll(roleDir, 0o755); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(roleDir, "token"),
[]byte("token-bytes-redacted\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Setenv("MOLECULE_PERSONA_ROOT", root)
out := map[string]string{}
loadPersonaEnvFile("agent-dev-a", out)
want := map[string]string{
"GITEA_TOKEN": "token-bytes-redacted",
"GITEA_USER": "agent-dev-a",
"GITEA_USER_EMAIL": "agent-dev-a@" + gitIdentityEmailDomain,
}
if len(out) != len(want) {
t.Fatalf("got %d keys, want %d: %#v", len(out), len(want), out)
}
for k, v := range want {
if out[k] != v {
t.Errorf("out[%q] = %q; want %q", k, out[k], v)
}
}
}
// TestLoadPersonaTokenFile_EnvFileWins: when BOTH an env file and a
// token file exist in the same persona dir, the env file is the more-
// specific declaration and wins outright — the fallback must not fire
// at all. This pins precedence so a persona later migrated to the
// richer env-file form (carrying GITEA_TOKEN_SCOPES / GITEA_SSH_KEY_PATH)
// doesn't get its token silently overridden by the fallback.
func TestLoadPersonaTokenFile_EnvFileWins(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
roleDir := filepath.Join(root, "agent-dev-b")
if err := os.MkdirAll(roleDir, 0o755); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
envBody := "GITEA_USER=env-form-user\nGITEA_TOKEN=env-form-token\n" +
"GITEA_USER_EMAIL=env-form@example.invalid\nGITEA_TOKEN_SCOPES=write:repository\n"
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(roleDir, "env"), []byte(envBody), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(roleDir, "token"),
[]byte("token-form-token\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Setenv("MOLECULE_PERSONA_ROOT", root)
out := map[string]string{}
loadPersonaEnvFile("agent-dev-b", out)
if out["GITEA_USER"] != "env-form-user" {
t.Errorf("env file should win for GITEA_USER; got %q", out["GITEA_USER"])
}
if out["GITEA_TOKEN"] != "env-form-token" {
t.Errorf("env file should win for GITEA_TOKEN; got %q", out["GITEA_TOKEN"])
}
if out["GITEA_USER_EMAIL"] != "env-form@example.invalid" {
t.Errorf("env file should win for GITEA_USER_EMAIL; got %q", out["GITEA_USER_EMAIL"])
}
if out["GITEA_TOKEN_SCOPES"] != "write:repository" {
t.Errorf("env file extras must be preserved; got GITEA_TOKEN_SCOPES=%q", out["GITEA_TOKEN_SCOPES"])
}
}
// TestLoadPersonaTokenFile_NeitherFile: persona dir exists but ships
// neither env nor token — silent no-op. This is the legitimate case
// for a partially-provisioned persona during bootstrap; callers expect
// an empty map, no error, no log noise.
func TestLoadPersonaTokenFile_NeitherFile(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
roleDir := filepath.Join(root, "agent-pm")
if err := os.MkdirAll(roleDir, 0o755); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Setenv("MOLECULE_PERSONA_ROOT", root)
out := map[string]string{}
loadPersonaEnvFile("agent-pm", out)
if len(out) != 0 {
t.Errorf("expected empty out when neither env nor token exists; got %#v", out)
}
}
// TestLoadPersonaTokenFile_EmptyToken: a token file with only
// whitespace must be treated as absent — never emit
// GITEA_TOKEN="" / GITEA_USER=<role> / GITEA_USER_EMAIL=<role>@... because
// that would set GITEA_USER without a usable token, and the askpass
// helper would then prompt with an empty password. Silent no-op is the
// correct behavior — let downstream auth fall through to its existing
// "no credentials available" path.
func TestLoadPersonaTokenFile_EmptyToken(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
roleDir := filepath.Join(root, "agent-dev-a")
if err := os.MkdirAll(roleDir, 0o755); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// Whitespace-only contents: spaces, tabs, newlines.
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(roleDir, "token"),
[]byte(" \t\n \n"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Setenv("MOLECULE_PERSONA_ROOT", root)
out := map[string]string{}
loadPersonaEnvFile("agent-dev-a", out)
if len(out) != 0 {
t.Errorf("expected empty out when token file is whitespace-only; got %#v", out)
}
}
// TestLoadPersonaTokenFile_TrimsWhitespace: tokens shipped from the
// operator-host bootstrap kit may have a trailing newline (the
// canonical `printf "%s\n" "$token" > token` shape). The fallback must
// trim leading + trailing whitespace so the askpass helper emits the
// raw token bytes — Gitea's PAT validator rejects tokens with embedded
// whitespace.
func TestLoadPersonaTokenFile_TrimsWhitespace(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
roleDir := filepath.Join(root, "agent-dev-b")
if err := os.MkdirAll(roleDir, 0o755); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(roleDir, "token"),
[]byte("\n raw-token-bytes \n\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Setenv("MOLECULE_PERSONA_ROOT", root)
out := map[string]string{}
loadPersonaEnvFile("agent-dev-b", out)
if out["GITEA_TOKEN"] != "raw-token-bytes" {
t.Errorf("token whitespace not trimmed; got %q", out["GITEA_TOKEN"])
}
}
// TestLoadPersonaTokenFile_RejectsUnsafeRole: defense-in-depth — even
// in the fallback path, role names that fail isSafeRoleName must not
// touch the filesystem. Mirrors TestLoadPersonaEnvFile_RejectsTraversal.
func TestLoadPersonaTokenFile_RejectsUnsafeRole(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
// Plant a token at /tmp/.../token so a bad traversal would reach it.
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(root, "token"),
[]byte("stolen-token\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Setenv("MOLECULE_PERSONA_ROOT", filepath.Join(root, "personas"))
for _, bad := range []string{"..", "../personas", "/abs", "with/slash", "."} {
out := map[string]string{}
loadPersonaTokenFile(bad, out)
if len(out) != 0 {
t.Errorf("role %q should have been rejected; got %#v", bad, out)
}
}
}
// TestLoadPersonaTokenFile_NilMapSafe: callers pass a fresh map in
// practice, but defense-in-depth — a nil map must not panic.
func TestLoadPersonaTokenFile_NilMapSafe(t *testing.T) {
defer func() {
if r := recover(); r != nil {
t.Fatalf("nil map caused panic: %v", r)
}
}()
loadPersonaTokenFile("agent-dev-a", nil)
}
+3 -31
View File
@@ -327,33 +327,7 @@ func (h *RegistryHandler) Register(c *gin.Context) {
}
}
// Reconcile the runtime-supplied card's identity fields against the
// trusted workspaces row before storing. The runtime builds its card
// from config.name, which the CP-regenerated /configs/config.yaml
// sets to the workspace UUID — so without this the stored card
// served at /.well-known/agent-card.json and returned to peers via
// agent_card_url has name = UUID, description = "", role = null even
// though the operator-controlled workspaces.name holds the friendly
// name the canvas shows. We only FILL gaps from the DB (never
// downgrade a card that already carries a real name); identity stays
// platform-controlled — the agent cannot self-set these. Best-effort:
// a lookup failure leaves the card exactly as the runtime sent it
// (no-worse-than-before). See agent_card_reconcile.go.
reconciledCard := payload.AgentCard
{
var dbName, dbRole sql.NullString
if qErr := db.DB.QueryRowContext(ctx,
`SELECT name, role FROM workspaces WHERE id = $1`, payload.ID,
).Scan(&dbName, &dbRole); qErr == nil {
if rc, did := reconcileAgentCardIdentity(
payload.AgentCard, payload.ID, dbName.String, dbRole.String,
); did {
reconciledCard = rc
log.Printf("Registry register: reconciled agent_card identity for %s from workspaces row", payload.ID)
}
}
}
agentCardStr := string(reconciledCard)
agentCardStr := string(payload.AgentCard)
// urlForUpsert: poll-mode workspaces don't need a URL. Empty input
// becomes NULL via sql.NullString so the row's URL stays clean (the
@@ -439,12 +413,10 @@ func (h *RegistryHandler) Register(c *gin.Context) {
}
}
// Broadcast WORKSPACE_ONLINE — use the reconciled card so the canvas
// Agent Card view live-updates with the friendly name, matching what
// was just persisted (not the runtime's raw UUID-name card).
// Broadcast WORKSPACE_ONLINE
if err := h.broadcaster.RecordAndBroadcast(ctx, string(events.EventWorkspaceOnline), payload.ID, map[string]interface{}{
"url": cachedURL,
"agent_card": reconciledCard,
"agent_card": payload.AgentCard,
"delivery_mode": effectiveMode,
}); err != nil {
log.Printf("Registry broadcast error: %v", err)
@@ -56,10 +56,8 @@ const (
// (an externally routable address) is used directly.
func (h *WorkspaceHandler) gracefulPreRestart(ctx context.Context, workspaceID string) {
// Non-blocking send — don't stall the restart cycle.
// Run in a tracked async goroutine (goAsync, not bare `go`) so the
// caller (runRestartCycle) can proceed to stopForRestart without
// waiting, while the test harness can still drain it before swapping
// the global db.DB (resolveAgentURLForRestartSignal reads db.DB).
// Run in a detached goroutine so the caller (runRestartCycle) can
// proceed to stopForRestart without waiting.
h.goAsync(func() {
signalCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), restartSignalTimeout)
defer cancel()
@@ -1,117 +0,0 @@
package handlers
// template_files_agent_home_stub_test.go — pins the Phase-1 stub
// contract for the /agent-home root added by internal#425 RFC.
//
// Today (pre-Phase-2b), every Files API verb against `?root=/agent-home`
// must return HTTP 501 with the canonical pending-message body. The
// stub MUST NOT:
// 1. Hit the DB (the workspace might not even exist yet from the
// canvas's POV — the root selector is testable without one).
// 2. Touch the EIC tunnel / Docker / template-dir paths — those
// would 500/404/[] depending on the env and confuse the canvas.
// 3. Accept writes/deletes that the future docker-exec backend
// would reject — fail closed.
//
// When Phase 2b lands, this file gets replaced by a real
// docker-exec dispatch test; the stub-message constant in
// templates.go disappears.
import (
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
)
// TestAgentHomeAllowedRoot pins that /agent-home is in the allowedRoots
// set. Without this, a future refactor that drops the key would
// silently degrade the canvas root selector to a 400 instead of the
// stub 501.
func TestAgentHomeAllowedRoot(t *testing.T) {
if !allowedRoots["/agent-home"] {
t.Fatal("/agent-home must be in allowedRoots — RFC #425 contract")
}
}
// TestAgentHomeStub_AllVerbs_Return501 pins the canonical stub
// response across all four verbs. Each must:
//
// - status 501
// - body contains the canonical "/agent-home not implemented" prefix
// - NOT contain "workspace not found" (proves we short-circuit before
// the DB lookup)
//
// Driven as a table to keep symmetry — adding a fifth verb in the
// future means adding one row here.
func TestAgentHomeStub_AllVerbs_Return501(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
method string
invoke func(c *gin.Context)
}{
{
name: "ListFiles",
method: "GET",
invoke: func(c *gin.Context) { (&TemplatesHandler{}).ListFiles(c) },
},
{
name: "ReadFile",
method: "GET",
invoke: func(c *gin.Context) { (&TemplatesHandler{}).ReadFile(c) },
},
{
name: "WriteFile",
method: "PUT",
invoke: func(c *gin.Context) { (&TemplatesHandler{}).WriteFile(c) },
},
{
name: "DeleteFile",
method: "DELETE",
invoke: func(c *gin.Context) { (&TemplatesHandler{}).DeleteFile(c) },
},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
c, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(w)
c.Params = gin.Params{
{Key: "id", Value: "ws-stub"},
// Path param without leading slash so DeleteFile's
// filepath.IsAbs guard doesn't 400 before the root
// dispatch runs. The List/Read/Write paths strip the
// leading slash themselves and accept either form.
