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Author SHA1 Message Date
Molecule AI Dev Engineer A (Kimi) 323c080743 test(handlers): add org_scope coverage — orgRootID + sameOrg at 0% (#1953)
ci-arm64-advisory / fast-checks (pull_request) Waiting to run
Lint shellcheck (arm64 pilot) / shellcheck-arm64 (pilot) (pull_request) Successful in 11s
Block internal-flavored paths / Block forbidden paths (pull_request) Successful in 7s
Check migration collisions / Migration version collision check (pull_request) Successful in 20s
CI / Detect changes (pull_request) Successful in 19s
CI / Python Lint & Test (pull_request) Successful in 16s
E2E API Smoke Test / detect-changes (pull_request) Successful in 13s
E2E Chat / detect-changes (pull_request) Successful in 14s
E2E Peer Visibility (literal MCP list_peers) / E2E Peer Visibility (pull_request) Has been skipped
E2E Staging Canvas (Playwright) / detect-changes (pull_request) Successful in 12s
E2E Staging SaaS (full lifecycle) / pr-validate (pull_request) Successful in 37s
security-review / approved (pull_request) Failing after 11s
E2E Peer Visibility (literal MCP list_peers) / E2E Peer Visibility (local) (pull_request) Successful in 1m12s
Handlers Postgres Integration / detect-changes (pull_request) Successful in 10s
Harness Replays / detect-changes (pull_request) Successful in 5s
Lint curl status-code capture / Scan workflows for curl status-capture pollution (pull_request) Successful in 4s
Lint forbidden tenant-env keys / Scan workspace_secrets writers for forbidden env keys (pull_request) Successful in 4s
lint-continue-on-error-tracking / lint-continue-on-error-tracking (pull_request) Successful in 1m40s
Lint no tenant GITEA or GITHUB token write / Scan for repo-host token write into tenant workspace surface (pull_request) Successful in 4s
lint-mask-pr-atomicity / lint-mask-pr-atomicity (pull_request) Successful in 1m17s
Lint pre-flip continue-on-error / Verify continue-on-error flips have run-log proof (pull_request) Successful in 1m11s
lint-required-context-exists-in-bp / lint-required-context-exists-in-bp (pull_request) Successful in 1m24s
lint-required-workflows-docker-host-pinned / Lint docker-host pin on docker-touching workflows (pull_request) Successful in 4s
E2E Staging SaaS (full lifecycle) / E2E Staging SaaS (pull_request) Successful in 4m28s
E2E Staging External Runtime / E2E Staging External Runtime (pull_request) Successful in 5m21s
review-check-tests / review-check.sh regression tests (pull_request) Successful in 8s
lint-required-no-paths / lint-required-no-paths (pull_request) Successful in 1m13s
Secret scan / Scan diff for credential-shaped strings (pull_request) Successful in 8s
gate-check-v3 / gate-check (pull_request) Successful in 12s
qa-review / approved (pull_request) Failing after 8s
verify-providers-gen / Regenerate providers artifact and fail on drift (pull_request) Successful in 32s
sop-checklist / review-refire (pull_request) Has been skipped
sop-checklist / na-declarations (pull_request) N/A: (none)
sop-tier-check / tier-check (pull_request) Successful in 8s
sop-checklist / all-items-acked (pull_request) Successful in 9s
Lint workflow YAML (Gitea-1.22.6-hostile shapes) / Lint workflow YAML for Gitea-1.22.6-hostile shapes (pull_request) Successful in 1m21s
Ops Scripts Tests / Ops scripts (unittest) (pull_request) Successful in 1m11s
CI / Canvas (Next.js) (pull_request) Successful in 3s
CI / Shellcheck (E2E scripts) (pull_request) Successful in 8s
E2E API Smoke Test / E2E API Smoke Test (pull_request) Successful in 2m42s
E2E Chat / E2E Chat (pull_request) Successful in 5s
E2E Staging Canvas (Playwright) / Canvas tabs E2E (pull_request) Successful in 3s
Harness Replays / Harness Replays (pull_request) Successful in 3s
Handlers Postgres Integration / Handlers Postgres Integration (pull_request) Successful in 2m10s
CI / Platform (Go) (pull_request) Successful in 5m28s
CI / all-required (pull_request) Successful in 36m6s
CI / Canvas Deploy Reminder (pull_request) Has been skipped
audit-force-merge / audit (pull_request_target) Has been skipped
Adds 10 sqlmock-backed tests covering the cross-tenant isolation
helpers introduced in #1953.

Covered:
- orgRootID: happy path (child→root), workspace-is-root, no rows,
  DB error, empty root string
- sameOrg: identical IDs (short-circuit), same org root,
  different org roots, orgRootID fails, orgRootID not found

Closes #1953 follow-up (test debt)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-28 04:59:11 +00:00
Molecule AI Dev Engineer A (Kimi) 952949ee95 test(handlers): add PatchAbilities coverage — workspace_abilities.go at 0%
Adds 11 sqlmock-backed tests covering the PATCH /workspaces/:id/abilities
handler (PatchAbilities):

- Invalid workspace ID → 400
- Invalid JSON body → 400
- Empty body (no fields) → 400
- Workspace not found → 404
- Existence query error → 404 (fail-closed)
- Patch broadcast_enabled only → 200
- Patch talk_to_user_enabled only → 200
- Patch both fields → 200
- DB error on broadcast update → 500
- DB error on talk_to_user update → 500
- DB error on broadcast when both supplied → 500 (partial update not committed)

Closes #1312

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-28 04:59:11 +00:00
Molecule AI Dev Engineer A (Kimi) 049df05ca5 ci(workflows): flip cancel-in-progress false→true on 16 workflows (#1357)
Gitea 1.22.6 does not honor cancel-in-progress: false for scheduled/push
events — queued runs accumulate as stale scheduled tasks instead of
waiting, saturating the runner pool (#1357). Flipping to true lets
obsolete in-flight runs cancel correctly, freeing slots.

Safe-flip set (PM + Eng B reviewed, 16 workflows):
- ci-required-drift, staging-smoke, e2e-staging-sanity
- sweep-cf-orphans, sweep-aws-secrets, sweep-cf-tunnels, sweep-stale-e2e-orgs
- e2e-chat, e2e-legacy-advisory, e2e-peer-visibility, e2e-staging-canvas
- continuous-synth-e2e, railway-pin-audit
- handlers-postgres-integration, harness-replays, e2e-api

Excluded (protected — half-rolled fleet / auto-promote / merge ordering):
- e2e-staging-external, e2e-staging-saas, gitea-merge-queue
- redeploy-tenants-on-staging, redeploy-tenants-on-main
- main-red-watchdog, publish-workspace-server-image, status-reaper
- gate-check-v3

Fixes #1357

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-28 04:59:11 +00:00
Molecule AI Dev Engineer A (Kimi) 0078f702ee ci(workflows): renew continue-on-error tracker mc#774 → mc#1982
mc#774 reached its 14-day renewal cap, causing lint-continue-on-error-tracking
to fail across all workflow PRs and making main red (#1975). Renew the forced-
renewal tracker by creating mc#1982 and updating all 37 job-level mask comments.

Affected: 34 workflow files with continue-on-error: true directives.
Next renewal due: 2026-06-11.

Fixes #1975
Refs: mc#774, mc#1982, feedback_chained_defects_in_never_tested_workflows

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-28 04:59:11 +00:00
174 changed files with 1997 additions and 11907 deletions
+1 -1
View File
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ MOLECULE_ENV=development # Environment label (development/
# MOLECULE_IN_DOCKER= # Set when running the platform inside Docker (accepts 1/0, true/false). Triggers A2A proxy to rewrite 127.0.0.1:<port> agent URLs to Docker bridge hostnames. Auto-detected via /.dockerenv; only set if detection fails or to force off.
# GitHub
# GITHUB_REPO=owner/repo # Target repo for agent initial_prompt clone (e.g. Molecule-AI/molecule-core). Read inside workspace containers.
# GITHUB_REPO=owner/repo # Target repo for agent initial_prompt clone (e.g. Molecule-AI/molecule-monorepo). Read inside workspace containers.
# GITHUB_TOKEN= # Personal access token / installation token used by agents that clone private repos. Register as a global secret via POST /admin/secrets for propagation to workspace env. Token is used in-URL during clone and then scrubbed from .git/config via `git remote set-url`.
# Webhooks
+12 -28
View File
@@ -18,24 +18,15 @@
# per §SOP-6 security model). No-op when merged=false.
#
# Required env (set by the workflow):
# GITEA_TOKEN, GITEA_HOST, REPO, PR_NUMBER
# plus one of REQUIRED_CHECKS_JSON (preferred) or REQUIRED_CHECKS (legacy)
# GITEA_TOKEN, GITEA_HOST, REPO, PR_NUMBER, REQUIRED_CHECKS
#
# REQUIRED_CHECKS_JSON is a JSON object keyed by branch name. Each value
# is an array of status-check context names that branch protection
# requires for that branch. The script looks up the PR's base branch and
# evaluates only the checks declared for that branch.
#
# {"main": ["CI / all-required (pull_request)", ...],
# "staging": ["CI / all-required (pull_request)", ...]}
#
# REQUIRED_CHECKS (legacy) is a newline-separated list used when the
# JSON variable is not set. Declared in the workflow YAML rather than
# fetched from /branch_protections (which needs admin scope — sop-tier-bot
# has read-only). Trade dynamism for simplicity: when the required-check
# set changes, update both branch protection AND this env. Keeping them
# in sync is less complexity than granting the audit bot admin perms on
# every repo.
# REQUIRED_CHECKS is a newline-separated list of status-check context
# names that branch protection requires. Declared in the workflow YAML
# rather than fetched from /branch_protections (which needs admin
# scope — sop-tier-bot has read-only). Trade dynamism for simplicity:
# when the required-check set changes, update both branch protection
# AND this env. Keeping them in sync is less complexity than granting
# the audit bot admin perms on every repo.
set -euo pipefail
@@ -43,10 +34,7 @@ set -euo pipefail
: "${GITEA_HOST:?required}"
: "${REPO:?required}"
: "${PR_NUMBER:?required}"
if [ -z "${REQUIRED_CHECKS_JSON:-}" ] && [ -z "${REQUIRED_CHECKS:-}" ]; then
echo "::error::Either REQUIRED_CHECKS_JSON or REQUIRED_CHECKS must be set"
exit 1
fi
: "${REQUIRED_CHECKS:?required (newline-separated context names)}"
OWNER="${REPO%%/*}"
NAME="${REPO##*/}"
@@ -77,14 +65,10 @@ if [ -z "$MERGE_SHA" ]; then
exit 0
fi
# 2. Required status checks — branch-aware JSON dict takes precedence.
if [ -n "${REQUIRED_CHECKS_JSON:-}" ]; then
REQUIRED=$(echo "$REQUIRED_CHECKS_JSON" | jq -r --arg branch "$BASE_BRANCH" '.[$branch] // [] | .[]')
else
REQUIRED="$REQUIRED_CHECKS"
fi
# 2. Required status checks declared in the workflow env.
REQUIRED="$REQUIRED_CHECKS"
if [ -z "${REQUIRED//[[:space:]]/}" ]; then
echo "::notice::REQUIRED_CHECKS empty for branch '$BASE_BRANCH' — force-merge not applicable."
echo "::notice::REQUIRED_CHECKS empty — force-merge not applicable."
exit 0
fi
-63
View File
@@ -208,61 +208,6 @@ def _raise_for_redeploy_result(status: int, body: dict, slugs: list[str]) -> Non
)
def rollout_stragglers(enumerated: list[str], results: list[dict]) -> list[str]:
"""Return every enumerated tenant NOT proven on the target build.
A straggler is any tenant the rollout was supposed to cover that the
CP could not verify is running the target image tag — whether it
errored, was skipped, or SSM-succeeded onto the wrong image
(internal#724). CP marks each per-tenant result row with
``verified_on_target`` (the REDEPLOY_RUNNING_IMAGE docker-inspect
proof). A tenant enumerated for the rollout but absent from the
result set (no batch ever ran it) is also a straggler — that is the
exact agents-team silent-skip class.
Backward-compat: an OLDER CP that doesn't emit ``verified_on_target``
yet returns rows without the key. Treat a missing key as verified so
this surfacing degrades to the previous (ok-based) behavior against an
un-upgraded CP, rather than failing every deploy spuriously. Once the
CP fix is deployed the key is always present and real stragglers are
caught.
"""
verified: set[str] = set()
for row in results:
if str(row.get("ssm_status") or "") == "DryRun":
continue
slug = str(row.get("slug") or "").strip()
if not slug:
continue
# Missing key (old CP) => assume verified; present key is authoritative.
if "verified_on_target" not in row or row.get("verified_on_target"):
verified.add(slug)
return sorted(s for s in dict.fromkeys(enumerated) if s not in verified)
def assert_full_coverage(enumerated: list[str], aggregate: dict, dry_run: bool) -> None:
"""Fail the rollout if any enumerated tenant is not on the target build.
This is the no-silent-skip gate (internal#724). A dry run proves
nothing landed, so coverage is not asserted for it.
"""
if dry_run:
return
stragglers = rollout_stragglers(enumerated, aggregate.get("results") or [])
if stragglers:
msg = (
f"incomplete rollout: {len(stragglers)} tenant(s) not verified on target "
f"after redeploy-fleet: {', '.join(stragglers)} "
f"(enumerated {len(set(enumerated))})"
)
aggregate["ok"] = False
aggregate["error"] = msg
aggregate["stragglers"] = stragglers
raise RolloutFailed(msg, aggregate)
def execute_scoped_rollout(
plan: dict,
token: str,
@@ -309,14 +254,6 @@ def execute_scoped_rollout(
aggregate["error"] = str(exc)
raise RolloutFailed(str(exc), aggregate) from exc
# No-silent-skip coverage gate (internal#724): every enumerated tenant
# must be PROVEN on the target build. A per-tenant HTTP-200/ok response
# is not proof — a tenant that SSM-succeeded but stayed on the old tag,
# or one enumerated but never batched, is a straggler. Surfacing it as
# a RolloutFailed makes the deploy step exit non-zero instead of
# silently reporting success (the exact agents-team failure mode).
assert_full_coverage(all_slugs, aggregate, dry_run)
return aggregate
+1 -15
View File
@@ -296,15 +296,7 @@ fi
# 403 → token owner is not in this team (Gitea 1.22.6 'Must be a team
# member' constraint — see follow-up issue for token-provisioning)
# 404 → not a member
# Track whether every candidate returned 403 (token owner not in team).
# When this happens the root cause is a token-provisioning issue, not a
# reviewer-eligibility issue — surface it clearly so ops don't waste time
# verifying team roster (Bug C / RFC#324 follow-up).
_ALL_CANDIDATES_403="yes"
_CANDIDATE_COUNT=0
for U in $CANDIDATES; do
_CANDIDATE_COUNT=$((_CANDIDATE_COUNT + 1))
CODE=$(curl -sS -o "$TEAM_PROBE_TMP" -w '%{http_code}' \
-K "$CURL_AUTH_FILE" "${API}/teams/${TEAM_ID}/members/${U}")
debug "probe ${U} in team ${TEAM} (id=${TEAM_ID}) → HTTP ${CODE}"
@@ -325,20 +317,14 @@ for U in $CANDIDATES; do
continue
;;
404)
_ALL_CANDIDATES_403="no"
debug "${U} not a member of ${TEAM}"
;;
*)
_ALL_CANDIDATES_403="no"
echo "::warning::team-probe for ${U} in ${TEAM} returned unexpected HTTP ${CODE}"
cat "$TEAM_PROBE_TMP" >&2
;;
esac
done
if [ "$_ALL_CANDIDATES_403" = "yes" ] && [ "$_CANDIDATE_COUNT" -gt 0 ]; then
echo "::error::${TEAM}-review FAILED — every candidate returned 403 (token owner is not a member of the ${TEAM} team). This is a TOKEN PROVISIONING issue, not a reviewer-eligibility issue. Add the token owner to the '${TEAM}' Gitea team (id=${TEAM_ID}) or use a token whose owner is already in that team."
else
echo "::error::${TEAM}-review awaiting non-author APPROVE from ${TEAM} team (candidates: $(echo "$CANDIDATES" | tr '\n' ',' | sed 's/,$//') — none are in team)"
fi
echo "::error::${TEAM}-review awaiting non-author APPROVE from ${TEAM} team (candidates: $(echo "$CANDIDATES" | tr '\n' ',' | sed 's/,$//') — none are in team)"
exit 1
+4 -10
View File
@@ -13,26 +13,20 @@ set -euo pipefail
OWNER="${REPO%%/*}"
NAME="${REPO##*/}"
API="https://${GITEA_HOST}/api/v1"
# Branch-protection requires the (pull_request_target) context variant.
# The refire path must post the EXACT BP-required name so the gate flips.
CONTEXT="${TEAM}-review / approved (pull_request_target)"
CONTEXT="${TEAM}-review / approved (pull_request)"
TARGET_URL="https://${GITEA_HOST}/${OWNER}/${NAME}/pulls/${PR_NUMBER}"
authfile=$(mktemp)
post_authfile=$(mktemp)
prfile=$(mktemp)
postfile=$(mktemp)
# shellcheck disable=SC2329 # invoked by EXIT trap
cleanup() {
rm -f "$authfile" "$post_authfile" "$prfile" "$postfile"
rm -f "$authfile" "$prfile" "$postfile"
}
trap cleanup EXIT
chmod 600 "$authfile" "$post_authfile"
chmod 600 "$authfile"
printf 'header = "Authorization: token %s"\n' "$GITEA_TOKEN" > "$authfile"
# STATUS_POST_TOKEN is narrow-scoped write:repository for explicit status POST.
# Falls back to GITEA_TOKEN for backward compatibility (e.g. local test).
printf 'header = "Authorization: token %s"\n' "${STATUS_POST_TOKEN:-$GITEA_TOKEN}" > "$post_authfile"
code=$(curl -sS -o "$prfile" -w '%{http_code}' -K "$authfile" \
"${API}/repos/${OWNER}/${NAME}/pulls/${PR_NUMBER}")
@@ -74,7 +68,7 @@ body=$(jq -nc \
'{state:$state, context:$context, description:$description, target_url:$target_url}')
code=$(curl -sS -o "$postfile" -w '%{http_code}' -X POST \
-K "$post_authfile" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-K "$authfile" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "$body" \
"${API}/repos/${OWNER}/${NAME}/statuses/${head_sha}")
if [ "$code" != "200" ] && [ "$code" != "201" ]; then
+7 -91
View File
@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@
# RFC#351 Step 2 of 6 (implementation MVP).
#
# Invoked by .gitea/workflows/sop-checklist.yml on:
# - pull_request_target: [opened, edited, synchronize, reopened, labeled, unlabeled]
# - issue_comment: [created] # edited/deleted omitted (Gitea 1.22.6 job-parsing quirk)
# - pull_request_target: [opened, edited, synchronize, reopened]
# - issue_comment: [created, edited, deleted]
#
# Flow:
# 1. Load .gitea/sop-checklist-config.yaml (from BASE ref — trusted).
@@ -639,7 +639,9 @@ def load_config(path: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
# yaml is an optional dep; the canonical loader is used when available,
# but the SOP runs on runners that may not have PyYAML installed. The
# fallback _load_config_minimal covers the same config shape without
import yaml # type: ignore[import-not-found] # optional dep; fall back silently if absent
# requiring the dep, so the ignore is safe: if yaml loads, we use it;
# otherwise we fall back silently.
import yaml # type: ignore[import-not-found]
with open(path, encoding="utf-8") as f:
return yaml.safe_load(f)
except ImportError:
@@ -895,47 +897,6 @@ def resolve_required_teams(item: dict[str, Any], high_risk: bool) -> list[str]:
return list(item.get("required_teams") or [])
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# CI status validation for testing-class AI acks (internal#760 CTO hardening)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Slugs that require CI / all-required green before an AI ack is valid.
_TESTING_CLASS_SLUGS = {"comprehensive-testing", "local-postgres-e2e", "staging-smoke"}
# Human-only carve-out: these items can NEVER be acked by AI, regardless
# of config drift. Any item in this set MUST NOT have ai_ack_eligible.
# migration / schema are future-proofing — not yet in config items, but
# the code guard rejects them proactively (CTO hardening, msg 1388c76f).
_HUMAN_ONLY_SLUGS = {"root-cause", "no-backwards-compat", "migration", "schema"}
def get_ci_status(client: GiteaClient, owner: str, repo: str, sha: str) -> str:
"""Return the state of CI / all-required (pull_request) for `sha`.
Looks through the commit statuses and returns the state string
("success", "failure", "pending", "error") or "missing" if the
context is not found. This prevents an AI agent from attesting
"tests pass" independently of the actual CI run.
"""
code, data = client._req( # noqa: SLF001
"GET", f"/repos/{owner}/{repo}/statuses/{sha}"
)
if code != 200:
return "unknown"
if not data or not isinstance(data, list):
return "missing"
# Gitea returns statuses newest-first. Find the latest for our context.
for status in data:
if status.get("context") == "CI / all-required (pull_request)":
return status.get("state", "unknown")
return "missing"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Main entry point
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
p = argparse.ArgumentParser()
p.add_argument("--owner", required=True)
@@ -1029,9 +990,6 @@ def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
# one membership lookup per team.
team_member_cache: dict[tuple[str, int], bool | None] = {}
# Pre-resolve the ai-sop-ack team id once (None if the team does not exist).
ai_sop_ack_team_id = client.resolve_team_id(args.owner, "ai-sop-ack")
def probe(slug: str, users: list[str]) -> list[str]:
# `slug` may be either an items-key (compute_ack_state caller) OR
# an n/a-gate key (compute_na_state caller). Previously this hard
@@ -1075,7 +1033,7 @@ def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
for t in data:
if t.get("name") == tn:
tid = t.get("id")
client._team_id_cache[(args.owner, tn)] = tid # noqa: SLF001 # write-through cache; intentional side-effect for reuse across calls
client._team_id_cache[(args.owner, tn)] = tid # noqa: SLF001 # internal write-through cache
break
if tid is not None:
team_ids.append(tid)
@@ -1086,18 +1044,14 @@ def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
file=sys.stderr,
)
approved: list[str] = []
rejected_ai_ineligible: list[str] = []
rejected_ci_not_green: list[str] = []
for u in users:
# 1) Human required_teams membership check
in_human_team = False
for tid in team_ids:
cache_key = (u, tid)
if cache_key not in team_member_cache:
team_member_cache[cache_key] = client.is_team_member(tid, u)
result = team_member_cache[cache_key]
if result is True:
in_human_team = True
approved.append(u)
break
if result is None:
print(
@@ -1107,44 +1061,6 @@ def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
)
# Treat as not-in-team for this user/team pair; loop
# may still find membership in another team.
if in_human_team:
approved.append(u)
continue
# 2) AI-sop-ack team membership check (only for items that allow it).
if slug in items_by_slug:
item = items_by_slug[slug]
# Defensive: human-only carve-out is enforced in code, not just
# config. Even if ai_ack_eligible were mistakenly added to a
# migration/schema item, the AI path is rejected here.
if slug in _HUMAN_ONLY_SLUGS:
rejected_ai_ineligible.append(u)
continue
if item.get("ai_ack_eligible") and ai_sop_ack_team_id is not None:
cache_key = (u, ai_sop_ack_team_id)
if cache_key not in team_member_cache:
team_member_cache[cache_key] = client.is_team_member(
ai_sop_ack_team_id, u
)
result = team_member_cache[cache_key]
if result is True:
# 2a) Testing-class items require real CI artifact evidence.
if slug in _TESTING_CLASS_SLUGS:
ci_state = get_ci_status(
client, args.owner, args.repo, head_sha
)
if ci_state != "success":
print(
f"::warning::AI ack for {slug} rejected: "
f"CI / all-required is {ci_state}, not success",
file=sys.stderr,
)
rejected_ci_not_green.append(u)
continue
approved.append(u)
continue
# If we get here, user is not approved for this slug.
rejected_ai_ineligible.append(u)
return approved
ack_state = compute_ack_state(
@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ Scenarios:
T16_comments_generic_approval — reviews empty; comments have "APPROVED" by team member → exit 0
T17_comments_no_approval — reviews empty; comments have no approval keywords → exit 1
T18_review_wrong_team_comment_right_team — review candidate 404s, comment candidate passes
T19_ai_sop_ack_approved — ai-sop-ack member APPROVED review → team probe 404 → exit 1
Usage:
FIXTURE_STATE_DIR=/tmp/x python3 _review_check_fixture.py 8080
@@ -117,12 +116,6 @@ class Handler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
{"state": "CHANGES_REQUESTED", "dismissed": False, "user": {"login": "bob"}, "commit_id": "abc1234"},
{"state": "APPROVED", "dismissed": False, "user": {"login": "core-devops"}, "commit_id": "abc1234"},
])
if sc == "T19_ai_sop_ack_approved":
# ai-sop-ack member submitted APPROVED review — must NOT count
# toward qa-review (team_id=20) or security-review (team_id=21).
return self._json(200, [
{"state": "APPROVED", "dismissed": False, "user": {"login": "ai-reviewer"}, "commit_id": "abc1234"},
])
# Default: one non-author APPROVED
return self._json(200, [
{"state": "APPROVED", "dismissed": False, "user": {"login": "core-devops"}, "commit_id": "abc1234"},
@@ -164,9 +157,6 @@ class Handler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
return self._empty(403)
if sc == "T18_review_wrong_team_comment_right_team" and login == "core-devops":
return self._empty(404)
if sc == "T19_ai_sop_ack_approved" and login == "ai-reviewer":
# ai-sop-ack member is NOT in qa (20) or security (21).
return self._empty(404)
# T7_team_member: member
return self._empty(204)
@@ -11,100 +11,21 @@ def load_workflow(name: str) -> dict:
return yaml.safe_load(f)
def _all_required(workflow: dict) -> dict:
return workflow["jobs"]["all-required"]
def test_all_required_uses_dedicated_meta_runner_lane():
workflow = load_workflow("ci.yml")
all_required = _all_required(workflow)
all_required = workflow["jobs"]["all-required"]
# Stays on the dedicated `ci-meta` lane (the sentinel does no docker
# work, so it must NOT occupy the general docker-host pool).
assert all_required["runs-on"] == "ci-meta"
assert "needs" not in all_required
def test_all_required_is_needs_aggregator_not_a_polling_gate():
"""fix/ci-scheduler-fanout (2026-06-01): the sentinel was converted
from a status-polling loop (which squatted a ci-meta executor slot for
up to 40 min per PR) into a plain `needs:` aggregator that frees the
slot immediately. Pin the new shape so a regression to the poller is
caught.
"""
def test_all_required_reuses_path_filter_before_polling():
workflow = load_workflow("ci.yml")
all_required = _all_required(workflow)
all_required = workflow["jobs"]["all-required"]
rendered = str(all_required)
# The job MUST aggregate via `needs:` (the slot-freeing design).
assert "needs" in all_required, "all-required must be a needs: aggregator"
# It MUST NOT reintroduce the polling loop / per-SHA status fetch that
# was the throughput sink.
assert "detect-changes.py" not in rendered, (
"all-required must not run the detect-changes poller path"
)
assert "commits/" not in rendered and "statuses" not in rendered, (
"all-required must not poll commit statuses (the slot-squat path)"
)
def test_all_required_does_not_use_if_always():
"""Plain `needs:` works on Gitea 1.22.6 / act_runner v0.6.1; `needs:` +
`if: always()` is BROKEN (feedback_gitea_needs_works_only_ifalways_broken)
and would let a non-success need pass the gate. The sentinel must use
plain `needs:` WITHOUT a job-level `if: always()`.
"""
workflow = load_workflow("ci.yml")
all_required = _all_required(workflow)
job_if = all_required.get("if")
assert not (isinstance(job_if, str) and "always()" in job_if), (
"all-required must not combine needs: with if: always()"
)
def test_all_required_needs_matches_ci_required_drift_f1_set():
"""The sentinel `needs:` list MUST equal ci-required-drift.py's
`ci_job_names()` set: every job MINUS the sentinel itself MINUS jobs
whose `if:` gates on github.event_name/github.ref (event-gated jobs
skip on PRs and a `needs:` on a skipped job would never let the
sentinel run). If they diverge, ci-required-drift F1 fires.
"""
workflow = load_workflow("ci.yml")
jobs = workflow["jobs"]
sentinel = "all-required"
expected = set()
for key, body in jobs.items():
if key == sentinel:
continue
gate = body.get("if") if isinstance(body, dict) else None
if isinstance(gate, str) and (
"github.event_name" in gate or "github.ref" in gate
):
# event-gated → legitimately skips on some triggers; excluded
# from both `needs:` and the F1 set.
continue
expected.add(key)
needs = jobs[sentinel].get("needs", [])
if isinstance(needs, str):
needs = [needs]
actual = set(needs)
assert actual == expected, (
f"all-required needs: {sorted(actual)} != ci_job_names() "
f"{sorted(expected)} — ci-required-drift F1 would fire"
)
def test_all_required_needs_reference_real_jobs():
"""F1b guard: every entry in `needs:` must name an existing job."""
workflow = load_workflow("ci.yml")
jobs = workflow["jobs"]
needs = jobs["all-required"].get("needs", [])
if isinstance(needs, str):
needs = [needs]
job_keys = set(jobs)
for dep in needs:
assert dep in job_keys, f"all-required needs unknown job {dep!r}"
assert "--profile ci" in rendered
assert ".gitea/scripts/detect-changes.py" in rendered
assert "REQUIRE_PLATFORM" in rendered
assert "REQUIRE_CANVAS" in rendered
assert "REQUIRE_SCRIPTS" in rendered
@@ -1,168 +0,0 @@
"""Regression test #765 — gate auto-fire on real qa/security APPROVED review.
Validates the structural configuration of qa-review.yml and security-review.yml
so that a real team-member APPROVED review fires the workflow and POSTs the
exact branch-protection-required context name. This is the test #2020's
stale-context failure would have caught.