{Key: "path", Value: "notes.md"},
}
// WriteFile binds JSON; provide a minimal valid body so the
// short-circuit isn't masked by the bind-error path.
var body string
if tc.method == "PUT" {
body = `{"content":"x"}`
}
c.Request = httptest.NewRequest(
tc.method,
"/workspaces/ws-stub/files/notes.md?root=/agent-home",
strings.NewReader(body),
)
if body != "" {
c.Request.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
}
tc.invoke(c)
if w.Code != http.StatusNotImplemented {
t.Fatalf("expected 501, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
if !strings.Contains(w.Body.String(), "/agent-home not implemented") {
t.Errorf("body should contain canonical stub message; got %s", w.Body.String())
}
if strings.Contains(w.Body.String(), "workspace not found") {
t.Errorf("stub leaked through to DB lookup; body=%s", w.Body.String())
}
})
}
}
@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ package handlers
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"log"
"os"
@@ -358,28 +357,6 @@ func writeFileViaEIC(ctx context.Context, instanceID, runtime, root, relPath str
var stderr bytes.Buffer
sshCmd.Stderr = &stderr
if err := sshCmd.Run(); err != nil {
// When the per-op context deadline (eicFileOpTimeout) fires,
// exec.CommandContext SIGKILLs the ssh subprocess and Run()
// returns the bare "signal: killed" with empty stderr. That
// surfaced to the canvas as an opaque
// `500 {"error":"ssh install: signal: killed ()"}` which gave
// the operator no idea the workspace was simply mid-provision
// with a slow/unready EIC tunnel (internal#423). Detect the
// deadline explicitly and return an actionable message instead
// — the EIC mechanism, timeout value, and success path are all
// unchanged; this only improves the error a stuck write emits.
if cerr := ctx.Err(); cerr != nil {
reason := "timed out after " + eicFileOpTimeout.String()
if errors.Is(cerr, context.Canceled) && !errors.Is(cerr, context.DeadlineExceeded) {
reason = "was cancelled"
}
return fmt.Errorf(
"ssh install: EIC tunnel to workspace %s — "+
"the workspace may still be provisioning (slow/unready SSH); "+
"retry once it is online, or apply provider credentials via "+
"Settings → Secrets (encrypted, does not use this file-write path)",
reason)
}
return fmt.Errorf("ssh install: %w (%s)", err, strings.TrimSpace(stderr.String()))
}
log.Printf("writeFileViaEIC: ws instance=%s runtime=%s root=%s wrote %d bytes → %s",
@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
package handlers
// template_files_eic_write_timeout_test.go — pins the actionable-error
// behavior added for internal#423.
//
// When the per-op context deadline (eicFileOpTimeout) fires,
// exec.CommandContext SIGKILLs the ssh subprocess and Run() returns the
// bare "signal: killed" with empty stderr. Before the fix that surfaced
// to the canvas as an opaque `500 {"error":"ssh install: signal:
// killed ()"}` — useless to an operator whose workspace was simply
// mid-provision with a slow/unready EIC tunnel. The fix detects the
// deadline explicitly (errors.Is(ctx.Err(), context.DeadlineExceeded))
// and returns a message that names the cause and the
// Settings → Secrets workaround.
import (
"context"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
)
// TestWriteFileViaEIC_DeadlineExceeded_ActionableError stubs
// withEICTunnel so the *real* inner closure runs against a context that
// has already exceeded its deadline. The ssh subprocess fails (no real
// sshd on the fake port) and ctx.Err() == DeadlineExceeded, so the new
// branch must fire and produce an actionable message — NOT the opaque
// "signal: killed ()" string the canvas used to show.
func TestWriteFileViaEIC_DeadlineExceeded_ActionableError(t *testing.T) {
prev := withEICTunnel
withEICTunnel = func(_ context.Context, instanceID string, fn func(s eicSSHSession) error) error {
// Run the real inner closure. It closes over the ctx that
// writeFileViaEIC derived from our already-cancelled parent, so
// the ssh subprocess is killed immediately and ctx.Err()
// resolves — exactly the eicFileOpTimeout-expiry shape.
return fn(eicSSHSession{
instanceID: instanceID,
osUser: "ubuntu",
localPort: 1, // nothing listening → ssh fails fast
keyPath: "/nonexistent/key",
})
}
t.Cleanup(func() { withEICTunnel = prev })
// Drive the real writeFileViaEIC. Pass a parent whose deadline has
// already passed: the context.WithTimeout(ctx, eicFileOpTimeout)
// derived inside writeFileViaEIC inherits the expired parent
// deadline, so ctx.Err() == context.DeadlineExceeded by the time
// the killed ssh subprocess returns — the exact production shape
// (eicFileOpTimeout expiry), exercised deterministically.
parent, cancel := context.WithDeadline(context.Background(), time.Now().Add(-time.Second))
defer cancel()
err := writeFileViaEIC(parent, "i-test", "claude-code", "/configs", "config.yaml", []byte("model: sonnet\n"))
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected an error from a killed ssh subprocess, got nil")
}
msg := err.Error()
// Must NOT leak the opaque bare-signal string to the operator.
if strings.Contains(msg, "signal: killed ()") {
t.Fatalf("error still surfaces the opaque %q form: %q", "signal: killed ()", msg)
}
// Must name the cause and the Secrets workaround so the canvas
// shows something actionable.
for _, want := range []string{"timed out", "provisioning", "Settings", "Secrets"} {
if !strings.Contains(msg, want) {
t.Errorf("actionable error missing %q; got: %q", want, msg)
}
}
}
@@ -18,35 +18,11 @@ import (
)
// allowedRoots are the container paths that the Files API can browse.
//
// `/agent-home` (added 2026-05-15, internal#425 RFC) is the container's
// own $HOME — `/root` for openclaw, `/home/agent` for claude-code/hermes
// — browsed via `docker exec` rather than host-side `find`. The
// dispatch is stubbed today (returns 501); full implementation lands in
// Phase 2b of the RFC. The allowedRoots key is added now so the canvas
// can design its root-selector UI against the final shape and the
// stub-vs-full transition is server-side only.
var allowedRoots = map[string]bool{
"/configs": true,
"/workspace": true,
"/home": true,
"/plugins": true,
"/agent-home": true,
}
// agentHomeStubMessage is the body returned by every Files API verb
// when `?root=/agent-home` is requested before Phase 2b lands. Keep the
// status code 501 (Not Implemented) — the route exists, the verb is
// understood, but the handler is unimplemented. Distinguishes from
// 400/404 so a canvas behind a less-current server can render a clean
// "feature pending" state instead of a generic error.
const agentHomeStubMessage = "/agent-home not implemented yet (internal#425 RFC Phase 2b — docker-exec backend pending)"
// isAgentHomeStubRequest returns true when the request targets the
// stubbed /agent-home root. Centralised so every verb in this file
// short-circuits with the same response shape.
func isAgentHomeStubRequest(rootPath string) bool {
return rootPath == "/agent-home"
"/configs": true,
"/workspace": true,
"/home": true,
"/plugins": true,
}
// maxUploadFiles limits the number of files in a single import/replace.
@@ -248,14 +224,7 @@ func (h *TemplatesHandler) ListFiles(c *gin.Context) {
// ?depth= — max depth to recurse (default: 1, max: 5)
rootPath := c.DefaultQuery("root", "/configs")
if !allowedRoots[rootPath] {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "root must be one of: /configs, /workspace, /home, /plugins, /agent-home"})
return
}
// /agent-home dispatch is stubbed pre-Phase-2b. Short-circuit before
// the DB lookup + EIC dance so a canvas exercising the new root key
// gets a clean 501 instead of a half-effort response.
if isAgentHomeStubRequest(rootPath) {
c.JSON(http.StatusNotImplemented, gin.H{"error": agentHomeStubMessage})
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "root must be one of: /configs, /workspace, /home, /plugins"})
return
}
subPath := c.DefaultQuery("path", "")
@@ -424,11 +393,7 @@ func (h *TemplatesHandler) ReadFile(c *gin.Context) {
ctx := c.Request.Context()
rootPath := c.DefaultQuery("root", "/configs")
if !allowedRoots[rootPath] {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "root must be one of: /configs, /workspace, /home, /plugins, /agent-home"})
return
}
if isAgentHomeStubRequest(rootPath) {
c.JSON(http.StatusNotImplemented, gin.H{"error": agentHomeStubMessage})
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "root must be one of: /configs, /workspace, /home, /plugins"})
return
}
@@ -541,11 +506,7 @@ func (h *TemplatesHandler) WriteFile(c *gin.Context) {
ctx := c.Request.Context()
rootPath := c.DefaultQuery("root", "/configs")
if !allowedRoots[rootPath] {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "root must be one of: /configs, /workspace, /home, /plugins, /agent-home"})
return
}
if isAgentHomeStubRequest(rootPath) {
c.JSON(http.StatusNotImplemented, gin.H{"error": agentHomeStubMessage})
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "root must be one of: /configs, /workspace, /home, /plugins"})
return
}
var wsName, instanceID, runtime string
@@ -622,11 +583,7 @@ func (h *TemplatesHandler) DeleteFile(c *gin.Context) {
ctx := c.Request.Context()
rootPath := c.DefaultQuery("root", "/configs")
if !allowedRoots[rootPath] {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "root must be one of: /configs, /workspace, /home, /plugins, /agent-home"})
return
}
if isAgentHomeStubRequest(rootPath) {
c.JSON(http.StatusNotImplemented, gin.H{"error": agentHomeStubMessage})
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "root must be one of: /configs, /workspace, /home, /plugins"})
return
}
var wsName, instanceID, runtime string
@@ -10,20 +10,8 @@ import (
"github.com/Molecule-AI/molecule-monorepo/platform/internal/db"
"github.com/Molecule-AI/molecule-monorepo/platform/internal/wsauth"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
"github.com/google/uuid"
)
// validWorkspaceID returns true when id is a syntactically valid UUID.
// workspace_id is a `uuid` column; passing a non-UUID (e.g. the canvas
// "global" sentinel sent when no node is selected) makes Postgres raise
// `invalid input syntax for type uuid`, which previously leaked as an
// opaque 500. Reject up front with a clean 400 instead. Mirrors the
// uuid.Parse guard already used in handlers/activity.go.
func validWorkspaceID(id string) bool {
_, err := uuid.Parse(id)
return err == nil
}
// TokenHandler exposes user-facing token management for workspaces.
// Routes: GET/POST/DELETE /workspaces/:id/tokens (behind WorkspaceAuth).
type TokenHandler struct{}
@@ -43,10 +31,6 @@ type tokenListItem struct {
// never the plaintext or hash).
func (h *TokenHandler) List(c *gin.Context) {
workspaceID := c.Param("id")
if !validWorkspaceID(workspaceID) {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "invalid workspace id"})
return
}
limit := 50
if v := c.Query("limit"); v != "" {
@@ -69,7 +53,6 @@ func (h *TokenHandler) List(c *gin.Context) {
LIMIT $2 OFFSET $3
`, workspaceID, limit, offset)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("tokens: list query failed for workspace %s: %v", workspaceID, err)
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": "failed to list tokens"})
return
}
@@ -102,10 +85,6 @@ const maxTokensPerWorkspace = 50
// exactly once in the response — it cannot be recovered afterwards.
func (h *TokenHandler) Create(c *gin.Context) {
workspaceID := c.Param("id")
if !validWorkspaceID(workspaceID) {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "invalid workspace id"})
return
}
// Rate limit: max active tokens per workspace
var count int
@@ -138,10 +117,6 @@ func (h *TokenHandler) Create(c *gin.Context) {
func (h *TokenHandler) Revoke(c *gin.Context) {
workspaceID := c.Param("id")
tokenID := c.Param("tokenId")
if !validWorkspaceID(workspaceID) {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "invalid workspace id"})
return
}
result, err := db.DB.ExecContext(c.Request.Context(), `
UPDATE workspace_auth_tokens
@@ -41,15 +41,6 @@ import (
func init() { gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode) }
// Workspace IDs are validated as UUIDs up front (tokens.go validWorkspaceID),
// so handler tests must pass syntactically valid UUIDs. Fixed values keep
// sqlmock WithArgs assertions deterministic.
const (
wsUUID1 = "11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111"
wsUUID2 = "22222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222"
wsUUID3 = "33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333"
)
// withMockDB swaps `db.DB` for a sqlmock and returns the mock plus a
// restore func. Tests use this in place of setupTokenTestDB which
// skips on a missing real DB.