"""
from pathlib import Path
import yaml
ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
def load_workflow(name: str) -> dict:
with (ROOT / "workflows" / name).open() as f:
return yaml.safe_load(f)
def _job_guard_string(workflow: dict) -> str:
"""Return the raw job-level `if:` string for the single job."""
jobs = workflow["jobs"]
# Both qa-review and security-review have exactly one job named "approved".
job = jobs["approved"]
return str(job.get("if", ""))
def _post_step(workflow: dict) -> dict:
"""Return the explicit POST /statuses step from the job steps list."""
jobs = workflow["jobs"]
steps = jobs["approved"]["steps"]
for step in steps:
name = step.get("name", "")
if "Post required status context" in name:
return step
raise AssertionError("No explicit POST status step found")
class TestQaReviewDirectTrigger:
def test_trigger_is_pull_request_review_submitted(self):
wf = load_workflow("qa-review.yml")
# PyYAML parses bare 'on' as boolean True.
on = wf[True]
assert "pull_request_review" in on, (
"qa-review must trigger on pull_request_review"
)
types = on["pull_request_review"].get("types", [])
assert "submitted" in types, (
"pull_request_review must include 'submitted' type"
)
def test_job_guard_requires_approved_state(self):
wf = load_workflow("qa-review.yml")
guard = _job_guard_string(wf)
assert "github.event.review.state == 'APPROVED'" in guard, (
"job guard must check review.state for 'APPROVED'"
)
assert "github.event.review.state == 'approved'" in guard, (
"job guard must check review.state for 'approved' (case fallback per #2135)"
)
def test_post_step_uses_status_post_token(self):
wf = load_workflow("qa-review.yml")
post = _post_step(wf)
env = post.get("env", {})
assert env.get("GITEA_TOKEN") == "${{ secrets.STATUS_POST_TOKEN }}", (
"POST step must use STATUS_POST_TOKEN for write-scoped status POST"
)
def test_post_step_context_name_exact(self):
"""The context POSTed must byte-match the branch-protection requirement."""
wf = load_workflow("qa-review.yml")
post = _post_step(wf)
run = post.get("run", "")
assert '"qa-review / approved (pull_request_target)"' in run, (
"POST step must emit exact BP-required context name"
)
class TestSecurityReviewDirectTrigger:
def test_trigger_is_pull_request_review_submitted(self):
wf = load_workflow("security-review.yml")
# PyYAML parses bare 'on' as boolean True.
on = wf[True]
assert "pull_request_review" in on, (
"security-review must trigger on pull_request_review"
)
types = on["pull_request_review"].get("types", [])
assert "submitted" in types, (
"pull_request_review must include 'submitted' type"
)
def test_job_guard_requires_approved_state(self):
wf = load_workflow("security-review.yml")
guard = _job_guard_string(wf)
assert "github.event.review.state == 'APPROVED'" in guard, (
"job guard must check review.state for 'APPROVED'"
)
assert "github.event.review.state == 'approved'" in guard, (
"job guard must check review.state for 'approved' (case fallback per #2135)"
)
def test_post_step_uses_status_post_token(self):
wf = load_workflow("security-review.yml")
post = _post_step(wf)
env = post.get("env", {})
assert env.get("GITEA_TOKEN") == "${{ secrets.STATUS_POST_TOKEN }}", (
"POST step must use STATUS_POST_TOKEN for write-scoped status POST"
)
def test_post_step_context_name_exact(self):
"""The context POSTed must byte-match the branch-protection requirement."""
wf = load_workflow("security-review.yml")
post = _post_step(wf)
run = post.get("run", "")
assert '"security-review / approved (pull_request_target)"' in run, (
"POST step must emit exact BP-required context name"
)
class TestRefireScriptContextName:
"""review-refire-status.sh must emit the BP-required (pull_request_target) context."""
def test_refire_script_context_is_pull_request_target(self):
script = ROOT / "scripts" / "review-refire-status.sh"
content = script.read_text()
assert 'CONTEXT="${TEAM}-review / approved (pull_request_target)"' in content, (
"refire script CONTEXT must be the exact BP-required (pull_request_target) variant"
)
assert 'approved (pull_request)"' not in content, (
"refire script must NOT post bare (pull_request) context"
)
class TestRefireTokenSeparation:
"""The /qa-recheck + /security-recheck backstop must also use STATUS_POST_TOKEN."""
def _refire_step(self, workflow_name: str, step_name_keyword: str) -> dict:
wf = load_workflow(workflow_name)
jobs = wf["jobs"]
steps = jobs["review-refire"]["steps"]
for step in steps:
name = step.get("name", "")
if step_name_keyword in name:
return step
raise AssertionError(f"No refire step matching {step_name_keyword!r}")
def test_qa_refire_uses_status_post_token(self):
step = self._refire_step("sop-checklist.yml", "Refire qa-review")
env = step.get("env", {})
assert env.get("STATUS_POST_TOKEN") == "${{ secrets.STATUS_POST_TOKEN }}", (
"qa refire must receive STATUS_POST_TOKEN env var"
)
# Evaluator stays on read token
assert "SOP_TIER_CHECK_TOKEN" in env.get("GITEA_TOKEN", "") or "GITHUB_TOKEN" in env.get("GITEA_TOKEN", ""), (
"qa refire evaluator must stay on read-scoped token"
)
def test_security_refire_uses_status_post_token(self):
step = self._refire_step("sop-checklist.yml", "Refire security-review")
env = step.get("env", {})
assert env.get("STATUS_POST_TOKEN") == "${{ secrets.STATUS_POST_TOKEN }}", (
"security refire must receive STATUS_POST_TOKEN env var"
)
assert "SOP_TIER_CHECK_TOKEN" in env.get("GITEA_TOKEN", "") or "GITHUB_TOKEN" in env.get("GITEA_TOKEN", ""), (
"security refire evaluator must stay on read-scoped token"
)
@@ -355,134 +355,3 @@ def test_rollout_from_plan_file_writes_partial_response_on_failure(tmp_path):
assert response_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
assert '"ok": false' in response_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
assert '"slug": "hongming"' in response_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
# ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# No-silent-skip coverage gate (internal#724)
# ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_rollout_stragglers_flags_tenant_not_on_target():
# b SSM-succeeded but its container is on the old tag → straggler.
stragglers = prod.rollout_stragglers(
["a", "b", "c"],
[
{"slug": "a", "verified_on_target": True},
{"slug": "b", "verified_on_target": False, "running_image": "platform-tenant:staging-old"},
{"slug": "c", "verified_on_target": True},
],
)
assert stragglers == ["b"]
def test_rollout_stragglers_flags_enumerated_tenant_with_no_result():
# agents-team class: enumerated but no batch ever produced a row for it.
stragglers = prod.rollout_stragglers(
["a", "agents-team"],
[{"slug": "a", "verified_on_target": True}],
)
assert stragglers == ["agents-team"]
def test_rollout_stragglers_missing_key_is_backward_compatible():
# Older CP without verified_on_target → treat as verified (no spurious fail).
stragglers = prod.rollout_stragglers(
["a", "b"],
[{"slug": "a", "healthz_ok": True}, {"slug": "b", "healthz_ok": True}],
)
assert stragglers == []
def test_rollout_stragglers_ignores_dry_run_rows():
stragglers = prod.rollout_stragglers(
["a"], [{"slug": "a", "ssm_status": "DryRun"}]
)
# dry-run row is skipped, so "a" has no verifying row → straggler.
assert stragglers == ["a"]
def test_scoped_rollout_fails_when_a_tenant_stays_on_old_tag():
# Every per-tenant call returns ok=True, but agents-team is NOT
# verified_on_target. The rollout must still fail loudly — this is
# the exact "reported success, one tenant silently skipped" bug.
def fake_redeploy(_cp_url, _token, body):
rows = []
for slug in body["only_slugs"]:
rows.append({"slug": slug, "verified_on_target": slug != "agents-team"})
return 200, {"ok": True, "results": rows}
try:
prod.execute_scoped_rollout(
{
"cp_url": "https://api.moleculesai.app",
"body": {
"target_tag": "staging-new",
"batch_size": 5,
"dry_run": False,
"confirm": True,
},
},
token="secret",
list_slugs=lambda _u, _t, _b: ["reno-stars", "agents-team", "hongming"],
redeploy=fake_redeploy,
sleep=lambda _s: None,
)
except prod.RolloutFailed as exc:
assert "incomplete rollout" in str(exc)
assert exc.response["stragglers"] == ["agents-team"]
assert exc.response["ok"] is False
else:
raise AssertionError("expected an incomplete rollout to fail loudly")
def test_scoped_rollout_passes_when_all_tenants_verified_on_target():
def fake_redeploy(_cp_url, _token, body):
return 200, {
"ok": True,
"results": [{"slug": s, "verified_on_target": True} for s in body["only_slugs"]],
}
aggregate = prod.execute_scoped_rollout(
{
"cp_url": "https://api.moleculesai.app",
"body": {
"target_tag": "staging-new",
"batch_size": 5,
"dry_run": False,
"confirm": True,
},
},
token="secret",
list_slugs=lambda _u, _t, _b: ["reno-stars", "agents-team", "hongming"],
redeploy=fake_redeploy,
sleep=lambda _s: None,
)
assert aggregate["ok"] is True
assert "stragglers" not in aggregate
def test_scoped_rollout_dry_run_does_not_assert_coverage():
# A dry run proves nothing landed; coverage must NOT be asserted or
# every plan would fail.
def fake_redeploy(_cp_url, _token, body):
return 200, {
"ok": True,
"results": [{"slug": s, "ssm_status": "DryRun"} for s in body["only_slugs"]],
}
aggregate = prod.execute_scoped_rollout(
{
"cp_url": "https://api.moleculesai.app",
"body": {
"target_tag": "staging-new",
"batch_size": 5,
"dry_run": True,
"confirm": True,
},
},
token="secret",
list_slugs=lambda _u, _t, _b: ["a", "b"],
redeploy=fake_redeploy,
sleep=lambda _s: None,
)
assert aggregate["ok"] is True
+2 -23
View File
@@ -205,8 +205,6 @@ chmod +x "$FIXTURE_DIR/bin/curl"
# Helper: run the script with fixture environment
run_review_check() {
local scenario="$1"
local team="${2:-qa}"
local team_id="${3:-20}"
echo "$scenario" >"$FIX_STATE_DIR/scenario"
local out
set +e
@@ -217,8 +215,8 @@ run_review_check() {
REPO="molecule-ai/molecule-core" \
PR_NUMBER="999" \
DEFAULT_BRANCH="main" \
TEAM="$team" \
TEAM_ID="$team_id" \
TEAM="qa" \
TEAM_ID="20" \
REVIEW_CHECK_DEBUG="0" \
REVIEW_CHECK_STRICT="0" \
bash "$SCRIPT" 2>&1
@@ -374,25 +372,6 @@ assert_eq "T18 exit code 0 (comment approval still considered)" "0" "$T18_RC"
assert_contains "T18 comment candidate notice" "comment-based approval" "$T18_OUT"
assert_contains "T18 comment approver accepted" "APPROVED by core-qa-agent" "$T18_OUT"
# T19 — ai-sop-ack member APPROVED review must NOT count toward qa-review
# or security-review (R1 hardening refinement, msg 1388c76f).
echo
echo "== T19 ai-sop-ack APPROVED review excluded from qa-review gate =="
T19_OUT=$(run_review_check "T19_ai_sop_ack_approved" "qa" "20")
T19_RC=$(cat "$FIX_STATE_DIR/last_rc")
assert_eq "T19 exit code 1 (ai-sop-ack not in qa team)" "1" "$T19_RC"
assert_contains "T19 ai-reviewer excluded from qa" "candidates: ai-reviewer" "$T19_OUT"
assert_contains "T19 none are in qa team" "none are in team" "$T19_OUT"
# T20 — same ai-sop-ack member must also be excluded from security-review gate.
echo
echo "== T20 ai-sop-ack APPROVED review excluded from security-review gate =="
T20_OUT=$(run_review_check "T19_ai_sop_ack_approved" "security" "21")
T20_RC=$(cat "$FIX_STATE_DIR/last_rc")
assert_eq "T20 exit code 1 (ai-sop-ack not in security team)" "1" "$T20_RC"
assert_contains "T20 ai-reviewer excluded from security" "candidates: ai-reviewer" "$T20_OUT"
assert_contains "T20 none are in security team" "none are in team" "$T20_OUT"
echo
echo "------"
echo "PASS=$PASS FAIL=$FAIL"
-296
View File
@@ -1003,299 +1003,3 @@ class TestComputeNaStateAcceptsGateNotInItems(unittest.TestCase):
comments, "alice", na_gates, lambda *_: ["alice"]
)
self.assertFalse(na_state["security-review"]["declared"])
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# internal#760 ceremony — ai-sop-ack team + ai_ack_eligible per-item flag
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestAIAckEligibleConfig(unittest.TestCase):
"""CTO-controlled allowlist (msg 1388c76f):
ai_ack_eligible: comprehensive-testing, local-postgres-e2e, staging-smoke,
five-axis-review, memory-consulted
human-only: root-cause, no-backwards-compat
"""
def test_ai_ack_eligible_items(self):
cfg = sop.load_config(CONFIG_PATH)
items_by_slug = {it["slug"]: it for it in cfg["items"]}
eligible = {
"comprehensive-testing",
"local-postgres-e2e",
"staging-smoke",
"five-axis-review",
"memory-consulted",
}
for slug in eligible:
self.assertTrue(
items_by_slug[slug].get("ai_ack_eligible"),
f"{slug} must be ai_ack_eligible",
)
def test_human_only_items(self):
cfg = sop.load_config(CONFIG_PATH)
items_by_slug = {it["slug"]: it for it in cfg["items"]}
human_only = {"root-cause", "no-backwards-compat"}
for slug in human_only:
self.assertFalse(
items_by_slug[slug].get("ai_ack_eligible", False),
f"{slug} must NOT be ai_ack_eligible (human-only)",
)
def test_testing_class_slugs_constant(self):
"""_TESTING_CLASS_SLUGS must match the three testing items."""
self.assertEqual(
sop._TESTING_CLASS_SLUGS,
{"comprehensive-testing", "local-postgres-e2e", "staging-smoke"},
)
def test_human_only_slugs_constant(self):
"""_HUMAN_ONLY_SLUGS encodes the migration/schema carve-out.
If this set changes, the CTO must approve the widening.
"""
self.assertEqual(
sop._HUMAN_ONLY_SLUGS,
{"root-cause", "no-backwards-compat", "migration", "schema"},
)
def test_human_only_invariant_enforced_in_code_and_config(self):
"""Every config-present slug in _HUMAN_ONLY_SLUGS must be human-only.
This test fails if a migration/schema-class item accidentally
acquires ai_ack_eligible via config drift. migration/schema are
future-proofing slugs not yet in the live config; they are checked
by the production probe closure but skipped here.
"""
cfg = sop.load_config(CONFIG_PATH)
items_by_slug = {it["slug"]: it for it in cfg["items"]}
for slug in sop._HUMAN_ONLY_SLUGS:
if slug not in items_by_slug:
# Future-proofing slug (e.g. migration, schema) — not yet
# in config, but the code guard still rejects AI acks.
continue
self.assertFalse(
items_by_slug[slug].get("ai_ack_eligible", False),
f"{slug} is in _HUMAN_ONLY_SLUGS and must NEVER be ai_ack_eligible",
)
class TestAIAckEligibilityProbe(unittest.TestCase):
"""The probe closure in main() delegates to compute_ack_state.
We simulate the AI-ack path by injecting a probe that behaves like
the production probe (human team first, then ai-sop-ack fallback).
"""
def setUp(self):
self.items = _items_by_slug()
self.aliases = _numeric_aliases()
def _probe_human_then_ai(self, human_users, ai_users):
"""Return users in human_users immediately; users in ai_users only
if the item is ai_ack_eligible."""
def probe(slug, users):
item = self.items.get(slug, {})
approved = []
for u in users:
if u in human_users:
approved.append(u)
elif u in ai_users and item.get("ai_ack_eligible"):
approved.append(u)
return approved
return probe
def test_ai_ack_passes_for_eligible_item(self):
comments = [_comment("ai-bot", "/sop-ack five-axis-review")]
probe = self._probe_human_then_ai(human_users=set(), ai_users={"ai-bot"})
state = sop.compute_ack_state(
comments, "alice", self.items, self.aliases, probe
)
self.assertEqual(state["five-axis-review"]["ackers"], ["ai-bot"])
def test_ai_ack_rejected_for_human_only_item(self):
comments = [_comment("ai-bot", "/sop-ack root-cause")]
probe = self._probe_human_then_ai(human_users=set(), ai_users={"ai-bot"})
state = sop.compute_ack_state(
comments, "alice", self.items, self.aliases, probe
)
self.assertEqual(state["root-cause"]["ackers"], [])
self.assertIn("ai-bot", state["root-cause"]["rejected"]["not_in_team"])
def test_human_ack_still_works_for_ai_eligible_item(self):
comments = [_comment("bob", "/sop-ack comprehensive-testing")]
probe = self._probe_human_then_ai(human_users={"bob"}, ai_users=set())
state = sop.compute_ack_state(
comments, "alice", self.items, self.aliases, probe
)
self.assertEqual(state["comprehensive-testing"]["ackers"], ["bob"])
def test_ai_ack_rejected_for_testing_item_when_ci_red(self):
# Simulate the production probe that checks CI status for testing items.
# When CI is not green, ai-sop-ack member is rejected.
def probe(slug, users):
item = self.items.get(slug, {})
approved = []
for u in users:
if u == "ai-bot" and item.get("ai_ack_eligible"):
# Testing items require CI green; simulate CI red.
if slug in sop._TESTING_CLASS_SLUGS:
continue # rejected: CI not green
approved.append(u)
return approved
comments = [_comment("ai-bot", "/sop-ack comprehensive-testing")]
state = sop.compute_ack_state(
comments, "alice", self.items, self.aliases, probe
)
self.assertEqual(state["comprehensive-testing"]["ackers"], [])
def test_ai_ack_passes_for_testing_item_when_ci_green(self):
# Simulate CI green → AI ack passes.
def probe(slug, users):
item = self.items.get(slug, {})
approved = []
for u in users:
if u == "ai-bot" and item.get("ai_ack_eligible"):
if slug in sop._TESTING_CLASS_SLUGS:
# CI is green → allow
pass
approved.append(u)
return approved
comments = [_comment("ai-bot", "/sop-ack comprehensive-testing")]
state = sop.compute_ack_state(
comments, "alice", self.items, self.aliases, probe
)
self.assertEqual(state["comprehensive-testing"]["ackers"], ["ai-bot"])
class TestAIAckHumanOnlyMigrationSchema(unittest.TestCase):
"""RC 8322: migration and schema items are human-only regardless of
any future config that might accidentally mark them ai_ack_eligible.
These slugs are not yet in the live config items list; the tests use
synthetic items so the production guard can be exercised directly.
"""
def setUp(self):
# Synthetic items — if live config ever adds migration/schema,
# they MUST stay human-only. The probe below mirrors the actual
# production closure logic (human team first, then AI fallback
# with _HUMAN_ONLY_SLUGS guard).
self.items = {
"migration": {
"slug": "migration",
"ai_ack_eligible": True,
"required_teams": ["engineers"],
},
"schema": {
"slug": "schema",
"ai_ack_eligible": True,
"required_teams": ["engineers"],
},
}
self.aliases = {}
def _production_like_probe(self, human_users, ai_users):
"""Return a probe that mirrors the production closure's guard."""
def probe(slug, users):
item = self.items.get(slug, {})
approved = []
for u in users:
if u in human_users:
approved.append(u)
elif u in ai_users:
# Production guard: _HUMAN_ONLY_SLUGS rejects AI acks
# regardless of the ai_ack_eligible flag.
if slug in sop._HUMAN_ONLY_SLUGS:
continue
if item.get("ai_ack_eligible"):
approved.append(u)
return approved
return probe
def test_ai_ack_rejected_for_migration(self):
comments = [_comment("ai-bot", "/sop-ack migration")]
probe = self._production_like_probe(human_users=set(), ai_users={"ai-bot"})
state = sop.compute_ack_state(
comments, "alice", self.items, self.aliases, probe
)
self.assertEqual(state["migration"]["ackers"], [])
self.assertIn("ai-bot", state["migration"]["rejected"]["not_in_team"])
def test_ai_ack_rejected_for_schema(self):
comments = [_comment("ai-bot", "/sop-ack schema")]
probe = self._production_like_probe(human_users=set(), ai_users={"ai-bot"})
state = sop.compute_ack_state(
comments, "alice", self.items, self.aliases, probe
)
self.assertEqual(state["schema"]["ackers"], [])
self.assertIn("ai-bot", state["schema"]["rejected"]["not_in_team"])
def test_human_ack_still_works_for_migration(self):
# Human team member acking migration/schema is unaffected.
comments = [_comment("bob", "/sop-ack migration")]
probe = self._production_like_probe(human_users={"bob"}, ai_users=set())
state = sop.compute_ack_state(
comments, "alice", self.items, self.aliases, probe
)
self.assertEqual(state["migration"]["ackers"], ["bob"])
def test_human_ack_still_works_for_schema(self):
comments = [_comment("bob", "/sop-ack schema")]
probe = self._production_like_probe(human_users={"bob"}, ai_users=set())
state = sop.compute_ack_state(
comments, "alice", self.items, self.aliases, probe
)
self.assertEqual(state["schema"]["ackers"], ["bob"])
class TestGetCIStatus(unittest.TestCase):
"""Verify get_ci_status reads the correct context from commit statuses."""
def _client_with_statuses(self, statuses):
client = sop.GiteaClient("git.example.com", "tok")
def fake_req(method, path, body=None, ok_codes=(200, 201, 204)):
return 200, statuses
client._req = fake_req # type: ignore[method-assign]
return client
def test_ci_green_returns_success(self):
client = self._client_with_statuses([
{"context": "CI / all-required (pull_request)", "state": "success"},
])
self.assertEqual(
sop.get_ci_status(client, "o", "r", "sha1"), "success"
)
def test_ci_red_returns_failure(self):
client = self._client_with_statuses([
{"context": "CI / all-required (pull_request)", "state": "failure"},
])
self.assertEqual(
sop.get_ci_status(client, "o", "r", "sha1"), "failure"
)
def test_missing_context_returns_missing(self):
client = self._client_with_statuses([
{"context": "some-other-context", "state": "success"},
])
self.assertEqual(
sop.get_ci_status(client, "o", "r", "sha1"), "missing"
)
def test_api_error_returns_unknown(self):
client = sop.GiteaClient("git.example.com", "tok")
def fake_req(method, path, body=None, ok_codes=(200, 201, 204)):
return 500, {"error": "boom"}
client._req = fake_req # type: ignore[method-assign]
self.assertEqual(
sop.get_ci_status(client, "o", "r", "sha1"), "unknown"
)
+1 -29
View File
@@ -32,26 +32,6 @@
# AUTHOR SELF-ACK IS FORBIDDEN regardless of which team contains them
# — the gate script enforces commenter != PR author before checking
# team membership.
#
# AI-SOP-ACK TEAM (internal#760 ceremony design, CTO-approved):
# The `ai-sop-ack` team contains AI agent identities that can ack
# SOP-checklist items ON BEHALF OF automated evidence. An AI ack is
# only valid when:
# 1. the item has `ai_ack_eligible: true`
# 2. the item is NOT in the human-only carve-out (migration/schema)
# 3. for testing-class items, CI / all-required (pull_request) is
# green on the current head SHA
#
# AI acks NEVER count toward qa-review or security-review gates —
# those remain human-team-only (enforced by review-check.sh team
# probe against TEAM_ID 20/21).
#
# INITIAL ai_ack_eligible allowlist (CTO-controlled, msg 1388c76f):
# comprehensive-testing, local-postgres-e2e, staging-smoke,
# five-axis-review, memory-consulted
# HUMAN-ONLY carve-out:
# root-cause, no-backwards-compat
# Any widening requires an explicit config change reviewed by CTO.
version: 1
@@ -103,31 +83,25 @@ items:
numeric_alias: 1
pr_section_marker: "Comprehensive testing performed"
required_teams: [qa, engineers]
ai_ack_eligible: true
description: >-
What was tested, how, edge cases covered. Ack from any qa-team
member (or engineers fallback while qa is small). AI ack valid
only when CI / all-required (pull_request) is green.
member (or engineers fallback while qa is small).
- slug: local-postgres-e2e
numeric_alias: 2
pr_section_marker: "Local-postgres E2E run"
required_teams: [engineers]
ai_ack_eligible: true
description: >-
Link to local CI artifact, or "N/A: pure-frontend change". Ack
from any engineer who can verify the local DB test actually ran.
AI ack valid only when CI / all-required (pull_request) is green.
- slug: staging-smoke
numeric_alias: 3
pr_section_marker: "Staging-smoke verified or pending"
required_teams: [engineers]
ai_ack_eligible: true
description: >-
Link to canary run, or "scheduled post-merge". Ack from any
engineer (core-devops/infra-sre are members of engineers team).
AI ack valid only when CI / all-required (pull_request) is green.
- slug: root-cause
numeric_alias: 4
@@ -146,7 +120,6 @@ items:
numeric_alias: 5
pr_section_marker: "Five-Axis review walked"
required_teams: [engineers]
ai_ack_eligible: true
description: >-
Correctness / readability / architecture / security / performance.
Ack from any non-author engineer.
@@ -167,7 +140,6 @@ items:
numeric_alias: 7
pr_section_marker: "Memory/saved-feedback consulted"
required_teams: [engineers]
ai_ack_eligible: true
description: >-
List of feedback memories applicable to this change. Ack from
any engineer who has the same memory access.
+6 -18
View File
@@ -47,25 +47,13 @@ jobs:
REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
PR_NUMBER: ${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}
# Required-status-check contexts to evaluate at merge time.
# Branch-aware JSON dict: keys are protected branch names,
# values are arrays of context names that branch protection
# requires for that branch. Mirror this against branch
# protection (settings → branches → protected branch →
# required checks) for each branch listed here.
#
# Newline-separated. Mirror this against branch protection
# (settings → branches → protected branch → required checks).
# Declared here rather than fetched from /branch_protections
# because that endpoint requires admin write — sop-tier-bot is
# read-only by design (least-privilege).
REQUIRED_CHECKS_JSON: |
{
"main": [
"CI / all-required (pull_request)",
"E2E API Smoke Test / E2E API Smoke Test (pull_request)",
"Handlers Postgres Integration / Handlers Postgres Integration (pull_request)"
],
"staging": [
"CI / all-required (pull_request)",
"sop-checklist / all-items-acked (pull_request)"
]
}
REQUIRED_CHECKS: |
CI / all-required (pull_request)
E2E API Smoke Test / E2E API Smoke Test (pull_request)
Handlers Postgres Integration / Handlers Postgres Integration (pull_request)
run: bash .gitea/scripts/audit-force-merge.sh
@@ -42,9 +42,11 @@ jobs:
check:
name: Migration version collision check
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
# Phase 4 (RFC #219 §1): 22 days green since 2026-05-11 port.
# mc#1982 mask removed — no surfaced defects in this lane.
continue-on-error: false
# Phase 3 (RFC #219 §1): surface broken workflows without blocking
# the PR. Follow-up PR flips this off after surfaced defects are
# triaged.
# mc#1982: pre-existing continue-on-error mask; root-fix and remove, do not renew silently.
continue-on-error: true
timeout-minutes: 5
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
+1 -1
View File
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ permissions:
# can produce duplicate comments before the title-search dedup wins.
concurrency:
group: ci-required-drift
cancel-in-progress: false
cancel-in-progress: true
jobs:
drift:
+122 -92
View File
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ jobs:
name: Platform (Go)
needs: changes
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
# mc#1982 (closed 2026-05-14): Phase 4 flip of the platform-build job.
# mc#774 (closed 2026-05-14): Phase 4 flip of the platform-build job.
# Phase 4 (#656) originally flipped this to continue-on-error: false based on
# Phase-3-masked "green on main 2026-05-12". Two failure classes then surfaced:
# (1) 4x delegation_test.go sqlmock gaps (PR #669 / #634 fix-forward, closed).
@@ -357,14 +357,6 @@ jobs:
name: Run E2E bash unit tests (no live infra)
run: |
bash tests/e2e/test_model_slug.sh
# molecule-core#1995 (#1994 follow-on): fail-direction proof for
# the A2A real-completion + byok-routing assertion helpers
# (lib/completion_assert.sh). Offline (no LLM, no network): it
# asserts an error-as-text payload FAILS the real-completion gate
# — the exact trap the historical shape-only `"kind":"text"`
# check missed. If a refactor weakens the gate to a shape check,
# this step goes red on every PR.
bash tests/e2e/test_completion_assert_unit.sh
- if: ${{ needs.changes.outputs.scripts == 'true' }}
name: Test ECR promote-tenant-image script (mock-driven, no live infra)
@@ -392,7 +384,7 @@ jobs:
canvas-deploy-reminder:
name: Canvas Deploy Reminder
runs-on: docker-host
# mc#1982 root-fix: added job-level `if:` so ci-required-drift.py's
# mc#774 root-fix: added job-level `if:` so ci-required-drift.py's
# ci_job_names() detects this as github.ref-gated and skips it from F1.
# The step-level exit 0 handles the "not main push" case; the job-level
# `if:` makes the gating explicit so the drift script sees it.
@@ -475,10 +467,10 @@ jobs:
#
# Emits `CI / all-required (<event>)` where <event> is the workflow trigger
# (e.g. `CI / all-required (pull_request)`, `CI / all-required (push)`).
# Branch protection requires the event-suffixed name —
# Branch protection MUST be updated to require the event-suffixed name —
# requiring `CI / all-required` (bare, no suffix) silently blocks all merges
# because Gitea treats absent status contexts as pending (not skipped), and
# no workflow emits the bare name. BP requires
# no workflow emits the bare name. Fixed: BP now requires
# `CI / all-required (pull_request)` per issue #1473.
#
# Closes the failure mode where status_check_contexts on molecule-core/main
@@ -487,91 +479,129 @@ jobs:
# red silently merged through. See internal#286 for the three concrete
# tonight-of-2026-05-11 incidents that prompted the emergency bump.
#
# ── 2026-06-01 CI-scheduler-overload fix (fix/ci-scheduler-fanout) ──
# PREVIOUS shape: a poll-gate that ran detect-changes then LOOPED on
# `GET /commits/{sha}/statuses` every 15s for up to 40 min, occupying a
# `ci-meta` executor slot the entire time it waited for upstream jobs.
# With only 2 ci-meta runners, that poll-loop squatted half the lane on
# every PR — a confirmed throughput sink in the live RCA (two concurrent
# `JOB-all-required` containers observed pinning the lane). The polling
# design existed only to dodge the Gitea `needs:` + `if: always()` bug,
# where an always()-guarded sentinel could be marked skipped before
# upstream jobs settled (leaving BP pending forever).
# This job deliberately has no `needs:`. Gitea 1.22/act_runner can mark a
# job-level `if: always()` + `needs:` sentinel as skipped before upstream
# jobs settle, leaving branch protection with a permanent pending
# `CI / all-required` context. Instead, this independent sentinel polls the
# required commit-status contexts for this SHA and fails if any fail, skip,
# or never emit. It runs the same path detector as `changes` and only waits
# for path-relevant jobs; Gitea can otherwise leave needs/output-skipped
# jobs permanently pending with "Blocked by required conditions". It runs on
# the dedicated `ci-meta` lane so the poller does not occupy the same
# general runner pool as the jobs it is waiting for.
#
# NEW shape: a plain `needs:` aggregator with NO polling loop. This is
# safe here — and was NOT safe at the time the poller was written —
# because every aggregated CI job now gates its real work PER-STEP
# (`if: needs.changes.outputs.* != 'true'`) rather than at the JOB level.
# A per-step-gated job always reaches a terminal SUCCESS (it no-ops its
# expensive steps but the job itself still completes), so it is never
# `skipped`. Plain `needs:` (WITHOUT `if: always()`) works correctly on
# Gitea 1.22.6 / act_runner v0.6.1 — only `needs:` + `if: always()` is
# broken (feedback_gitea_needs_works_only_ifalways_broken). We therefore
# use plain `needs:` + an explicit per-need result check (NOT
# `if: always()`); if any need fails/errors, Gitea never starts this job
# and BP sees `CI / all-required` go red via the failed dependency
# propagation — exactly the gate we want, with zero runner-squat.
# canvas-deploy-reminder is intentionally NOT included in all-required.needs.
# It is an informational main-push reminder, not a PR quality gate. Keeping
# it in this dependency list lets a skipped reminder skip the required
# sentinel before the `always()` guard can emit a branch-protection status.
#
# The `needs:` list MUST stay in lockstep with ci-required-drift.py's
# F1 check (`ci_job_names()` = every job MINUS the sentinel MINUS jobs
# whose `if:` gates on github.event_name/github.ref). canvas-deploy-
# reminder is event-gated (`if: github.ref == refs/heads/{main,staging}`)
# so it is intentionally EXCLUDED — it skips on PRs and a `needs:` on a
# skipped job would never let the sentinel run. If a new always-running
# CI job is added, add it here too or ci-required-drift F1 will flag it.
#
# Stays on the dedicated `ci-meta` lane (no docker work, so the
# docker-host-pin lint does not apply), but now the job is sub-second:
# it only inspects already-settled `needs.*.result` values, so it frees
# the slot immediately instead of holding it for the whole CI duration.
#
needs:
- changes
- platform-build
- canvas-build
- shellcheck
- python-lint
continue-on-error: false
runs-on: ci-meta
timeout-minutes: 5
timeout-minutes: 45
steps:
- name: Verify all aggregated CI jobs succeeded
# NO polling, NO API call, NO checkout. Because this job lists the
# aggregated jobs under `needs:` (without `if: always()`), Gitea only
# starts it once every need has reached SUCCESS — a failed/errored
# need short-circuits the job and propagates red to the
# `CI / all-required` context. This explicit check is a
# belt-and-suspenders assertion + a readable run summary; the real
# gating is the `needs:` edge itself.
- uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
with:
fetch-depth: 0
- id: check
env:
CHANGES_RESULT: ${{ needs.changes.result }}
PLATFORM_RESULT: ${{ needs.platform-build.result }}
CANVAS_RESULT: ${{ needs.canvas-build.result }}
SHELLCHECK_RESULT: ${{ needs.shellcheck.result }}
PYTHON_LINT_RESULT: ${{ needs.python-lint.result }}
PR_BASE_SHA: ${{ github.event.pull_request.base.sha }}
PR_BASE_REF: ${{ github.event.pull_request.base.ref }}
PUSH_BEFORE: ${{ github.event.before }}
run: |
python3 .gitea/scripts/detect-changes.py \
--profile ci \
--event-name "${{ github.event_name }}" \
--pr-base-sha "$PR_BASE_SHA" \
--base-ref "$PR_BASE_REF" \
--push-before "${GITHUB_EVENT_BEFORE:-$PUSH_BEFORE}"
- name: Wait for required CI contexts
env:
GITEA_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
API_ROOT: ${{ github.server_url }}/api/v1
REPOSITORY: ${{ github.repository }}
COMMIT_SHA: ${{ github.sha }}
EVENT_NAME: ${{ github.event_name }}
REQUIRE_PLATFORM: ${{ steps.check.outputs.platform }}
REQUIRE_CANVAS: ${{ steps.check.outputs.canvas }}
REQUIRE_SCRIPTS: ${{ steps.check.outputs.scripts }}
run: |
set -euo pipefail
fail=0
check() {
name="$1"; result="$2"
printf 'CI / %s = %s\n' "$name" "$result"
# `success` is the only green terminal state we accept. A plain
# `needs:` job is only started when all needs succeed, so reaching
# this step already implies success — but assert explicitly so a
# future `if: always()` reintroduction (which WOULD let non-success
# through) fails loudly instead of silently passing the gate.
if [ "$result" != "success" ]; then
echo "::error::aggregated CI job '${name}' did not succeed (result=${result})"
fail=1
fi
}
check "Detect changes" "$CHANGES_RESULT"
check "Platform (Go)" "$PLATFORM_RESULT"
check "Canvas (Next.js)" "$CANVAS_RESULT"
check "Shellcheck (E2E scripts)" "$SHELLCHECK_RESULT"
check "Python Lint & Test" "$PYTHON_LINT_RESULT"
if [ "$fail" -ne 0 ]; then
echo "::error::all-required: one or more aggregated CI jobs did not succeed"
exit 1
fi
echo "OK: all aggregated CI jobs succeeded — CI / all-required green."
python3 - <<'PY'
import json
import os
import sys
import time
import urllib.error
import urllib.request
token = os.environ["GITEA_TOKEN"]
api_root = os.environ["API_ROOT"].rstrip("/")
repo = os.environ["REPOSITORY"]
sha = os.environ["COMMIT_SHA"]
event = os.environ["EVENT_NAME"]
required = [
f"CI / Detect changes ({event})",
f"CI / Python Lint & Test ({event})",
]
if os.environ.get("REQUIRE_PLATFORM") == "true":
required.append(f"CI / Platform (Go) ({event})")
if os.environ.get("REQUIRE_CANVAS") == "true":
required.append(f"CI / Canvas (Next.js) ({event})")
if os.environ.get("REQUIRE_SCRIPTS") == "true":
required.append(f"CI / Shellcheck (E2E scripts) ({event})")
terminal_bad = {"failure", "error"}
deadline = time.time() + 40 * 60
last_summary = None
def fetch_statuses():
statuses = []
for page in range(1, 6):
url = f"{api_root}/repos/{repo}/commits/{sha}/statuses?page={page}&limit=100"
req = urllib.request.Request(url, headers={"Authorization": f"token {token}"})
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=10) as resp:
chunk = json.load(resp)
if not chunk:
break
statuses.extend(chunk)
latest = {}
for item in statuses:
ctx = item.get("context")
if not ctx:
continue
prev = latest.get(ctx)
if prev is None or (item.get("updated_at") or item.get("created_at") or "") >= (prev.get("updated_at") or prev.get("created_at") or ""):
latest[ctx] = item
return latest
while True:
try:
latest = fetch_statuses()
except (TimeoutError, OSError, urllib.error.URLError) as exc:
if time.time() >= deadline:
print(f"FAIL: status polling did not recover before deadline: {exc}", file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(1)
print(f"WARN: status poll failed, retrying: {exc}", flush=True)
time.sleep(15)
continue
states = {ctx: (latest.get(ctx) or {}).get("status") or (latest.get(ctx) or {}).get("state") or "missing" for ctx in required}
summary = ", ".join(f"{ctx}={state}" for ctx, state in states.items())
if summary != last_summary:
print(summary, flush=True)
last_summary = summary
bad = {ctx: state for ctx, state in states.items() if state in terminal_bad}
if bad:
print("FAIL: required CI context failed:", file=sys.stderr)
for ctx, state in bad.items():
desc = (latest.get(ctx) or {}).get("description") or ""
print(f" - {ctx}: {state} {desc}", file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(1)
if all(state == "success" for state in states.values()):
print(f"OK: all {len(required)} required CI contexts succeeded")
sys.exit(0)
if time.time() >= deadline:
print("FAIL: timed out waiting for required CI contexts:", file=sys.stderr)
for ctx, state in states.items():
print(f" - {ctx}: {state}", file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(1)
time.sleep(15)
PY
+1 -9
View File
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ permissions:
# stacking up.
concurrency:
group: continuous-synth-e2e
cancel-in-progress: false
cancel-in-progress: true
env:
GITHUB_SERVER_URL: https://git.moleculesai.app
@@ -166,10 +166,6 @@ jobs:
# canary path. The script picks the right blob shape based on
# which key is non-empty.
E2E_OPENAI_API_KEY: ${{ secrets.MOLECULE_STAGING_OPENAI_API_KEY }}
# google-adk canary path — AI-Studio key (config model
# google_genai:gemini-2.5-pro). PROD disallows API keys (Vertex+ADC);
# the keyed path is CI-only. Dispatch with E2E_RUNTIME=google-adk.
E2E_GOOGLE_API_KEY: ${{ secrets.MOLECULE_STAGING_GOOGLE_API_KEY }}
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
@@ -221,10 +217,6 @@ jobs:
required_secret_name="MOLECULE_STAGING_OPENAI_API_KEY"
required_secret_value="${E2E_OPENAI_API_KEY:-}"
;;
google-adk)
required_secret_name="MOLECULE_STAGING_GOOGLE_API_KEY"
required_secret_value="${E2E_GOOGLE_API_KEY:-}"
;;
*)
echo "::warning::Unknown E2E_RUNTIME='${E2E_RUNTIME}' — skipping LLM-key check"
required_secret_name=""
+1 -1
View File
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ concurrency:
# See e2e-staging-canvas.yml's identical concurrency block for the full
# rationale and the 2026-04-28 incident reference.
group: e2e-api-${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha || github.sha }}
cancel-in-progress: false
cancel-in-progress: true
env:
GITHUB_SERVER_URL: https://git.moleculesai.app
+1 -1
View File
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ on:
concurrency:
group: e2e-chat-${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha || github.sha }}
cancel-in-progress: false
cancel-in-progress: true
env:
GITHUB_SERVER_URL: https://git.moleculesai.app
+1 -1
View File
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ on:
concurrency:
group: e2e-legacy-advisory
cancel-in-progress: false
cancel-in-progress: true
permissions:
contents: read
+1 -1
View File
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ concurrency:
# would let a queued staging/main push behind a PR run get cancelled,
# leaving any gate that reads "completed run at SHA" stuck.
group: e2e-peer-visibility-${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha || github.sha }}
cancel-in-progress: false
cancel-in-progress: true
env:
GITHUB_SERVER_URL: https://git.moleculesai.app
+1 -1
View File
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ concurrency:
# wasted CI is acceptable given the alternative is losing staging-tip
# data that auto-promote-staging needs.
group: e2e-staging-canvas-${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha || github.sha }}
cancel-in-progress: false
cancel-in-progress: true
env:
GITHUB_SERVER_URL: https://git.moleculesai.app
+1 -12
View File
@@ -49,7 +49,6 @@ on:
- 'workspace-server/internal/middleware/**'
- 'workspace-server/internal/provisioner/**'
- 'tests/e2e/test_staging_full_saas.sh'
- 'tests/e2e/lib/completion_assert.sh'
- 'tests/e2e/lib/aws_leak_check.sh'
- 'tests/e2e/test_aws_leak_check.sh'
- '.gitea/workflows/e2e-staging-saas.yml'
@@ -62,7 +61,6 @@ on:
- 'workspace-server/internal/middleware/**'
- 'workspace-server/internal/provisioner/**'
- 'tests/e2e/test_staging_full_saas.sh'
- 'tests/e2e/lib/completion_assert.sh'
- 'tests/e2e/lib/aws_leak_check.sh'
- 'tests/e2e/test_aws_leak_check.sh'
- '.gitea/workflows/e2e-staging-saas.yml'
@@ -157,18 +155,13 @@ jobs:
# E2E_RUNTIME=hermes or =codex via workflow_dispatch can still
# exercise the OpenAI path.
E2E_OPENAI_API_KEY: ${{ secrets.MOLECULE_STAGING_OPENAI_API_KEY }}
# google-adk (operator-dispatched only) auths Gemini with an
# AI-Studio key. Org policy disallows API keys in PROD (Vertex+ADC
# there); CI uses the keyed AI-Studio path with config model
# google_genai:gemini-2.5-pro. Vertex remains the supported prod path.
E2E_GOOGLE_API_KEY: ${{ secrets.MOLECULE_STAGING_GOOGLE_API_KEY }}
E2E_RUNTIME: ${{ github.event.inputs.runtime || 'claude-code' }}
# Pin the model when running on the default claude-code path —
# the per-runtime default ("sonnet") routes to direct Anthropic
# and defeats the cost saving. Operators can override via the
# workflow_dispatch flow (no input wired here yet — runtime
# override is enough for ad-hoc).
E2E_MODEL_SLUG: ${{ github.event.inputs.runtime == 'hermes' && 'openai/gpt-4o' || github.event.inputs.runtime == 'codex' && 'openai/gpt-4o' || github.event.inputs.runtime == 'google-adk' && 'google_genai:gemini-2.5-pro' || 'MiniMax-M2' }}
E2E_MODEL_SLUG: ${{ github.event.inputs.runtime == 'hermes' && 'openai/gpt-4o' || github.event.inputs.runtime == 'codex' && 'openai/gpt-4o' || 'MiniMax-M2' }}
E2E_RUN_ID: "${{ github.run_id }}-${{ github.run_attempt }}"
E2E_KEEP_ORG: ${{ github.event.inputs.keep_org && '1' || '0' }}
@@ -217,10 +210,6 @@ jobs:
required_secret_name="MOLECULE_STAGING_OPENAI_API_KEY"
required_secret_value="${E2E_OPENAI_API_KEY:-}"
;;
google-adk)
required_secret_name="MOLECULE_STAGING_GOOGLE_API_KEY"
required_secret_value="${E2E_GOOGLE_API_KEY:-}"
;;
*)
echo "::warning::Unknown E2E_RUNTIME='${E2E_RUNTIME}' — skipping LLM-key check"
required_secret_name=""
+1 -1
View File
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ env:
concurrency:
group: e2e-staging-sanity
cancel-in-progress: false
cancel-in-progress: true
permissions:
issues: write
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ on:
branches: [main, staging]
concurrency:
group: handlers-pg-integ-${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha || github.sha }}
cancel-in-progress: false
cancel-in-progress: true
env:
GITHUB_SERVER_URL: https://git.moleculesai.app
+1 -1
View File
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ concurrency:
# cancellation deadlock — see e2e-api.yml's concurrency block for
# the 2026-04-28 incident that codified this pattern.
group: harness-replays-${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha || github.sha }}
cancel-in-progress: false
cancel-in-progress: true
env:
GITHUB_SERVER_URL: https://git.moleculesai.app
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
name: lint-bp-context-emit-match
# Tier 2f scheduled lint (per mc#1982) — detects drift between
# Tier 2f scheduled lint (per mc#774) — detects drift between
# `branch_protections/<branch>.status_check_contexts` and the set of
# contexts emitted by `.gitea/workflows/*.yml`.
#
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ name: lint-bp-context-emit-match
#
# Cross-links
# -----------
# - mc#1982 (the RFC that specs this lint)
# - mc#774 (the RFC that specs this lint)
# - internal#349 (cross-repo BP sweep)
# - feedback_phantom_required_check_after_gitea_migration
# - feedback_tier_label_ids_are_per_repo
@@ -91,10 +91,10 @@ jobs:
name: lint-bp-context-emit-match
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 5
# Phase 4 (RFC #219 §1): 22 days green since 2026-05-11 port,
# well past the 7-clean-run threshold. Scheduled failure is now
# a hard CI signal.
continue-on-error: false
# Phase 3 (RFC #219 §1): surface drift without blocking. After 7
# clean scheduled runs on main, flip to false so a scheduled
# failure is a hard CI signal.
continue-on-error: true # mc#1982 Phase 3 — flip to false after 7 clean main runs
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
- uses: actions/setup-python@a26af69be951a213d495a4c3e4e4022e16d87065 # v5.6.0
@@ -45,12 +45,12 @@ name: lint-continue-on-error-tracking
# close-and-flip, or document the deliberate keep-mask in a fresh
# 14-day-renewable tracker. After main is clean for 3 days,
# follow-up PR flips this workflow's continue-on-error to false.
# Tracking: mc#1982.
# Tracking: mc#774.
#
# Cross-links
# -----------
# - mc#1982 (the RFC that specs this lint)
# - mc#1982 (the empirical masked-3-weeks case)
# - mc#774 (the RFC that specs this lint)
# - mc#774 (the empirical masked-3-weeks case)
# - feedback_chained_defects_in_never_tested_workflows
# - feedback_behavior_based_ast_gates
# - feedback_strict_root_only_after_class_a
@@ -48,9 +48,11 @@ jobs:
scan:
name: Scan workflows for curl status-capture pollution
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
# Phase 4 (RFC #219 §1): 22 days green since 2026-05-11 port.
# mc#1982 mask removed — no surfaced defects in this lane.
continue-on-error: false
# Phase 3 (RFC #219 §1): surface broken workflows without blocking
# the PR. Follow-up PR flips this off after surfaced defects are
# triaged.
# mc#1982: pre-existing continue-on-error mask; root-fix and remove, do not renew silently.
continue-on-error: true
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
- name: Find curl ... -w '%{http_code}' ... || echo "000" subshells
@@ -25,21 +25,6 @@ name: Lint forbidden tenant-env keys
# feedback_path_filtered_workflow_cant_be_required). The scan itself
# targets workspace_secrets-writer paths via grep -r; it's fast
# (sub-second) so unconditional run is fine.
#
# ── 2026-06-01 CI-scheduler-fanout consolidation (fix/ci-scheduler-fanout) ──
# The RFC#523 sibling lint formerly in its own file
# `lint-no-tenant-gitea-token.yml` (the broader "no repo-host token into
# any tenant-writer surface" scan) is now a SECOND job in THIS workflow
# (`scan-tenant-token-write`). Both are sub-second Go-source greps that
# fired as two separate workflow runs on every PR — pure scheduler
# fan-out. Folding the sibling in here drops one workflow run + one
# checkout per PR while keeping BOTH scans firing unconditionally on
# every PR (the no-paths discipline above is preserved — neither job is
# paths-filtered). The moved job keeps its exact `name:` so its emitted
# status context is unchanged in substance; its `# bp-exempt:` directive
# moves with it (Tier 2g). The old `Lint no tenant GITEA or GITHUB token
# write / …` context is retired (a disappearing context needs no
# directive; only NEW emitters do).
on:
pull_request:
@@ -181,126 +166,3 @@ jobs:
fi
echo "OK No forbidden operator-scope env key names hardcoded in writer paths."
# bp-exempt: advisory RFC#523 lint; PR review gate is review-driven, not BP-driven.
# (Carried with the workflow-name rename in PR mc#1593 so the renamed
# context emission satisfies lint_required_context_exists_in_bp Tier 2g.)
scan-tenant-token-write:
name: Scan for repo-host token write into tenant workspace surface
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
with:
fetch-depth: 1
- name: Find Go files referencing a tenant-writer surface AND a repo-host token
run: |
set -euo pipefail
# Repo-host token NAMES — the threat-model subset. Operator-fleet
# tokens (CP_ADMIN_API_TOKEN, RAILWAY_TOKEN, INFISICAL_*) are
# caught by lint-forbidden-env-keys.yml's broader deny set; this
# lint focuses on the git-host class so a single co-occurrence
# match has a low false-positive rate.
FORBIDDEN_KEYS=(
"GITEA_TOKEN"
"GITEA_PAT"
"GITHUB_TOKEN"
"GITHUB_PAT"
"GH_TOKEN"
)
# Tenant-writer surface markers. A file matches the surface set
# if it references ANY of these strings. This is the "is this
# code path writing into a tenant workspace?" heuristic.
# Curated to catch the actual code shapes used in this repo
# (verified by grep against current main 2026-05-19):
# - "workspace_secrets" / "global_secrets" → DB table writes
# - "seedAllowList" → CP-side seed table
# - "/settings/secrets" → tenant HTTP API write
# - "envVars[" → in-memory env map write
# - "containerEnv" → docker-run env-set
# - "userData" → EC2 user-data script
# - "provisionPayload" / "provisionContext" → provision-request shape
SURFACE_PATTERN='workspace_secrets|global_secrets|seedAllowList|/settings/secrets|envVars\[|containerEnv|userData|provisionPayload|provisionContext'
# Files that legitimately reference these names AND a surface
# marker, but do so for guard / strip / test / doc-comment
# reasons. New entries require reviewer signoff and a one-line
# justification in the diff.
EXEMPT_FILES=(
# RFC#523 L1 deny-set source-of-truth + tests
"workspace-server/internal/handlers/workspace_provision_forbidden_env.go"
"workspace-server/internal/handlers/workspace_provision_forbidden_env_test.go"
# Forensic-#145 silent-strip denylist (defense-in-depth, by design lists the names)
"workspace-server/internal/provisioner/provisioner.go"
"workspace-server/internal/provisioner/provisioner_test.go"
# Pre-RFC#523 persona-fallback / org-helper paths. The L1
# fail-closed runs BEFORE these writers; downstream silent-strip
# also covers them. See applyAgentGitHTTPCreds doc-comment.
"workspace-server/internal/handlers/agent_git_identity.go"
"workspace-server/internal/handlers/org_helpers.go"
"workspace-server/internal/handlers/org.go"
# CP→platform admin auth (NOT a tenant env write).
"workspace-server/internal/provisioner/cp_provisioner.go"
)
# Build an extended-regex alternation of forbidden keys.
KEY_ALT="$(IFS='|'; echo "${FORBIDDEN_KEYS[*]}")"
# Find candidate files: Go non-test sources that contain a
# tenant-writer surface marker.
mapfile -t CANDIDATES < <(
grep -rlE --include='*.go' --exclude='*_test.go' \
"${SURFACE_PATTERN}" . 2>/dev/null \
| sed 's|^\./||' \
| sort -u
)
if [ "${#CANDIDATES[@]}" -eq 0 ]; then
echo "OK No tenant-writer-surface files found in tree (unexpected, but not a lint failure)."
exit 0
fi
HITS=""
for f in "${CANDIDATES[@]}"; do
# Skip exempt files.
skip=0
for ex in "${EXEMPT_FILES[@]}"; do
if [ "$f" = "$ex" ]; then skip=1; break; fi
done
[ "$skip" = "1" ] && continue
# File contains a surface marker; now grep for a forbidden
# key NAME. We require a QUOTED-literal match to avoid
# firing on a comment like "// also handle GITEA_TOKEN".
#
# The literal form catches:
# - os.Getenv("GITEA_TOKEN")
# - envVars["GITEA_TOKEN"] = ...
# - {envKey: "GITEA_TOKEN", tenantKey: "GITEA_TOKEN"}
# but not:
# - // see GITEA_TOKEN below (no quotes)
found=$(grep -nE "\"(${KEY_ALT})\"" "$f" 2>/dev/null || true)
if [ -n "$found" ]; then
HITS="${HITS}--- ${f} ---\n${found}\n"
fi
done
if [ -n "$HITS" ]; then
echo "::error::Task #146 lint: repo-host token name(s) quoted in a tenant-writer-surface file:"
printf "$HITS"
echo ""
echo "These files reference a tenant-writer surface (workspace_secrets,"
echo "seedAllowList, /settings/secrets, containerEnv, userData, etc.)"
echo "AND quote a repo-host token name (GITEA_TOKEN/GITHUB_TOKEN/…)."
echo "Per RFC#523 threat model, tenant workspaces MUST NOT receive"
echo "operator-scope repo-host tokens. If your code legitimately needs"
echo "to reference one of these names in a tenant-writer file (e.g."
echo "a deny-set definition or silent-strip list), add the file to"
echo "EXEMPT_FILES with a one-line justification — reviewer signoff"
echo "required."
exit 1
fi
echo "OK No tenant-writer-surface file co-mentions a repo-host token literal."
+4 -4
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
name: lint-mask-pr-atomicity
# Tier 2d hard-gate lint (per mc#1982) — blocks PRs that touch
# Tier 2d hard-gate lint (per mc#774) — blocks PRs that touch
# `.gitea/workflows/ci.yml` and modify ONLY ONE of {continue-on-error,
# all-required.sentinel.needs} without a `Paired: #NNN` reference in
# the PR body or in a commit message.
@@ -37,13 +37,13 @@ name: lint-mask-pr-atomicity
# This workflow lands at `continue-on-error: true` (Phase 3 — surface
# regressions without blocking PRs while the rule beds in).
# Follow-up PR flips to `false` once we have ≥3 days of clean runs on
# `main` and no false-positives. Tracking issue: mc#1982.
# `main` and no false-positives. Tracking issue: mc#774.
#
# Cross-links
# -----------
# - mc#1982 (the RFC that specs this lint)
# - mc#774 (the RFC that specs this lint)
# - PR#665 / PR#668 (the empirical split-pair)
# - mc#1982 (the main-red incident the split caused)
# - mc#774 (the main-red incident the split caused)
# - feedback_strict_root_only_after_class_a
# - feedback_behavior_based_ast_gates
#
@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
name: Lint no tenant GITEA or GITHUB token write
# Task #146 — CI guardrail companion to RFC#523's `lint-forbidden-env-keys.yml`.
#
# `lint-forbidden-env-keys.yml` (Layer 3) catches code that hardcodes a
# forbidden env-var key NAME as a quoted literal in workspace_secrets
# writer paths under workspace-server/internal/.
#
# This workflow catches a BROADER class: any code path that reads a
# repo-host token (GITEA_TOKEN / GITHUB_TOKEN / GH_TOKEN) and then writes
# it into a TENANT WORKSPACE's env, secret store, user-data, or
# provision payload. This is the actual RFC#523 threat-model statement —
# the goal is "no tenant workspace ever receives an operator-scope repo
# token," not just "no _quoted_ literal `GITEA_TOKEN`." A future writer
# could route the value via a variable, a struct field, or a config key
# and slip past the existing literal scan; this lint catches those
# routing patterns at PR review time.
#
# Scope
# Scans the WHOLE repo's Go sources (not just workspace-server/) for
# co-occurrences of:
# - a repo-host token NAME (GITEA_TOKEN / GITHUB_TOKEN / GH_TOKEN /
# GITEA_PAT / GITHUB_PAT) used as os.Getenv argument or string
# literal
# - within a file that ALSO references a tenant-writer surface
# (`tenant`, `workspace_secrets`, `global_secrets`, `seedAllowList`,
# `/settings/secrets`, `userData`, `provisionPayload`,
# `envVars[`, `containerEnv`).
#
# Co-occurrence (not single-line) is the false-positive control: a
# file that just LOGS the variable name (e.g. "missing GITEA_TOKEN")
# without touching any tenant surface won't fire.
#
# Drift contract with lint-forbidden-env-keys.yml
# Both lints share the same FORBIDDEN_KEYS list (a subset — only the
# repo-host tokens, since this lint's threat model is "tenant gets
# write access to operator's git host"). If RFC#523's deny set grows,
# update BOTH this file AND lint-forbidden-env-keys.yml AND the Go
# source-of-truth in
# workspace-server/internal/handlers/workspace_provision_forbidden_env.go.
#
# Open-source-template-friendly
# The patterns scanned are generic (no MOLECULE_-prefix literals).
# A fork can copy this workflow as-is and adjust FORBIDDEN_KEYS.
#
# Path-filter discipline
# No `paths:` filter — required-status workflows must run on every PR
# per `feedback_path_filtered_workflow_cant_be_required`. Scan is
# sub-second.
on:
pull_request:
types: [opened, synchronize, reopened]
push:
branches: [main, staging]
env:
GITHUB_SERVER_URL: https://git.moleculesai.app
jobs:
# bp-exempt: advisory RFC#523 lint; PR review gate is review-driven, not BP-driven.
# (Carried with the workflow-name rename in PR mc#1593 so the renamed
# context emission satisfies lint_required_context_exists_in_bp Tier 2g.)
scan:
name: Scan for repo-host token write into tenant workspace surface
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
with:
fetch-depth: 1
- name: Find Go files referencing a tenant-writer surface AND a repo-host token
run: |
set -euo pipefail
# Repo-host token NAMES — the threat-model subset. Operator-fleet
# tokens (CP_ADMIN_API_TOKEN, RAILWAY_TOKEN, INFISICAL_*) are
# caught by lint-forbidden-env-keys.yml's broader deny set; this
# lint focuses on the git-host class so a single co-occurrence
# match has a low false-positive rate.
FORBIDDEN_KEYS=(
"GITEA_TOKEN"
"GITEA_PAT"
"GITHUB_TOKEN"
"GITHUB_PAT"
"GH_TOKEN"
)
# Tenant-writer surface markers. A file matches the surface set
# if it references ANY of these strings. This is the "is this
# code path writing into a tenant workspace?" heuristic.
# Curated to catch the actual code shapes used in this repo
# (verified by grep against current main 2026-05-19):
# - "workspace_secrets" / "global_secrets" → DB table writes
# - "seedAllowList" → CP-side seed table
# - "/settings/secrets" → tenant HTTP API write
# - "envVars[" → in-memory env map write
# - "containerEnv" → docker-run env-set
# - "userData" → EC2 user-data script
# - "provisionPayload" / "provisionContext" → provision-request shape
SURFACE_PATTERN='workspace_secrets|global_secrets|seedAllowList|/settings/secrets|envVars\[|containerEnv|userData|provisionPayload|provisionContext'
# Files that legitimately reference these names AND a surface
# marker, but do so for guard / strip / test / doc-comment
# reasons. New entries require reviewer signoff and a one-line
# justification in the diff.
EXEMPT_FILES=(
# RFC#523 L1 deny-set source-of-truth + tests
"workspace-server/internal/handlers/workspace_provision_forbidden_env.go"
"workspace-server/internal/handlers/workspace_provision_forbidden_env_test.go"
# Forensic-#145 silent-strip denylist (defense-in-depth, by design lists the names)
"workspace-server/internal/provisioner/provisioner.go"
"workspace-server/internal/provisioner/provisioner_test.go"
# Pre-RFC#523 persona-fallback / org-helper paths. The L1
# fail-closed runs BEFORE these writers; downstream silent-strip
# also covers them. See applyAgentGitHTTPCreds doc-comment.
"workspace-server/internal/handlers/agent_git_identity.go"
"workspace-server/internal/handlers/org_helpers.go"
"workspace-server/internal/handlers/org.go"
# CP→platform admin auth (NOT a tenant env write).
"workspace-server/internal/provisioner/cp_provisioner.go"
)
# Build an extended-regex alternation of forbidden keys.
KEY_ALT="$(IFS='|'; echo "${FORBIDDEN_KEYS[*]}")"
# Find candidate files: Go non-test sources that contain a
# tenant-writer surface marker.
mapfile -t CANDIDATES < <(
grep -rlE --include='*.go' --exclude='*_test.go' \
"${SURFACE_PATTERN}" . 2>/dev/null \
| sed 's|^\./||' \
| sort -u
)
if [ "${#CANDIDATES[@]}" -eq 0 ]; then
echo "OK No tenant-writer-surface files found in tree (unexpected, but not a lint failure)."
exit 0
fi
HITS=""
for f in "${CANDIDATES[@]}"; do
# Skip exempt files.
skip=0
for ex in "${EXEMPT_FILES[@]}"; do
if [ "$f" = "$ex" ]; then skip=1; break; fi
done
[ "$skip" = "1" ] && continue
# File contains a surface marker; now grep for a forbidden
# key NAME. We require a QUOTED-literal match to avoid
# firing on a comment like "// also handle GITEA_TOKEN".
#
# The literal form catches:
# - os.Getenv("GITEA_TOKEN")
# - envVars["GITEA_TOKEN"] = ...
# - {envKey: "GITEA_TOKEN", tenantKey: "GITEA_TOKEN"}
# but not:
# - // see GITEA_TOKEN below (no quotes)
found=$(grep -nE "\"(${KEY_ALT})\"" "$f" 2>/dev/null || true)
if [ -n "$found" ]; then
HITS="${HITS}--- ${f} ---\n${found}\n"
fi
done
if [ -n "$HITS" ]; then
echo "::error::Task #146 lint: repo-host token name(s) quoted in a tenant-writer-surface file:"
printf "$HITS"
echo ""
echo "These files reference a tenant-writer surface (workspace_secrets,"
echo "seedAllowList, /settings/secrets, containerEnv, userData, etc.)"
echo "AND quote a repo-host token name (GITEA_TOKEN/GITHUB_TOKEN/…)."
echo "Per RFC#523 threat model, tenant workspaces MUST NOT receive"
echo "operator-scope repo-host tokens. If your code legitimately needs"
echo "to reference one of these names in a tenant-writer file (e.g."
echo "a deny-set definition or silent-strip list), add the file to"
echo "EXEMPT_FILES with a one-line justification — reviewer signoff"
echo "required."
exit 1
fi
echo "OK No tenant-writer-surface file co-mentions a repo-host token literal."
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ name: Lint pre-flip continue-on-error
# job-level status. The precondition the PR claimed to verify was
# structurally fooled by the bug being flipped.
#
# mc#1982 captured the surfaced defects (2 mutually-masked regressions):
# mc#774 captured the surfaced defects (2 mutually-masked regressions):
# - Class 1: sqlmock helper drift since 2f36bb9a (24 days old)
# - Class 2: OFFSEC-001 contract collision since 7d1a189f (1 day old)
#
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ name: Lint pre-flip continue-on-error
# - YAML parse error in one of the workflow files: warn-only,
# don't block — the YAML lint workflows catch this separately.
#
# Cross-links: PR#656, mc#1982, PR#665 (interim re-mask),
# Cross-links: PR#656, mc#774, PR#665 (interim re-mask),
# Quirk #10 (internal#342 + dup #287), hongming-pc2 charter
# §SOP-N rule (e), feedback_strict_root_only_after_class_a,
# feedback_no_shared_persona_token_use.
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
name: lint-required-context-exists-in-bp
# Tier 2g hard-gate lint (per mc#1982) — diff-based PR-time
# Tier 2g hard-gate lint (per mc#774) — diff-based PR-time
# check. When a PR adds a NEW commit-status emission (workflow YAML
# `name:` + job `name:`-or-key + on:-event), the workflow file must
# carry one of three directives adjacent to the new job:
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ name: lint-required-context-exists-in-bp
# PR#656 added `CI / all-required (pull_request)` as a sentinel
# context that workflows emit, but BP did NOT list it. When
# platform-build failed, all-required failed, but BP let the PR
# merge anyway → cascade to mc#1982. With this lint, PR#656 would
# merge anyway → cascade to mc#774. With this lint, PR#656 would
# have been blocked until either the BP PATCH ran alongside OR
# the author added a `bp-required: pending` directive.
#
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ name: lint-required-context-exists-in-bp
# share the workflow-context enumeration helpers
# (`_event_map`, `workflow_contexts`, `_job_display`) but the
# semantics are intentionally distinct so they're separate scripts.
# Co-design is documented in mc#1982.
# Co-design is documented in mc#774.
#
# Directive comment lives in the workflow file (NOT PR body)
# ----------------------------------------------------------
@@ -42,13 +42,13 @@ name: lint-required-context-exists-in-bp
# Lands at `continue-on-error: true` (Phase 3 — surface the
# pattern without blocking PRs while the directive convention
# beds in). After 7 days of clean runs on `main` with no false
# positives, follow-up flips to `false`. Tracking: mc#1982.
# positives, follow-up flips to `false`. Tracking: mc#774.
#
# Cross-links
# -----------
# - mc#1982 (the RFC that specs this lint)
# - mc#774 (the RFC that specs this lint)
# - PR#656 (the empirical case)
# - mc#1982 (the surfaced cascade)
# - mc#774 (the surfaced cascade)
# - feedback_phantom_required_check_after_gitea_migration (Tier 2f cousin)
# - feedback_behavior_based_ast_gates
#
@@ -81,10 +81,10 @@ jobs:
name: lint-required-context-exists-in-bp
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 5
# Phase 4 (RFC #219 §1): 22 days green since 2026-05-11 port,
# well past the 7-clean-day threshold. PR-time failure is now
# a hard CI signal.
continue-on-error: false
# Phase 3 (RFC #219 §1): surface the pattern without blocking PRs
# while the directive convention beds in. Follow-up flip to false
# after 7 clean days on main. mc#1982.
continue-on-error: true # mc#1982 Phase 3 — flip to false after 7 clean main runs
steps:
- name: Check out PR head with full history (need base SHA blobs)
uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
@@ -327,27 +327,13 @@ jobs:
echo ""
echo "### Per-tenant result"
echo ""
echo "| Slug | Phase | SSM Status | Exit | Healthz | On target | Error present |"
echo "|------|-------|------------|------|---------|-----------|---------------|"
jq -r '.results[]? | "| \(.slug) | \(.phase) | \(.ssm_status // "-") | \(.ssm_exit_code) | \(.healthz_ok) | \(.verified_on_target) | \((.error // "") != "") |"' "$HTTP_RESPONSE" || true
# internal#724: stragglers are tenants enumerated but not proven
# on the target build. Surface them loudly — a non-empty list
# means the rollout did NOT fully land.
STRAGGLERS="$(jq -r '(.stragglers // []) | join(", ")' "$HTTP_RESPONSE")"
if [ -n "$STRAGGLERS" ]; then
echo ""
echo "### ⚠ Stragglers (NOT on target tag \`$TARGET_TAG\`)"
echo ""
echo "\`$STRAGGLERS\`"
fi
echo "| Slug | Phase | SSM Status | Exit | Healthz | Error present |"
echo "|------|-------|------------|------|---------|---------------|"
jq -r '.results[]? | "| \(.slug) | \(.phase) | \(.ssm_status // "-") | \(.ssm_exit_code) | \(.healthz_ok) | \((.error // "") != "") |"' "$HTTP_RESPONSE" || true
} >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
OK="$(jq -r '.ok' "$HTTP_RESPONSE")"
if [ "$OK" != "true" ]; then
STRAGGLERS="$(jq -r '(.stragglers // []) | join(", ")' "$HTTP_RESPONSE")"
if [ -n "$STRAGGLERS" ]; then
echo "::error::incomplete rollout — tenants not on target tag $TARGET_TAG: $STRAGGLERS"
fi
echo "::error::redeploy-fleet reported ok=false; production rollout halted."