@@ -90,13 +81,13 @@ func TestTokenHandler_List_HappyPath(t *testing.T) {
created := time.Date(2026, 4, 1, 12, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
last := created.Add(time.Hour)
mock.ExpectQuery(`SELECT id, prefix, created_at, last_used_at\s+FROM workspace_auth_tokens`).
WithArgs(wsUUID1, 50, 0).
WithArgs("ws-1", 50, 0).
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"id", "prefix", "created_at", "last_used_at"}).
AddRow("tok-1", "abc12345", created, last).
AddRow("tok-2", "def67890", created, nil))
w := makeReq(t, NewTokenHandler().List, "GET",
"/workspaces/ws-1/tokens", gin.Params{{Key: "id", Value: wsUUID1}})
"/workspaces/ws-1/tokens", gin.Params{{Key: "id", Value: "ws-1"}})
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
@@ -130,7 +121,7 @@ func TestTokenHandler_List_EmptyResult(t *testing.T) {
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"id", "prefix", "created_at", "last_used_at"}))
w := makeReq(t, NewTokenHandler().List, "GET",
"/workspaces/ws-2/tokens", gin.Params{{Key: "id", Value: wsUUID2}})
"/workspaces/ws-2/tokens", gin.Params{{Key: "id", Value: "ws-2"}})
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200 on empty list, got %d", w.Code)
@@ -155,7 +146,7 @@ func TestTokenHandler_List_QueryError(t *testing.T) {
WillReturnError(errors.New("connection refused"))
w := makeReq(t, NewTokenHandler().List, "GET",
"/workspaces/ws-3/tokens", gin.Params{{Key: "id", Value: wsUUID3}})
"/workspaces/ws-3/tokens", gin.Params{{Key: "id", Value: "ws-3"}})
if w.Code != http.StatusInternalServerError {
t.Errorf("query error must surface as 500, got %d", w.Code)
@@ -167,13 +158,13 @@ func TestTokenHandler_List_RespectsLimit(t *testing.T) {
defer cleanup()
mock.ExpectQuery(`SELECT id, prefix, created_at, last_used_at`).
WithArgs(wsUUID1, 10, 5).
WithArgs("ws-1", 10, 5).
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"id", "prefix", "created_at", "last_used_at"}))
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
c, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(w)
c.Request = httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/workspaces/ws-1/tokens?limit=10&offset=5", nil)
c.Params = gin.Params{{Key: "id", Value: wsUUID1}}
c.Params = gin.Params{{Key: "id", Value: "ws-1"}}
NewTokenHandler().List(c)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
@@ -195,7 +186,7 @@ func TestTokenHandler_List_ScanError(t *testing.T) {
AddRow("tok-1", "abc", "not-a-timestamp", nil))
w := makeReq(t, NewTokenHandler().List, "GET",
"/workspaces/ws-1/tokens", gin.Params{{Key: "id", Value: wsUUID1}})
"/workspaces/ws-1/tokens", gin.Params{{Key: "id", Value: "ws-1"}})
if w.Code != http.StatusInternalServerError {
t.Errorf("scan error must surface as 500, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
@@ -210,11 +201,11 @@ func TestTokenHandler_Create_RateLimited(t *testing.T) {
// Count query returns 50 (== max) → 429.
mock.ExpectQuery(`SELECT COUNT\(\*\) FROM workspace_auth_tokens`).
WithArgs(wsUUID1).
WithArgs("ws-1").
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"count"}).AddRow(50))
w := makeReq(t, NewTokenHandler().Create, "POST",
"/workspaces/ws-1/tokens", gin.Params{{Key: "id", Value: wsUUID1}})
"/workspaces/ws-1/tokens", gin.Params{{Key: "id", Value: "ws-1"}})
if w.Code != http.StatusTooManyRequests {
t.Errorf("max active tokens should 429, got %d", w.Code)
@@ -234,7 +225,7 @@ func TestTokenHandler_Create_IssueFails(t *testing.T) {
WillReturnError(errors.New("disk full"))
w := makeReq(t, NewTokenHandler().Create, "POST",
"/workspaces/ws-1/tokens", gin.Params{{Key: "id", Value: wsUUID1}})
"/workspaces/ws-1/tokens", gin.Params{{Key: "id", Value: "ws-1"}})
if w.Code != http.StatusInternalServerError {
t.Errorf("IssueToken DB error must 500, got %d", w.Code)
@@ -251,7 +242,7 @@ func TestTokenHandler_Create_HappyPath(t *testing.T) {
WillReturnResult(sqlmock.NewResult(1, 1))
w := makeReq(t, NewTokenHandler().Create, "POST",
"/workspaces/ws-1/tokens", gin.Params{{Key: "id", Value: wsUUID1}})
"/workspaces/ws-1/tokens", gin.Params{{Key: "id", Value: "ws-1"}})
if w.Code != http.StatusCreated {
t.Fatalf("expected 201, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
@@ -266,7 +257,7 @@ func TestTokenHandler_Create_HappyPath(t *testing.T) {
if body.AuthToken == "" {
t.Errorf("auth_token must be present and non-empty in response")
}
if body.WorkspaceID != wsUUID1 {
if body.WorkspaceID != "ws-1" {
t.Errorf("workspace_id mismatch: %q", body.WorkspaceID)
}
}
@@ -278,12 +269,12 @@ func TestTokenHandler_Revoke_HappyPath(t *testing.T) {
defer cleanup()
mock.ExpectExec(`UPDATE workspace_auth_tokens\s+SET revoked_at = now\(\)`).
WithArgs("tok-1", wsUUID1).
WithArgs("tok-1", "ws-1").
WillReturnResult(sqlmock.NewResult(0, 1))
w := makeReq(t, NewTokenHandler().Revoke, "DELETE",
"/workspaces/ws-1/tokens/tok-1", gin.Params{
{Key: "id", Value: wsUUID1},
{Key: "id", Value: "ws-1"},
{Key: "tokenId", Value: "tok-1"},
})
@@ -298,12 +289,12 @@ func TestTokenHandler_Revoke_NotFound(t *testing.T) {
// 0 rows affected → token not found OR already revoked.
mock.ExpectExec(`UPDATE workspace_auth_tokens`).
WithArgs("tok-ghost", wsUUID1).
WithArgs("tok-ghost", "ws-1").
WillReturnResult(sqlmock.NewResult(0, 0))
w := makeReq(t, NewTokenHandler().Revoke, "DELETE",
"/workspaces/ws-1/tokens/tok-ghost", gin.Params{
{Key: "id", Value: wsUUID1},
{Key: "id", Value: "ws-1"},
{Key: "tokenId", Value: "tok-ghost"},
})
@@ -321,7 +312,7 @@ func TestTokenHandler_Revoke_DBError(t *testing.T) {
w := makeReq(t, NewTokenHandler().Revoke, "DELETE",
"/workspaces/ws-1/tokens/tok-1", gin.Params{
{Key: "id", Value: wsUUID1},
{Key: "id", Value: "ws-1"},
{Key: "tokenId", Value: "tok-1"},
})
@@ -330,59 +321,6 @@ func TestTokenHandler_Revoke_DBError(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// ---- UUID validation (regression: "global" sentinel 500) ------------
// The canvas Settings → Workspace Tokens tab sent the literal sentinel
// "global" as the workspace id when no node was selected. workspace_id
// is a `uuid` column, so the query raised
// `invalid input syntax for type uuid: "global"` which leaked as an
// opaque 500. List/Create/Revoke now reject any non-UUID id with a
// clean 400 before touching the DB. No DB expectation is set on the
// mock — a DB hit would fail ExpectationsWereMet, proving short-circuit.
func TestTokenHandler_RejectsNonUUIDWorkspaceID(t *testing.T) {
h := NewTokenHandler()
cases := []struct {
name string
run func(c *gin.Context)
method string
params gin.Params
}{
{"List", h.List, "GET", gin.Params{{Key: "id", Value: "global"}}},
{"Create", h.Create, "POST", gin.Params{{Key: "id", Value: "global"}}},
{"Revoke", h.Revoke, "DELETE", gin.Params{
{Key: "id", Value: "global"},
{Key: "tokenId", Value: "tok-1"},
}},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
mock, cleanup := withMockDB(t)
defer cleanup()
w := makeReq(t, tc.run, tc.method,
"/workspaces/global/tokens", tc.params)
if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Fatalf("%s with non-UUID id must 400, got %d: %s",
tc.name, w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
var body struct {
Error string `json:"error"`
}
_ = json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &body)
if body.Error != "invalid workspace id" {
t.Errorf("%s: want error=%q, got %q",
tc.name, "invalid workspace id", body.Error)
}
// No query/exec was expected → if the handler hit the DB
// this fails, proving the guard short-circuits before SQL.
if err := mock.ExpectationsWereMet(); err != nil {
t.Errorf("%s leaked a DB call past the uuid guard: %v", tc.name, err)
}
})
}
}
// Compile-time noise removal: the imports list pulls in the sql /
// driver packages and the silenced ctx so a future scenario that
// needs them doesn't have to re-add the import. Documented here so
@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ import (
"github.com/Molecule-AI/molecule-monorepo/platform/internal/db"
"github.com/Molecule-AI/molecule-monorepo/platform/internal/wsauth"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
"github.com/google/uuid"
)
func init() { gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode) }
@@ -168,14 +167,11 @@ func TestTokenHandler_RevokeWrongWorkspace(t *testing.T) {
h := NewTokenHandler()
// Try to revoke with a different (valid-UUID) workspace ID that does
// not own the token — should 404. A valid UUID is required so this
// exercises the ownership branch, not the up-front uuid-shape 400.
otherWS := uuid.NewString()
// Try to revoke with a different workspace ID — should 404
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
c, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(w)
c.Params = gin.Params{{Key: "id", Value: otherWS}, {Key: "tokenId", Value: tokenID}}
c.Request = httptest.NewRequest("DELETE", "/workspaces/"+otherWS+"/tokens/"+tokenID, nil)
c.Params = gin.Params{{Key: "id", Value: "wrong-workspace-id"}, {Key: "tokenId", Value: tokenID}}
c.Request = httptest.NewRequest("DELETE", "/workspaces/wrong/tokens/"+tokenID, nil)
h.Revoke(c)
if w.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
@@ -80,15 +80,6 @@ type WorkspaceHandler struct {
asyncWG sync.WaitGroup
}
// newHandlerHook, when non-nil, is invoked for every WorkspaceHandler
// created via NewWorkspaceHandler. It is nil in production (zero cost);
// the test harness sets it so setupTestDB can drain every handler's
// in-flight async goroutines before swapping the global db.DB. Without
// this, a detached restart goroutine (maybeMarkContainerDead ->
// goAsync(RestartByID) -> runRestartCycle reads db.DB) races the
// db.DB restore in another test's t.Cleanup.
var newHandlerHook func(*WorkspaceHandler)
func (h *WorkspaceHandler) goAsync(fn func()) {
h.asyncWG.Add(1)
go func() {
@@ -117,9 +108,6 @@ func NewWorkspaceHandler(b events.EventEmitter, p *provisioner.Provisioner, plat
if p != nil {
h.provisioner = p
}
if newHandlerHook != nil {
newHandlerHook(h)
}
return h
}
@@ -237,10 +237,10 @@ func (h *WorkspaceHandler) Restart(c *gin.Context) {
// the silent-drop bugs PRs #2811/#2824 closed). RestartWorkspaceAuto
// enforces CP-FIRST ordering matching the other dispatchers — see
// docs/architecture/backends.md.
h.goAsync(func() {
go func() {
h.RestartWorkspaceAutoOpts(context.Background(), id, templatePath, configFiles, payload, resetClaudeSession)
})
h.goAsync(func() { h.sendRestartContext(id, restartData) })
}()
go h.sendRestartContext(id, restartData)
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"status": "provisioning", "config_dir": configLabel, "reset_session": resetClaudeSession})
}
@@ -610,9 +610,7 @@ func (h *WorkspaceHandler) runRestartCycle(workspaceID string) {
h.provisionWorkspaceAutoSync(workspaceID, "", nil, payload)
// sendRestartContext is a one-way notification to the new container; safe
// to fire async — the next restart cycle won't depend on it completing.