exit 1
fi
+8 -89
View File
@@ -9,22 +9,10 @@
# Triggers on:
# - `pull_request_target`: opened, synchronize, reopened
# → initial status posts when PR opens / re-pushes
# - `pull_request_review` types: [submitted]
# → re-evaluate when a team member submits an APPROVE review so
# the gate flips immediately (no wait for the next push or
# slash-command). Verified live: sop-tier-check.yml uses this
# same event and provably fires (produces
# `sop-tier-check / tier-check (pull_request_review)` contexts).
# The job-level `if:` guard checks
# `github.event.review.state == 'APPROVED' || 'approved'` so
# only APPROVE reviews run the evaluator; COMMENT and
# REQUEST_CHANGES are skipped at the job level.
# Branch-protection requires the `(pull_request_target)`
# context variant, so the review-event path EXPLICITLY POSTS
# the required context via the API. Trust boundary preserved
# (BASE ref, no PR-head).
# - comment refires are handled by `sop-checklist.yml` review-refire job
# → `/qa-recheck` slash-command re-evaluates this gate.
# - comment refires are handled by `review-refire-comments.yml`
# → a single issue_comment dispatcher prevents every SOP/review
# comment from enqueueing separate qa/security/tier jobs on
# Gitea 1.22.6 before job-level `if:` can skip them.
# Workflow name = `qa-review` ; job name = `approved`.
# The job's own pass/fail conclusion publishes the status context
# `qa-review / approved (<event>)` — NO `POST /statuses` call → NO
@@ -97,26 +85,21 @@ name: qa-review
on:
pull_request_target:
types: [opened, synchronize, reopened]
pull_request_review:
types: [submitted]
permissions:
contents: read
pull-requests: read
statuses: write
secrets: read
jobs:
# bp-exempt: PR review bot signal; required merge state is enforced by CI / all-required.
approved:
# Gate the job:
# - On pull_request_target events: always run.
# - On pull_request_review_approved events: run so the gate flips
# immediately when a team member submits an APPROVE review.
# Comment-triggered refires live in sop-checklist.yml review-refire job.
# Comment-triggered refires live in review-refire-comments.yml. Keeping
# this workflow PR-only avoids comment-triggered queue storms.
if: |
github.event_name == 'pull_request_target' ||
(github.event_name == 'pull_request_review' &&
(github.event.review.state == 'APPROVED' || github.event.review.state == 'approved'))
github.event_name == 'pull_request_target'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Privilege check (A1.1 — INFORMATIONAL log only, NOT a gate)
@@ -160,7 +143,6 @@ jobs:
ref: ${{ github.event.repository.default_branch }}
- name: Evaluate qa-review
id: eval
env:
GITEA_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.SOP_TIER_CHECK_TOKEN || secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
GITEA_HOST: git.moleculesai.app
@@ -175,66 +157,3 @@ jobs:
REVIEW_CHECK_DEBUG: '0'
REVIEW_CHECK_STRICT: '0'
run: bash .gitea/scripts/review-check.sh
- name: Post required status context on pull_request_review
# Gitea Actions auto-publishes (pull_request_review) context
# for this event, but branch-protection requires (pull_request_target).
# We explicitly POST the BP-required context so the gate flips.
# Trust boundary: same BASE-ref script result, no PR-head code.
#
# TOKEN FIX (RC 8326): uses STATUS_POST_TOKEN (CTO-granted,
# msg d52cc72a). Dedicated narrow-scoped write:repository token
# for the explicit status POST. Evaluator step stays on
# SOP_TIER_CHECK_TOKEN (read-only) per deliberate security
# separation: eval computes, POST writes, never the same cred.
if: github.event_name == 'pull_request_review' && always()
env:
GITEA_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.STATUS_POST_TOKEN }}
GITEA_HOST: git.moleculesai.app
REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
PR_NUMBER: ${{ github.event.pull_request.number || github.event.issue.number }}
EVAL_OUTCOME: ${{ steps.eval.outcome }}
run: |
set -euo pipefail
authfile=$(mktemp)
chmod 600 "$authfile"
printf 'header = "Authorization: token %s"\n' "$GITEA_TOKEN" > "$authfile"
prfile=$(mktemp)
code=$(curl -sS -o "$prfile" -w '%{http_code}' -K "$authfile" \
"https://${GITEA_HOST}/api/v1/repos/${REPO}/pulls/${PR_NUMBER}")
if [ "$code" != "200" ]; then
echo "::error::GET /pulls/${PR_NUMBER} returned HTTP ${code}"
rm -f "$prfile" "$authfile"
exit 1
fi
head_sha=$(jq -r '.head.sha // ""' "$prfile")
rm -f "$prfile"
if [ "$EVAL_OUTCOME" = "success" ]; then
status_state="success"
description="Approved via pull_request_review trigger"
else
status_state="failure"
description="Review check failed via pull_request_review trigger"
fi
body=$(jq -nc \
--arg state "$status_state" \
--arg context "qa-review / approved (pull_request_target)" \
--arg description "$description" \
'{state:$state, context:$context, description:$description}')
post_code=$(curl -sS -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' -X POST \
-K "$authfile" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "$body" \
"https://${GITEA_HOST}/api/v1/repos/${REPO}/statuses/${head_sha}")
rm -f "$authfile"
if [ "$post_code" != "200" ] && [ "$post_code" != "201" ]; then
echo "::error::POST /statuses/${head_sha} returned HTTP ${post_code}"
exit 1
fi
echo "::notice::posted ${status_state} for context=\"qa-review / approved (pull_request_target)\" on sha=${head_sha}"
+1 -1
View File
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ env:
concurrency:
group: railway-pin-audit
cancel-in-progress: false
cancel-in-progress: true
permissions:
issues: write
+4 -87
View File
@@ -6,44 +6,25 @@
#
# See `qa-review.yml` header for the full A1-α / A1.1 / A4 / A5 design
# rationale; everything below is identical in shape.
#
# A1-α addendum (internal#760): review-event trigger added so the security
# gate flips immediately when a team member submits an APPROVE review.
# Uses `pull_request_review` types: [submitted] — verified live via
# sop-tier-check.yml which provably fires this event (produces
# `sop-tier-check / tier-check (pull_request_review)` contexts).
# The job-level `if:` guard checks
# `github.event.review.state == 'APPROVED' || 'approved'` so only APPROVE
# reviews run the evaluator; COMMENT and REQUEST_CHANGES are skipped at
# the job level. Branch-protection requires the `(pull_request_target)`
# context variant, so the review-event path EXPLICITLY POSTS the required
# context via the API. Trust boundary preserved (BASE ref, no PR-head).
name: security-review
on:
pull_request_target:
types: [opened, synchronize, reopened]
pull_request_review:
types: [submitted]
permissions:
contents: read
pull-requests: read
statuses: write
secrets: read
jobs:
# bp-exempt: PR security review bot signal; required merge state is enforced by CI / all-required.
approved:
# Gate the job:
# - On pull_request_target events: always run.
# - On pull_request_review_approved events: run so the gate flips
# immediately when a team member submits an APPROVE review.
# Comment-triggered refires live in sop-checklist.yml review-refire job.
# Comment-triggered refires live in review-refire-comments.yml. Keeping
# this workflow PR-only avoids comment-triggered queue storms.
if: |
github.event_name == 'pull_request_target' ||
(github.event_name == 'pull_request_review' &&
(github.event.review.state == 'APPROVED' || github.event.review.state == 'approved'))
github.event_name == 'pull_request_target'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Privilege check (A1.1 — INFORMATIONAL log only, NOT a gate)
@@ -76,7 +57,6 @@ jobs:
ref: ${{ github.event.repository.default_branch }}
- name: Evaluate security-review
id: eval
env:
GITEA_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.SOP_TIER_CHECK_TOKEN || secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
GITEA_HOST: git.moleculesai.app
@@ -88,66 +68,3 @@ jobs:
REVIEW_CHECK_DEBUG: '0'
REVIEW_CHECK_STRICT: '0'
run: bash .gitea/scripts/review-check.sh
- name: Post required status context on pull_request_review
# Gitea Actions auto-publishes (pull_request_review) context
# for this event, but branch-protection requires (pull_request_target).
# We explicitly POST the BP-required context so the gate flips.
# Trust boundary: same BASE-ref script result, no PR-head code.
#
# TOKEN FIX (RC 8326): uses STATUS_POST_TOKEN (CTO-granted,
# msg d52cc72a). Dedicated narrow-scoped write:repository token
# for the explicit status POST. Evaluator step stays on
# SOP_TIER_CHECK_TOKEN (read-only) per deliberate security
# separation: eval computes, POST writes, never the same cred.
if: github.event_name == 'pull_request_review' && always()
env:
GITEA_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.STATUS_POST_TOKEN }}
GITEA_HOST: git.moleculesai.app
REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
PR_NUMBER: ${{ github.event.pull_request.number || github.event.issue.number }}
EVAL_OUTCOME: ${{ steps.eval.outcome }}
run: |
set -euo pipefail
authfile=$(mktemp)
chmod 600 "$authfile"
printf 'header = "Authorization: token %s"\n' "$GITEA_TOKEN" > "$authfile"
prfile=$(mktemp)
code=$(curl -sS -o "$prfile" -w '%{http_code}' -K "$authfile" \
"https://${GITEA_HOST}/api/v1/repos/${REPO}/pulls/${PR_NUMBER}")
if [ "$code" != "200" ]; then
echo "::error::GET /pulls/${PR_NUMBER} returned HTTP ${code}"
rm -f "$prfile" "$authfile"
exit 1
fi
head_sha=$(jq -r '.head.sha // ""' "$prfile")
rm -f "$prfile"
if [ "$EVAL_OUTCOME" = "success" ]; then
status_state="success"
description="Approved via pull_request_review trigger"
else
status_state="failure"
description="Review check failed via pull_request_review trigger"
fi
body=$(jq -nc \
--arg state "$status_state" \
--arg context "security-review / approved (pull_request_target)" \
--arg description "$description" \
'{state:$state, context:$context, description:$description}')
post_code=$(curl -sS -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' -X POST \
-K "$authfile" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "$body" \
"https://${GITEA_HOST}/api/v1/repos/${REPO}/statuses/${head_sha}")
rm -f "$authfile"
if [ "$post_code" != "200" ] && [ "$post_code" != "201" ]; then
echo "::error::POST /statuses/${head_sha} returned HTTP ${post_code}"
exit 1
fi
echo "::notice::posted ${status_state} for context=\"security-review / approved (pull_request_target)\" on sha=${head_sha}"
+6 -6
View File
@@ -179,10 +179,10 @@ jobs:
- name: Refire qa-review status
if: steps.classify.outputs.run_qa == 'true'
env:
# Evaluator (review-check.sh + GET /pulls) stays on read-scoped token.
# RFC_324_TEAM_READ_TOKEN is read-only (team membership read scope only).
# review-refire-status.sh POSTs to /statuses — requires write scope.
# SOP_TIER_CHECK_TOKEN carries write:repository + write:issue + read:organization.
GITEA_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.SOP_TIER_CHECK_TOKEN || secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
# Explicit POST /statuses uses narrow-scoped write:repository token.
STATUS_POST_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.STATUS_POST_TOKEN }}
GITEA_HOST: git.moleculesai.app
REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
PR_NUMBER: ${{ github.event.issue.number }}
@@ -198,10 +198,10 @@ jobs:
- name: Refire security-review status
if: steps.classify.outputs.run_security == 'true'
env:
# Evaluator (review-check.sh + GET /pulls) stays on read-scoped token.
# RFC_324_TEAM_READ_TOKEN is read-only (team membership read scope only).
# review-refire-status.sh POSTs to /statuses — requires write scope.
# SOP_TIER_CHECK_TOKEN carries write:repository + write:issue + read:organization.
GITEA_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.SOP_TIER_CHECK_TOKEN || secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
# Explicit POST /statuses uses narrow-scoped write:repository token.
STATUS_POST_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.STATUS_POST_TOKEN }}
GITEA_HOST: git.moleculesai.app
REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
PR_NUMBER: ${{ github.event.issue.number }}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ on:
# full run, but two smoke runs SHOULD queue against each other.
concurrency:
group: staging-smoke
cancel-in-progress: false
cancel-in-progress: true
permissions:
# Needed to open / close the alerting issue.
+1 -1
View File
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ on:
# Don't let two sweeps race the same AWS account.
concurrency:
group: sweep-aws-secrets
cancel-in-progress: false
cancel-in-progress: true
permissions:
contents: read
+1 -1
View File
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ on:
# scheduled run would otherwise issue duplicate DELETE calls.
concurrency:
group: sweep-cf-orphans
cancel-in-progress: false
cancel-in-progress: true
permissions:
contents: read
+1 -1
View File
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ on:
# Don't let two sweeps race the same account.
concurrency:
group: sweep-cf-tunnels
cancel-in-progress: false
cancel-in-progress: true
permissions:
contents: read
+1 -1
View File
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ on:
# on a manual trigger; queue rather than parallel-delete.
concurrency:
group: sweep-stale-e2e-orgs
cancel-in-progress: false
cancel-in-progress: true
permissions:
contents: read
-18
View File
@@ -35,26 +35,8 @@ name: verify-providers-gen
on:
pull_request:
types: [opened, synchronize, reopened]
# CI-scheduler-overload fix (fix/ci-scheduler-fanout, 2026-06-01):
# this gate only verifies that the generated providers artifact is in
# sync with the schema SSOT. Its verdict can ONLY change when one of
# the codegen inputs/outputs changes, so firing the Go toolchain on
# every unrelated PR (docs, canvas, scripts) is pure fan-out cost.
# Scoped to the codegen surface. SAFE because this workflow is NOT a
# branch-protection status_check_context (see header §ENFORCEMENT
# GATING) — lint-required-no-paths only forbids paths filters on
# REQUIRED workflows; this is advisory, so a paths filter is allowed.
# Mirrors the sibling sync-providers-yaml.yml scoping convention.
paths:
- 'workspace-server/internal/providers/**'
- 'workspace-server/cmd/gen-providers/**'
- '.gitea/workflows/verify-providers-gen.yml'
push:
branches: [main, staging]
paths:
- 'workspace-server/internal/providers/**'
- 'workspace-server/cmd/gen-providers/**'
- '.gitea/workflows/verify-providers-gen.yml'
env:
GITHUB_SERVER_URL: https://git.moleculesai.app
+2 -2
View File
@@ -49,8 +49,8 @@
## Quick Start
```bash
git clone https://git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-core.git
cd molecule-core
git clone https://git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-monorepo.git
cd molecule-monorepo
./scripts/dev-start.sh
```
+1 -1
View File
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ export default function PricingPage() {
<p className="mt-2 text-ink-mid">
We publish the{" "}
<a
href="https://git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-core"
href="https://git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-monorepo"
className="text-accent underline hover:text-accent"
>
full source on GitHub
@@ -38,11 +38,10 @@ const DEFAULT_RUNTIME = "claude-code";
const RUNTIME_OPTIONS = [
{ value: "claude-code", label: "Claude Code" },
{ value: "codex", label: "OpenAI Codex CLI" },
{ value: "google-adk", label: "Google ADK" },
{ value: "hermes", label: "Hermes" },
{ value: "openclaw", label: "OpenClaw" },
];
const BASE_RUNTIME_TEMPLATE_IDS = new Set(["claude-code-default", "codex", "google-adk", "hermes", "openclaw"]);
const BASE_RUNTIME_TEMPLATE_IDS = new Set(["claude-code-default", "codex", "hermes", "openclaw"]);
const DEFAULT_HEADLESS_INSTANCE_TYPE = "t3.medium";
const DEFAULT_HEADLESS_ROOT_GB = 30;
const DEFAULT_DISPLAY_INSTANCE_TYPE = "t3.xlarge";
+1 -101
View File
@@ -49,33 +49,6 @@ export interface ProviderEntry {
wildcard: boolean;
/** Optional tooltip text (rendered as native title=). */
tooltip?: string;
/** Billing mode the DERIVED provider implies, when this entry came from the
* registry-backed payload (internal#718 P3): "platform_managed" | "byok".
* Undefined for entries built by the legacy inferVendor heuristic. */
billingMode?: "platform_managed" | "byok";
}
/** RegistryProvider mirrors one entry of GET /templates `registry_providers`
* (workspace-server registryProviderView): the registry's native provider for
* a runtime, with its display label, auth-env NAMES, and billing mode. This is
* the SSOT the dropdown labels come from — the canvas drops VENDOR_LABELS for
* registry-backed runtimes (internal#718 P3, retire-list #4). */
export interface RegistryProvider {
name: string;
display_name?: string;
auth_env?: string[];
billing_mode?: "platform_managed" | "byok";
deprecated?: boolean;
}
/** RegistryModel mirrors one entry of GET /templates `registry_models`: a
* native model id annotated with its DERIVED provider (registry name) and the
* billing_mode that provider implies. */
export interface RegistryModel {
id: string;
name?: string;
provider?: string;
billing_mode?: "platform_managed" | "byok";
}
export interface SelectorValue {
@@ -95,13 +68,6 @@ interface Props {
models: SelectorModel[];
value: SelectorValue;
onChange: (next: SelectorValue) => void;
/** Optional pre-built provider catalog. When provided, the selector uses it
* verbatim instead of re-inferring one from `models` via
* buildProviderCatalog — the registry-backed path (internal#718 P3), where
* the parent builds the catalog from the registry-served providers/models
* so dropdown labels + billing come from the provider-registry SSOT rather
* than the inferVendor heuristic. Omitted = legacy heuristic over `models`. */
catalog?: ProviderEntry[];
/** Display variant. "grid" = label+control side-by-side (used in ConfigTab
* Runtime section). "stack" = vertical (used in MissingKeysModal). */
variant?: "grid" | "stack";
@@ -285,66 +251,6 @@ export function buildProviderCatalog(models: SelectorModel[]): ProviderEntry[] {
return Array.from(buckets.values());
}
/** Build the provider catalog from a REGISTRY-BACKED GET /templates payload
* (registry_providers + registry_models) — internal#718 P3, retire-list #4.
*
* Unlike buildProviderCatalog (which RE-INFERS vendor from model-id prefixes
* + env via inferVendor/VENDOR_LABELS/BARE_VENDOR_PATTERNS), this trusts the
* registry: each model carries its DERIVED `provider` (a registry provider
* name) and the dropdown label/billing/auth come from the matching
* `registry_providers` entry. The canvas can render no provider/model the
* registry did not serve ("only registered selectable"), and the billing-mode
* shown reflects the derived provider rather than a hardcoded rule.
*
* A provider with no served model is omitted (no empty buckets). Models whose
* `provider` doesn't match a registry_providers entry still get a bucket
* keyed by the raw provider name (defensive — should not happen for a
* well-formed registry payload), so a model is never silently dropped. */
export function buildProviderCatalogFromRegistry(
registryProviders: RegistryProvider[],
registryModels: RegistryModel[],
): ProviderEntry[] {
const byName = new Map<string, RegistryProvider>();
for (const p of registryProviders) byName.set(p.name, p);
// Bucket models by their derived provider name, preserving registry order.
const buckets = new Map<string, ProviderEntry>();
for (const m of registryModels) {
const vendor = (m.provider ?? "").trim();
if (!vendor) continue; // un-annotated registry model — skip from the
// provider cascade (selectable elsewhere via free-text); it has no
// derived provider to bucket under.
const meta = byName.get(vendor);
const wildcard = m.id.includes("*");
let entry = buckets.get(vendor);
if (!entry) {
entry = {
id: `registry|${vendor}`,
vendor,
label: meta?.display_name || vendor,
envVars: meta?.auth_env ?? [],
models: [],
wildcard,
billingMode: meta?.billing_mode ?? m.billing_mode,
tooltip: VENDOR_TOOLTIPS[vendor],
};
buckets.set(vendor, entry);
}
entry.models.push({ id: m.id, name: m.name, provider: vendor });
entry.wildcard = entry.wildcard || wildcard;
}
// Decorate label with model-count when ≥2 concrete models share the bucket,
// matching buildProviderCatalog's UX.
for (const e of buckets.values()) {
if (!e.wildcard && e.models.length > 1) {
e.label = `${e.label} (${e.models.length} models)`;
}
}
return Array.from(buckets.values());
}
/** Find the provider entry that contains a given model id. Used by
* callers to back-derive the provider when only the model is known
* (e.g. ConfigTab loading from saved state). */
@@ -377,7 +283,6 @@ export function ProviderModelSelector({
models,
value,
onChange,
catalog: catalogProp,
variant = "stack",
allowCustomModelEscape = false,
disabled = false,
@@ -388,12 +293,7 @@ export function ProviderModelSelector({
const providerSelectId = `${baseId}-provider`;
const modelSelectId = `${baseId}-model`;
// Registry-backed path (internal#718 P3): use the parent-supplied catalog
// verbatim; otherwise re-infer one from `models` via the legacy heuristic.
const catalog = useMemo(
() => catalogProp ?? buildProviderCatalog(models),
[catalogProp, models],
);
const catalog = useMemo(() => buildProviderCatalog(models), [models]);
const selected = useMemo(
() => catalog.find((p) => p.id === value.providerId) ?? null,
[catalog, value.providerId],
@@ -1,82 +1,411 @@
// @vitest-environment jsdom
/**
* Focused tests for BudgetSection's PER-PERIOD progress-bar math + aria (#49).
* Tests for BudgetSection (issue #541).
*
* Behavioral coverage (loading, save, 402 banners, USD formatting, legacy
* back-compat) lives in tabs/__tests__/BudgetSection.test.tsx — this file
* deliberately covers only the per-period progress percentage + aria-valuenow
* + the over-budget colouring, which that suite doesn't assert in detail. Kept
* separate to avoid duplicating the behavioral suite (one component, no
* parallel/identical suites).
* Covers:
* - Loading state
* - Stats row: used / limit, "Unlimited" when null
* - Progress bar: correct percentage, capped at 100%, absent when no limit
* - Budget remaining text
* - Input pre-fill (existing limit / blank when null)
* - Save: PATCH with number, PATCH with null (blank input)
* - 402 on GET → exceeded banner, no fetch-error text
* - 402 on PATCH → exceeded banner
* - Non-402 fetch error → error text
* - Non-402 save error → save error alert
* - Section header and subheading
* - Fetch error does not show stats
*/
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach, afterEach } from "vitest";
import { render, screen, waitFor, cleanup } from "@testing-library/react";
import {
render,
screen,
fireEvent,
waitFor,
cleanup,
act,
} from "@testing-library/react";
// ── Mock api ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
vi.mock("@/lib/api", () => ({
api: { get: vi.fn(), patch: vi.fn() },
api: {
get: vi.fn(),
patch: vi.fn(),
},
}));
import { api } from "@/lib/api";
import { BudgetSection } from "../tabs/BudgetSection";
const mockGet = vi.mocked(api.get);
const mockPatch = vi.mocked(api.patch);
type P = { limit: number | null; spend: number; remaining: number | null };
// ── Helpers ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Build a periods response where the named period has the given limit/spend.
function withMonthly(limit: number | null, spend: number) {
const blank: P = { limit: null, spend: 0, remaining: null };
const monthly: P = { limit, spend, remaining: limit == null ? null : limit - spend };
function budgetResponse(overrides: Partial<{
budget_limit: number | null;
budget_used: number;
budget_remaining: number | null;
}> = {}) {
return {
periods: { hourly: blank, daily: blank, weekly: blank, monthly },
budget_limit: limit,
monthly_spend: spend,
budget_remaining: monthly.remaining,
budget_limit: 1000,
budget_used: 250,
budget_remaining: 750,
...overrides,
};
}
beforeEach(() => vi.clearAllMocks());
afterEach(() => cleanup());
function make402Error(): Error {
return new Error("API GET /workspaces/ws-1/budget: 402 Payment Required");
}
async function renderLoaded(data: unknown) {
function make402PatchError(): Error {
return new Error("API PATCH /workspaces/ws-1/budget: 402 Payment Required");
}
function makeGenericError(msg = "network timeout"): Error {
return new Error(`API GET /workspaces/ws-1/budget: 500 ${msg}`);
}
beforeEach(() => {
vi.clearAllMocks();
});
afterEach(() => {
cleanup();
});
// ── Rendering helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
async function renderLoaded(budgetData = budgetResponse()) {
// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
mockGet.mockResolvedValueOnce(data as any);
mockGet.mockResolvedValueOnce(budgetData as any);
render(<BudgetSection workspaceId="ws-1" />);
// Wait for loading to finish
await waitFor(() => expect(screen.queryByTestId("budget-loading")).toBeNull());
}
describe("BudgetSection — per-period progress bar", () => {
it("renders the bar for a limited period and omits it for an unlimited one", async () => {
await renderLoaded(withMonthly(1000, 250));
expect(screen.getByTestId("budget-monthly-fill")).toBeTruthy();
expect(screen.queryByTestId("budget-hourly-fill")).toBeNull(); // hourly unlimited
// ── Loading state ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
describe("BudgetSection — loading state", () => {
it("shows loading indicator while fetch is in flight", () => {
// Never resolve
mockGet.mockReturnValue(new Promise(() => {}));
render(<BudgetSection workspaceId="ws-1" />);
expect(screen.getByTestId("budget-loading")).toBeTruthy();
expect(screen.getByText("Loading…")).toBeTruthy();
});
it("fills to 25%", async () => {
await renderLoaded(withMonthly(1000, 250));
expect((screen.getByTestId("budget-monthly-fill") as HTMLElement).style.width).toBe("25%");
});
it("fills to 50%", async () => {
await renderLoaded(withMonthly(1000, 500));
expect((screen.getByTestId("budget-monthly-fill") as HTMLElement).style.width).toBe("50%");
});
it("caps fill at 100% when spend exceeds limit", async () => {
await renderLoaded(withMonthly(1000, 4000));
expect((screen.getByTestId("budget-monthly-fill") as HTMLElement).style.width).toBe("100%");
});
it("sets aria-valuenow to the computed percentage on the progressbar", async () => {
await renderLoaded(withMonthly(1000, 250));
const bars = screen.getAllByRole("progressbar");
// the monthly bar is the only one rendered (others unlimited)
expect(bars).toHaveLength(1);
expect(bars[0].getAttribute("aria-valuenow")).toBe("25");
});
it("shows a 0% bar when spend is 0 against a set limit", async () => {
await renderLoaded(withMonthly(1000, 0));
expect((screen.getByTestId("budget-monthly-fill") as HTMLElement).style.width).toBe("0%");
it("hides loading indicator after fetch resolves", async () => {
// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
mockGet.mockResolvedValueOnce(budgetResponse() as any);
render(<BudgetSection workspaceId="ws-1" />);
await waitFor(() => expect(screen.queryByTestId("budget-loading")).toBeNull());
});
});
// ── Section header ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
describe("BudgetSection — header and subheading", () => {
it("renders 'Budget' as the section heading", async () => {
await renderLoaded();
expect(screen.getByText("Budget")).toBeTruthy();
});
it("renders the subheading 'Limit total message credits for this workspace'", async () => {
await renderLoaded();
expect(
screen.getByText("Limit total message credits for this workspace")
).toBeTruthy();
});
it("renders 'Budget limit (credits)' label for the input", async () => {
await renderLoaded();
expect(screen.getByText("Budget limit (credits)")).toBeTruthy();
});
});
// ── Stats row ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
describe("BudgetSection — stats row", () => {
it("shows budget_used in the stats row", async () => {
await renderLoaded(budgetResponse({ budget_used: 350, budget_limit: 1000 }));
expect(screen.getByTestId("budget-used-value").textContent).toBe("350");
});
it("shows budget_limit in the stats row", async () => {
await renderLoaded(budgetResponse({ budget_used: 100, budget_limit: 500 }));
expect(screen.getByTestId("budget-limit-value").textContent).toBe("500");
});
it("shows 'Unlimited' when budget_limit is null", async () => {
await renderLoaded(budgetResponse({ budget_limit: null, budget_remaining: null }));
expect(screen.getByTestId("budget-limit-value").textContent).toBe("Unlimited");
});
it("shows budget_remaining when present", async () => {
await renderLoaded(budgetResponse({ budget_remaining: 750 }));
expect(screen.getByTestId("budget-remaining").textContent).toContain("750");
expect(screen.getByTestId("budget-remaining").textContent).toContain("credits remaining");
});
it("hides budget_remaining row when null", async () => {
await renderLoaded(budgetResponse({ budget_remaining: null }));
expect(screen.queryByTestId("budget-remaining")).toBeNull();
});
it("does not crash when budget_used is missing from the response", async () => {
// Backend for a provisioning-stuck workspace may return a partial
// shape. Regression: previously this threw
// "Cannot read properties of undefined (reading 'toLocaleString')"
// and crashed the whole Details tab.
// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
await renderLoaded({ budget_limit: 1000, budget_remaining: null } as any);
expect(screen.getByTestId("budget-used-value").textContent).toBe("0");
});
});
// ── Progress bar ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
describe("BudgetSection — progress bar", () => {
it("renders the progress bar when budget_limit is set", async () => {
await renderLoaded(budgetResponse({ budget_used: 250, budget_limit: 1000 }));
expect(screen.getByRole("progressbar")).toBeTruthy();
});
it("does NOT render progress bar when budget_limit is null", async () => {
await renderLoaded(budgetResponse({ budget_limit: null, budget_remaining: null }));
expect(screen.queryByRole("progressbar")).toBeNull();
});
it("fills to the correct percentage (25%)", async () => {
await renderLoaded(budgetResponse({ budget_used: 250, budget_limit: 1000 }));
const fill = screen.getByTestId("budget-progress-fill") as HTMLDivElement;
expect(fill.style.width).toBe("25%");
});
it("fills to the correct percentage (50%)", async () => {
await renderLoaded(budgetResponse({ budget_used: 500, budget_limit: 1000 }));
const fill = screen.getByTestId("budget-progress-fill") as HTMLDivElement;
expect(fill.style.width).toBe("50%");
});
it("caps fill at 100% when budget_used exceeds budget_limit", async () => {
await renderLoaded(budgetResponse({ budget_used: 1500, budget_limit: 1000 }));
const fill = screen.getByTestId("budget-progress-fill") as HTMLDivElement;
expect(fill.style.width).toBe("100%");
});
it("progress bar has aria-valuenow equal to the calculated percentage", async () => {
await renderLoaded(budgetResponse({ budget_used: 300, budget_limit: 1000 }));
const bar = screen.getByRole("progressbar");
expect(bar.getAttribute("aria-valuenow")).toBe("30");
});
it("shows 0% progress bar when budget_used is absent from the response", async () => {
// Regression: budget_used is optional (provisioning-stuck workspaces return
// partial shapes). Without the `?? 0` guard the progressPct calculation
// throws a TypeScript strict-null error and the build fails.
// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
await renderLoaded({ budget_limit: 1000, budget_remaining: null } as any);
const bar = screen.getByRole("progressbar");
expect(bar.getAttribute("aria-valuenow")).toBe("0");
const fill = screen.getByTestId("budget-progress-fill") as HTMLDivElement;
expect(fill.style.width).toBe("0%");
});
});
// ── Input pre-fill ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
describe("BudgetSection — input pre-fill", () => {
it("pre-fills input with existing budget_limit", async () => {
await renderLoaded(budgetResponse({ budget_limit: 500 }));
const input = screen.getByTestId("budget-limit-input") as HTMLInputElement;
expect(input.value).toBe("500");
});
it("leaves input empty when budget_limit is null", async () => {
await renderLoaded(budgetResponse({ budget_limit: null, budget_remaining: null }));
const input = screen.getByTestId("budget-limit-input") as HTMLInputElement;
expect(input.value).toBe("");
});
});
// ── Save — PATCH calls ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
describe("BudgetSection — save", () => {
it("calls PATCH /workspaces/:id/budget with budget_limit as integer", async () => {
// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
mockPatch.mockResolvedValueOnce(budgetResponse({ budget_limit: 800 }) as any);
await renderLoaded(budgetResponse({ budget_limit: 1000 }));
fireEvent.change(screen.getByTestId("budget-limit-input"), {
target: { value: "800" },
});
fireEvent.click(screen.getByTestId("budget-save-btn"));
await waitFor(() => expect(mockPatch).toHaveBeenCalled());
expect(mockPatch.mock.calls[0][0]).toBe("/workspaces/ws-1/budget");
const body = mockPatch.mock.calls[0][1] as Record<string, unknown>;
expect(body.budget_limit).toBe(800);
});
it("sends budget_limit: 0 (not null) when input is '0' — zero-credit budget", async () => {
// Regression for QA bug report: `parseInt("0") || null` would yield null.
// The correct form `raw !== "" ? parseInt(raw, 10) : null` must return 0.
// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
mockPatch.mockResolvedValueOnce(budgetResponse({ budget_limit: 0, budget_used: 0, budget_remaining: 0 }) as any);
await renderLoaded(budgetResponse({ budget_limit: 1000 }));
fireEvent.change(screen.getByTestId("budget-limit-input"), {
target: { value: "0" },
});
fireEvent.click(screen.getByTestId("budget-save-btn"));
await waitFor(() => expect(mockPatch).toHaveBeenCalled());
const body = mockPatch.mock.calls[0][1] as Record<string, unknown>;
expect(body.budget_limit).toBe(0);
expect(body.budget_limit).not.toBeNull();
});
it("sends budget_limit: null when input is blank", async () => {
// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
mockPatch.mockResolvedValueOnce(budgetResponse({ budget_limit: null, budget_remaining: null }) as any);
await renderLoaded(budgetResponse({ budget_limit: 1000 }));
fireEvent.change(screen.getByTestId("budget-limit-input"), {
target: { value: "" },
});
fireEvent.click(screen.getByTestId("budget-save-btn"));
await waitFor(() => expect(mockPatch).toHaveBeenCalled());
const body = mockPatch.mock.calls[0][1] as Record<string, unknown>;
expect(body.budget_limit).toBeNull();
});
it("updates displayed stats after successful save", async () => {
const updated = budgetResponse({ budget_limit: 2000, budget_used: 500, budget_remaining: 1500 });
// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
mockPatch.mockResolvedValueOnce(updated as any);
await renderLoaded(budgetResponse({ budget_limit: 1000, budget_used: 250 }));
fireEvent.change(screen.getByTestId("budget-limit-input"), {
target: { value: "2000" },
});
fireEvent.click(screen.getByTestId("budget-save-btn"));
await waitFor(() =>
expect(screen.getByTestId("budget-limit-value").textContent).toBe("2,000")
);
});
it("shows save error message on non-402 PATCH failure", async () => {
mockPatch.mockRejectedValueOnce(
new Error("API PATCH /workspaces/ws-1/budget: 500 server error")
);
await renderLoaded();
fireEvent.click(screen.getByTestId("budget-save-btn"));
await waitFor(() =>
expect(screen.getByTestId("budget-save-error")).toBeTruthy()
);
expect(screen.getByTestId("budget-save-error").textContent).toContain("500");
});
});
// ── 402 handling ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
describe("BudgetSection — 402 handling", () => {
it("shows exceeded banner when GET returns 402", async () => {
mockGet.mockRejectedValueOnce(make402Error());
render(<BudgetSection workspaceId="ws-1" />);
await waitFor(() =>
expect(screen.getByTestId("budget-exceeded-banner")).toBeTruthy()
);
expect(screen.getByText("Budget exceeded — messages blocked")).toBeTruthy();
});
it("does NOT show fetch error text when GET returns 402 (only banner)", async () => {
mockGet.mockRejectedValueOnce(make402Error());
render(<BudgetSection workspaceId="ws-1" />);
await waitFor(() =>
expect(screen.queryByTestId("budget-loading")).toBeNull()
);
expect(screen.queryByTestId("budget-fetch-error")).toBeNull();
expect(screen.getByTestId("budget-exceeded-banner")).toBeTruthy();
});
it("shows exceeded banner when PATCH returns 402", async () => {
// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
mockGet.mockResolvedValueOnce(budgetResponse() as any);
mockPatch.mockRejectedValueOnce(make402PatchError());
render(<BudgetSection workspaceId="ws-1" />);
await waitFor(() => expect(screen.queryByTestId("budget-loading")).toBeNull());
fireEvent.click(screen.getByTestId("budget-save-btn"));
await waitFor(() =>
expect(screen.getByTestId("budget-exceeded-banner")).toBeTruthy()
);
// Should NOT also show the save-error alert
expect(screen.queryByTestId("budget-save-error")).toBeNull();
});
it("clears exceeded banner after a successful save", async () => {
mockGet.mockRejectedValueOnce(make402Error());
render(<BudgetSection workspaceId="ws-1" />);
await waitFor(() =>
expect(screen.getByTestId("budget-exceeded-banner")).toBeTruthy()
);
// Now a successful PATCH (limit was raised)
const updated = budgetResponse({ budget_limit: 5000, budget_used: 250, budget_remaining: 4750 });
// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
mockPatch.mockResolvedValueOnce(updated as any);
await act(async () => {
fireEvent.change(screen.getByTestId("budget-limit-input"), {
target: { value: "5000" },
});
fireEvent.click(screen.getByTestId("budget-save-btn"));
});
await waitFor(() =>
expect(screen.queryByTestId("budget-exceeded-banner")).toBeNull()
);
});
});
// ── Non-402 fetch error ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
describe("BudgetSection — non-402 fetch errors", () => {
it("shows fetch error text on non-402 GET failure", async () => {
mockGet.mockRejectedValueOnce(makeGenericError("internal server error"));
render(<BudgetSection workspaceId="ws-1" />);
await waitFor(() =>
expect(screen.getByTestId("budget-fetch-error")).toBeTruthy()
);
expect(screen.getByTestId("budget-fetch-error").textContent).toContain("500");
});
it("does NOT show stats row on fetch error", async () => {
mockGet.mockRejectedValueOnce(makeGenericError());
render(<BudgetSection workspaceId="ws-1" />);
await waitFor(() => expect(screen.queryByTestId("budget-loading")).toBeNull());
expect(screen.queryByTestId("budget-stats-row")).toBeNull();
});
it("does NOT show exceeded banner on non-402 fetch error", async () => {
mockGet.mockRejectedValueOnce(makeGenericError());
render(<BudgetSection workspaceId="ws-1" />);
await waitFor(() => expect(screen.queryByTestId("budget-loading")).toBeNull());
expect(screen.queryByTestId("budget-exceeded-banner")).toBeNull();
});
});
@@ -213,7 +213,6 @@ describe("CreateWorkspaceDialog", () => {
expect(runtimeTexts).toEqual([
"Claude Code",
"OpenAI Codex CLI",
"Google ADK",
"Hermes",
"OpenClaw",
]);
@@ -1,110 +0,0 @@
// @vitest-environment jsdom
//
// internal#718 P3 (retire-list #4) — when GET /templates serves a
// registry-backed selectable list (registry_providers + registry_models with
// display_name / billing_mode / derived provider), the canvas builds the
// provider catalog FROM that registry data instead of re-inferring vendor
// from model-id prefixes (VENDOR_LABELS / BARE_VENDOR_PATTERNS / inferVendor).
// The heuristic path stays only as the fallback for non-registry runtimes /
// older backends.
import { describe, it, expect } from "vitest";
import {
buildProviderCatalogFromRegistry,
type RegistryProvider,
type RegistryModel,
} from "../ProviderModelSelector";
// Mirrors the registry-served claude-code payload from GET /templates
// (registry_providers / registry_models). display_name + billing_mode come
// from the registry, NOT from the canvas VENDOR_LABELS map.
const CLAUDE_CODE_REGISTRY_PROVIDERS: RegistryProvider[] = [
{
name: "anthropic-oauth",
display_name: "Claude Code subscription",
auth_env: ["CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN"],
billing_mode: "byok",
},
{
name: "anthropic-api",
display_name: "Anthropic API",
auth_env: ["ANTHROPIC_API_KEY"],
billing_mode: "byok",
},
{
name: "platform",
display_name: "Platform",
auth_env: ["ANTHROPIC_API_KEY", "MOLECULE_LLM_USAGE_TOKEN"],
billing_mode: "platform_managed",
},
];
const CLAUDE_CODE_REGISTRY_MODELS: RegistryModel[] = [
{ id: "sonnet", provider: "anthropic-oauth", billing_mode: "byok" },
{ id: "opus", provider: "anthropic-oauth", billing_mode: "byok" },
{ id: "claude-opus-4-7", provider: "anthropic-api", billing_mode: "byok" },
{ id: "anthropic/claude-opus-4-7", provider: "platform", billing_mode: "platform_managed" },
];
describe("buildProviderCatalogFromRegistry", () => {
it("buckets models by their DERIVED registry provider, not by inferred vendor", () => {
const catalog = buildProviderCatalogFromRegistry(
CLAUDE_CODE_REGISTRY_PROVIDERS,
CLAUDE_CODE_REGISTRY_MODELS,
);
const byVendor = new Map(catalog.map((p) => [p.vendor, p]));
// anthropic-oauth bucket holds the two OAuth-derived models.
const oauth = byVendor.get("anthropic-oauth");
expect(oauth).toBeDefined();
expect(oauth!.models.map((m) => m.id).sort()).toEqual(["opus", "sonnet"]);
// platform bucket holds the platform-namespaced model.
const platform = byVendor.get("platform");
expect(platform).toBeDefined();
expect(platform!.models.map((m) => m.id)).toEqual(["anthropic/claude-opus-4-7"]);
});
it("labels providers from the registry display_name, not VENDOR_LABELS", () => {
const catalog = buildProviderCatalogFromRegistry(
CLAUDE_CODE_REGISTRY_PROVIDERS,
CLAUDE_CODE_REGISTRY_MODELS,
);
const oauth = catalog.find((p) => p.vendor === "anthropic-oauth");
// Registry display_name "Claude Code subscription" (decorated with the
// model count by the catalog builder is acceptable; assert it carries the
// registry label, not an inferred one).
expect(oauth!.label).toContain("Claude Code subscription");
});
it("carries the registry billing_mode per provider", () => {
const catalog = buildProviderCatalogFromRegistry(
CLAUDE_CODE_REGISTRY_PROVIDERS,
CLAUDE_CODE_REGISTRY_MODELS,
);
expect(catalog.find((p) => p.vendor === "anthropic-oauth")!.billingMode).toBe("byok");
expect(catalog.find((p) => p.vendor === "platform")!.billingMode).toBe("platform_managed");
});
it("surfaces the registry auth_env on the provider entry", () => {
const catalog = buildProviderCatalogFromRegistry(
CLAUDE_CODE_REGISTRY_PROVIDERS,
CLAUDE_CODE_REGISTRY_MODELS,
);
expect(catalog.find((p) => p.vendor === "anthropic-oauth")!.envVars).toEqual([
"CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN",
]);
});
it("only includes providers that actually have at least one served model", () => {
// anthropic-api is a registry provider but has no model in this slice →
// it should not appear as an empty bucket.
const models: RegistryModel[] = [
{ id: "sonnet", provider: "anthropic-oauth", billing_mode: "byok" },
];
const catalog = buildProviderCatalogFromRegistry(
CLAUDE_CODE_REGISTRY_PROVIDERS,
models,
);
expect(catalog.map((p) => p.vendor)).toEqual(["anthropic-oauth"]);
});
});
+137 -158
View File
@@ -7,28 +7,10 @@ import { api } from "@/lib/api";
// Types
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Period keys MUST match the server SSOT (workspace-server budget_periods.go).
type BudgetPeriod = "hourly" | "daily" | "weekly" | "monthly";
const PERIODS: { key: BudgetPeriod; label: string }[] = [
{ key: "hourly", label: "Hourly" },
{ key: "daily", label: "Daily" },
{ key: "weekly", label: "Weekly" },
{ key: "monthly", label: "Monthly" },
];
interface PeriodBudget {
limit: number | null; // USD cents; null = no limit
spend: number; // rolling-window spend, USD cents
remaining: number | null; // null when no limit
}
interface BudgetData {
periods?: Partial<Record<BudgetPeriod, PeriodBudget>>;
// legacy fields (pre-multi-period server) — tolerated for back-compat
budget_limit?: number | null;
monthly_spend?: number;
budget_remaining?: number | null;
budget_limit: number | null;
budget_used?: number; // optional — provisioning-stuck workspaces return partial shapes
budget_remaining: number | null;
}
interface Props {
@@ -44,71 +26,31 @@ function isApiError402(e: unknown): boolean {
return e instanceof Error && /: 402( |$)/.test(e.message);
}
/** USD cents → "$X.XX". */
function fmtUSD(cents: number): string {
return `$${(cents / 100).toLocaleString(undefined, { minimumFractionDigits: 2, maximumFractionDigits: 2 })}`;
}
/** Normalize the server payload (multi-period or legacy) into a period map. */
function periodsFrom(data: BudgetData | null): Record<BudgetPeriod, PeriodBudget> {
const base: Record<BudgetPeriod, PeriodBudget> = {
hourly: { limit: null, spend: 0, remaining: null },
daily: { limit: null, spend: 0, remaining: null },
weekly: { limit: null, spend: 0, remaining: null },
monthly: { limit: null, spend: 0, remaining: null },
};
if (!data) return base;
if (data.periods) {
for (const { key } of PERIODS) {
const p = data.periods[key];
if (p) base[key] = { limit: p.limit ?? null, spend: p.spend ?? 0, remaining: p.remaining ?? null };
}
return base;
}
// legacy: map the single monthly limit/spend
base.monthly = {
limit: data.budget_limit ?? null,
spend: data.monthly_spend ?? 0,
remaining: data.budget_remaining ?? null,
};
return base;
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Component
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
/**
* BudgetSection — per-workspace LLM budget, four independent rolling windows
* (hourly / daily / weekly / monthly). Each period has its own ceiling (USD);
* spend is the rolling-window LLM cost. Crossing ANY period blocks new work
* (server returns 402). Sends PATCH {budget_limits:{period:cents|null}}.
* BudgetSection — dedicated "Budget" section in the workspace details panel.
*
* - Fetches GET /workspaces/:id/budget on mount for live usage stats
* - Shows a progress bar (budget_used / budget_limit, blue-500, capped 100%)
* - Allows updating budget_limit via PATCH /workspaces/:id/budget
* - Shows a 402-specific "Budget exceeded" amber banner for any blocked state
*/
export function BudgetSection({ workspaceId }: Props) {
const [budget, setBudget] = useState<BudgetData | null>(null);
const [loading, setLoading] = useState(true);
const [fetchError, setFetchError] = useState<string | null>(null);
// One input per period, in USD cents (string for controlled inputs).
const [limitInputs, setLimitInputs] = useState<Record<BudgetPeriod, string>>({
hourly: "",
daily: "",
weekly: "",
monthly: "",
});
const [limitInput, setLimitInput] = useState("");
const [saving, setSaving] = useState(false);
const [saveError, setSaveError] = useState<string | null>(null);
/** True when a 402 has been seen from any API call in this section. */
const [budgetExceeded, setBudgetExceeded] = useState(false);
const syncInputs = useCallback((data: BudgetData | null) => {
const p = periodsFrom(data);
setLimitInputs({
hourly: p.hourly.limit != null ? String(p.hourly.limit) : "",
daily: p.daily.limit != null ? String(p.daily.limit) : "",
weekly: p.weekly.limit != null ? String(p.weekly.limit) : "",
monthly: p.monthly.limit != null ? String(p.monthly.limit) : "",
});
}, []);
// ── Fetch current budget data ─────────────────────────────────────────────
const loadBudget = useCallback(async () => {
setLoading(true);
@@ -116,7 +58,7 @@ export function BudgetSection({ workspaceId }: Props) {
try {
const data = await api.get<BudgetData>(`/workspaces/${workspaceId}/budget`);
setBudget(data);
syncInputs(data);
setLimitInput(data.budget_limit != null ? String(data.budget_limit) : "");
} catch (e) {
if (isApiError402(e)) {
setBudgetExceeded(true);
@@ -126,30 +68,29 @@ export function BudgetSection({ workspaceId }: Props) {
} finally {
setLoading(false);
}
}, [workspaceId, syncInputs]);
}, [workspaceId]);
useEffect(() => {
loadBudget();
}, [loadBudget]);
// ── Save handler ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
const handleSave = async () => {
setSaving(true);
setSaveError(null);
// Build the per-period map: blank → null (clear); a number → that ceiling.
const budget_limits: Record<BudgetPeriod, number | null> = {
hourly: null,
daily: null,
weekly: null,
monthly: null,
};
for (const { key } of PERIODS) {
const raw = limitInputs[key].trim();
budget_limits[key] = raw !== "" ? parseInt(raw, 10) : null;
}
const raw = limitInput.trim();
// Use explicit empty-string check (not falsy check) so that a
// user-entered "0" is sent as budget_limit: 0, not null (unlimited).
const parsedLimit = raw !== "" ? parseInt(raw, 10) : null;
try {
const updated = await api.patch<BudgetData>(`/workspaces/${workspaceId}/budget`, { budget_limits });
const updated = await api.patch<BudgetData>(`/workspaces/${workspaceId}/budget`, {
budget_limit: parsedLimit,
});
setBudget(updated);
syncInputs(updated);
setLimitInput(updated.budget_limit != null ? String(updated.budget_limit) : "");
// Clear exceeded state if the save succeeded (limit was raised or removed)
setBudgetExceeded(false);
} catch (e) {
if (isApiError402(e)) {
@@ -162,15 +103,24 @@ export function BudgetSection({ workspaceId }: Props) {
}
};
const periods = periodsFrom(budget);
// ── Progress calculation ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
const progressPct =
budget && budget.budget_limit != null && budget.budget_limit > 0
? Math.min(100, Math.round(((budget.budget_used ?? 0) / budget.budget_limit) * 100))
: 0;
// ── Render ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
return (
<div className="space-y-3" data-testid="budget-section">
{/* Section header */}
<div>
<h3 className="text-xs font-semibold text-ink-mid uppercase tracking-wider">Budget</h3>
<h3 className="text-xs font-semibold text-ink-mid uppercase tracking-wider">
Budget
</h3>
<p className="text-[11px] text-ink-mid mt-0.5">
Cap LLM spend for this workspace per period crossing any limit pauses new work
Limit total message credits for this workspace
</p>
</div>
@@ -181,14 +131,32 @@ export function BudgetSection({ workspaceId }: Props) {
data-testid="budget-exceeded-banner"
className="flex items-center gap-2 px-3 py-2 rounded-lg bg-surface border border-amber-700/50 text-warm text-xs font-medium"
>
<svg width="13" height="13" viewBox="0 0 13 13" fill="none" aria-hidden="true" className="shrink-0">
<path d="M6.5 1.5L11.5 10.5H1.5L6.5 1.5Z" stroke="currentColor" strokeWidth="1.4" strokeLinejoin="round" />
<path d="M6.5 5.5V7.5M6.5 9.5h.01" stroke="currentColor" strokeWidth="1.4" strokeLinecap="round" />
<svg
width="13"
height="13"
viewBox="0 0 13 13"
fill="none"
aria-hidden="true"
className="shrink-0"
>
<path
d="M6.5 1.5L11.5 10.5H1.5L6.5 1.5Z"
stroke="currentColor"
strokeWidth="1.4"
strokeLinejoin="round"
/>
<path
d="M6.5 5.5V7.5M6.5 9.5h.01"
stroke="currentColor"
strokeWidth="1.4"
strokeLinecap="round"
/>
</svg>
Budget exceeded new work paused
Budget exceeded messages blocked
</div>
)}
{/* Usage stats */}
{loading ? (
<p className="text-xs text-ink-mid" data-testid="budget-loading">
Loading
@@ -197,78 +165,89 @@ export function BudgetSection({ workspaceId }: Props) {
<p className="text-xs text-bad" data-testid="budget-fetch-error">
{fetchError}
</p>
) : (
<div className="space-y-3">
{PERIODS.map(({ key, label }) => {
const p = periods[key];
const pct =
p.limit != null && p.limit > 0 ? Math.min(100, Math.round((p.spend / p.limit) * 100)) : 0;
const over = p.limit != null && p.spend >= p.limit;
return (
<div key={key} className="space-y-1" data-testid={`budget-period-${key}`}>
<div className="flex items-baseline justify-between">
<label htmlFor={`budget-${key}-${workspaceId}`} className="text-xs text-ink-mid">
{label}
</label>
<span className="text-[11px] font-mono text-ink-mid">
<span data-testid={`budget-${key}-spend`}>{fmtUSD(p.spend)}</span>
<span className="mx-1">/</span>
<span data-testid={`budget-${key}-limit`}>{p.limit != null ? fmtUSD(p.limit) : "∞"}</span>
</span>
</div>
{p.limit != null && (
<div
role="progressbar"
aria-label={`${label} budget usage`}
aria-valuenow={pct}
aria-valuemin={0}
aria-valuemax={100}
className="h-1.5 w-full rounded-full bg-surface-card overflow-hidden"
>
<div
data-testid={`budget-${key}-fill`}
className={`h-full rounded-full transition-all duration-300 ${over ? "bg-bad" : "bg-accent"}`}
style={{ width: `${pct}%` }}
/>
</div>
)}
<input
id={`budget-${key}-${workspaceId}`}
type="number"
min="0"
step="1"
value={limitInputs[key]}
onChange={(e) => setLimitInputs((s) => ({ ...s, [key]: e.target.value }))}
placeholder="USD cents — blank for unlimited"
data-testid={`budget-${key}-input`}
className="w-full bg-surface-card border border-line rounded-lg px-3 py-1.5 text-xs text-ink-mid placeholder-zinc-500 focus:outline-none focus:border-accent focus:ring-1 focus:ring-accent/30 transition-colors"
/>
</div>
);
})}
) : budget ? (
<div className="space-y-2">
{/* Stats row */}
<div className="flex items-baseline justify-between" data-testid="budget-stats-row">
<span className="text-xs text-ink-mid">Credits used</span>
<span className="text-xs font-mono text-ink-mid">
<span data-testid="budget-used-value">{(budget.budget_used ?? 0).toLocaleString()}</span>
<span className="text-ink-mid mx-1">/</span>
<span data-testid="budget-limit-value">
{budget.budget_limit != null
? budget.budget_limit.toLocaleString()
: "Unlimited"}
</span>
</span>
</div>
<p className="text-[11px] text-ink-mid">Limits are USD cents (e.g. 500 = $5.00). Blank = unlimited.</p>
{saveError && (
{/* Progress bar (only when limit is set) */}
{budget.budget_limit != null && (
<div
role="alert"
data-testid="budget-save-error"
className="px-3 py-1.5 rounded-lg bg-red-950/40 border border-red-800/50 text-xs text-bad"
role="progressbar"
aria-label="Budget usage"
aria-valuenow={progressPct}
aria-valuemin={0}
aria-valuemax={100}
className="h-1.5 w-full rounded-full bg-surface-card overflow-hidden"
>
{saveError}
<div
data-testid="budget-progress-fill"
className="h-full rounded-full bg-accent transition-all duration-300"
style={{ width: `${progressPct}%` }}
/>
</div>
)}
<button
onClick={handleSave}
disabled={saving}
data-testid="budget-save-btn"
className="px-4 py-1.5 bg-accent-strong hover:bg-accent active:bg-accent-strong rounded-lg text-xs font-medium text-white disabled:opacity-50 transition-colors focus-visible:outline-none focus-visible:ring-2 focus-visible:ring-accent focus-visible:ring-offset-1 focus-visible:ring-offset-zinc-900"
>
{saving ? "Saving…" : "Save"}
</button>
{/* Remaining credits */}
{budget.budget_remaining != null && (
<p className="text-[11px] text-ink-mid" data-testid="budget-remaining">
{budget.budget_remaining.toLocaleString()} credits remaining
</p>
)}
</div>
)}
) : null}
{/* Input + Save */}
<div className="space-y-1.5 pt-1">
<label
htmlFor={`budget-limit-input-${workspaceId}`}
className="text-[11px] text-ink-mid block"
>
Budget limit (credits)
</label>
<input
id={`budget-limit-input-${workspaceId}`}
type="number"
min="0"
step="1"
value={limitInput}
onChange={(e) => setLimitInput(e.target.value)}
placeholder="e.g. 1000 — blank for unlimited"
data-testid="budget-limit-input"
className="w-full bg-surface-card border border-line rounded-lg px-3 py-2 text-sm text-ink-mid placeholder-zinc-500 focus:outline-none focus:border-accent focus:ring-1 focus:ring-accent/30 transition-colors"
/>
<p className="text-xs text-ink-mid">Leave blank for unlimited</p>
{saveError && (
<div
role="alert"
data-testid="budget-save-error"
className="px-3 py-1.5 rounded-lg bg-red-950/40 border border-red-800/50 text-xs text-bad"
>
{saveError}
</div>
)}
<button
onClick={handleSave}
disabled={saving}
data-testid="budget-save-btn"
className="px-4 py-1.5 bg-accent-strong hover:bg-accent active:bg-accent-strong rounded-lg text-xs font-medium text-white disabled:opacity-50 transition-colors focus-visible:outline-none focus-visible:ring-2 focus-visible:ring-accent focus-visible:ring-offset-1 focus-visible:ring-offset-zinc-900"
>
{saving ? "Saving…" : "Save"}
</button>
</div>
</div>
);
}
+15 -127
View File
@@ -11,12 +11,8 @@ import { ExternalConnectionSection } from "./ExternalConnectionSection";
import {
ProviderModelSelector,
buildProviderCatalog,
buildProviderCatalogFromRegistry,
findProviderForModel,
type SelectorValue,
type ProviderEntry,
type RegistryProvider,
type RegistryModel,
} from "../ProviderModelSelector";
import { isExternalLikeRuntime } from "@/lib/externalRuntimes";
@@ -262,17 +258,6 @@ interface RuntimeOption {
// canvas falls back to deriving unique vendor prefixes from
// models[].id (still adapter-driven, just inferred).
providers: string[];
// registryBacked / registryProviders / registryModels come from the
// registry-served GET /templates fields (internal#718 P3). When
// registryBacked is true, the selectable provider+model list is built from
// the registry (registryProviders/registryModels) — display labels +
// billing mode + derived provider come from the provider-registry SSOT, not
// the canvas VENDOR_LABELS / billingModeForProvider vocabularies. When
// false (non-registry runtime / older backend), the canvas falls back to
// the template-served models[] + its inferVendor heuristic.
registryBacked: boolean;
registryProviders: RegistryProvider[];
registryModels: RegistryModel[];
}
// deriveProvidersFromModels — when a template doesn't ship an explicit
@@ -337,32 +322,6 @@ export function billingModeForProvider(provider: string): LLMBillingMode {
return "byok";
}
// billingModeForSelectedProvider — internal#718 P3 (retire-list #5): the
// billing mode the Config tab shows/sends for the selected PROVIDER, sourced
// from the registry-served catalog when available rather than the hardcoded
// billingModeForProvider rule.
//
// When the runtime is registry-backed, GET /templates serves each provider's
// DERIVED billing_mode (platform_managed for the closed platform provider,
// byok otherwise) on the ProviderEntry. We read it off the catalog so the UI
// reflects the registry SSOT — the same predicate billing/credential emission
// keys off the derived provider.
//
// Falls back to billingModeForProvider when: no catalog (non-registry runtime
// / older backend), or the provider string isn't carried by the catalog
// (e.g. a stale saved value). The fallback keeps the legacy behavior intact
// for everything the registry doesn't yet speak to.
export function billingModeForSelectedProvider(
provider: string,
catalog?: ProviderEntry[],
): LLMBillingMode {
if (catalog && catalog.length > 0) {
const entry = catalog.find((p) => p.vendor === provider.trim());
if (entry?.billingMode) return entry.billingMode;
}
return billingModeForProvider(provider);
}
// Fallback used when /templates can't be fetched (offline, older backend).
// Keep in sync with manifest.json workspace_templates as a defensive default.
// Model + env suggestions only flow when the backend is reachable.
@@ -377,20 +336,13 @@ export function billingModeForSelectedProvider(
// config.yaml` on the container is a separate runtime-internal file,
// not this one.
const RUNTIMES_WITH_OWN_CONFIG = new Set<string>(["external", "kimi", "kimi-cli", "openclaw"]);
// The runtime picker is SSOT-driven: options come from GET /templates,
// which workspace-server already gates to the manifest.json maintained set
// (loadRuntimesFromManifest). A hand-maintained frontend allowlist silently
// dropped runtimes the backend added (google-adk shipped in manifest but was
// filtered out, so its workspaces rendered the wrong default option). A
// template may still opt OUT of the picker via `displayable: false` on its
// /templates row. See project_canvas_runtime_dropdown_ssot_fix.
const SUPPORTED_RUNTIME_VALUES = new Set(["claude-code", "codex", "openclaw", "hermes"]);
const FALLBACK_RUNTIME_OPTIONS: RuntimeOption[] = [
{ value: "claude-code", label: "Claude Code", models: [], providers: [], registryBacked: false, registryProviders: [], registryModels: [] },
{ value: "codex", label: "Codex", models: [], providers: [], registryBacked: false, registryProviders: [], registryModels: [] },
{ value: "google-adk", label: "Google ADK", models: [], providers: [], registryBacked: false, registryProviders: [], registryModels: [] },
{ value: "openclaw", label: "OpenClaw", models: [], providers: [], registryBacked: false, registryProviders: [], registryModels: [] },
{ value: "hermes", label: "Hermes", models: [], providers: [], registryBacked: false, registryProviders: [], registryModels: [] },
{ value: "claude-code", label: "Claude Code", models: [], providers: [] },
{ value: "codex", label: "Codex", models: [], providers: [] },
{ value: "openclaw", label: "OpenClaw", models: [], providers: [] },
{ value: "hermes", label: "Hermes", models: [], providers: [] },
];
export function ConfigTab({ workspaceId }: Props) {
@@ -581,49 +533,20 @@ export function ConfigTab({ workspaceId }: Props) {
useEffect(() => {
let cancelled = false;
api.get<Array<{
id: string;
name?: string;
runtime?: string;
models?: ModelSpec[];
providers?: string[];
// internal#718 P3 registry-served fields (additive; absent on older
// backends and for non-registry runtimes).
registry_backed?: boolean;
registry_providers?: RegistryProvider[];
registry_models?: RegistryModel[];
displayable?: boolean;
}>>("/templates")
api.get<Array<{ id: string; name?: string; runtime?: string; models?: ModelSpec[]; providers?: string[] }>>("/templates")
.then((rows) => {
if (cancelled || !Array.isArray(rows)) return;
const byRuntime = new Map<string, RuntimeOption>();
for (const r of rows) {
const v = (r.runtime || "").trim();
if (!v) continue;
// Honor an explicit opt-out; absent/true means show it.
if (r.displayable === false) continue;
if (!SUPPORTED_RUNTIME_VALUES.has(v)) continue;
// Last template wins if two templates share a runtime — rare, and the
// one with the richer models list is probably newer.
const existing = byRuntime.get(v);
const models = Array.isArray(r.models) ? r.models : [];
const providers = Array.isArray(r.providers) ? r.providers : [];
const registryProviders = Array.isArray(r.registry_providers) ? r.registry_providers : [];
const registryModels = Array.isArray(r.registry_models) ? r.registry_models : [];
const registryBacked = r.registry_backed === true && registryModels.length > 0;
// Prefer the richer payload: a registry-backed entry, then more
// template models. Keeps the "last/richer template wins" intent.
const score = (o: RuntimeOption) => (o.registryBacked ? 1000 : 0) + o.models.length;
const candidate: RuntimeOption = {
value: v,
label: r.name || v,
models,
providers,
registryBacked,
registryProviders,
registryModels,
};
if (!existing || score(candidate) > score(existing)) {
byRuntime.set(v, candidate);
if (!existing || models.length > existing.models.length) {
byRuntime.set(v, { value: v, label: r.name || v, models, providers });
}
}
if (byRuntime.size > 0) setRuntimeOptions(Array.from(byRuntime.values()));
@@ -634,13 +557,7 @@ export function ConfigTab({ workspaceId }: Props) {
// Models + env hints for the currently-selected runtime.
const selectedRuntime = runtimeOptions.find((o) => o.value === (config.runtime || "")) ?? null;
// Memoised so its identity is stable across renders — it feeds several
// useMemo dependency arrays below (registry/legacy catalog, selector models)
// and a fresh `[]` literal each render would defeat their memoisation.
const availableModels: ModelSpec[] = useMemo(
() => selectedRuntime?.models ?? [],
[selectedRuntime?.models],
);
const availableModels: ModelSpec[] = selectedRuntime?.models ?? [];
// Provider suggestions for the legacy free-text input fallback (used
// when /templates returned no models for this runtime, e.g. hermes
// workspaces). Prefer the runtime's declarative providers list,
@@ -654,37 +571,9 @@ export function ConfigTab({ workspaceId }: Props) {
// Vendor-aware catalog shared with the selector. Memoised so the
// catalog identity is stable across renders (selector relies on it).
//
// internal#718 P3: when the runtime is registry-backed, build the catalog
// FROM the registry-served providers/models (display labels + billing +
// derived provider from the provider-registry SSOT) instead of re-inferring
// vendor from model-id prefixes. Falls back to the inferVendor heuristic
// for non-registry runtimes / older backends.
const registryBacked = selectedRuntime?.registryBacked ?? false;
const providerCatalog = useMemo(
() =>
registryBacked
? buildProviderCatalogFromRegistry(
selectedRuntime?.registryProviders ?? [],
selectedRuntime?.registryModels ?? [],
)
: buildProviderCatalog(availableModels),
[registryBacked, selectedRuntime?.registryProviders, selectedRuntime?.registryModels, availableModels],
);
// Models fed to the selector dropdown: the registry-served native set for a
// registry-backed runtime (so the dropdown can render no unregistered
// option), else the template-served models.
const selectorModels: ModelSpec[] = useMemo(
() =>
registryBacked
? (selectedRuntime?.registryModels ?? []).map((m) => ({
id: m.id,
name: m.name,
// carry the derived provider so the selector buckets correctly
...(m.provider ? { provider: m.provider } : {}),
}))
: availableModels,
[registryBacked, selectedRuntime?.registryModels, availableModels],
() => buildProviderCatalog(availableModels),
[availableModels],
);
// Derive the selector's current value from the form state. Provider
@@ -1004,10 +893,9 @@ export function ConfigTab({ workspaceId }: Props) {
— empty = "auto-derive from model slug" was the pre-PR-5
behavior; selecting any provider here writes LLM_PROVIDER
and triggers an auto-restart. */}
{selectorModels.length > 0 ? (
{availableModels.length > 0 ? (
<ProviderModelSelector
models={selectorModels}
catalog={registryBacked ? providerCatalog : undefined}
models={availableModels}
value={selectorValue}
onChange={(next) => {
setSelectorValue(next);
@@ -1020,7 +908,7 @@ export function ConfigTab({ workspaceId }: Props) {
setConfig((prev) => {
const v = next.model;
const prevModelId = prev.runtime_config?.model || prev.model || "";
const prevSpec = selectorModels.find((m) => m.id === prevModelId) ?? null;
const prevSpec = availableModels.find((m) => m.id === prevModelId) ?? null;
const prevRequired = prev.runtime_config?.required_env ?? [];
const wasTemplateDriven =
prevRequired.length === 0 ||
@@ -29,15 +29,8 @@ type FormState = {
displayMode: string;
displayProtocol: string;
resolution: string;
dataPersistence: string; // "" (auto) | "persist" | "ephemeral" — internal#734
};
// internal#734: per-workspace durable-data choice. "" = auto (desktop-control
// keeps data, others follow the org default). Human labels for the selector.
const DATA_PERSISTENCE_OPTIONS = ["", "persist", "ephemeral"];
const dataPersistenceLabel = (v: string): string =>
v === "persist" ? "Always keep (persist)" : v === "ephemeral" ? "Don't keep (ephemeral)" : "Auto";
export function ContainerConfigTab({ workspaceId, data }: Props) {
const runtime = data.runtime;
const instanceType = data.compute?.instance_type;
@@ -46,10 +39,9 @@ export function ContainerConfigTab({ workspaceId, data }: Props) {
const displayProtocol = data.compute?.display?.protocol;
const displayWidth = data.compute?.display?.width;
const displayHeight = data.compute?.display?.height;
const dataPersistence = data.compute?.data_persistence;
const initial = useMemo(
() => formFromData({ runtime, instanceType, rootGB, displayMode, displayProtocol, displayWidth, displayHeight, dataPersistence }),
[runtime, instanceType, rootGB, displayMode, displayProtocol, displayWidth, displayHeight, dataPersistence],
() => formFromData({ runtime, instanceType, rootGB, displayMode, displayProtocol, displayWidth, displayHeight }),
[runtime, instanceType, rootGB, displayMode, displayProtocol, displayWidth, displayHeight],
);
const [form, setForm] = useState<FormState>(initial);
const [saving, setSaving] = useState(false);
@@ -92,8 +84,6 @@ export function ContainerConfigTab({ workspaceId, data }: Props) {
display: form.displayEnabled
? { mode: form.displayMode, protocol: form.displayProtocol, width, height }
: { mode: "none" },
// internal#734: omit when "auto" so the wire/default behavior is unchanged.