// Tracked via goAsync so the test harness can drain it before the
// global db.DB swap (sendRestartContext reads db.DB).
h.goAsync(func() { h.sendRestartContext(workspaceID, restartData) })
go h.sendRestartContext(workspaceID, restartData)
}
// Pause handles POST /workspaces/:id/pause
@@ -178,21 +178,12 @@ func (p *CPProvisioner) Start(ctx context.Context, cfg WorkspaceConfig) (string,
// /admin/liveness and other admin-gated platform endpoints (core#831).
// p.adminToken is read from os.Getenv("ADMIN_TOKEN") at provisioner creation;
// it is also used for CP→platform HTTP auth but those are separate concerns.
//
// Forensic #145 hardening: tenant workspaces run on EC2 via this path, so
// the SCM-write-token denylist (see buildContainerEnv) is enforced here
// too. Always build a filtered copy — never pass cfg.EnvVars through
// verbatim — so a latent persona-merged GITEA_TOKEN can't reach the
// tenant container regardless of whether ADMIN_TOKEN is set.
env := make(map[string]string, len(cfg.EnvVars)+1)
for k, v := range cfg.EnvVars {
if isSCMWriteTokenKey(k) {
log.Printf("CPProvisioner.Start: dropped SCM-write credential %q from tenant workspace env (forensic #145 guard)", k)
continue
}
env[k] = v
}
env := cfg.EnvVars
if p.adminToken != "" {
env = make(map[string]string, len(cfg.EnvVars)+1)
for k, v := range cfg.EnvVars {
env[k] = v
}
env["ADMIN_TOKEN"] = p.adminToken
}
// Collect template files and generated configs, with OFFSEC-010 guards:
@@ -643,28 +643,6 @@ func ValidateWorkspaceAccess(access, workspacePath string) error {
}
}
// scmWriteTokenKeys is the explicit denylist of environment variable names
// that carry a Git SCM *write* credential (push / merge / approve). These
// must never reach a tenant workspace container — see the forensic #145
// rationale in buildContainerEnv. Kept as an exact-match set rather than a
// substring/prefix heuristic so the guard is auditable and can't silently
// over-strip a legitimately-named var.
var scmWriteTokenKeys = map[string]struct{}{
"GITEA_TOKEN": {},
"GITHUB_TOKEN": {},
"GH_TOKEN": {}, // gh CLI honours GH_TOKEN as a GITHUB_TOKEN alias
"GITLAB_TOKEN": {},
"GL_TOKEN": {}, // glab CLI alias
"BITBUCKET_TOKEN": {},
}
// isSCMWriteTokenKey reports whether an env var name is a known Git SCM
// write credential that must be stripped from tenant workspace env.
func isSCMWriteTokenKey(key string) bool {
_, ok := scmWriteTokenKeys[key]
return ok
}
// buildContainerEnv assembles the initial environment variables injected
// into every workspace container.
//
@@ -701,21 +679,6 @@ func buildContainerEnv(cfg WorkspaceConfig) []string {
env = append(env, fmt.Sprintf("AWARENESS_URL=%s", cfg.AwarenessURL))
}
for k, v := range cfg.EnvVars {
// Forensic #145 hardening: tenant workspace containers run
// agent-controlled code and must NEVER receive a Git SCM *write*
// credential. Without merge/approve creds in-container the
// two-eyes review gate is structurally self-bypass-proof — an
// agent that forges an approval has no token to act on it. A
// latent path exists (loadPersonaEnvFile merges a per-role
// persona `GITEA_TOKEN` into cfg.EnvVars when MOLECULE_PERSONA_ROOT
// is set on a tenant host); it is inert today (persona dirs are
// operator-host-only) but unguarded. Strip SCM-write tokens here
// by construction so the invariant holds regardless of whether
// that path ever becomes reachable.
if isSCMWriteTokenKey(k) {
log.Printf("buildContainerEnv: dropped SCM-write credential %q from workspace env (forensic #145 guard)", k)
continue
}
env = append(env, fmt.Sprintf("%s=%s", k, v))
}
// Inject ADMIN_TOKEN from the platform server's environment so workspace
@@ -725,15 +725,10 @@ func TestBuildContainerEnv_AwarenessOnlyWhenBothSet(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestBuildContainerEnv_CustomEnvVarsAppended(t *testing.T) {
// NOTE: this test previously asserted GITHUB_TOKEN passed through
// verbatim. That assertion encoded the forensic #145 latent leak as
// expected behavior. Post-guard, ordinary custom env still flows but
// SCM-write credentials are stripped — see
// TestBuildContainerEnv_StripsSCMWriteTokens for the negative assertion.
cfg := WorkspaceConfig{
WorkspaceID: "ws-x",
PlatformURL: "http://localhost:8080",
EnvVars: map[string]string{"CUSTOM": "value", "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY": "sk-not-an-scm-token"},
EnvVars: map[string]string{"CUSTOM": "value", "GITHUB_TOKEN": "fake-token-for-test"},
}
env := buildContainerEnv(cfg)
seen := map[string]string{}
@@ -746,8 +741,8 @@ func TestBuildContainerEnv_CustomEnvVarsAppended(t *testing.T) {
if seen["CUSTOM"] != "value" {
t.Errorf("CUSTOM env missing, got env=%v", env)
}
if seen["ANTHROPIC_API_KEY"] != "sk-not-an-scm-token" {
t.Errorf("non-SCM custom env must still pass through, got env=%v", env)
if seen["GITHUB_TOKEN"] != "fake-token-for-test" {
t.Errorf("GITHUB_TOKEN env missing, got env=%v", env)
}
// Built-in defaults still present
if seen["MOLECULE_URL"] == "" {
@@ -755,129 +750,6 @@ func TestBuildContainerEnv_CustomEnvVarsAppended(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// ---------- forensic #145: SCM-write-token denylist guard ----------
// TestBuildContainerEnv_StripsSCMWriteTokens is the core negative
// assertion: a tenant workspace env constructed via buildContainerEnv MUST
// NOT contain any Git SCM *write* credential, regardless of how it got into
// cfg.EnvVars. This proves the two-eyes review gate stays structurally
// self-bypass-proof — an agent in-container has no merge/approve token to
// act on a forged approval. See forensic #145.
//
// This test FAILS on the pre-guard code (where buildContainerEnv passed
// cfg.EnvVars through verbatim) and PASSES once the denylist filter is in
// place — i.e. the guard is proven by construction, not by environment
// accident.
func TestBuildContainerEnv_StripsSCMWriteTokens(t *testing.T) {
scmTokens := []string{
"GITEA_TOKEN", "GITHUB_TOKEN", "GH_TOKEN",
"GITLAB_TOKEN", "GL_TOKEN", "BITBUCKET_TOKEN",
}
t.Run("normal path — SCM tokens explicitly set in EnvVars", func(t *testing.T) {
envVars := map[string]string{"CUSTOM": "ok", "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY": "sk-keep"}
for _, k := range scmTokens {
envVars[k] = "leaked-write-credential-" + k
}
cfg := WorkspaceConfig{
WorkspaceID: "ws-tenant",
PlatformURL: "http://localhost:8080",
Tier: 2,
EnvVars: envVars,
}
assertNoSCMWriteToken(t, buildContainerEnv(cfg), scmTokens)
// Sanity: non-SCM custom env is NOT collateral-damaged by the filter.
if !envContains(buildContainerEnv(cfg), "CUSTOM=ok") {
t.Errorf("filter must not strip non-SCM custom env")
}
if !envContains(buildContainerEnv(cfg), "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=sk-keep") {
t.Errorf("filter must not strip non-SCM API keys")
}
})
t.Run("persona-file path — simulates loadPersonaEnvFile merge", func(t *testing.T) {
// The latent path: handlers.loadPersonaEnvFile() merges a per-role
// persona env file (carrying GITEA_USER, GITEA_TOKEN, …) into the
// workspace env map when MOLECULE_PERSONA_ROOT is set on a tenant
// host. We can't invoke that cross-package helper here, but its
// observable effect is exactly "a GITEA_TOKEN appears in
// cfg.EnvVars". Constructing that condition directly proves the
// guard holds even if the latent path becomes reachable.
cfg := WorkspaceConfig{
WorkspaceID: "ws-tenant",
PlatformURL: "http://localhost:8080",
Tier: 2,
EnvVars: map[string]string{
// Persona identity fields that are SAFE to keep (read-only
// identity, not a write credential):
"GITEA_USER": "backend-engineer",
"GITEA_USER_EMAIL": "backend-engineer@agents.moleculesai.app",
// The credential that must be stripped:
"GITEA_TOKEN": "persona-merged-write-pat",
"GITEA_TOKEN_SCOPES": "write:repository",
},
}
got := buildContainerEnv(cfg)
assertNoSCMWriteToken(t, got, scmTokens)
// Non-credential persona identity may still flow through — only the
// write token is the denied surface.
if !envContains(got, "GITEA_USER=backend-engineer") {
t.Errorf("non-credential persona identity (GITEA_USER) should not be stripped")
}
})
}
// TestCPProvisionerEnv_StripsSCMWriteTokens covers the tenant-EC2 path:
// CPProvisioner.Start builds the env map the control plane forwards to the
// EC2 workspace container. The same forensic #145 denylist must hold there.
func TestCPProvisionerEnv_StripsSCMWriteTokens(t *testing.T) {
// isSCMWriteTokenKey is the single source of truth shared by both
// buildContainerEnv (local Docker) and CPProvisioner.Start (tenant EC2).