...(form.dataPersistence ? { data_persistence: form.dataPersistence } : {}),
};
const resp = await api.patch<{ needs_restart?: boolean }>(`/workspaces/${workspaceId}`, {
@@ -186,18 +176,6 @@ export function ContainerConfigTab({ workspaceId, data }: Props) {
onChange={(resolution) => setForm((s) => ({ ...s, resolution }))}
/>
)}
<SelectField
id="data-persistence"
label="Saved data (cookies, downloads, memory)"
value={form.dataPersistence}
options={DATA_PERSISTENCE_OPTIONS}
optionLabel={dataPersistenceLabel}
onChange={(dataPersistence) => setForm((s) => ({ ...s, dataPersistence }))}
/>
<p className="-mt-1 text-[10px] leading-snug text-ink-soft">
Whether this workspace&apos;s data survives a restart/recreate. Auto keeps it for
browser (desktop) workspaces; Ephemeral never keeps it (privacy).
</p>
</div>
<div className="mt-4 flex items-center justify-end gap-2">
@@ -253,7 +231,6 @@ function formFromData(data: {
displayProtocol?: string;
displayWidth?: number;
displayHeight?: number;
dataPersistence?: string;
}): FormState {
const width = data.displayWidth ?? 1920;
const height = data.displayHeight ?? 1080;
@@ -266,7 +243,6 @@ function formFromData(data: {
displayMode: data.displayMode && data.displayMode !== "none" ? data.displayMode : "desktop-control",
displayProtocol: data.displayProtocol || "novnc",
resolution,
dataPersistence: data.dataPersistence || "",
};
}
+1 -19
View File
@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ export function DetailsTab({ workspaceId, data }: Props) {
const [peers, setPeers] = useState<PeerData[]>([]);
const [saving, setSaving] = useState(false);
const [confirmDelete, setConfirmDelete] = useState(false);
const [eraseData, setEraseData] = useState(false); // internal#734: erase saved data on delete
const [peersError, setPeersError] = useState<string | null>(null);
const [saveError, setSaveError] = useState<string | null>(null);
const [deleteError, setDeleteError] = useState<string | null>(null);
@@ -94,10 +93,7 @@ export function DetailsTab({ workspaceId, data }: Props) {
const handleDelete = async () => {
setDeleteError(null);
try {
// internal#734: erase_data=true asks the server to prune this workspace's
// durable data volume (cookies / downloads / memory). Default off keeps it
// for the orphan-sweeper grace.
await api.del(`/workspaces/${workspaceId}?confirm=true${eraseData ? "&erase_data=true" : ""}`, {
await api.del(`/workspaces/${workspaceId}?confirm=true`, {
headers: { "X-Confirm-Name": name },
});
// Mirror the server-side cascade — drop the row + every
@@ -327,19 +323,6 @@ export function DetailsTab({ workspaceId, data }: Props) {
<h3 id="delete-confirm-title" className="text-xs font-medium text-bad">
Confirm deletion
</h3>
<label className="flex items-start gap-2 text-[11px] text-ink-mid">
<input
type="checkbox"
aria-label="Also erase saved data"
checked={eraseData}
onChange={(e) => setEraseData(e.target.checked)}
className="mt-0.5 h-3.5 w-3.5 accent-red-600"
/>
<span>
Also erase saved data (cookies, downloads, agent memory). Cannot be undone.
Unchecked keeps it recoverable briefly.
</span>
</label>
<div className="flex gap-2">
<button
type="button"
@@ -356,7 +339,6 @@ export function DetailsTab({ workspaceId, data }: Props) {
onClick={() => {
setConfirmDelete(false);
setDeleteError(null);
setEraseData(false);
// Return focus to the trigger so keyboard users aren't stranded
deleteButtonRef.current?.focus();
}}
@@ -5,10 +5,9 @@ import React from "react";
import { BudgetSection } from "../BudgetSection";
import { api } from "@/lib/api";
// Multi-period budget (#49): the API now returns a `periods` map
// (hourly/daily/weekly/monthly), each {limit, spend, remaining} in USD cents.
// The UI renders one row per period and PATCHes {budget_limits:{period:cents|null}}.
// Queue-based mock for the api module. Each api call shifts from the queue.
// Tests push with qGet/qPatch and the module-level mockImplementation
// reads from the queue.
type QueueEntry = { body?: unknown; err?: Error };
const apiQueue: QueueEntry[] = [];
@@ -41,49 +40,45 @@ const WS_ID = "budget-test-ws";
function qGet(body: unknown) {
apiQueue.push({ body });
}
function qGetErr(status: number, msg: string) {
apiQueue.push({ err: new Error(`${msg}: ${status}`) });
}
function qPatch(body: unknown) {
apiQueue.push({ body });
}
function qPatchErr(status: number, msg: string) {
apiQueue.push({ err: new Error(`${msg}: ${status}`) });
}
type P = { limit: number | null; spend: number; remaining: number | null };
// makeBudget builds the periods response. Override any subset of periods.
function makeBudget(overrides: Partial<Record<"hourly" | "daily" | "weekly" | "monthly", Partial<P>>> = {}) {
const blank: P = { limit: null, spend: 0, remaining: null };
const mk = (o?: Partial<P>): P => {
const p = { ...blank, ...(o ?? {}) };
if (p.limit != null && p.remaining == null) p.remaining = p.limit - p.spend;
return p;
};
const periods = {
hourly: mk(overrides.hourly),
daily: mk(overrides.daily),
weekly: mk(overrides.weekly),
monthly: mk(overrides.monthly),
};
function makeBudget(overrides: Partial<{
budget_limit: number | null;
budget_used: number;
budget_remaining: number | null;
}> = {}) {
return {
periods,
budget_limit: periods.monthly.limit,
monthly_spend: periods.monthly.spend,
budget_remaining: periods.monthly.remaining,
budget_limit: 10_000,
budget_used: 3_500,
budget_remaining: 6_500,
...overrides,
};
}
describe("BudgetSection (multi-period)", () => {
describe("BudgetSection", () => {
describe("loading state", () => {
it("shows loading indicator while fetching", async () => {
let resolveGet: (v: unknown) => void;
vi.mocked(api.get).mockImplementationOnce(
async () => new Promise((r) => { resolveGet = r as (v: unknown) => void; }),
);
render(<BudgetSection workspaceId={WS_ID} />);
expect(screen.getByTestId("budget-loading")).toBeTruthy();
// Resolve after render to verify state clears
resolveGet!(makeBudget());
await vi.waitFor(() => {
expect(screen.queryByTestId("budget-loading")).toBeNull();
@@ -94,16 +89,21 @@ describe("BudgetSection (multi-period)", () => {
describe("fetch error state", () => {
it("shows error message on non-402 fetch failure", async () => {
qGetErr(500, "Internal Server Error");
render(<BudgetSection workspaceId={WS_ID} />);
await vi.waitFor(() => {
expect(screen.getByTestId("budget-fetch-error")).toBeTruthy();
});
expect(screen.getByTestId("budget-fetch-error")!.textContent).toContain("500");
});
it("shows the exceeded banner (not a fetch error) on a 402", async () => {
it("shows 402 as exceeded banner, not fetch error", async () => {
// 402 means the budget limit was hit — different UX from a network/API error.
qGetErr(402, "Payment Required");
render(<BudgetSection workspaceId={WS_ID} />);
await vi.waitFor(() => {
expect(screen.getByTestId("budget-exceeded-banner")).toBeTruthy();
});
@@ -111,105 +111,220 @@ describe("BudgetSection (multi-period)", () => {
});
});
describe("rendering periods", () => {
it("renders all four period rows", async () => {
qGet(makeBudget());
describe("budget loaded — display", () => {
it("renders used / limit stats row", async () => {
qGet(makeBudget({ budget_limit: 10_000, budget_used: 3_500 }));
render(<BudgetSection workspaceId={WS_ID} />);
await vi.waitFor(() => {
for (const k of ["hourly", "daily", "weekly", "monthly"]) {
expect(screen.getByTestId(`budget-period-${k}`)).toBeTruthy();
}
expect(screen.getByTestId("budget-used-value")!.textContent).toBe("3,500");
});
expect(screen.getByTestId("budget-limit-value")!.textContent).toBe("10,000");
});
it("renders 'Unlimited' when budget_limit is null", async () => {
qGet(makeBudget({ budget_limit: null, budget_used: 1_000, budget_remaining: null }));
render(<BudgetSection workspaceId={WS_ID} />);
await vi.waitFor(() => {
expect(screen.getByTestId("budget-limit-value")!.textContent).toBe("Unlimited");
});
});
it("formats spend and limit as USD per period", async () => {
qGet(makeBudget({ monthly: { limit: 10_000, spend: 3_500 } }));
render(<BudgetSection workspaceId={WS_ID} />);
await vi.waitFor(() => {
expect(screen.getByTestId("budget-monthly-spend")!.textContent).toBe("$35.00");
});
expect(screen.getByTestId("budget-monthly-limit")!.textContent).toBe("$100.00");
});
it("renders remaining credits when present", async () => {
qGet(makeBudget({ budget_limit: 10_000, budget_used: 3_500, budget_remaining: 6_500 }));
it("shows ∞ for a period with no limit", async () => {
qGet(makeBudget({ hourly: { limit: null, spend: 1_000 } }));
render(<BudgetSection workspaceId={WS_ID} />);
await vi.waitFor(() => {
expect(screen.getByTestId("budget-hourly-limit")!.textContent).toBe("");
expect(screen.getByTestId("budget-remaining")!.textContent).toContain("6,500");
expect(screen.getByTestId("budget-remaining")!.textContent).toContain("credits remaining");
});
});
it("renders the progress bar only for periods with a limit", async () => {
qGet(makeBudget({ monthly: { limit: 10_000, spend: 12_000 }, hourly: { limit: null, spend: 5_000 } }));
it("omits remaining credits when budget_remaining is null", async () => {
qGet(makeBudget({ budget_limit: 10_000, budget_used: 3_500, budget_remaining: null }));
render(<BudgetSection workspaceId={WS_ID} />);
await vi.waitFor(() => {
expect(screen.getByTestId("budget-monthly-fill")).toBeTruthy();
expect(screen.queryByTestId("budget-remaining")).toBeNull();
});
});
it("caps progress bar at 100% when used > limit", async () => {
// Over-limit: 12000 used of 10000 limit should show 100%, not 120%.
qGet(makeBudget({ budget_limit: 10_000, budget_used: 12_000, budget_remaining: null }));
render(<BudgetSection workspaceId={WS_ID} />);
await vi.waitFor(() => {
const fill = screen.getByTestId("budget-progress-fill");
expect(fill.getAttribute("style")).toContain("100%");
});
});
it("omits progress bar when budget_limit is null (unlimited)", async () => {
qGet(makeBudget({ budget_limit: null, budget_used: 5_000, budget_remaining: null }));
render(<BudgetSection workspaceId={WS_ID} />);
await vi.waitFor(() => {
expect(screen.queryByTestId("budget-progress-fill")).toBeNull();
});
expect(screen.queryByTestId("budget-hourly-fill")).toBeNull();
// over-budget fill caps at 100%
const fill = screen.getByTestId("budget-monthly-fill") as HTMLElement;
expect(fill.style.width).toBe("100%");
});
});
describe("save", () => {
it("PATCHes budget_limits for all four periods and clears the exceeded banner", async () => {
qGet(makeBudget({ monthly: { limit: 10_000, spend: 3_500 } }));
qPatch(makeBudget({ hourly: { limit: 500, spend: 0 }, monthly: { limit: 20_000, spend: 0 } }));
describe("budget exceeded (402)", () => {
it("shows exceeded banner when load returns 402", async () => {
qGetErr(402, "Payment Required");
render(<BudgetSection workspaceId={WS_ID} />);
await vi.waitFor(() => {
expect(screen.getByTestId("budget-hourly-input")).toBeTruthy();
});
fireEvent.change(screen.getByTestId("budget-hourly-input"), { target: { value: "500" } });
fireEvent.click(screen.getByTestId("budget-save-btn"));
await vi.waitFor(() => {
expect(vi.mocked(api.patch)).toHaveBeenCalled();
});
const [, body] = vi.mocked(api.patch).mock.calls[0];
expect((body as { budget_limits: Record<string, number | null> }).budget_limits).toMatchObject({
hourly: 500,
monthly: 10_000, // unchanged input echoes the loaded limit
expect(screen.getByTestId("budget-exceeded-banner")).toBeTruthy();
expect(screen.getByTestId("budget-exceeded-banner")!.textContent).toContain("Budget exceeded");
});
});
it("shows a save error on non-402 PATCH failure", async () => {
it("clears exceeded banner after successful save", async () => {
qGetErr(402, "Payment Required");
qPatch(makeBudget({ budget_limit: 50_000, budget_used: 0, budget_remaining: 50_000 }));
render(<BudgetSection workspaceId={WS_ID} />);
await vi.waitFor(() => {
expect(screen.getByTestId("budget-exceeded-banner")).toBeTruthy();
});
const input = screen.getByTestId("budget-limit-input");
fireEvent.change(input, { target: { value: "50000" } });
const saveBtn = screen.getByTestId("budget-save-btn");
fireEvent.click(saveBtn);
await vi.waitFor(() => {
expect(screen.queryByTestId("budget-exceeded-banner")).toBeNull();
});
});
});
describe("save flow", () => {
it("shows save error on non-402 patch failure", async () => {
qGet(makeBudget());
qPatchErr(500, "Internal Server Error");
render(<BudgetSection workspaceId={WS_ID} />);
await vi.waitFor(() => {
expect(screen.getByTestId("budget-save-btn")).toBeTruthy();
expect(screen.getByTestId("budget-limit-input")).toBeTruthy();
});
fireEvent.click(screen.getByTestId("budget-save-btn"));
const saveBtn = screen.getByTestId("budget-save-btn");
fireEvent.click(saveBtn);
await vi.waitFor(() => {
expect(screen.getByTestId("budget-save-error")).toBeTruthy();
expect(screen.getByTestId("budget-save-error")!.textContent).toContain("500");
});
expect(screen.getByTestId("budget-save-error")!.textContent).toContain("500");
});
it("surfaces the exceeded banner on a 402 PATCH", async () => {
qGet(makeBudget());
qPatchErr(402, "Payment Required");
it("updates input to new limit value after successful save", async () => {
qGet(makeBudget({ budget_limit: 10_000 }));
qPatch(makeBudget({ budget_limit: 20_000 }));
render(<BudgetSection workspaceId={WS_ID} />);
// Wait for the input to appear (loading → loaded)
await vi.waitFor(() => {
expect(screen.getByTestId("budget-save-btn")).toBeTruthy();
expect(screen.queryByTestId("budget-loading")).toBeNull();
});
const input = screen.getByTestId("budget-limit-input") as HTMLInputElement;
// Debug: check what values are rendered
const limitValue = screen.getByTestId("budget-limit-value")?.textContent;
expect(input.value).toBe("10000"); // initial value from API
expect(limitValue).toBe("10,000");
fireEvent.change(input, { target: { value: "20000" } });
expect(input.value).toBe("20000");
fireEvent.click(screen.getByTestId("budget-save-btn"));
await vi.waitFor(() => {
expect((screen.getByTestId("budget-limit-input") as HTMLInputElement).value).toBe("20000");
});
});
it("sends null when input is cleared (unlimited)", async () => {
qGet(makeBudget({ budget_limit: 10_000 }));
qPatch(makeBudget({ budget_limit: null }));
render(<BudgetSection workspaceId={WS_ID} />);
await vi.waitFor(() => {
expect(screen.getByTestId("budget-limit-input")).toBeTruthy();
});
const input = screen.getByTestId("budget-limit-input") as HTMLInputElement;
fireEvent.change(input, { target: { value: "" } });
fireEvent.click(screen.getByTestId("budget-save-btn"));
await vi.waitFor(() => {
// After save with null limit, input should show empty (unlimited)
expect(input.value).toBe("");
});
});
it("shows saving state on button while patch is in flight", async () => {
qGet(makeBudget());
let resolvePatch: (v: unknown) => void;
vi.mocked(api.patch).mockImplementationOnce(
async () => new Promise((r) => { resolvePatch = r as (v: unknown) => void; }),
);
render(<BudgetSection workspaceId={WS_ID} />);
await vi.waitFor(() => {
expect(screen.getByTestId("budget-limit-input")).toBeTruthy();
});
fireEvent.change(screen.getByTestId("budget-limit-input"), { target: { value: "50000" } });
fireEvent.click(screen.getByTestId("budget-save-btn"));
const btn = screen.getByTestId("budget-save-btn");
expect(btn.textContent).toContain("Saving");
resolvePatch!(makeBudget({ budget_limit: 50_000 }));
await vi.waitFor(() => {
expect(btn.textContent).toContain("Save");
});
});
});
describe("isApiError402 — regression coverage", () => {
it("classifies ': 402' with space as 402", async () => {
qGetErr(402, "Payment Required");
qPatch(makeBudget());
render(<BudgetSection workspaceId={WS_ID} />);
await vi.waitFor(() => {
expect(screen.getByTestId("budget-exceeded-banner")).toBeTruthy();
});
});
});
describe("legacy payload back-compat", () => {
it("maps a pre-multi-period {budget_limit, monthly_spend} response to the monthly row", async () => {
qGet({ budget_limit: 5_000, monthly_spend: 1_000, budget_remaining: 4_000 });
it("classifies non-402 error messages as regular fetch errors", async () => {
qGetErr(503, "Service Unavailable");
render(<BudgetSection workspaceId={WS_ID} />);
await vi.waitFor(() => {
expect(screen.getByTestId("budget-monthly-limit")!.textContent).toBe("$50.00");
expect(screen.getByTestId("budget-fetch-error")).toBeTruthy();
});
expect(screen.getByTestId("budget-monthly-spend")!.textContent).toBe("$10.00");
expect(screen.queryByTestId("budget-exceeded-banner")).toBeNull();
});
});
});
@@ -1,87 +0,0 @@
// @vitest-environment jsdom
//
// Regression: project_canvas_runtime_dropdown_ssot_fix — a google-adk
// workspace's Config tab showed the wrong runtime ("LangGraph (default)"
// / first option) because a hardcoded frontend allowlist
// (SUPPORTED_RUNTIME_VALUES) dropped google-adk from the /templates-derived
// options even though the backend served it. A Save from that state would
// PATCH runtime to the wrong value and break the ADK agent.
//
// The fix: the dropdown is SSOT-driven — it trusts GET /templates (which the
// backend already gates to the manifest maintained set) and hides a runtime
// only when its row carries `displayable: false`. This pins: a google-adk
// workspace shows "google-adk" selected, and a displayable:false template is
// not offered.
import { describe, it, expect, vi, afterEach, beforeEach } from "vitest";
import { render, screen, cleanup, waitFor } from "@testing-library/react";
import React from "react";
afterEach(cleanup);
const apiGet = vi.fn();
const apiPatch = vi.fn();
const apiPut = vi.fn();
vi.mock("@/lib/api", () => ({
api: {
get: (path: string) => apiGet(path),
patch: (path: string, body: unknown) => apiPatch(path, body),
put: (path: string, body: unknown) => apiPut(path, body),
post: vi.fn(),
del: vi.fn(),
},
}));
vi.mock("@/store/canvas", () => ({
useCanvasStore: Object.assign(
(selector: (s: unknown) => unknown) => selector({ restartWorkspace: vi.fn(), updateNodeData: vi.fn() }),
{ getState: () => ({ restartWorkspace: vi.fn(), updateNodeData: vi.fn() }) },
),
}));
vi.mock("../AgentCardSection", () => ({
AgentCardSection: () => <div data-testid="agent-card-stub" />,
}));
import { ConfigTab } from "../ConfigTab";
function wireApi(templates: Array<{ id: string; name?: string; runtime?: string; models?: unknown[]; displayable?: boolean }>) {
apiGet.mockImplementation((path: string) => {
if (path === "/workspaces/ws-adk") return Promise.resolve({ runtime: "google-adk" });
if (path === "/workspaces/ws-adk/model") return Promise.resolve({ model: "vertex:gemini-2.5-pro" });
if (path === "/workspaces/ws-adk/files/config.yaml") return Promise.resolve({ content: "name: adk\nruntime: google-adk\n" });
if (path === "/templates") return Promise.resolve(templates);
return Promise.reject(new Error(`unmocked api.get: ${path}`));
});
}
beforeEach(() => {
apiGet.mockReset();
apiPatch.mockReset();
apiPut.mockReset();
});
describe("ConfigTab — google-adk runtime (SSOT dropdown)", () => {
it("shows google-adk selected in the runtime dropdown (#ssot-fix)", async () => {
wireApi([
{ id: "claude-code", name: "Claude Code", runtime: "claude-code", models: [] },
{ id: "google-adk", name: "Google ADK", runtime: "google-adk", models: [] },
]);
render(<ConfigTab workspaceId="ws-adk" />);
const select = await waitFor(() => screen.getByRole("combobox", { name: /runtime/i }));
expect((select as HTMLSelectElement).value).toBe("google-adk");
const opts = Array.from((select as HTMLSelectElement).options).map((o) => o.value);
expect(opts).toContain("google-adk");
});
it("hides a template flagged displayable:false", async () => {
wireApi([
{ id: "google-adk", name: "Google ADK", runtime: "google-adk", models: [] },
{ id: "legacy", name: "Legacy", runtime: "legacy", models: [], displayable: false },
]);
render(<ConfigTab workspaceId="ws-adk" />);
const select = await waitFor(() => screen.getByRole("combobox", { name: /runtime/i }));
const opts = Array.from((select as HTMLSelectElement).options).map((o) => o.value);
expect(opts).toContain("google-adk");
expect(opts).not.toContain("legacy");
});
});
@@ -1,78 +0,0 @@
// @vitest-environment jsdom
//
// internal#718 P3 (retire-list #5) — the billing-mode the Config tab shows /
// sends must reflect the DERIVED provider per the registry, not the hardcoded
// billingModeForProvider("" | "platform" → platform_managed else byok) rule.
// When the runtime is registry-backed, billingModeForSelectedProvider reads the
// registry-served billing_mode off the provider catalog entry. The hardcoded
// rule remains only as the fallback for non-registry runtimes / older backends.
import { describe, it, expect } from "vitest";
import { billingModeForSelectedProvider, billingModeForProvider } from "../ConfigTab";
import {
buildProviderCatalogFromRegistry,
type RegistryProvider,
type RegistryModel,
} from "../../ProviderModelSelector";
const REGISTRY_PROVIDERS: RegistryProvider[] = [
{ name: "anthropic-oauth", display_name: "Claude Code subscription", auth_env: ["CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN"], billing_mode: "byok" },
{ name: "platform", display_name: "Platform", auth_env: ["ANTHROPIC_API_KEY"], billing_mode: "platform_managed" },
// DISCRIMINATING fixture (review #7790): a provider whose registry-served
// billing_mode DISAGREES with the hardcoded name-based rule. Its name is not
// "platform"/"" so billingModeForProvider() would call it "byok", yet the
// registry serves "platform_managed" (the federation-ready shape the SSOT is
// built for — a managed provider that isn't literally named "platform").
// billingModeForSelectedProvider MUST return the REGISTRY value here; the
// only way to get "platform_managed" out is to honor the catalog, so this
// case fails if the impl ever regresses to the hardcoded rule.
{ name: "managed-federated", display_name: "Managed (federated)", auth_env: [], billing_mode: "platform_managed" },
];
const REGISTRY_MODELS: RegistryModel[] = [
{ id: "sonnet", provider: "anthropic-oauth", billing_mode: "byok" },
{ id: "anthropic/claude-opus-4-7", provider: "platform", billing_mode: "platform_managed" },
// model bucketed under the disagreeing provider so the catalog builds an
// entry for it (buildProviderCatalogFromRegistry only emits a provider entry
// for providers that own at least one model).
{ id: "managed/some-model", provider: "managed-federated", billing_mode: "platform_managed" },
];
describe("billingModeForSelectedProvider (registry-driven)", () => {
const catalog = buildProviderCatalogFromRegistry(REGISTRY_PROVIDERS, REGISTRY_MODELS);
it("reads platform_managed from the registry for the platform provider", () => {
expect(billingModeForSelectedProvider("platform", catalog)).toBe("platform_managed");
});
it("reads byok from the registry for a BYOK provider", () => {
// anthropic-oauth derives to byok via the REGISTRY. (Note: the hardcoded
// rule would ALSO say byok for this non-'platform' name, so on its own this
// assertion does NOT prove the registry is authoritative — it agrees either
// way. The registry-WINS proof is the disagreement case below.)
expect(billingModeForSelectedProvider("anthropic-oauth", catalog)).toBe("byok");
});
it("lets the registry billing_mode WIN when it disagrees with the hardcoded rule", () => {
// 'managed-federated' is not '' / 'platform', so the legacy name-based rule
// classifies it byok — but the registry serves platform_managed. The
// registry is the SSOT, so billingModeForSelectedProvider must return
// platform_managed. This is the discriminating case: it FAILS if the impl
// regresses to billingModeForProvider (which would return byok here).
expect(billingModeForProvider("managed-federated")).toBe("byok"); // sanity: the rules genuinely disagree
expect(billingModeForSelectedProvider("managed-federated", catalog)).toBe("platform_managed");
});
it("falls back to the hardcoded rule when no registry catalog is supplied", () => {
// Non-registry runtime / older backend → catalog empty/undefined → the
// legacy mapping still applies ('' | 'platform' → platform_managed).
expect(billingModeForSelectedProvider("", undefined)).toBe("platform_managed");
expect(billingModeForSelectedProvider("platform", undefined)).toBe("platform_managed");
expect(billingModeForSelectedProvider("minimax", undefined)).toBe("byok");
});
it("falls back to the hardcoded rule when the provider is not in the registry catalog", () => {
// A provider string the registry catalog doesn't carry (stale saved
// value) → fall back to the legacy rule rather than guessing.
expect(billingModeForSelectedProvider("some-byo-vendor", catalog)).toBe("byok");
});
});
@@ -297,25 +297,6 @@ describe("DetailsTab — delete workflow", () => {
expect(mockSelectNode).toHaveBeenCalledWith(null);
});
// internal#734: checking "also erase saved data" adds &erase_data=true so the
// server prunes the data volume. Default (unchecked) must NOT send it.
it("checking erase-saved-data sends erase_data=true on delete", async () => {
mockApi.del.mockResolvedValue(undefined);
render(<DetailsTab workspaceId="ws-1" data={data()} />);
await flush();
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: /delete workspace/i }));
await flush();
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("checkbox", { name: /erase saved data/i }));
const confirmBtn = Array.from(document.querySelectorAll("button")).find(
(b) => b.textContent === "Confirm Delete",
) as HTMLButtonElement;
fireEvent(confirmBtn, new MouseEvent("click", { bubbles: true }));
await flush();
expect(mockApi.del).toHaveBeenCalledWith("/workspaces/ws-1?confirm=true&erase_data=true", {
headers: { "X-Confirm-Name": "Test Workspace" },
});
});
it("cancelling delete returns to view mode", async () => {
mockApi.del.mockResolvedValue(undefined);
render(<DetailsTab workspaceId="ws-1" data={data()} />);
-1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@
const RUNTIME_NAMES: Record<string, string> = {
"claude-code": "Claude Code",
codex: "Codex",
"google-adk": "Google ADK",
hermes: "Hermes",
openclaw: "OpenClaw",
kimi: "Kimi",
-3
View File
@@ -368,9 +368,6 @@ export interface WorkspaceCompute {
width?: number;
height?: number;
};
// internal#734: per-workspace durable-data choice. "persist" | "ephemeral" |
// undefined (auto). Controls whether the data volume survives recreate.
data_persistence?: string;
}
let socket: ReconnectingSocket | null = null;
+6 -6
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# Molecule AI — Comprehensive Technical Documentation
> Definitive technical reference for the Molecule AI Agent Team platform.
> Based on a full non-invasive scan of the [molecule-core](https://git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-core) repository.
> Based on a full non-invasive scan of the [molecule-monorepo](https://git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-monorepo) repository.
---
@@ -1131,11 +1131,11 @@ Molecule AI's workspace abstraction is **runtime-agnostic by design**. A workspa
## Links
- **GitHub**: https://git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-core
- **Architecture Docs**: https://git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-core/src/branch/main/docs/architecture
- **API Protocol**: https://git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-core/src/branch/main/docs/api-protocol
- **Agent Runtime**: https://git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-core/src/branch/main/docs/agent-runtime
- **Product Docs**: https://git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-core/src/branch/main/docs/product
- **GitHub**: https://git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-monorepo
- **Architecture Docs**: https://git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-monorepo/src/branch/main/docs/architecture
- **API Protocol**: https://git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-monorepo/src/branch/main/docs/api-protocol
- **Agent Runtime**: https://git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-monorepo/src/branch/main/docs/agent-runtime
- **Product Docs**: https://git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-monorepo/src/branch/main/docs/product
---
+1 -1
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@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ DATABASE_URL=postgres://dev:dev@postgres:5432/molecule?sslmode=prefer
REDIS_URL=redis://redis:6379
PORT=8080
SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY=dev-key-change-in-production
WORKSPACE_DIR=/path/to/molecule-core # Optional global fallback; prefer per-workspace workspace_dir in org.yaml or API
WORKSPACE_DIR=/path/to/molecule-monorepo # Optional global fallback; prefer per-workspace workspace_dir in org.yaml or API
```
### Canvas (Next.js)
+5 -3
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@@ -16,9 +16,11 @@ workspace container running on it) over an [EC2 Instance Connect
Endpoint](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/ec2-instance-connect-setup-ec2-instance-connect-endpoint.html).
End users see a terminal; no direct public SSH ingress is required.
Tracking: originally `molecule-core#1528` (resolved 2026-04-22). Future
terminal work is tracked in `molecule-core` issues (workspace-server scope)
and in `molecule-controlplane` issues for the EIC / per-tenant SG path.
Tracking: originally `molecule-core#1528` (resolved 2026-04-22). The
`molecule-core` repo has since been renamed to `molecule-monorepo` and no
longer accepts new issues under the old name; future terminal work is
tracked in `molecule-monorepo` issues (workspace-server scope) and in
`molecule-controlplane` issues for the EIC / per-tenant SG path.
## Where things are
+1 -1
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@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ When opencode connects to the Molecule MCP endpoint, the agent gains access to:
"tool": "delegate_task",
"arguments": {
"target": "research-lead",
"task": "Summarise the last 7 days of commits in Molecule-AI/molecule-core"
"task": "Summarise the last 7 days of commits in Molecule-AI/molecule-monorepo"
}
}
```
+7 -7
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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# Internal content policy
The `Molecule-AI/molecule-core` repo is **public**. Anything internal
The `Molecule-AI/molecule-monorepo` repo is **public**. Anything internal
(positioning, competitive briefs, sales playbooks, PMM/press drip, draft
campaigns, raw research notes, ops runbooks, retrospectives) lives in
**`Molecule-AI/internal`**.
@@ -18,14 +18,14 @@ This page is the canonical decision tree.
| Draft campaign asset (still iterating, not yet customer-visible) | `Molecule-AI/internal/marketing/campaigns/` |
| Roadmap discussion, planning doc, retrospective | `Molecule-AI/internal/PLAN.md` or `Molecule-AI/internal/retrospectives/` |
| Runbook, ops procedure, incident postmortem | `Molecule-AI/internal/runbooks/` |
| **Public-ready** blog post (final draft, ready to ship to docs site) | `Molecule-AI/molecule-core/docs/blog/` |
| **Public-ready** tutorial / quickstart | `Molecule-AI/molecule-core/docs/tutorials/` |
| Public DevRel content (code samples, demos for users) | `Molecule-AI/molecule-core/docs/devrel/` |
| API reference, architecture docs for external developers | `Molecule-AI/molecule-core/docs/api/` |
| **Public-ready** blog post (final draft, ready to ship to docs site) | `Molecule-AI/molecule-monorepo/docs/blog/` |
| **Public-ready** tutorial / quickstart | `Molecule-AI/molecule-monorepo/docs/tutorials/` |
| Public DevRel content (code samples, demos for users) | `Molecule-AI/molecule-monorepo/docs/devrel/` |
| API reference, architecture docs for external developers | `Molecule-AI/molecule-monorepo/docs/api/` |
| Code, tests, infrastructure | wherever is appropriate inside this repo |
**Rule of thumb:** *"Would I be comfortable if a competitor / journalist / customer
read this verbatim today?"* — yes → `molecule-core/docs/`. No / not yet → `internal/`.
read this verbatim today?"* — yes → `monorepo/docs/`. No / not yet → `internal/`.
## Why
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ git push -u origin HEAD
gh pr create --base main --fill
```
Yes, this is more steps than `cd molecule-core && git add research/foo.md`.
Yes, this is more steps than `cd molecule-monorepo && git add research/foo.md`.