// Assert it classifies every known SCM-write var as denied and leaves
// ordinary / read-only-identity vars alone.
for _, k := range []string{
"GITEA_TOKEN", "GITHUB_TOKEN", "GH_TOKEN",
"GITLAB_TOKEN", "GL_TOKEN", "BITBUCKET_TOKEN",
} {
if !isSCMWriteTokenKey(k) {
t.Errorf("isSCMWriteTokenKey(%q) = false, want true (SCM-write credential must be denied)", k)
}
}
for _, k := range []string{
"GITEA_USER", "GITEA_USER_EMAIL", "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY",
"CUSTOM", "PLATFORM_URL", "ADMIN_TOKEN", "",
} {
if isSCMWriteTokenKey(k) {
t.Errorf("isSCMWriteTokenKey(%q) = true, want false (must not over-strip non-SCM env)", k)
}
}
}
func assertNoSCMWriteToken(t *testing.T, env []string, scmTokens []string) {
t.Helper()
for _, e := range env {
key := e
if i := strings.IndexByte(e, '='); i >= 0 {
key = e[:i]
}
for _, banned := range scmTokens {
if key == banned {
t.Errorf("SCM-write credential %q leaked into workspace env (forensic #145 invariant violated): %q", banned, e)
}
}
}
}
func envContains(env []string, want string) bool {
for _, e := range env {
if e == want {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// ---------- buildWorkspaceMount — #65 workspace_access ----------
func TestBuildWorkspaceMount_SelectionMatrix(t *testing.T) {
@@ -1,226 +0,0 @@
// Package secrets provides the canonical SSOT for credential-shaped
// regex patterns used by:
//
// - the CI `Secret scan` workflow (.gitea/workflows/secret-scan.yml)
// - the runtime's bundled pre-commit hook
// (molecule-ai-workspace-runtime/molecule_runtime/scripts/pre-commit-checks.sh)
// - the upcoming Phase 2b docker-exec Files API backend, which has
// to refuse to surface files whose path OR content matches a
// credential shape (RFC internal#425, Hongming 2026-05-15)
//
// Before this package, the same regex set lived as duplicate bash
// arrays in two unrelated repos; adding a pattern required editing
// both, and pattern drift was caught only via secret-scan workflow
// failures on PRs that had unrelated changes (#2090-class incident
// vector). Centralising in Go makes the Files API the SSOT, with the
// YAML + bash arrays generated/asserted from this package so drift
// is detected at CI time, not at exfiltration time.
//
// This file is Phase 2a of the internal#425 RFC. Phase 2b will import
// `Patterns` from `template_files_docker_exec.go` to gate
// `listFilesViaDockerExec` / `readFileViaDockerExec` against
// secret-shaped paths AND content. Until 2b lands, the package has
// one consumer: this package's own unit tests, which pin the regex
// strings so a refactor that drops or weakens one is caught here.
package secrets
import (
"fmt"
"regexp"
"sync"
)
// Pattern is one named credential shape — a human label plus the
// compiled regex. The label appears in CI error output ("matched:
// github-pat") so an operator can identify the family without seeing
// the actual matched bytes (echoing the bytes widens the blast radius
// per the secret-scan workflow's recovery prose).
type Pattern struct {
// Name is a short kebab-case identifier (e.g. "github-pat",
// "anthropic-api-key"). Stable across versions — consumers may
// switch on it.
Name string
// Description is a one-line human-readable explanation of what
// the pattern matches. Used in CI error messages and the Files
// API "<denied: secret-shape>" placeholder rationale.
Description string
// regexSource is the regex literal in Go-RE2 syntax. Stored as a
// string so the slice declaration below stays readable; compiled
// once via sync.Once into a *regexp.Regexp.
regexSource string
}
// Patterns is the canonical credential-shape regex set.
//
// Adding a pattern here:
//
// 1. Add a new Pattern{} entry below with a kebab-case Name, a
// one-line Description, and the regex literal. Anchor on a
// low-false-positive prefix.
// 2. Add a positive + negative test case in patterns_test.go.
// 3. Mirror the regex string into:
// a. .gitea/workflows/secret-scan.yml SECRET_PATTERNS array
// b. molecule-ai-workspace-runtime/molecule_runtime/scripts/pre-commit-checks.sh
// (or wait for the codegen target that consumes this slice — TBD
// follow-up; tracked in the Phase 2a PR description.)
//
// The order is: alphabetical within each provider family, families
// grouped by ecosystem (GitHub family, AI-provider family, chat
// family, cloud family). Keep this stable so diffs are reviewable.
var Patterns = []Pattern{
// --- GitHub token family ---
{
Name: "github-pat-classic",
Description: "GitHub personal access token (classic)",
regexSource: `ghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{36,}`,
},
{
Name: "github-app-installation-token",
Description: "GitHub App installation token (#2090 vector)",
regexSource: `ghs_[A-Za-z0-9]{36,}`,
},
{
Name: "github-oauth-user-to-server",
Description: "GitHub OAuth user-to-server token",
regexSource: `gho_[A-Za-z0-9]{36,}`,
},
{
Name: "github-oauth-user",
Description: "GitHub OAuth user token",
regexSource: `ghu_[A-Za-z0-9]{36,}`,
},
{
Name: "github-oauth-refresh",
Description: "GitHub OAuth refresh token",
regexSource: `ghr_[A-Za-z0-9]{36,}`,
},
{
Name: "github-pat-fine-grained",
Description: "GitHub fine-grained personal access token",
regexSource: `github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{82,}`,
},
// --- AI-provider API key family ---
{
Name: "anthropic-api-key",
Description: "Anthropic API key",
regexSource: `sk-ant-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{40,}`,
},
{
Name: "openai-project-key",
Description: "OpenAI project API key",
regexSource: `sk-proj-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{40,}`,
},
{
Name: "openai-service-account-key",
Description: "OpenAI service-account API key",
regexSource: `sk-svcacct-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{40,}`,
},
{
Name: "minimax-api-key",
Description: "MiniMax API key (F1088 vector)",
regexSource: `sk-cp-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{60,}`,
},
// --- Chat-platform token family ---
{
Name: "slack-token",
Description: "Slack token (xoxb/xoxa/xoxp/xoxr/xoxs)",
regexSource: `xox[baprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{20,}`,
},
// --- Cloud-provider credential family ---
{
Name: "aws-access-key-id",
Description: "AWS access key ID",
regexSource: `AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}`,
},
{
Name: "aws-sts-temp-access-key-id",
Description: "AWS STS temporary access key ID",
regexSource: `ASIA[0-9A-Z]{16}`,
},
}
// compiledOnce protects the lazy build of compiledPatterns. We compile
// lazily so package init is cheap; callers pay only on first match
// (typically once per workspace-server boot).
var (
compiledOnce sync.Once
compiledPatterns []*compiledPattern
compileErr error
)
type compiledPattern struct {
Name string
Description string
Re *regexp.Regexp
}
// compileAll compiles every Pattern.regexSource into a *regexp.Regexp.
// Called once via compiledOnce. Any compile failure here is a build
// bug (the unit tests assert each regex compiles) — surfacing via
// returned error so callers don't panic in request handling.
func compileAll() {
out := make([]*compiledPattern, 0, len(Patterns))
for _, p := range Patterns {
re, err := regexp.Compile(p.regexSource)
if err != nil {
compileErr = fmt.Errorf("secrets: pattern %q failed to compile: %w", p.Name, err)
return
}
out = append(out, &compiledPattern{Name: p.Name, Description: p.Description, Re: re})
}
compiledPatterns = out
}
// ScanBytes returns a non-nil Match if any pattern matches anywhere
// inside b. Returns (nil, nil) on no match. Returns (nil, err) only
// if a regex in the package fails to compile — that's a build bug,
// not a runtime data issue.
//
// Match contains the pattern Name + Description so the caller can
// emit a path-or-content-denial rationale WITHOUT round-tripping the
// matched bytes (which would defeat the purpose). The matched bytes
// stay inside this function.
//
// The Files API Phase 2b backend will call ScanBytes on:
//
// - the absolute path string (catches a file literally named
// `ghs_abc.txt`)
// - the file content (catches a credential pasted into a workspace
// file by an agent or user — the Files API refuses to surface it
// and the canvas renders "<denied: secret-shape>")
//
// Ordering: patterns are tried in declaration order. First match
// wins. This means narrower patterns (e.g. `sk-svcacct-…`) should
// appear in `Patterns` before broader ones (`sk-…`) — today there's
// no overlap, so order is descriptive only.
func ScanBytes(b []byte) (*Match, error) {
compiledOnce.Do(compileAll)
if compileErr != nil {
return nil, compileErr
}
for _, cp := range compiledPatterns {
if cp.Re.Match(b) {
return &Match{Name: cp.Name, Description: cp.Description}, nil
}
}
return nil, nil
}
// ScanString is the string-input convenience wrapper around ScanBytes.
// Identical semantics — the body never copies, []byte(s) is a
// zero-copy reinterpret for the regex matcher.
func ScanString(s string) (*Match, error) {
return ScanBytes([]byte(s))
}
// Match describes which pattern caught a value. Deliberately does
// NOT include the matched substring — callers must not echo it.
type Match struct {
// Name is the pattern's kebab-case identifier (e.g. "github-pat-classic").
Name string
// Description is the human-readable line for UI / log surfaces.
Description string
}
@@ -1,189 +0,0 @@
package secrets
import (
"strings"
"testing"
)
// TestEveryPatternCompiles pins that every Pattern.regexSource is a
// valid Go-RE2 expression. Without this, a bad regex would silently
// disable ScanBytes for everything after it (the lazy compile would
// set compileErr and ScanBytes would return that error every call).
func TestEveryPatternCompiles(t *testing.T) {
for _, p := range Patterns {
if p.Name == "" {
t.Errorf("pattern with empty Name: regex=%q", p.regexSource)
}
if p.Description == "" {
t.Errorf("pattern %q has empty Description", p.Name)
}
}
// Force compile + check error.
if _, err := ScanBytes([]byte("placeholder")); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ScanBytes init failed: %v", err)
}
}
// TestNoDuplicateNames — a duplicate pattern Name would make the
// "first match wins" semantics surprising to readers and any caller
// switching on Match.Name (none today but adding the guard is cheap).
func TestNoDuplicateNames(t *testing.T) {
seen := map[string]bool{}
for _, p := range Patterns {
if seen[p.Name] {
t.Errorf("duplicate pattern Name: %q", p.Name)
}
seen[p.Name] = true
}
}
// TestKnownPatternsAllPresent — pins which specific Name values are
// expected. A future refactor that renames or removes one without
// updating consumers (CI workflow, runtime pre-commit hook, Files
// API Phase 2b backend) would silently widen the leak surface.
// Failing here forces the rename to be intentional.
func TestKnownPatternsAllPresent(t *testing.T) {
expected := []string{
"github-pat-classic",
"github-app-installation-token",
"github-oauth-user-to-server",
"github-oauth-user",
"github-oauth-refresh",
"github-pat-fine-grained",
"anthropic-api-key",
"openai-project-key",
"openai-service-account-key",
"minimax-api-key",
"slack-token",
"aws-access-key-id",
"aws-sts-temp-access-key-id",
}
got := map[string]bool{}
for _, p := range Patterns {
got[p.Name] = true
}
for _, want := range expected {
if !got[want] {
t.Errorf("expected pattern %q missing from Patterns slice", want)
}
}
}
// TestPositiveMatches — for each pattern, supply a representative
// shape and assert ScanBytes returns a Match with the right Name.
// These are TEST FIXTURES, not real credentials — each is the
// pattern's prefix + a long-enough trailing run of placeholder chars.
// `EXAMPLE` is sprinkled in to make grep-finds in CI logs obviously
// fake to a human reader (matches saved memory
// feedback_assert_exact_not_substring: tighten by Name not body).
func TestPositiveMatches(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
fixture string
expectedName string
}{
{"ghp_" + "EXAMPLE111122223333444455556666777788889999", "github-pat-classic"},
{"ghs_" + "EXAMPLE111122223333444455556666777788889999", "github-app-installation-token"},
{"gho_" + "EXAMPLE111122223333444455556666777788889999", "github-oauth-user-to-server"},
{"ghu_" + "EXAMPLE111122223333444455556666777788889999", "github-oauth-user"},
{"ghr_" + "EXAMPLE111122223333444455556666777788889999", "github-oauth-refresh"},
{"github_pat_EXAMPLE" + strings.Repeat("1", 80), "github-pat-fine-grained"},
{"sk-ant-EXAMPLE" + strings.Repeat("1", 40), "anthropic-api-key"},
{"sk-proj-EXAMPLE" + strings.Repeat("1", 40), "openai-project-key"},
{"sk-svcacct-EXAMPLE" + strings.Repeat("1", 40), "openai-service-account-key"},
{"sk-cp-EXAMPLE" + strings.Repeat("1", 60), "minimax-api-key"},
{"xoxb-" + strings.Repeat("a", 25), "slack-token"},
{"xoxa-" + strings.Repeat("a", 25), "slack-token"},
// AWS regex requires [0-9A-Z]{16} — uppercase + digits only.