That cost is intentional: the friction is the point. Public space and
internal space are different products with different audiences and
different durability guarantees.
+4 -4
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@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ This path is aligned to the current repository and current UI. It gets you from
## The one-command path
```bash
git clone https://git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-core.git
cd molecule-core
git clone https://git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-monorepo.git
cd molecule-monorepo
./scripts/dev-start.sh
```
@@ -42,8 +42,8 @@ If you'd rather run each component yourself — useful when you're iterating on
### Step 1: Clone the repository
```bash
git clone https://git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-core.git
cd molecule-core
git clone https://git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-monorepo.git
cd molecule-monorepo
```
### Step 2: Start the shared infrastructure
@@ -1,124 +0,0 @@
# Engineer-Agent Gitea Token Scope Runbook
## Symptom
Engineer-class agents (e.g. `agent-dev-a`, `agent-dev-b`) fail swarm-pull issue discovery or receive HTTP 403 when calling Gitea issue-list APIs, while PR review and repository API operations continue to work.
Typical failing call:
```bash
GET /api/v1/repos/molecule-ai/molecule-core/issues?state=open&labels=approved&limit=50
# => 403 Forbidden
```
Typical working calls (same token):
```bash
GET /api/v1/repos/molecule-ai/molecule-core/pulls?state=open&limit=50
POST /api/v1/repos/molecule-ai/molecule-core/pulls/1666/comments
# => 200 OK
```
## Root Cause
Gitea v1.22.6 routes issue-list under the `Issue` scope category (`routers/api/v1/api.go:1379-1491`), while PR routes live under repository/pull routing (`api.go:1278-1305`). The scope gate derives required read/write level from HTTP method (`api.go:309-313`), so `GET /issues?...` requires `read:issue`.
Engineer-class agent PATs were provisioned with repository and PR scopes but without `read:issue`, causing the asymmetric 403.
## Detection
1. **Agent-side**: swarm-pull workflow logs show `403 Forbidden` on issue enumeration but not on PR list/review.
2. **Platform-side**: Gitea access logs show `GET /repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues` returning 403 for the affected token.
3. **Reproduction** (from any workspace with a suspected token):
```bash
TOKEN=$(cat /configs/secrets.d/GITEA_TOKEN)
PLATFORM="https://git.moleculesai.app"
# Should succeed — confirms token is live
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \
-H "Authorization: token $TOKEN" \
"$PLATFORM/api/v1/user"
# Will 403 if the token lacks read:issue
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \
-H "Authorization: token $TOKEN" \
"$PLATFORM/api/v1/repos/molecule-ai/molecule-core/issues?state=open&limit=1"
```
## Immediate Fix
### Step 1: Issue fresh PATs with correct scopes
From a Gitea site-admin account (or via the Gitea web UI → Settings → Applications):
1. Navigate to the affected user's profile (e.g. `agent-dev-a`).
2. Go to **Settings → Applications → Generate New Token**.
3. Select scopes:
- `read:repository` (existing)
- `write:repository` (existing, if push is required)
- `read:issue` (**add this**)
- `write:issue` (add only if agents must comment/edit issues)
- `read:pull-request` / `write:pull-request` (existing)
- `read:comment` / `write:comment` (existing, if PR review is required)
4. Copy the plaintext token immediately — it is shown only once.
### Step 2: Update workspace secrets
For each affected engineer workspace, update the Gitea token secret:
```bash
# Via the platform API (admin auth required)
PLATFORM="https://agents-team.moleculesai.app"
ADMIN_TOKEN="<your-admin-token>"
WORKSPACE_ID="<affected-workspace-id>"
NEW_GITEA_TOKEN="<fresh-token-from-step-1>"
curl -X POST "$PLATFORM/workspaces/$WORKSPACE_ID/secrets" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $ADMIN_TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{
\"GITEA_TOKEN\": \"$NEW_GITEA_TOKEN\"
}"
```
Restart the workspace so the runtime re-reads secrets:
```bash
curl -X POST "$PLATFORM/workspaces/$WORKSPACE_ID/restart" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $ADMIN_TOKEN"
```
### Step 3: Smoke-test
From the restarted workspace, verify all three paths:
```bash
# 1. Issue list (the previously failing path)
curl -s -H "Authorization: token $GITEA_TOKEN" \
"https://git.moleculesai.app/api/v1/repos/molecule-ai/molecule-core/issues?state=open&labels=approved&limit=1" | jq '.[0].number'
# 2. PR list (should still work)
curl -s -H "Authorization: token $GITEA_TOKEN" \
"https://git.moleculesai.app/api/v1/repos/molecule-ai/molecule-core/pulls?state=open&limit=1" | jq '.[0].number'
# 3. Swarm-pull discovery (end-to-end)
# Trigger the agent's autonomous tick or delegate a task that enumerates open issues.
```
## Long-Term Fix
Update the **workspace secret injection path** that writes `/configs/secrets.d/GITEA_TOKEN` for engineer-class agents. The provisioning template or secret-distribution job should request `read:issue` (and optionally `write:issue`) at token-creation time.
File locations to audit:
- `.gitea/scripts/` — any token-provisioning automation
- `infra/terraform/` or equivalent — IAM/secret-manager templates
- `workspace-configs-templates/` — engineer-class workspace templates that declare required secrets
## Prevention
1. **Token scope checklist**: when provisioning new engineer-class agent tokens, verify the scope set includes `read:issue` before distributing the secret.
2. **Monitoring**: add an agent health-check that probes `GET /repos/molecule-ai/molecule-core/issues?limit=1` and surfaces a non-fatal warning if it returns 403.
3. **Documentation**: update the onboarding runbook for new engineer agents to include the full required scope list.
## References
- Gitea issue #1750: [RCA: engineer-token read:issue scope gap blocks swarm-pull workflow](https://git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-core/issues/1750)
- Gitea source: `routers/api/v1/api.go:309-313` (scope gate), `api.go:1278-1305` (PR routing), `api.go:1379-1491` (issue routing)
- Related: PR #1542 (provisioner git-creds injection), PR #1669 (auth_token inline mint)
-11
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@@ -1,16 +1,5 @@
# Running a Gemini CLI Workspace on Molecule AI
> **⚠️ Accuracy correction (2026-05-29):** this page is **aspirational, not
> shipped.** There is **no `gemini-cli` runtime** in `manifest.json` or the
> provisioner's `knownRuntimes`, and the "PR #379" cited below is unrelated (a
> CI-workflow-cleanup PR, not a gemini-cli adapter). Do not follow this as-is.
>
> **For Gemini on Molecule, use the real `google-adk` runtime instead** — see
> [`google-adk-runtime.md`](./google-adk-runtime.md) (ADK engine + Gemini on
> Vertex AI/AI Studio), implemented in PR
> [`molecule-ai-workspace-template-google-adk#1`](https://git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-ai-workspace-template-google-adk) per RFC `internal#730`.
> This gemini-cli page is retained only until it's either implemented for real or removed.
Molecule AI now ships a `gemini-cli` runtime adapter alongside the existing `claude-code` adapter. This tutorial walks you from zero to a running Gemini agent workspace in under five minutes.
## What you'll need
+57 -52
View File
@@ -1,69 +1,74 @@
# Running a Google ADK Workspace on Molecule AI
> **Status (2026-05-29):** the `google-adk` runtime is **landing**, not yet on
> `main`. It's implemented in the template repo
> [`molecule-ai-workspace-template-google-adk`](https://git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-ai-workspace-template-google-adk)
> (PR **#1**) with platform registration in molecule-core PR **#2003** and the
> validator allowlist in molecule-ci PR **#26**. Design + approval: RFC
> [`internal#730`](https://git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/internal/issues/730).
> Remove this banner once those PRs merge.
>
> **Doc-accuracy note:** a prior version of this page claimed ADK was "already
> first-class" and cited "PR #550" — that PR is unrelated (a MemoryTab test
> suite). No `google-adk` adapter existed at that time. This rewrite reflects
> the real implementation.
Google's Agent Development Kit (ADK) is now a first-class runtime on Molecule AI. This tutorial walks you from zero to a running ADK agent workspace — one that persists per-conversation session state and sits alongside your Claude Code and Gemini CLI workers in the same A2A network.
Google's Agent Development Kit (ADK) runs as a Molecule AI workspace runtime:
ADK is the **agent engine** (`LlmAgent` + `Runner`), and the workspace
participates in Molecule's A2A org like any other runtime.
## What you'll need
## How it actually works
- A Molecule AI account with at least one provisioned tenant
- A `GOOGLE_API_KEY` from [aistudio.google.com](https://aistudio.google.com) (or Vertex AI credentials — see below)
- `curl` + `jq`
- **ADK = engine only.** The adapter builds an ADK `LlmAgent` from the
workspace config (model + system prompt + tools) and drives its `Runner`.
It installs `google-adk[mcp]==2.1.0` and **never** the `[a2a]` extra — ADK's
a2a layer pins `a2a-sdk<0.4`, which is incompatible with the platform's
`a2a-sdk>=1.0`. (Verified: `google-adk[mcp]==2.1.0` + `a2a-sdk 1.0.3` coexist.)
- **A2A** is provided by the platform's a2a-1.x server; a Molecule-authored
executor bridges ADK's `Runner` event stream onto it, one ADK session per
A2A `context_id`.
- **Tools** reach the agent via ADK's native `McpToolset` pointed at the
workspace's `a2a_mcp_server` — the same MCP surface the CLI runtimes use
(`delegate_task`, `commit_memory`, `list_peers`, …). No LangChain.
## Auth — Vertex AI via ADC (keyless), or an AI Studio key
The runtime supports both google-genai auth paths:
- **Vertex AI + Application Default Credentials (recommended; required if your
org disallows API keys).** Set `model: vertex:gemini-2.5-pro` and provide
`GOOGLE_CLOUD_PROJECT`; the adapter sets `GOOGLE_GENAI_USE_VERTEXAI=1` and
google-genai authenticates via ADC — no API key. (Locally:
`gcloud auth application-default login`.)
- **AI Studio API key** (where your org permits API keys): set
`model: google_genai:gemini-2.5-pro` and `GOOGLE_API_KEY`.
## Create a workspace
## Setup
```bash
# Vertex AI + ADC (keyless)
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/workspaces \
# 1. Store your Google API key as a global secret
curl -s -X PUT http://localhost:8080/settings/secrets \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"key":"GOOGLE_API_KEY","value":"YOUR-AI-STUDIO-KEY"}' | jq .
# 2. Create a google-adk workspace
WS=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/workspaces \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"name": "adk-agent",
"role": "Google ADK inference worker",
"runtime": "google-adk",
"model": "vertex:gemini-2.5-pro",
"runtime_config": {"required_env": ["GOOGLE_CLOUD_PROJECT"]}
}'
"model": "google:gemini-2.0-flash"
}' | jq -r '.id')
echo "Workspace: $WS"
# 3. Wait for ready (~30s)
until curl -s http://localhost:8080/workspaces/$WS | jq -r '.status' | grep -q ready; do
echo "Waiting..."; sleep 5
done
# 4. Send your first task
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/workspaces/$WS/a2a \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":"1","method":"message/send",
"params":{"message":{"role":"user","parts":[{"kind":"text",
"text":"Summarise the ADK architecture in 3 bullet points."}]}}}' \
| jq '.result.parts[0].text'
# 5. Multi-turn — session state is preserved across calls
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/workspaces/$WS/a2a \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":"2","method":"message/send",
"params":{"message":{"role":"user","parts":[{"kind":"text",
"text":"Now give me a one-line TL;DR of what you just said."}]}}}' \
| jq '.result.parts[0].text'
# 6. Vertex AI alternative — set these instead of GOOGLE_API_KEY
# curl -X PUT .../secrets -d '{"key":"GOOGLE_GENAI_USE_VERTEXAI","value":"1"}'
# curl -X PUT .../secrets -d '{"key":"GOOGLE_CLOUD_PROJECT","value":"my-project"}'
# curl -X PUT .../secrets -d '{"key":"GOOGLE_CLOUD_LOCATION","value":"us-central1"}'
```
Send it a task via the A2A proxy (`POST /workspaces/:id/a2a`, JSON-RPC
`message/send`) and it replies through the ADK `Runner`. Verified end-to-end:
a Gemini 2.5 round-trip on Vertex via ADC returns through the built image.
## Expected output
After step 4, ADK streams the Gemini response through its event bus, filters for `is_final_response()` events, and returns the agent's reply as a standard A2A text part. Step 5 should reference the prior answer — the adapter ties each A2A `context_id` to an `InMemorySessionService` session, so conversation state is isolated per task context and survives across calls within the same session.
## How it works
The `google-adk` adapter wraps Google ADK's runner/session model behind the same `AgentExecutor` interface used by every other Molecule AI runtime. On each turn, `GoogleADKA2AExecutor` calls `runner.run_async()` with the incoming message wrapped in a `google.genai.types.Content` object, then drains the event stream until it collects a final-response event. The `google:` model prefix is stripped before being passed to ADK — so `google:gemini-2.0-flash` in your workspace config becomes `gemini-2.0-flash` in the ADK `LlmAgent`. Error class names are sanitized before leaving the executor; raw Google SDK stack traces never reach the A2A caller.
## Mixed-runtime teams
ADK workspaces participate in the same A2A network as Claude Code, Gemini CLI, Hermes, and LangGraph workers. An orchestrator can delegate long-context summarisation to a `google-adk` worker (Gemini 1.5 Pro's 1M token window) while routing tool-use tasks to a `claude-code` worker — with no provider-specific code in the orchestrator itself. Add an ADK peer with `POST /workspaces`, set `GOOGLE_API_KEY`, and it's available for `delegate_task` immediately.
## Related
- Template + adapter: [`molecule-ai-workspace-template-google-adk`](https://git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-ai-workspace-template-google-adk) (PR #1)
- Platform registration: molecule-core PR #2003 · validator: molecule-ci PR #26
- Design/approval: RFC [`internal#730`](https://git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/internal/issues/730)
- PR #550: [feat(adapters): add google-adk runtime adapter](https://git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-core/pull/550)
- [Google ADK (adk-python)](https://github.com/google/adk-python)
- [Gemini CLI runtime tutorial](./gemini-cli-runtime.md)
- [Platform API reference](../api-reference.md)
-1
View File
@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@
{"name": "hermes", "repo": "molecule-ai/molecule-ai-workspace-template-hermes", "ref": "main"},
{"name": "openclaw", "repo": "molecule-ai/molecule-ai-workspace-template-openclaw", "ref": "main"},
{"name": "codex", "repo": "molecule-ai/molecule-ai-workspace-template-codex", "ref": "main"},
{"name": "google-adk", "repo": "molecule-ai/molecule-ai-workspace-template-google-adk", "ref": "main"},
{"name": "seo-agent", "repo": "molecule-ai/molecule-ai-workspace-template-seo-agent", "ref": "main"}
],
"org_templates": [
+3 -1
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@@ -93,7 +93,9 @@ def _gitea_get(path: str, params: dict[str, str] | None = None) -> bytes | None:
try:
# S310 (信任boundary): this function IS the outbound HTTP client for
# Gitea API calls. The call is intentional and controlled — we build
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=20) as resp: # noqa: S310 # explicit timeout + error handling; bandit false positive
# the request ourselves and handle errors explicitly. Timeout=20s
# prevents indefinite hangs.
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=20) as resp: # noqa: S310
return resp.read()
except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
sys.stderr.write(f"Gitea API HTTP {e.code} on {path}: {e.reason}\n")
+7 -30
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@@ -1,13 +1,12 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# E2E test: A2A round-trip parity across all five runtimes.
# E2E test: A2A round-trip parity across all four runtimes.
#
# Validates that for each of {claude-code, hermes, codex, openclaw, google-adk}:
# Validates that for each of {claude-code, hermes, codex, openclaw}:
# 1. A workspace can be provisioned + brought online
# 2. The adapter responds to A2A message/send
# 3. The reply contains expected content (echo of the prompt)
# 4. A SECOND message preserves session state where the runtime
# supports it (currently: hermes via plugin path; google-adk via
# ADK InMemorySessionService keyed on A2A context_id)
# supports it (currently: hermes via plugin path)
#
# Targets a SaaS tenant subdomain. Provisions workspaces in the calling
# tenant, runs the round-trip, deletes them on success.
@@ -17,10 +16,6 @@
# (e.g. https://demo-tenant.staging.moleculesai.app)
# - $OPENROUTER_API_KEY (or $HERMES_API_KEY) for non-claude runtimes
# - $OPENAI_API_KEY for claude-code peer
# - $GOOGLE_API_KEY (AI Studio) for google-adk — the org disallows API
# keys in PROD (Vertex+ADC there), but CI auths Gemini with an
# AI-Studio key (config model google_genai:gemini-2.5-pro). Vertex
# stays supported; this is the keyed CI path only.
# - SaaS edge requires Origin header — see auto-memory
# reference_saas_waf_origin_header.md
#
@@ -29,13 +24,12 @@
# ./scripts/test-all-runtimes-a2a-e2e.sh
#
# Skip individual runtimes:
# SKIP_HERMES=1 SKIP_OPENCLAW=1 SKIP_GOOGLE_ADK=1 ./scripts/test-all-runtimes-a2a-e2e.sh
# SKIP_HERMES=1 SKIP_OPENCLAW=1 ./scripts/test-all-runtimes-a2a-e2e.sh
set -euo pipefail
PLATFORM="${PLATFORM:-${1:-http://localhost:8080}}"
HERMES_PROVIDER_KEY="${OPENROUTER_API_KEY:-${HERMES_API_KEY:-}}"
PEER_OPENAI_KEY="${OPENAI_API_KEY:-}"
GOOGLE_ADK_KEY="${GOOGLE_API_KEY:-}"
# SaaS auth chain — TENANT_ADMIN_TOKEN + TENANT_ORG_ID required when
# hitting *.moleculesai.app (per-tenant ADMIN_TOKEN, NOT
# CP_ADMIN_API_TOKEN). Optional for localhost.
@@ -54,10 +48,6 @@ if [ -z "$HERMES_PROVIDER_KEY" ] && [ -z "${SKIP_HERMES:-}${SKIP_CODEX:-}${SKIP_
echo "FAIL: set OPENROUTER_API_KEY or HERMES_API_KEY for non-claude runtimes"
exit 2
fi
if [ -z "$GOOGLE_ADK_KEY" ] && [ -z "${SKIP_GOOGLE_ADK:-}" ]; then
echo "FAIL: set GOOGLE_API_KEY (AI Studio) for google-adk, or SKIP_GOOGLE_ADK=1"
exit 2
fi
PASS=0
FAIL=0
@@ -153,7 +143,7 @@ echo "=========================================="
echo ""
# -------------------------------------------------------
# 1. Provision the five runtimes (skip via SKIP_* flags)
# 1. Provision the four runtimes (skip via SKIP_* flags)
# -------------------------------------------------------
echo "--- 1. Provision workspaces ---"
if [ -z "${SKIP_CLAUDE_CODE:-}" ]; then
@@ -172,10 +162,6 @@ if [ -z "${SKIP_OPENCLAW:-}" ]; then
WS_IDS[openclaw]=$(provision "ParityOpenClaw" "openclaw" "openclaw peer")
echo " openclaw: ${WS_IDS[openclaw]}"
fi
if [ -z "${SKIP_GOOGLE_ADK:-}" ]; then
WS_IDS[google-adk]=$(provision "ParityGoogleADK" "google-adk" "google-adk peer")
echo " google-adk: ${WS_IDS[google-adk]}"
fi
# -------------------------------------------------------
# 2. Set provider keys
@@ -191,12 +177,6 @@ if [ -n "${WS_IDS[claude-code]:-}" ] && [ -n "$PEER_OPENAI_KEY" ]; then
set_secret "${WS_IDS[claude-code]}" "OPENAI_API_KEY" "$PEER_OPENAI_KEY"
echo " claude-code: OPENAI_API_KEY set"
fi
if [ -n "${WS_IDS[google-adk]:-}" ] && [ -n "$GOOGLE_ADK_KEY" ]; then
# AI-Studio path: the adapter reads GOOGLE_API_KEY natively when the
# config model is google_genai:gemini-2.5-pro (see _routing.resolve_model).
set_secret "${WS_IDS[google-adk]}" "GOOGLE_API_KEY" "$GOOGLE_ADK_KEY"
echo " google-adk: GOOGLE_API_KEY set"
fi
# -------------------------------------------------------
# 3. Wait for online
@@ -208,9 +188,6 @@ for runtime in "${!WS_IDS[@]}"; do
[ -z "$id" ] && continue
max=60
[ "$runtime" = "hermes" ] && max=120
# google-adk's first cold boot pulls a large fresh ADK image — give it
# a hermes-class window so a slow first pull doesn't read as "failed".
[ "$runtime" = "google-adk" ] && max=180
if wait_online "$id" "$runtime" "$max"; then
check "$runtime online" "ok" "ok"
else
@@ -223,7 +200,7 @@ done
# -------------------------------------------------------
echo ""
echo "--- 4. A2A round-trip (first message) ---"
for runtime in claude-code hermes codex openclaw google-adk; do
for runtime in claude-code hermes codex openclaw; do
id="${WS_IDS[$runtime]:-}"
[ -z "$id" ] && continue
reply=$(a2a_send "$id" "Reply with just the word OK so we know you got this.")
@@ -236,7 +213,7 @@ done
# -------------------------------------------------------
echo ""
echo "--- 5. Session continuity (second message recalls first) ---"
for runtime in claude-code hermes codex openclaw google-adk; do
for runtime in claude-code hermes codex openclaw; do
id="${WS_IDS[$runtime]:-}"
[ -z "$id" ] && continue
# Set up: tell the agent a name.
+6 -6
View File
@@ -27,9 +27,9 @@ def smoke_imports_and_invariants() -> None:
import-rewrite mistakes (the 0.1.16 incident, where main.py loaded but
main_sync was missing because the build script dropped a re-export).
"""
from molecule_runtime.main import main_sync # noqa: F401 # smoke-test re-export regression (mc#1769)
from molecule_runtime import a2a_client, a2a_tools # noqa: F401 # smoke-test re-export regression (mc#1769)
from molecule_runtime.builtin_tools import memory # noqa: F401 # smoke-test re-export regression (mc#1769)
from molecule_runtime.main import main_sync # noqa: F401
from molecule_runtime import a2a_client, a2a_tools # noqa: F401
from molecule_runtime.builtin_tools import memory # noqa: F401
from molecule_runtime.adapters import get_adapter, BaseAdapter, AdapterConfig
# cli_main + mcp_cli.main are the molecule-mcp console-script entry
@@ -38,8 +38,8 @@ def smoke_imports_and_invariants() -> None:
# rewrite here would break every external operator's MCP install on
# the next wheel publish. Pin both names because pyproject points
# at mcp_cli.main, which then imports a2a_mcp_server.cli_main.
from molecule_runtime.a2a_mcp_server import cli_main # noqa: F401 # smoke-test re-export regression (mc#1769)
from molecule_runtime.mcp_cli import main as mcp_cli_main # noqa: F401 # smoke-test re-export regression (mc#1769)
from molecule_runtime.a2a_mcp_server import cli_main # noqa: F401
from molecule_runtime.mcp_cli import main as mcp_cli_main # noqa: F401
assert callable(cli_main), "a2a_mcp_server.cli_main must be callable"
assert callable(mcp_cli_main), "mcp_cli.main must be callable"
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ def smoke_imports_and_invariants() -> None:
# imports + activates these at startup; if a wheel ships without
# them, the standalone agent silently loses the wait_for_message /
# inbox_peek / inbox_pop tools and reverts to outbound-only.
from molecule_runtime.inbox import ( # noqa: F401 # smoke-test re-export regression (mc#1769)
from molecule_runtime.inbox import ( # noqa: F401
InboxState,
activate as inbox_activate,
get_state as inbox_get_state,
-229
View File
@@ -1,229 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Real-completion + per-provider liveness + byok-routing assertion helpers
# for the staging full-SaaS E2E (tests/e2e/test_staging_full_saas.sh).
#
# WHY THIS LIB EXISTS (molecule-core#1995 / #1994 follow-on):
# The A2A e2e historically asserted only response SHAPE — e.g.
# test_a2a_e2e.sh:`check "SEO response has text" '"kind":"text"'`. A fully
# BROKEN agent returns its error AS a text part:
# {"kind":"text","text":"Agent error (Exception) — see workspace logs..."}
# which STILL matches `"kind":"text"` → the shape check PASSES on a broken
# agent. That is exactly why the 2026-05-2x drained-key / byok-misroute
# failures (agents-team PM + reno marketing erroring on every LLM call)
# sailed through CI. "Channel returns text shape" != "agent actually
# completed an LLM round-trip".
#
# These helpers add three load-bearing gates ON TOP of (never replacing) the
# existing shape + PONG checks:
# 1. a2a_assert_real_completion — deterministic known-answer round-trip
# (CONTAINS the expected token AND NOT an error-as-text payload).
# 2. provider_liveness_matrix — per-offered-provider cheap completion
# probe, providers sourced from the providers.yaml SSOT runtimes block.
# 3. assert_byok_not_platform_proxy — #1994 regression guard: a
# byok-resolving workspace must NOT resolve to platform_managed.
#
# Conventions: reuses the host script's fail()/ok()/log() + tenant_call().
# Source this AFTER those are defined. BASH 4+.
# Error-as-text trap markers. If the agent's text part contains ANY of
# these, the "round-trip" did not really complete — the agent surfaced an
# error AS text. This is the negative assertion that makes a broken agent
# FAIL instead of slipping through the shape check.
#
# Kept as an array (not a single regex) so a new failure signature is a
# one-line append + the failure message can name which marker matched.
A2A_ERROR_AS_TEXT_MARKERS=(
"Agent error"
"Exception"
"error result"
"MISSING_BYOK_CREDENTIAL"
)
# a2a_completion_error_marker <agent_text>
# Echoes the first error-as-text marker found in <agent_text> (case-
# insensitive), or nothing if clean. Exit 0 if a marker matched, 1 if not.
# Pure string scan — no LLM, no network — so it is deterministic and is the
# unit under the fail-direction proof in test_completion_assert_unit.sh.
a2a_completion_error_marker() {
local text="$1"
local upper marker
upper=$(printf '%s' "$text" | tr '[:lower:]' '[:upper:]')
for marker in "${A2A_ERROR_AS_TEXT_MARKERS[@]}"; do
if printf '%s' "$upper" | grep -qF -- "$(printf '%s' "$marker" | tr '[:lower:]' '[:upper:]')"; then
printf '%s' "$marker"
return 0
fi
done
return 1
}
# a2a_assert_real_completion <agent_text> <expected_token> <context_label>
# The CORE gate. Asserts the agent text:
# (a) does NOT contain any error-as-text marker (broken-agent trap), AND
# (b) CONTAINS <expected_token> (case-insensitive) — proving a real LLM
# round-trip produced the deterministic known answer.
# Calls fail() (which exits) on either violation. This MUST fail on an
# error-as-text payload — that is the property test_completion_assert_unit.sh
# pins.
a2a_assert_real_completion() {
local text="$1"
local expected="$2"
local ctx="${3:-A2A}"
if [ -z "$text" ]; then
fail "$ctx — real-completion gate: agent returned EMPTY text (no round-trip)."
fi
local hit
if hit=$(a2a_completion_error_marker "$text"); then
fail "$ctx — real-completion gate: agent returned an ERROR-AS-TEXT payload (matched '$hit'). A broken agent that surfaces its error as a text part is NOT a completed round-trip. This is the trap the shape-only check missed (#1994). Raw: ${text:0:200}"
fi
# Known-answer: real LLM round-trip yields the deterministic token. A
# prompt-echo / truncated-context / wrong-auth pipeline won't.
if ! printf '%s' "$text" | tr '[:lower:]' '[:upper:]' | grep -qF -- "$(printf '%s' "$expected" | tr '[:lower:]' '[:upper:]')"; then
fail "$ctx — real-completion gate: reply did NOT contain expected known-answer token '$expected'. The channel returned a text shape but no real completion. Raw: ${text:0:200}"
fi
ok "$ctx — real completion verified (contains '$expected', no error-as-text). Reply: \"${text:0:80}\""
}
# offered_platform_models_for_runtime <runtime>
# Emits, one per line, the platform-servable model ids the providers.yaml
# SSOT (runtimes.<runtime>.providers[name=platform].models) declares for
# <runtime>. This is the SSOT-driven offered/platform-servable matrix — NOT
# a hardcoded provider list — so a provider added/removed in providers.yaml
# automatically changes the matrix this probe exercises.
#
# Reads the embedded copy at workspace-server/internal/providers/providers.yaml
# (the same file go:embed compiles into the binary). Requires python3 +
# PyYAML (already a test-harness dep). On parse failure, emits nothing and
# returns 1 so the caller can fail loud rather than silently skip.
offered_platform_models_for_runtime() {
local runtime="$1"
local yaml_path="${PROVIDERS_YAML_PATH:-}"
if [ -z "$yaml_path" ]; then
# This lib lives at tests/e2e/lib/ -> repo root is three dirs up
# (lib -> e2e -> tests -> repo-root).
yaml_path="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/../../.." && pwd)/workspace-server/internal/providers/providers.yaml"
fi
if [ ! -f "$yaml_path" ]; then
log " [provider-matrix] providers.yaml SSOT not found at $yaml_path"
return 1
fi
RUNTIME_REF="$runtime" python3 - "$yaml_path" <<'PY'
import os, sys
try:
import yaml
except Exception as e: # PyYAML missing — fail loud, do not silently skip.
sys.stderr.write(f"PyYAML required for provider-matrix SSOT read: {e}\n")
sys.exit(2)
rt = os.environ["RUNTIME_REF"]
with open(sys.argv[1]) as f:
doc = yaml.safe_load(f)
native = (doc.get("runtimes") or {}).get(rt) or {}
for pref in native.get("providers", []) or []:
if pref.get("name") == "platform":
for m in pref.get("models", []) or []:
print(m)
PY
}
# provider_liveness_matrix <runtime> <probe_fn>
# For each platform-servable model the SSOT lists for <runtime>, calls
# <probe_fn> <model_id> which must echo the agent text (or empty) and return
# 0 on a non-error completion, non-zero otherwise. Logs a per-model pass/fail
# matrix. Returns 0 only if EVERY probed model produced a non-error
# completion; non-zero (and a recorded matrix) otherwise.
#
# Purpose: exercise each offered provider's AUTH + ROUTING path so a drained
# key / wrong base-URL / byok-misroute fails the gate (the #1994 class). The
# probe_fn is expected to use minimal max_tokens.
#
# This helper does the SSOT read + matrix bookkeeping; the host script
# supplies probe_fn (it owns workspace ids + tenant_call wiring).
provider_liveness_matrix() {
local runtime="$1"
local probe_fn="$2"
local models model rc total=0 passed=0
local -a results=()
models=$(offered_platform_models_for_runtime "$runtime") || {
fail "provider-liveness: could not read offered-provider matrix from providers.yaml SSOT for runtime=$runtime"
}
if [ -z "$models" ]; then
log " [provider-matrix] runtime=$runtime offers no platform-servable models in the SSOT — nothing to probe (not a failure)."
return 0
fi
log " [provider-matrix] SSOT offered platform models for $runtime:"
while IFS= read -r model; do
[ -z "$model" ] && continue
log " - $model"
done <<<"$models"
while IFS= read -r model; do
[ -z "$model" ] && continue
total=$((total + 1))
set +e
"$probe_fn" "$model"
rc=$?
set -e
if [ "$rc" = "0" ]; then
passed=$((passed + 1))
results+=("PASS $model")
elif [ "$rc" = "75" ]; then
# 75 (EX_TEMPFAIL convention) = probe skipped (key/runtime not
# available in this lane). Not counted toward pass/fail — logged.
total=$((total - 1))
results+=("SKIP $model (probe unavailable in this lane)")
else
results+=("FAIL $model")
fi
done <<<"$models"
log " [provider-matrix] result matrix (runtime=$runtime):"
local line
for line in "${results[@]}"; do
log " $line"
done
log " [provider-matrix] $passed/$total probed providers completed without error"
if [ "$passed" != "$total" ]; then
return 1
fi
return 0
}
# assert_byok_not_platform_proxy <billing_mode_json> <context_label>
# #1994 regression guard. Given the JSON body from
# GET /admin/workspaces/:id/llm-billing-mode (same derived resolver the
# provision-time strip gate uses), asserts the workspace resolves to BYOK
# and NOT platform_managed. A regression of #1994 (byok workspace baked to
# platform_managed → routed through the platform proxy → platform LLM key
# drained) flips resolved_mode to "platform_managed" and trips this gate.
# Calls fail() (exits) on violation.
assert_byok_not_platform_proxy() {
local body="$1"
local ctx="${2:-byok-guard}"
local mode prov
mode=$(printf '%s' "$body" | python3 -c "import json,sys
try: print(json.load(sys.stdin).get('resolved_mode',''))
except Exception: print('')" 2>/dev/null || echo "")
prov=$(printf '%s' "$body" | python3 -c "import json,sys
try:
d=json.load(sys.stdin); v=d.get('provider_selection')
print(v if v is not None else '')
except Exception: print('')" 2>/dev/null || echo "")
if [ -z "$mode" ]; then
fail "$ctx — byok-routing guard: could not read resolved_mode from billing-mode response. Raw: ${body:0:200}"
fi
if [ "$mode" = "platform_managed" ]; then
fail "$ctx — byok-routing guard TRIPPED (#1994 regression): a byok-configured workspace resolved to 'platform_managed' (provider_selection=$prov) → it would route through the platform proxy and drain the platform LLM key. Expected resolved_mode=byok. Raw: ${body:0:200}"
fi
if [ "$mode" != "byok" ]; then
fail "$ctx — byok-routing guard: unexpected resolved_mode='$mode' (expected 'byok'). provider_selection=$prov. Raw: ${body:0:200}"
fi
ok "$ctx — byok-routing guard: workspace resolves byok (provider_selection=$prov), NOT platform-proxy. #1994 stays fixed."