{"AKIA1234567890ABCDEF", "aws-access-key-id"},
{"ASIA1234567890ABCDEF", "aws-sts-temp-access-key-id"},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.expectedName, func(t *testing.T) {
m, err := ScanBytes([]byte(tc.fixture))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ScanBytes(%q) errored: %v", tc.fixture, err)
}
if m == nil {
t.Fatalf("ScanBytes(%q) returned no match — expected %q", tc.fixture, tc.expectedName)
}
if m.Name != tc.expectedName {
t.Errorf("ScanBytes(%q) matched %q; expected %q", tc.fixture, m.Name, tc.expectedName)
}
})
}
}
// TestNegativeShapes — strings that look credential-adjacent but
// shouldn't match (too short, wrong prefix, missing trailing bytes).
// Failing here means a pattern is too loose, which would generate
// false-positive denial in Files API and false-positive workflow
// failures in CI.
func TestNegativeShapes(t *testing.T) {
cases := []string{
// Too-short variants — anchored on the length suffix.
"ghp_tooshort",
"ghs_alsoshort1234",
"github_pat_short",
"sk-ant-short",
"sk-cp-not-enough-bytes-here",
// Looks like one of the prefixes but isn't (different letter).
"gha_EXAMPLE_thirty_six_or_more_chars_here_xxx",
// Slack family — wrong letter after xox.
"xoxz-aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa",
// AWS-shaped but wrong length suffix.
"AKIATOOSHORT",
// Empty / whitespace.
"",
" ",
// Plain prose mentioning the prefix as part of a longer word.
"see also `ghp_HOWTO.md` in the repo",
}
for _, c := range cases {
t.Run(c, func(t *testing.T) {
m, err := ScanBytes([]byte(c))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ScanBytes(%q) errored: %v", c, err)
}
if m != nil {
t.Errorf("ScanBytes(%q) unexpectedly matched %q", c, m.Name)
}
})
}
}
// TestScanString_NoOp — sanity-check ScanString is the zero-copy
// wrapper around ScanBytes. Without this, a future refactor that
// makes ScanString do its own thing (e.g. accidentally normalise
// case) would diverge silently.
func TestScanString_NoOp(t *testing.T) {
in := "ghp_" + "EXAMPLE111122223333444455556666777788889999"
m1, err1 := ScanBytes([]byte(in))
if err1 != nil {
t.Fatalf("ScanBytes errored: %v", err1)
}
m2, err2 := ScanString(in)
if err2 != nil {
t.Fatalf("ScanString errored: %v", err2)
}
if m1 == nil || m2 == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected matches; got bytes=%+v string=%+v", m1, m2)
}
if m1.Name != m2.Name {
t.Errorf("ScanString and ScanBytes returned different Names: %q vs %q", m1.Name, m2.Name)
}
}
// TestMatch_NoRoundtrip — assert the Match struct does NOT include
// the matched substring as a field. Adding such a field would
// regress the "matched bytes never leave ScanBytes" invariant that
// makes this package safe to call from log/UI surfaces. This is a
// reflection-light contract test — checks the field names statically.
func TestMatch_NoRoundtrip(t *testing.T) {
var m Match
// If someone adds a `Matched string` (or similar) field, this
// test reads as the canonical place to update + reconsider.
_ = m.Name
_ = m.Description
// The two-field shape is part of the public contract; new fields
// require deliberation about whether they leak the secret value.
}
-13
View File
@@ -62,19 +62,6 @@ RUN chmod +x ./scripts/molecule-git-token-helper.sh
COPY scripts/molecule-gh-token-refresh.sh ./scripts/
RUN chmod +x ./scripts/molecule-gh-token-refresh.sh
# Generic GIT_ASKPASS helper. Reads HTTPS Basic-Auth credentials from env
# vars (GIT_HTTP_USERNAME / GIT_HTTP_PASSWORD, with GITEA_USER / GITEA_TOKEN
# as fallback) and emits them on the git credential-prompt protocol so
# container-side `git` can authenticate to any private HTTPS remote
# without on-disk .gitconfig / .git-credentials mutation. The platform
# provisioner sets GIT_ASKPASS=/usr/local/bin/molecule-askpass via
# applyAgentGitIdentity (workspace-server/internal/handlers/agent_git_identity.go).
# Filename is the only project-specific marker; the script body contains
# no vendor literals and is identical to the script shipped in each
# open-source workspace template (scripts/git-askpass.sh).
COPY scripts/molecule-askpass /usr/local/bin/molecule-askpass
RUN chmod +x /usr/local/bin/molecule-askpass
# Dirs and permissions
RUN mkdir -p /workspace /plugins /home/agent/.claude /home/agent/.config /home/agent/.local \
/home/agent/.molecule-token-cache && \
-12
View File
@@ -35,14 +35,12 @@ from a2a_tools import (
tool_commit_memory,
tool_delegate_task,
tool_delegate_task_async,
tool_get_runtime_identity,
tool_get_workspace_info,
tool_inbox_peek,
tool_inbox_pop,
tool_list_peers,
tool_recall_memory,
tool_send_message_to_user,
tool_update_agent_card,
tool_wait_for_message,
)
from platform_tools.registry import TOOLS as _PLATFORM_TOOL_SPECS
@@ -132,10 +130,6 @@ async def handle_tool_call(name: str, arguments: dict) -> str:
return await tool_get_workspace_info(
source_workspace_id=arguments.get("source_workspace_id") or None,
)
elif name == "get_runtime_identity":
return await tool_get_runtime_identity()
elif name == "update_agent_card":
return await tool_update_agent_card(arguments.get("card"))
elif name == "commit_memory":
return await tool_commit_memory(
arguments.get("content", ""),
@@ -172,12 +166,6 @@ async def handle_tool_call(name: str, arguments: dict) -> str:
arguments.get("message", ""),
workspace_id=arguments.get("workspace_id") or None,
)
elif name == "get_runtime_identity":
return await tool_get_runtime_identity()
elif name == "update_agent_card":
return await tool_update_agent_card(
arguments.get("card"),
)
return f"Unknown tool: {name}"
-12
View File
@@ -167,15 +167,3 @@ from a2a_tools_inbox import ( # noqa: E402 (import after the top-of-module imp
tool_inbox_pop,
tool_wait_for_message,
)
# Identity tool handlers — extracted to a2a_tools_identity. Ports the
# two T4-tier MCP tools (``tool_get_runtime_identity`` +
# ``tool_update_agent_card``) from molecule-ai-workspace-runtime PR#17.
# That repo is mirror-only (reference_runtime_repo_is_mirror_only);
# this is the canonical edit point, and the wheel mirror is
# regenerated by publish-runtime.yml on merge.
from a2a_tools_identity import ( # noqa: E402 (import after the top-of-module imports)
tool_get_runtime_identity,
tool_update_agent_card,
)
-187
View File
@@ -1,187 +0,0 @@
"""Identity tool handlers — single-concern slice of the a2a_tools surface.
Owns the two MCP tools that close the T4-tier workspace owner-permission
gaps reported via the canvas:
* ``tool_get_runtime_identity`` env-only; returns model, model_provider,
molecule_model, anthropic_base_url, tier, workspace_id, runtime
(ADAPTER_MODULE). No HTTP call. Always permitted by RBAC even
read-only agents may know what model they are.
* ``tool_update_agent_card`` POSTs the card to ``/registry/update-card``
with the workspace's own bearer (same auth path as ``tool_commit_memory``
via ``a2a_tools_rbac.auth_headers_for_heartbeat``). The platform
replaces the stored card and broadcasts an ``agent_card_updated``
event so the canvas reflects the new card live. Gated on
``memory.write`` capability via the existing RBAC permission map so
read-only roles can't silently rewrite the platform card.
Both originated as a port of molecule-ai-workspace-runtime PR#17
(``feat(mcp): add update_agent_card + get_runtime_identity tools``).
The mirror-only PR#17 was closed without merge per
``reference_runtime_repo_is_mirror_only``; the canonical edit point is
this monorepo at ``workspace/`` and the wheel mirror is regenerated
automatically by the publish-runtime workflow.
Imports the auth-header primitive from ``a2a_tools_rbac`` (iter 4a)
NOT from ``a2a_tools`` to avoid a circular import with the
kitchen-sink re-export module.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import os
from typing import Any
import httpx
from a2a_client import PLATFORM_URL
from a2a_tools_rbac import (
auth_headers_for_heartbeat as _auth_headers_for_heartbeat,
check_memory_write_permission as _check_memory_write_permission,
)
def _runtime_identity_payload() -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Build the identity dict — env-only, no I/O.
Factored out from ``tool_get_runtime_identity`` so tests can assert
against the exact key set without re-parsing JSON. The MCP tool
handler ``tool_get_runtime_identity`` is the only public caller in
production; tests call this helper directly.
"""
return {
"model": os.environ.get("MODEL", ""),
"model_provider": os.environ.get("MODEL_PROVIDER", ""),
"molecule_model": os.environ.get("MOLECULE_MODEL", ""),
"anthropic_base_url": os.environ.get("ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL", ""),
"tier": os.environ.get("TIER", ""),
"workspace_id": os.environ.get("WORKSPACE_ID", ""),
# Adapter module is the closest thing the runtime has to a
# "template slug" — e.g. "adapter" for claude-code-default,
# "hermes" for hermes-template, etc. Picked from
# $ADAPTER_MODULE env baked by each template's Dockerfile.
"runtime": os.environ.get("ADAPTER_MODULE", ""),
}
async def tool_get_runtime_identity() -> str:
"""Return this runtime's identity — model, provider, tier, IDs.
Env-only; no HTTP call. Useful so the agent can answer "what model
am I?" correctly instead of guessing from a stale system prompt
that the operator may have changed between boots.
Returns the identity as a JSON-encoded string (the dispatch contract
every MCP tool in this module follows). Tests that want to assert
individual fields can call ``_runtime_identity_payload()`` directly,
or ``json.loads`` the return value.
Always permitted by RBAC there is no sensitive information here
that isn't already available to the process via ``os.environ``.
The point of the tool is to surface those env values to the agent
layer in a stable, documented shape rather than expecting every
agent runtime to know to ``echo $MODEL``.
"""
return json.dumps(_runtime_identity_payload(), indent=2)
async def tool_update_agent_card(card: Any) -> str:
"""Update this workspace's agent_card on the platform.
POSTs the provided card to ``/registry/update-card`` with the
workspace's own bearer token (same auth path as ``tool_commit_memory``
and ``tool_get_workspace_info``). The platform validates required
fields server-side, replaces the stored card, and broadcasts an
``agent_card_updated`` event so the canvas updates live.
Args:
card: A JSON-serialisable object (typically a dict) holding the
new card. The platform validates required fields server-side.
Returns:
JSON-encoded string. Body:
- ``{"success": true, "status": "updated"}`` on success;
- ``{"success": false, "error": "<msg>", "status_code": <int>}``
on platform error;
- ``{"success": false, "error": "<reason>"}`` on local validation
(non-dict card, missing WORKSPACE_ID, network error).
Permission gate: this tool requires the ``memory.write`` RBAC
capability same gate as ``tool_commit_memory``. The check runs
inline rather than at the dispatcher layer to keep ``a2a_mcp_server``
permission-agnostic (the gate sits with the implementation, not the
transport). Read-only roles get a clear error string back instead
of a 403 from the platform.
We re-check ``isinstance(card, dict)`` here defensively rather than
trust the MCP schema validator alone the schema only constrains
the transport, not the in-process call surface used by tests and
sibling modules.
"""
payload = await _update_agent_card_impl(card)
return json.dumps(payload, indent=2)
async def _update_agent_card_impl(card: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Dict-returning core of ``tool_update_agent_card``.
Split out so tests can assert against the raw dict shape (status
codes, error messages) without re-parsing JSON on every assertion.
The string-returning ``tool_update_agent_card`` is a thin wrapper
invoked by the MCP dispatcher.
"""
# RBAC: require memory.write permission. Same gate as
# tool_commit_memory (the agent already needs this capability to
# persist anything outbound). Read-only roles can still call
# get_runtime_identity / get_workspace_info to introspect — those
# are env-only / read-only and have no inline gate.
if not _check_memory_write_permission():
return {
"success": False,
"error": (
"RBAC — this workspace does not have the 'memory.write' "
"permission required to update the agent_card."
),
}
if not isinstance(card, dict):
return {
"success": False,
"error": "card must be a JSON object (dict)",
}
ws_id = os.environ.get("WORKSPACE_ID", "")
if not ws_id:
return {
"success": False,
"error": "WORKSPACE_ID env not set; cannot identify caller",
}
try:
async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=10.0) as client:
resp = await client.post(
f"{PLATFORM_URL}/registry/update-card",
json={"workspace_id": ws_id, "agent_card": card},
headers=_auth_headers_for_heartbeat(),
)
if resp.status_code == 200:
body: dict[str, Any] = {}
try:
body = resp.json()
except Exception:
pass
return {
"success": True,
"status": body.get("status", "updated"),
}
# Non-200 — surface what the platform returned.
error_msg = ""
try:
error_msg = resp.json().get("error", "") or resp.text
except Exception:
error_msg = resp.text
return {
"success": False,
"status_code": resp.status_code,
"error": error_msg,
}
except Exception as e:
return {"success": False, "error": f"network error: {e}"}
-10
View File
@@ -340,16 +340,6 @@ _CLI_A2A_COMMAND_KEYWORDS: dict[str, str | None] = {
"delegate_task_async": "delegate --async",
"check_task_status": "status",
"get_workspace_info": "info",
# `get_runtime_identity` + `update_agent_card` are MCP-first
# capabilities — the CLI subprocess interface doesn't expose them
# today. `get_runtime_identity` is env-only and an agent on a
# CLI-only runtime can already `echo $MODEL` etc, so there's no
# functional gap. `update_agent_card` requires a JSON object
# argument that wouldn't survive a positional-arg shell invocation
# cleanly. Mapped to None — flip to a keyword if a2a_cli grows
# `identity` / `card` subcommands in the future.
"get_runtime_identity": None,
"update_agent_card": None,
# `broadcast_message` is not exposed via the CLI subprocess interface
# today — it's an MCP-first capability. If a2a_cli grows a `broadcast`
# subcommand, map it here and the alignment test will gate the change.
-59
View File
@@ -57,14 +57,12 @@ from a2a_tools import (
tool_commit_memory,
tool_delegate_task,
tool_delegate_task_async,
tool_get_runtime_identity,
tool_get_workspace_info,
tool_inbox_peek,
tool_inbox_pop,
tool_list_peers,
tool_recall_memory,
tool_send_message_to_user,
tool_update_agent_card,
tool_wait_for_message,
)
@@ -291,61 +289,6 @@ _GET_WORKSPACE_INFO = ToolSpec(
section=A2A_SECTION,
)
_GET_RUNTIME_IDENTITY = ToolSpec(
name="get_runtime_identity",
short=(
"Return this runtime's identity — model, model_provider, tier, "
"workspace_id, runtime template. Reads from process env; no HTTP call."
),
when_to_use=(
"Use this to answer 'what model am I?' truthfully instead of "
"guessing from a stale system prompt — the operator may have "
"routed you to a different model via persona env between boots. "
"Always permitted by RBAC: even read-only agents may know what "
"model they are. Distinct from get_workspace_info — that one "
"calls the platform for ID/role/tier/parent (workspace metadata); "
"this one returns the live process env (MODEL, MODEL_PROVIDER, "
"MOLECULE_MODEL, ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL, TIER, WORKSPACE_ID, "
"ADAPTER_MODULE)."
),
input_schema={"type": "object", "properties": {}},
impl=tool_get_runtime_identity,
section=A2A_SECTION,
)
_UPDATE_AGENT_CARD = ToolSpec(
name="update_agent_card",
short=(
"Replace this workspace's agent_card on the platform. The "
"platform validates required fields and broadcasts an "
"agent_card_updated event so the canvas reflects the change live."
),
when_to_use=(
"Use when the workspace's capabilities, skills, description, or "
"name change and the canvas display needs to follow. The "
"platform stores the new card and pushes an "
"``agent_card_updated`` event to subscribers. Gated behind the "
"``memory.write`` RBAC capability — read-only roles cannot "
"rewrite the card. Tier-1+ owners always have this capability."
),
input_schema={
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"card": {
"type": "object",
"description": (
"The new agent_card object (name, version, "
"description, skills, etc). Server-side validation "
"rejects payloads missing required fields."
),
},
},
"required": ["card"],
},
impl=tool_update_agent_card,
section=A2A_SECTION,
)
_BROADCAST_MESSAGE = ToolSpec(
name="broadcast_message",
short=(
@@ -699,8 +642,6 @@ TOOLS: list[ToolSpec] = [
_CHECK_TASK_STATUS,
_LIST_PEERS,
_GET_WORKSPACE_INFO,
_GET_RUNTIME_IDENTITY,
_UPDATE_AGENT_CARD,
_BROADCAST_MESSAGE,
_SEND_MESSAGE_TO_USER,
# Inbox (standalone-only; in-container returns informational error)
-35
View File
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/sh
# git-askpass helper. Reads HTTPS Basic-Auth credentials from env vars so
# the deployer can wire git authentication for any private remote without
# touching ~/.gitconfig or ~/.git-credentials inside the container.
#
# Wire-up: set GIT_ASKPASS=/usr/local/bin/molecule-askpass in the
# container env, then export GIT_HTTP_USERNAME / GIT_HTTP_PASSWORD (or the
# GITEA_USER / GITEA_TOKEN fallback pair). When git encounters an HTTPS
# auth challenge on a host that has no credential.helper configured for
# it, git invokes GIT_ASKPASS twice — once with a "Username for ..."
# prompt and once with a "Password for ..." prompt. We pattern-match on
# that prompt and emit the matching env var.
#
# No hardcoded hostnames or vendor names — the deployer decides which
# host these credentials apply to by virtue of setting GIT_ASKPASS only
# when the target remote is in scope. The helper itself is reusable for
# any HTTPS git remote.
#
# Failure mode: if the env vars are unset, we emit an empty string and
# let git surface "Authentication failed" — this is intentional, so a
# misconfigured deployment fails loudly at first push instead of silently
# falling through to an unrelated credential chain.
case "$1" in
Username*)
printf '%s\n' "${GIT_HTTP_USERNAME:-${GITEA_USER:-}}"
;;
Password*)
printf '%s\n' "${GIT_HTTP_PASSWORD:-${GITEA_TOKEN:-}}"
;;
*)
# Unknown prompt — emit empty and let git decide.
printf '\n'
;;
esac
@@ -5,8 +5,6 @@
- **check_task_status**: Poll the status of a task started with delegate_task_async; returns result when done.
- **list_peers**: List the workspaces this agent can communicate with — name, ID, status, role for each.
- **get_workspace_info**: Get this workspace's own info — ID, name, role, tier, parent, status.
- **get_runtime_identity**: Return this runtime's identity — model, model_provider, tier, workspace_id, runtime template. Reads from process env; no HTTP call.
- **update_agent_card**: Replace this workspace's agent_card on the platform. The platform validates required fields and broadcasts an agent_card_updated event so the canvas reflects the change live.
- **broadcast_message**: Send a message to ALL agent workspaces in the org simultaneously. Requires broadcast_enabled=true on this workspace (set by user/admin).
- **send_message_to_user**: Send a message directly to the user's canvas chat — pushed instantly via WebSocket. Use this to: (1) acknowledge a task immediately ('Got it, I'll start working on this'), (2) send interim progress updates while doing long work, (3) deliver follow-up results after delegation completes, (4) attach files (zip, pdf, csv, image) for the user to download via the `attachments` field (NEVER paste file URLs in `message`). The message appears in the user's chat as if you're proactively reaching out.
- **wait_for_message**: Block until the next inbound message (canvas user OR peer agent) arrives, or until ``timeout_secs`` elapses.
@@ -29,12 +27,6 @@ Call this first when you need to delegate but don't know the target's ID. Access
### get_workspace_info
Use to introspect your own identity (e.g. before reporting back to the user, or to determine whether you're a tier-0 root that can write GLOBAL memory).
### get_runtime_identity
Use this to answer 'what model am I?' truthfully instead of guessing from a stale system prompt — the operator may have routed you to a different model via persona env between boots. Always permitted by RBAC: even read-only agents may know what model they are. Distinct from get_workspace_info — that one calls the platform for ID/role/tier/parent (workspace metadata); this one returns the live process env (MODEL, MODEL_PROVIDER, MOLECULE_MODEL, ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL, TIER, WORKSPACE_ID, ADAPTER_MODULE).
### update_agent_card
Use when the workspace's capabilities, skills, description, or name change and the canvas display needs to follow. The platform stores the new card and pushes an ``agent_card_updated`` event to subscribers. Gated behind the ``memory.write`` RBAC capability — read-only roles cannot rewrite the card. Tier-1+ owners always have this capability.
### broadcast_message
Use for urgent, org-wide signals: critical status changes, emergency stop instructions, coordinated task announcements. Every non-removed workspace receives the message in its activity log (poll-mode agents see it on their next poll; push-mode canvases get a real-time banner). This tool returns an error if broadcast_enabled is false — a user or admin must enable it via the workspace abilities settings first.
-390
View File
@@ -1,390 +0,0 @@
"""Tests for ``tool_get_runtime_identity`` and ``tool_update_agent_card``.
These two MCP tools close the T4-tier workspace owner-permission gaps
reported via the canvas:
- the agent could not update its own ``agent_card`` (no MCP tool
wrapped the existing ``POST /registry/update-card`` endpoint);
- the agent could not identify which model it was running (the
``MODEL`` env var is injected by ``provisioner.workspace_provision``
but nothing surfaced it back to the agent).
Ported from molecule-ai-workspace-runtime PR#17 (mirror-only repo;
canonical edit point per ``reference_runtime_repo_is_mirror_only``).
Adapted to core's conventions:
* tool functions return ``str`` (JSON-encoded), matching every other
tool in ``a2a_tools_*`` modules. Tests ``json.loads`` to inspect.
* permission check ``memory.write`` runs inline in
``tool_update_agent_card`` (same pattern as
``a2a_tools_memory.tool_commit_memory``).
* ``WORKSPACE_ID`` is read directly from ``os.environ`` core does
not have the runtime's validated-cache layer (``molecule_runtime.
builtin_tools.validation``).
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import pytest
# --- Drift gate: re-export aliases on a2a_tools ------------------------------
class TestBackCompatAliases:
"""Pin that ``a2a_tools.tool_*`` resolves to the same callable as
``a2a_tools_identity.tool_*``. Refactor wrapping (e.g. a doc-string
wrapper that loses the function identity) silently breaks call
sites that ``patch("a2a_tools.tool_update_agent_card", ...)``
this gate makes that drift fail fast."""
def test_tool_get_runtime_identity_alias(self):
import a2a_tools
import a2a_tools_identity
assert a2a_tools.tool_get_runtime_identity is a2a_tools_identity.tool_get_runtime_identity
def test_tool_update_agent_card_alias(self):
import a2a_tools
import a2a_tools_identity
assert a2a_tools.tool_update_agent_card is a2a_tools_identity.tool_update_agent_card
# --- tool_get_runtime_identity ----------------------------------------------
class TestGetRuntimeIdentity:
"""The tool returns env-derived runtime identity. No HTTP call."""
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_returns_all_known_env_fields(self, monkeypatch):
from a2a_tools_identity import tool_get_runtime_identity
monkeypatch.setenv("MODEL", "claude-opus-4-7")
monkeypatch.setenv("MODEL_PROVIDER", "anthropic")
monkeypatch.setenv("TIER", "T4")
monkeypatch.setenv("WORKSPACE_ID", "ws-abc")
monkeypatch.setenv("ADAPTER_MODULE", "adapter")
monkeypatch.setenv("MOLECULE_MODEL", "claude-opus-4-7")
monkeypatch.setenv("ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL", "https://api.anthropic.com")
out = await tool_get_runtime_identity()
# MCP tools return JSON-encoded strings (matches the contract
# every other tool_* in a2a_tools_* uses).
assert isinstance(out, str)
parsed = json.loads(out)
assert parsed["model"] == "claude-opus-4-7"
assert parsed["model_provider"] == "anthropic"
assert parsed["tier"] == "T4"
assert parsed["workspace_id"] == "ws-abc"
assert parsed["runtime"] == "adapter"
assert parsed["molecule_model"] == "claude-opus-4-7"
assert parsed["anthropic_base_url"] == "https://api.anthropic.com"
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_missing_env_returns_empty_strings(self, monkeypatch):
"""Tool MUST NOT raise when env vars are absent — every key is
present but the value is the empty string. The agent then knows
the slot exists but is unset."""
from a2a_tools_identity import tool_get_runtime_identity
for var in (
"MODEL", "MODEL_PROVIDER", "TIER", "WORKSPACE_ID",
"ADAPTER_MODULE", "MOLECULE_MODEL", "ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL",
):
monkeypatch.delenv(var, raising=False)
parsed = json.loads(await tool_get_runtime_identity())
assert parsed["model"] == ""
assert parsed["model_provider"] == ""
assert parsed["tier"] == ""
assert parsed["workspace_id"] == ""
assert parsed["runtime"] == ""
assert parsed["molecule_model"] == ""
assert parsed["anthropic_base_url"] == ""
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_no_http_call_made(self, monkeypatch):
"""``get_runtime_identity`` is env-only — must not open
httpx.AsyncClient even if the call would otherwise succeed.
Tripwire any client construction."""
import httpx
from a2a_tools_identity import tool_get_runtime_identity
class _Tripwire:
def __init__(self, *_a, **_kw):
raise AssertionError(
"tool_get_runtime_identity must not open httpx.AsyncClient"
)
monkeypatch.setattr(httpx, "AsyncClient", _Tripwire)
# Must not raise.
await tool_get_runtime_identity()
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_helper_dict_matches_string_payload(self, monkeypatch):
"""``_runtime_identity_payload`` is the dict-returning helper
used by both the public tool and tests. Verify the public tool
json.dumps the same dict no field is dropped or renamed by
the encoding step."""
from a2a_tools_identity import (
_runtime_identity_payload,
tool_get_runtime_identity,
)
monkeypatch.setenv("MODEL", "claude-opus-4-7")
monkeypatch.setenv("TIER", "T4")
monkeypatch.setenv("WORKSPACE_ID", "ws-helper-check")
helper = _runtime_identity_payload()
tool_str = await tool_get_runtime_identity()
assert json.loads(tool_str) == helper
# --- tool_update_agent_card -------------------------------------------------
class _MockResponse:
def __init__(self, status_code: int, payload: dict):
self.status_code = status_code
self._payload = payload
self.text = json.dumps(payload)
def json(self):
return self._payload
class _MockClient:
"""Drop-in for httpx.AsyncClient context manager.
Records the URL + json body + headers the tool POSTed so the test
can assert against them. Returns the canned _MockResponse passed
in at construction time.
"""
def __init__(self, *, response: _MockResponse, captured: dict):
self._response = response
self._captured = captured
async def __aenter__(self):
return self
async def __aexit__(self, *_args):
return False
async def post(self, url, *, json=None, headers=None, **_kw): # noqa: A002
self._captured["url"] = url
self._captured["json"] = json
self._captured["headers"] = headers
return self._response
@pytest.fixture
def _grant_memory_write(monkeypatch):
"""Force the inline RBAC gate inside ``tool_update_agent_card`` to
succeed. The gate calls
``a2a_tools_rbac.check_memory_write_permission`` which inspects
``$MOLECULE_ROLES`` / the role table; the patch sidesteps that
machinery so tests can focus on the platform-call shape.
"""
import a2a_tools_identity
monkeypatch.setattr(
a2a_tools_identity, "_check_memory_write_permission", lambda: True
)
class TestUpdateAgentCard:
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_posts_to_registry_update_card(
self, monkeypatch, _grant_memory_write,
):
"""Hits POST {PLATFORM_URL}/registry/update-card with the
workspace bearer and the {workspace_id, agent_card} body shape
the platform handler expects (workspace-server
``internal/handlers/registry.go``)."""
import a2a_tools_identity
monkeypatch.setenv("WORKSPACE_ID", "ws-42")
# Ensure PLATFORM_URL re-import sees a deterministic value —
# a2a_client imports it at module load so we patch the symbol
# on a2a_tools_identity directly (the module's own reference).
monkeypatch.setattr(a2a_tools_identity, "PLATFORM_URL", "http://test.invalid")
captured: dict = {}
response = _MockResponse(200, {"status": "updated"})
def _client_factory(*_a, **_kw):
return _MockClient(response=response, captured=captured)
monkeypatch.setattr(a2a_tools_identity.httpx, "AsyncClient", _client_factory)
monkeypatch.setattr(
a2a_tools_identity, "_auth_headers_for_heartbeat",
lambda: {"Authorization": "Bearer ws-token-xyz"},
)
card = {"name": "agent-foo", "version": "0.1.0", "description": "demo"}
result_str = await a2a_tools_identity.tool_update_agent_card(card)
result = json.loads(result_str)
# URL: PLATFORM_URL + /registry/update-card
assert captured["url"] == "http://test.invalid/registry/update-card"
# The platform handler expects {workspace_id, agent_card}; the
# agent_card is the raw object the agent submitted.
body = captured["json"]
assert body["workspace_id"] == "ws-42"
assert body["agent_card"] == card
# Auth header from auth_headers_for_heartbeat is forwarded
# verbatim — same path commit_memory uses.
assert captured["headers"]["Authorization"] == "Bearer ws-token-xyz"
assert result["success"] is True
assert result["status"] == "updated"
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_propagates_server_error(
self, monkeypatch, _grant_memory_write,
):
"""Non-200 from platform surfaces as a structured error to the
agent. The agent sees {success:false, status_code, error} and
can decide whether to retry, fall back, or escalate."""
import a2a_tools_identity
monkeypatch.setenv("WORKSPACE_ID", "ws-42")
monkeypatch.setattr(a2a_tools_identity, "PLATFORM_URL", "http://test.invalid")
captured: dict = {}
response = _MockResponse(400, {"error": "invalid card"})
monkeypatch.setattr(
a2a_tools_identity.httpx, "AsyncClient",
lambda *a, **kw: _MockClient(response=response, captured=captured),
)
monkeypatch.setattr(
a2a_tools_identity, "_auth_headers_for_heartbeat", lambda: {},
)
result = json.loads(
await a2a_tools_identity.tool_update_agent_card({"name": "x"})
)
assert result["success"] is False
assert result["status_code"] == 400
assert "invalid card" in str(result["error"]).lower()
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_rejects_non_dict_card(self, _grant_memory_write):
"""The MCP schema constrains transport callers to pass a dict;
in-process callers (tests, sibling modules) can still pass any
type. Reject non-dict defensively so the platform isn't asked
to validate JSON-encoded strings or lists."""
from a2a_tools_identity import tool_update_agent_card
result = json.loads(await tool_update_agent_card("not-a-dict"))
assert result["success"] is False
assert "dict" in str(result["error"]).lower()
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_workspace_id_missing_returns_error(
self, monkeypatch, _grant_memory_write,
):
"""If WORKSPACE_ID is not set the tool refuses to issue the
request it would otherwise POST with an empty workspace_id
and let the platform return a confusing 400."""
from a2a_tools_identity import tool_update_agent_card
monkeypatch.delenv("WORKSPACE_ID", raising=False)
result = json.loads(await tool_update_agent_card({"name": "x"}))
assert result["success"] is False
assert "workspace_id" in str(result["error"]).lower()
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_denies_when_memory_write_permission_missing(self, monkeypatch):
"""The agent's RBAC role must grant ``memory.write`` to update
the card. Read-only roles get an RBAC error string back
immediately, never touching the platform."""
import a2a_tools_identity
monkeypatch.setenv("WORKSPACE_ID", "ws-42")
monkeypatch.setattr(
a2a_tools_identity, "_check_memory_write_permission", lambda: False,
)
# Tripwire httpx — must not be called when RBAC denies.
import httpx
class _Tripwire:
def __init__(self, *_a, **_kw):
raise AssertionError("RBAC denial must short-circuit before httpx call")
monkeypatch.setattr(httpx, "AsyncClient", _Tripwire)
result = json.loads(
await a2a_tools_identity.tool_update_agent_card({"name": "x"}),
)
assert result["success"] is False
assert "memory.write" in str(result["error"]).lower()
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_network_exception_returns_structured_error(
self, monkeypatch, _grant_memory_write,
):
"""A network exception (DNS failure, connect timeout, etc) is
wrapped into a structured error dict instead of bubbling up
to the MCP transport layer."""
import a2a_tools_identity
monkeypatch.setenv("WORKSPACE_ID", "ws-42")
monkeypatch.setattr(a2a_tools_identity, "PLATFORM_URL", "http://test.invalid")
class _ExplodingClient:
async def __aenter__(self):
return self
async def __aexit__(self, *_a):
return False
async def post(self, *_a, **_kw):
raise RuntimeError("simulated DNS failure")
monkeypatch.setattr(
a2a_tools_identity.httpx, "AsyncClient",
lambda *a, **kw: _ExplodingClient(),
)
result = json.loads(
await a2a_tools_identity.tool_update_agent_card({"name": "x"})
)
assert result["success"] is False
assert "network" in str(result["error"]).lower()
# --- Registry contract ------------------------------------------------------
class TestRegistryContract:
"""Pin the new tools' registration in platform_tools.registry. The
structural tests in ``test_platform_tools.py`` already check
registryMCP alignment; these are tighter assertions specific to
the two new tools so a future contributor deleting one entry sees
a focused failure."""
def test_get_runtime_identity_in_registry(self):
from platform_tools.registry import by_name
spec = by_name("get_runtime_identity")
assert spec.section == "a2a"
# No input parameters — env-only call.
assert spec.input_schema == {"type": "object", "properties": {}}
# impl points at the actual tool function, not a shim.
from a2a_tools_identity import tool_get_runtime_identity
assert spec.impl is tool_get_runtime_identity
def test_update_agent_card_in_registry(self):
from platform_tools.registry import by_name
spec = by_name("update_agent_card")
assert spec.section == "a2a"
assert "card" in spec.input_schema["properties"]
assert spec.input_schema["required"] == ["card"]
from a2a_tools_identity import tool_update_agent_card
assert spec.impl is tool_update_agent_card