}
-35
View File
@@ -8,34 +8,6 @@ TIMEOUT="${A2A_TIMEOUT:-120}" # seconds per A2A call (override via A2A_TIMEOUT
# shellcheck source=_lib.sh
source "$(dirname "$0")/_lib.sh"
# molecule-core#1995 (#1994 follow-on): real-completion assertion helpers.
# Adds a NEGATIVE error-as-text check on top of the shape checks below, so a
# broken agent that returns its error AS a text part
# ({"kind":"text","text":"Agent error (Exception) ..."}) — which STILL
# matches the shape check `"kind":"text"` — now FAILS instead of passing.
# shellcheck source=lib/completion_assert.sh
source "$(dirname "$0")/lib/completion_assert.sh"
# check_no_error_as_text <desc> <agent_text>
# Additive negative gate: PASS only if the agent text carries NO
# error-as-text marker (Agent error / Exception / error result /
# MISSING_BYOK_CREDENTIAL). Uses the same scanner as the staging
# real-completion gate so the trap is closed consistently across lanes.
check_no_error_as_text() {
local desc="$1"
local text="$2"
local hit
if hit=$(a2a_completion_error_marker "$text"); then
echo "FAIL: $desc"
echo " agent returned an error-AS-text payload (matched '$hit') — a broken"
echo " agent that surfaces its error as a text part is NOT a real reply."
echo " got: $(echo "$text" | head -3)"
FAIL=$((FAIL + 1))
else
echo "PASS: $desc"
PASS=$((PASS + 1))
fi
}
check() {
local desc="$1"
@@ -109,8 +81,6 @@ check "JSON-RPC response has result" '"result"' "$R"
check "Response has agent role" '"role":"agent"' "$R"
check "Response has text part" '"kind":"text"' "$R"
TEXT=$(echo "$R" | python3 -c "import sys,json; r=json.load(sys.stdin); print(r['result']['parts'][0]['text'][:200])" 2>/dev/null || echo "PARSE_ERROR")
# Negative gate (#1994): the text part must not BE an error.
check_no_error_as_text "Echo reply is not an error-as-text payload" "$TEXT"
echo " Agent said: $TEXT"
echo ""
@@ -122,11 +92,6 @@ R=$(a2a_send "$SEO_ID" "What SEO skills do you have?")
check "SEO agent responds" '"result"' "$R"
check "SEO response has text" '"kind":"text"' "$R"
TEXT=$(echo "$R" | python3 -c "import sys,json; r=json.load(sys.stdin); print(r['result']['parts'][0]['text'][:200])" 2>/dev/null || echo "PARSE_ERROR")
# Negative gate (#1994): a broken SEO agent that returns "Agent error
# (Exception) ..." AS text still matches the `"kind":"text"` shape check
# above — THAT is the gap that let drained-key/byok-misroute failures pass
# CI. This makes that case FAIL.
check_no_error_as_text "SEO reply is not an error-as-text payload" "$TEXT"
echo " SEO Agent said: $TEXT"
echo ""
-111
View File
@@ -1,111 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Fail-direction / load-bearing proof for lib/completion_assert.sh.
#
# This is the watch-it-FAIL counterpart the dev-SOP Phase 3 requires: it
# proves the new real-completion + byok gates actually CATCH a broken agent,
# not just pass on a good one. It runs entirely offline (no LLM, no network,
# no provisioning) — pure assertion logic — so it can run on every PR in the
# fast lane (e2e-api.yml unit-shell step) and locally via `bash`.
#
# The decisive case is `error-as-text payload MUST FAIL`: that is the exact
# trap (#1994) the historical shape-only check missed. If a refactor weakens
# a2a_assert_real_completion to a substring/shape check, THIS test goes red.
set -uo pipefail
HERE="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
PASS=0
FAIL=0
# Minimal stand-ins for the host script's helpers. fail() must NOT exit the
# whole harness here — we want to assert that it WAS called. We trap it by
# running the assertion in a subshell and checking the subshell's exit code:
# the real fail() exits 1, ok() exits 0 implicitly.
log() { echo "[unit] $*"; }
ok() { echo "[unit] OK: $*"; }
fail() { echo "[unit] FAIL-CALLED: $*" >&2; exit 1; }
# shellcheck source=lib/completion_assert.sh
source "$HERE/lib/completion_assert.sh"
expect_pass() {
local desc="$1"; shift
if ( "$@" ) >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "PASS: $desc (assertion accepted, as expected)"
PASS=$((PASS + 1))
else
echo "FAIL: $desc — expected the assertion to ACCEPT, but it rejected"
FAIL=$((FAIL + 1))
fi
}
expect_fail() {
local desc="$1"; shift
if ( "$@" ) >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "FAIL: $desc — expected the assertion to REJECT, but it accepted (gate NOT load-bearing!)"
FAIL=$((FAIL + 1))
else
echo "PASS: $desc (assertion rejected, as expected)"
PASS=$((PASS + 1))
fi
}
echo "=== completion_assert.sh fail-direction proof ==="
# ---- a2a_assert_real_completion ----
# Good: real known-answer reply passes.
expect_pass "real PINEAPPLE reply passes" \
a2a_assert_real_completion "PINEAPPLE" "PINEAPPLE" "unit"
expect_pass "case-insensitive known answer passes" \
a2a_assert_real_completion "pineapple" "PINEAPPLE" "unit"
expect_pass "known answer with minor wrapping passes" \
a2a_assert_real_completion "Sure: PINEAPPLE" "PINEAPPLE" "unit"
# DECISIVE: the error-as-text trap. Each MUST fail — these are the payloads a
# broken agent returns that the old shape-only `"kind":"text"` check passed.
expect_fail "Agent error as text payload MUST fail" \
a2a_assert_real_completion "Agent error (Exception) — see workspace logs for details." "PINEAPPLE" "unit"
expect_fail "bare Exception as text MUST fail" \
a2a_assert_real_completion "Traceback ... Exception: boom" "PINEAPPLE" "unit"
expect_fail "error result as text MUST fail" \
a2a_assert_real_completion "tool returned error result" "PINEAPPLE" "unit"
expect_fail "MISSING_BYOK_CREDENTIAL as text MUST fail" \
a2a_assert_real_completion "MISSING_BYOK_CREDENTIAL: set your own key" "PINEAPPLE" "unit"
# Error-as-text that ALSO happens to contain the token still fails (error
# marker takes precedence — a real completion never carries these markers).
expect_fail "error-as-text containing the token still fails" \
a2a_assert_real_completion "Agent error: could not produce PINEAPPLE" "PINEAPPLE" "unit"
# Empty text fails.
expect_fail "empty text fails" \
a2a_assert_real_completion "" "PINEAPPLE" "unit"
# Wrong/echoed content (no token, no error) fails — shape-OK but not a real
# completion.
expect_fail "wrong content without token fails" \
a2a_assert_real_completion "Reply with exactly the word PINEAPPLE and nothing else." "BANANA" "unit"
# ---- assert_byok_not_platform_proxy (#1994 guard) ----
expect_pass "byok resolution passes the guard" \
assert_byok_not_platform_proxy '{"resolved_mode":"byok","provider_selection":"minimax","source":"derived_provider"}' "unit"
# DECISIVE: a platform_managed resolution on a byok workspace = the #1994
# regression. MUST fail.
expect_fail "platform_managed resolution trips the #1994 guard" \
assert_byok_not_platform_proxy '{"resolved_mode":"platform_managed","provider_selection":"platform","source":"derived_provider"}' "unit"
expect_fail "missing resolved_mode trips the guard" \
assert_byok_not_platform_proxy '{"provider_selection":"x"}' "unit"
expect_fail "disabled mode trips the guard (not byok)" \
assert_byok_not_platform_proxy '{"resolved_mode":"disabled"}' "unit"
# ---- a2a_completion_error_marker (the scanner under the gate) ----
if hit=$(a2a_completion_error_marker "all good PINEAPPLE"); then
echo "FAIL: clean text wrongly flagged as error marker ($hit)"; FAIL=$((FAIL + 1))
else
echo "PASS: clean text has no error marker"; PASS=$((PASS + 1))
fi
if hit=$(a2a_completion_error_marker "An Exception occurred"); then
echo "PASS: error marker detected ($hit)"; PASS=$((PASS + 1))
else
echo "FAIL: error marker NOT detected in 'An Exception occurred'"; FAIL=$((FAIL + 1))
fi
echo ""
echo "=== Results: $PASS passed, $FAIL failed ==="
[ "$FAIL" -eq 0 ]
-182
View File
@@ -99,12 +99,6 @@ source "$(dirname "$0")/lib/model_slug.sh"
# shellcheck disable=SC1091
# shellcheck source=lib/aws_leak_check.sh
source "$(dirname "$0")/lib/aws_leak_check.sh"
# shellcheck disable=SC1091
# shellcheck source=lib/completion_assert.sh
# molecule-core#1995 (#1994 follow-on): real-completion + per-provider
# liveness + byok-routing assertion helpers. Adds gates that FAIL on an
# error-as-text payload (the trap the shape-only A2A checks missed).
source "$(dirname "$0")/lib/completion_assert.sh"
CURL_COMMON=(-sS --fail-with-body --max-time 30)
E2E_TMP_FILES=()
@@ -873,182 +867,6 @@ fi
ok "A2A parent round-trip succeeded: \"${AGENT_TEXT:0:80}\""
# ─── 8b. Real-completion known-answer round-trip (CORE GATE, #1994) ────
# The existing PONG check + generic error grep above already do a lot, but
# this stanza is the canonical real-completion gate the #1994 follow-on
# adds: a DETERMINISTIC known-answer prompt asserted via
# a2a_assert_real_completion, which FAILS on an error-as-text payload
# ({"kind":"text","text":"Agent error (Exception) ..."}). That payload
# matches the historical shape-only check `"kind":"text"` and so passed CI
# on a fully broken agent (drained-key / byok-misroute, 2026-05-2x). This
# gate makes that case RED. Reuses the same cold-start retry-on-transient
# (502/503/504) loop the PONG probe uses — retry-once-on-network, never on
# agent-error. Single round-trip → the one place we spend a non-trivial
# token budget (default backend MiniMax — cheap token plan).
KA_PAYLOAD=$(python3 -c "
import json, uuid
print(json.dumps({
'jsonrpc': '2.0',
'method': 'message/send',
'id': 'e2e-known-answer-1',
'params': {
'message': {
'role': 'user',
'messageId': f'e2e-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]}',
'parts': [{'kind': 'text', 'text': 'Reply with exactly the word PINEAPPLE and nothing else.'}]
}
}
}))
")
KA_TMP=$(mktemp -t known_answer_a2a.XXXXXX)
KA_RESP=""
for KA_ATTEMPT in $(seq 1 6); do
: >"$KA_TMP"
set +e
KA_CODE=$(tenant_call POST "/workspaces/$PARENT_ID/a2a" \
--max-time 90 \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "$KA_PAYLOAD" \
-o "$KA_TMP" \
-w '%{http_code}' \
2>/dev/null)
KA_RC=$?
set -e
KA_CODE=${KA_CODE:-000}
KA_RESP=$(cat "$KA_TMP" 2>/dev/null || echo "")
if [ "$KA_RC" = "0" ] && [ "$KA_CODE" -ge 200 ] && [ "$KA_CODE" -lt 300 ]; then
break
fi
KA_SAFE_BODY=$(printf '%s' "$KA_RESP" | sanitize_http_body)
# Retry ONLY on transient transport errors — never on an agent-level
# error (those must surface and fail the gate).
if echo "$KA_CODE" | grep -Eq '^(502|503|504)$' && echo "$KA_SAFE_BODY" | grep -Eqi 'Service Unavailable|Bad Gateway|Gateway Timeout|workspace agent unreachable|connection refused|no healthy upstream|workspace agent busy|native_session'; then
log " known-answer A2A transient $KA_CODE attempt $KA_ATTEMPT/6: $KA_SAFE_BODY"
if [ "$KA_ATTEMPT" -lt 6 ]; then sleep 10; continue; fi
fi
break
done
rm -f "$KA_TMP"
if [ "$KA_RC" != "0" ] || [ "$KA_CODE" -lt 200 ] || [ "$KA_CODE" -ge 300 ]; then
KA_SAFE_BODY=$(printf '%s' "$KA_RESP" | sanitize_http_body)
fail "Known-answer A2A POST failed after $KA_ATTEMPT attempt(s) (curl_rc=$KA_RC, http=$KA_CODE): $KA_SAFE_BODY"
fi
KA_TEXT=$(echo "$KA_RESP" | python3 -c "
import json, sys
try:
d = json.load(sys.stdin)
parts = d.get('result', {}).get('parts', [])
print(parts[0].get('text', '') if parts else '')
except Exception:
print('')
" 2>/dev/null || echo "")
# CORE GATE: contains PINEAPPLE (real round-trip) AND no error-as-text.
a2a_assert_real_completion "$KA_TEXT" "PINEAPPLE" "A2A known-answer (parent, $RUNTIME/$MODEL_SLUG)"
# ─── 8c. byok-routing regression guard (#1994) ─────────────────────────
# The parent was provisioned with the customer's OWN vendor key
# (MINIMAX_API_KEY / ANTHROPIC_API_KEY in SECRETS_JSON) → it must resolve
# BYOK, not platform_managed. #1994 was exactly the inverse: a byok
# workspace baked platform_managed on (re-)provision → routed through the
# platform proxy → drained the platform LLM key. We read the SAME derived
# resolver the provision-time strip gate uses
# (GET /admin/workspaces/:id/llm-billing-mode) and assert resolved_mode!=
# platform_managed. A regression flips it RED.
#
# Only meaningful when the parent actually carries a byok credential; the
# OpenAI/hermes path uses a different env shape, and the no-key path is
# legitimately platform_managed (the CTO default). Gate on the same
# E2E_*_API_KEY presence the SECRETS_JSON branch keyed off.
if [ -n "${E2E_MINIMAX_API_KEY:-}" ] || [ -n "${E2E_ANTHROPIC_API_KEY:-}" ]; then
set +e
BILLING_RESP=$(tenant_call GET "/admin/workspaces/$PARENT_ID/llm-billing-mode" 2>/dev/null)
BILLING_RC=$?
set -e
if [ "$BILLING_RC" != "0" ] || [ -z "$BILLING_RESP" ]; then
fail "byok-routing guard: GET /admin/workspaces/$PARENT_ID/llm-billing-mode failed (rc=$BILLING_RC). Body: ${BILLING_RESP:0:200}"
fi
assert_byok_not_platform_proxy "$BILLING_RESP" "byok-guard (parent, $RUNTIME/$MODEL_SLUG)"
else
log "8c. byok-routing guard skipped — parent carries no own-vendor key (OpenAI/no-key path is legitimately platform_managed)."
fi
# ─── 8d. Per-offered-provider liveness matrix (SSOT-driven, #1994 class) ─
# For each platform-servable model the providers.yaml SSOT
# (runtimes.<runtime>.providers[platform].models) declares for this
# runtime, send a minimal max_tokens-bounded "say ok" probe and assert a
# NON-ERROR completion. Purpose: exercise each offered provider's AUTH +
# ROUTING path so a drained key / wrong base-URL / byok-misroute fails the
# gate (the #1994 class). Providers/models come from the SSOT — not a
# hardcoded list — so the matrix tracks providers.yaml automatically.
#
# This lane provisions ONE parent workspace with ONE configured key, so we
# can only truly drive the providers that key authenticates. Probing a
# model whose provider key is absent in this lane is reported SKIP (rc=75),
# not FAIL — keeping the gate deterministic + low-flake. The matrix still
# proves the configured provider's full auth+routing path end-to-end, and
# logs the offered set so over/under-offer drift is visible in the CI log.
provider_liveness_probe() {
local model_id="$1"
# Map the SSOT platform model id (e.g. minimax/MiniMax-M2.7) to the
# vendor namespace token to decide whether THIS lane has its key.
local vendor="${model_id%%/*}"
case "$vendor" in
minimax) [ -n "${E2E_MINIMAX_API_KEY:-}" ] || return 75 ;;
anthropic) [ -n "${E2E_ANTHROPIC_API_KEY:-}" ] || return 75 ;;
openai) [ -n "${E2E_OPENAI_API_KEY:-}" ] || return 75 ;;
*) return 75 ;; # kimi/moonshot etc. — no key wired in this lane
esac
local probe_payload
probe_payload=$(python3 -c "
import json, uuid
print(json.dumps({
'jsonrpc': '2.0',
'method': 'message/send',
'id': 'e2e-liveness-' + uuid.uuid4().hex[:6],
'params': {
'message': {
'role': 'user',
'messageId': f'e2e-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]}',
'parts': [{'kind': 'text', 'text': 'Reply with exactly: ok'}],
},
'configuration': {'max_tokens': 4}
}
}))
")
local tmp code rc resp
tmp=$(mktemp -t liveness_a2a.XXXXXX)
set +e
code=$(tenant_call POST "/workspaces/$PARENT_ID/a2a" \
--max-time 60 \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "$probe_payload" \
-o "$tmp" -w '%{http_code}' 2>/dev/null)
rc=$?
set -e
resp=$(cat "$tmp" 2>/dev/null || echo "")
rm -f "$tmp"
if [ "$rc" != "0" ] || [ "${code:-000}" -lt 200 ] || [ "${code:-000}" -ge 300 ]; then
log " probe $model_id: HTTP ${code:-000} rc=$rc"
return 1
fi
local text
text=$(echo "$resp" | python3 -c "
import json,sys
try:
d=json.load(sys.stdin); p=d.get('result',{}).get('parts',[])
print(p[0].get('text','') if p else '')
except Exception: print('')" 2>/dev/null || echo "")
if [ -z "$text" ] || a2a_completion_error_marker "$text" >/dev/null; then
log " probe $model_id: error-as-text or empty: ${text:0:120}"
return 1
fi
return 0
}
if ! provider_liveness_matrix "$RUNTIME" provider_liveness_probe; then
fail "Per-provider liveness matrix: at least one offered provider failed its auth+routing probe (see matrix above). This is the #1994 class — a drained key / wrong base-URL / byok-misroute."
fi
ok "Per-provider liveness matrix passed (all probed offered providers completed without error)"
# ─── 9. HMA + peers + activity (full mode) ─────────────────────────────
if [ "$MODE" = "full" ]; then
log "9/11 Writing + reading HMA memory on parent..."
+1 -1
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
#
# Invocation (from template-hermes repo's CI):
#
# bash /path/to/molecule-core/tools/check-template-parity.sh \
# bash /path/to/molecule-monorepo/tools/check-template-parity.sh \
# install.sh start.sh
#
# Or inline via curl:
-26
View File
@@ -36,7 +36,6 @@ import (
"time"
"git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-core/workspace-server/internal/channels"
"git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-core/workspace-server/internal/codexauth"
"git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-core/workspace-server/internal/crypto"
"git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-core/workspace-server/internal/db"
"git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-core/workspace-server/internal/events"
@@ -335,31 +334,6 @@ func main() {
pendinguploads.StartSweeper(c, pendinguploads.NewPostgres(db.DB), 0)
})
// Codex shared-OAuth central refresher — the SINGLE owner of the rotating
// refresh_token for the global codex (ChatGPT/Codex subscription) credential
// (global_secrets key CODEX_AUTH_JSON). Multiple codex workspaces share ONE
// ChatGPT-Pro OAuth token; OpenAI's refresh_token is single-use, so letting
// each per-agent app-server refresh on its own 401 burned the seed within
// seconds (a refresh storm). This goroutine is structurally single-flight
// (one goroutine + a package mutex), refreshes only within a safety margin
// of expiry, POSTs the refresh_token at most once per due cycle, and writes
// the rotated blob back — workspaces now only GET the current token (see the
// codex template's codex_auth_sync.sh). INERT when no CODEX_AUTH_JSON exists.
go supervised.RunWithRecover(ctx, "codex-auth-refresher", func(c context.Context) {
codexauth.StartCodexAuthRefresher(c, db.DB)
})
// RFC internal#742 Part 2: wire the boot-failure rescue capture into
// the provision-timeout sweep's failure verdict. When the sweep flips
// a stuck workspace to `failed`, this hook captures a forensic rescue
// bundle off the still-running (but boot-failed) EC2 and ships it to
// obs/Loki before the control plane reaps the instance. Best-effort +
// non-blocking (handlers.BootFailureRescueHook dispatches on its own
// goroutine + timeout). The handler-side boot-failure path
// (WorkspaceHandler.BootstrapFailed) wires its own capture inline.
registry.BootFailureRescueHook = handlers.BootFailureRescueHook
// Provision-timeout sweep — flips workspaces that have been stuck in
// status='provisioning' past the timeout window to 'failed' and emits
// WORKSPACE_PROVISION_TIMEOUT. Without this the UI banner is cosmetic
-114
View File
@@ -1,114 +0,0 @@
# Molecule Platform OpenAPI specs
This directory holds the machine-readable API contracts for the Molecule
platform.
| File | Spec | Scope | Status |
|------|------|-------|--------|
| `management.yaml` | OpenAPI **3.1** | The **management surface** across both services (orgs, billing, admin, provisioning, workspaces, secrets, templates, org-tokens, bundles). | **SSOT** — hand-authored. |
| `swagger.yaml` / `swagger.json` | OpenAPI 2.0 | swaggo-generated stub, `/schedules` only (the per-workspace **runtime** surface). | Legacy stub; superseded for management by `management.yaml`. |
`management.yaml` is the **single source of truth** the management tooling
derives from — the management MCP server, the management CLI (`molecule-cli`),
and the human-facing API docs (RFC #1706, the gap closed by
`PLATFORM-MANAGEMENT-API.md` §5c). Do not hand-edit those clients' route maps;
change them here and regenerate/derive.
## The two-service split
One structural fact drives the whole spec: there are **two services with two
auth stacks**, and the management surface spans both.
```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
browser / CLI / MCP │ Control plane (CP) │
│ │ molecule-controlplane @ api.moleculesai │
│ session │ /api/v1/* (stable) [+ /cp/* sunset] │
├───────────────▶│ orgs · members · billing · provisioning │
│ admin bearer │ · fleet/admin ops · pins │
│ provision sec │ │
└────────────────┴──────────────┬───────────────────────────┘
│ edge reverse-proxy
│ (subdomain / X-Molecule-Org-Slug)
┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
Org API Key / ws tok │ Tenant workspace-server │
│ │ molecule-core/workspace-server │
└───────────────▶│ ONE EC2 per org @ <slug>.moleculesai.app│
│ workspaces · secrets · templates · │
│ org-tokens · bundles │
└─────────────────────────────────────────┘
```
- **Control plane (CP)** — `api.moleculesai.app`, routes modelled under
`/api/v1/*` (the `/cp/*` mirror is identical but sunset-headed per RFC #61 and
is not duplicated in the spec). Owns **orgs, members, billing, provisioning,
fleet/admin ops**.
- **Tenant workspace-server** — one EC2 per org at `<slug>.moleculesai.app`.
Owns **workspaces, agents, secrets, templates, org-tokens, bundles**. Requests
may also be sent to the CP host with an `X-Molecule-Org-Slug` header; the CP
edge reverse-proxies them to the tenant host (the `Authorization`,
`X-Molecule-Org-*`, and cookie headers pass through unchanged and the tenant's
own middleware validates them).
The key consequence, called out in `PLATFORM-MANAGEMENT-API.md`: **the Org API
Key is a TENANT credential, not a CP one.** It is full tenant-admin over its own
org's workspace-server surface and reaches **nothing** on the CP (org
create/delete, billing, members, provisioning all 401/403 it). That is why
member/billing tools belong in a separate CP-admin MCP, not the org-key-authed
management MCP.
## Security scheme → surface map (the tier matrix)
`management.yaml` defines these `securitySchemes`; each operation declares the
one(s) it accepts. Mirror of `PLATFORM-MANAGEMENT-API.md` §1:
| Scheme | What it is | Where it applies |
|--------|-----------|------------------|
| `workosSession` | WorkOS AuthKit session cookie `mcp_session` (+ org membership/ownership checks) | CP `/api/v1/orgs/*`, `/api/v1/billing/*`. Also accepted on the tenant surface via the CP-session path. |
| `cpAdminBearer` | CP `CP_ADMIN_API_TOKEN` operator bearer (AdminGate, constant-time) | CP `/api/v1/admin/*` — admin-create-org, tenant teardown, workspace env, ListOrgWorkspaces, redeploy, pins. |
| `provisionSecret` | CP `PROVISION_SHARED_SECRET` bearer | CP `/api/v1/workspaces/provision`, `…/status`. Routes unmounted when the secret is unset. |
| `tenantAdminToken` | Per-tenant admin_token (+ `X-Molecule-Org-Id`) | CP `DELETE /api/v1/workspaces/:id` (deprovision) — **in addition to** `provisionSecret` (issue #118). |
| `orgApiKey` | Tenant Org API Key — `Authorization: Bearer <key>` + routing header; full tenant-admin, self-minting | **All** tenant routes: `/workspaces[/:id]`, `/workspaces/:id/secrets`, budget, billing-mode, `/settings/secrets`, `/org/import`, `/org/templates`, `/org/tokens`, `/templates`, `/bundles`. |
| `workspaceToken` | Per-workspace bearer, bound to one workspace id (+ routing header) | Read/lifecycle/secrets on a single `/workspaces/:id/*`. **Rejected** on admin list/create/delete when ADMIN_TOKEN is set — use `orgApiKey`. |
| `orgRoutingHeaderId` / `orgRoutingHeaderSlug` | `X-Molecule-Org-Id` / `X-Molecule-Org-Slug` | Required on every tenant-host request so the edge / TenantGuard route + authorize against the correct org. Send one of them alongside the bearer. |
### Guards worth knowing (modelled per-operation)
- **Dry-run:** `POST /api/v1/admin/orgs?dry_run=true` — validate + echo, no org
created. (The only dry-run on the whole management API.)
- **Confirm token:** `DELETE /api/v1/admin/tenants/:slug` and
`…/scrub-artifacts` — body `confirm` MUST equal the URL slug, else `400`
before any teardown.
- **Force flag:** `POST /api/v1/admin/workspaces/:id/env` — keys matching the
secret-keyword guard (`TOKEN`/`SECRET`/`KEY`/`PASSWORD`) require `force=true`.
- **Runtime-pin gate:** `POST /api/v1/workspaces/provision` returns `422
RUNTIME_PIN_MISSING` when no runtime image pin exists.
- **Auto-restart side-effects:** writing a workspace or global secret
auto-restarts the affected workspace(s).
## Security note (carried from the synthesis spec)
The Org API Key is **full tenant-admin and self-minting** — a management MCP
holding one holds tenant root. There is no scope-down today (TODO in
`orgtoken`). Per-role / per-workspace scoping should ship alongside the
management MCP.
## Validate
```bash
cd workspace-server/docs/openapi
npx @redocly/cli lint management.yaml # must be clean (0 errors, 0 warnings)
```
## Scope notes / best-effort flags
- The per-workspace **runtime** surface (schedules, agent, registry, a2a,
memory, approvals, channels, terminal, files) is intentionally **out of
scope** here — that's the runtime contract, not management.
- A handful of bodies are **best-effort** from the handlers (org-import inline
template, bundle import, list responses with open shapes) and are marked with
`additionalProperties: true` in the schema. Tighten as the handler structs
stabilise.
- `/cp/*` deprecated mirrors are omitted (identical shapes; RFC #61
Deprecation/Sunset). Build against `/api/v1/*`.
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
@@ -1,463 +0,0 @@
// Package codexauth owns the SINGLE, platform-side refresh of the global
// codex (ChatGPT/Codex subscription) OAuth credential stored in the
// global_secrets table under key CODEX_AUTH_JSON.
//
// THE PROBLEM IT FIXES (agents-team prod, 2026-05-31)
//
// Multiple codex workspaces share ONE ChatGPT-Pro OAuth token (the global
// secret CODEX_AUTH_JSON). OpenAI's refresh_token is SINGLE-USE: every refresh
// rotates it and invalidates the prior one. When each per-agent codex
// app-server refreshed independently on a 401, the siblings' in-flight tokens
// were invalidated within seconds — a refresh storm that burned the seed and
// wedged every codex agent.
//
// THE FIX (two halves; this is the core half)
//
// 1. The per-workspace codex app-server NO LONGER refreshes (the template's
// OAuth POST is gated off by default — see the codex template's
// codex_auth_sync.sh / CODEX_AUTH_REFRESH_OWNER gate). Workspaces only ever
// GET the current token and write it to auth.json.
// 2. ONE owner refreshes the rotating refresh_token: this background goroutine
// in the platform. It is structurally single-flight (one goroutine + a
// package mutex), refreshes ONLY when the access_token is within a safety
// margin of expiry, POSTs the refresh_token at most ONCE per due cycle, and
// writes the rotated blob back to global_secrets. On a permanent failure
// (the seed was already burned by an out-of-band login) it logs ONCE and
// backs off — it never hot-loops a dead refresh_token.
//
// Billing-mode resolution and the byok strip are UNTOUCHED by this package.
package codexauth
import (
"context"
"database/sql"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"log"
"net/http"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
"git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-core/workspace-server/internal/crypto"
)
const (
// CodexAuthSecretKey is the global_secrets key holding the shared codex
// ChatGPT/Codex subscription OAuth blob (auth.json contents).
CodexAuthSecretKey = "CODEX_AUTH_JSON"
// oauthTokenURL is OpenAI's OAuth token endpoint. The ONLY endpoint this
// package ever POSTs to, and only for a due refresh.
oauthTokenURL = "https://auth.openai.com/oauth/token"
// codexOAuthClientID is the public Codex CLI OAuth client id (the same id
// the codex CLI sends). Not a secret.
codexOAuthClientID = "app_EMoamEEZ73f0CkXaXp7hrann"
// refreshSafetyMargin is how far ahead of access_token expiry a refresh is
// considered DUE. A token expiring within this window is refreshed now; one
// expiring later is left untouched (skip-when-fresh). Generous so a slow
// tick can never let the shared token lapse for the fleet.
refreshSafetyMargin = 15 * time.Minute
// defaultInterval is how often the loop wakes to check due-ness. The check
// is cheap (decrypt + JWT exp parse) and only POSTs when actually due.
defaultInterval = 5 * time.Minute
// permanentFailureBackoff is how long the loop waits after a PERMANENT
// refresh failure (invalid_grant / "refresh token already used"). The seed
// is burned until a human re-seeds a fresh login; there is nothing to retry,
// so we back off hard rather than hammer the dead token.
permanentFailureBackoff = 1 * time.Hour
)
// SecretStore is the minimal global_secrets surface the refresher needs. The
// production implementation (postgresStore) is backed by *sql.DB; tests inject
// a fake. It is deliberately tiny — read one key, write one key — so the test
// double is trivial and the refresher never reaches for the package-global DB.
type SecretStore interface {
// Get returns the decrypted secret value and true, or ("", false) when the
// key is absent. A non-nil error is a real read failure (not absence).
Get(ctx context.Context, key string) (value string, found bool, err error)
// Put encrypts and upserts value under key, bumping the row's updated_at
// (the "last_refresh" timestamp). It is the rotated-blob write-back.
Put(ctx context.Context, key, value string) error
}
// httpDoer is the http client seam (real *http.Client in prod, fake transport
// in tests). Tests NEVER hit the network.
type httpDoer interface {
Do(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error)
}
// refresher is the single-owner refresh engine. The package-level mutex makes
// the refresh structurally single-flight: even if two refreshOnce calls raced
// (they cannot in prod — one goroutine drives it — but a test or a future
// caller might), only one POSTs at a time, and the access-token freshness
// re-check inside the lock means the second sees a freshly-rotated token and
// skips. One goroutine + this mutex = single-flight by construction.
type refresher struct {
store SecretStore
client httpDoer
now func() time.Time
// permanentlyFailed records that the current seed's refresh_token was
// rejected as already-used/invalid. While set, refreshOnce is INERT (it
// will not re-POST the dead token) until the secret value CHANGES (a human
// re-seed), detected by comparing the stored blob. This is the anti-storm
// latch — it lives on the struct, not globally, so it resets if the seed is
// replaced out of band.
failedSeed string // the auth-json blob that failed; "" = no known failure
}
// mu serializes refreshOnce across the process. Package-level so the
// single-flight guarantee holds regardless of how many refresher values exist
// (in prod there is exactly one).
var mu sync.Mutex
// oauthTokens is the token trio inside auth.json (and the OAuth response).
type oauthTokens struct {
AccessToken string `json:"access_token"`
RefreshToken string `json:"refresh_token"`
IDToken string `json:"id_token,omitempty"`
}
// StartCodexAuthRefresher launches the single background refresher goroutine.
// It returns immediately; the loop runs until ctx is cancelled. Wire it under
// supervised.RunWithRecover in main.go like the other Start* sweeps.
//
// db may be nil only in tests that drive refreshOnce directly; in prod it is
// the server's *sql.DB. The loop is INERT (logs once, keeps ticking) whenever
// CODEX_AUTH_JSON is absent — a deployment with no shared codex seed pays only
// a cheap periodic read.
func StartCodexAuthRefresher(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB) {
r := &refresher{
store: &postgresStore{db: db},
client: &http.Client{Timeout: 30 * time.Second},
now: time.Now,
}
r.run(ctx, defaultInterval)
}
// run is the tick loop. It checks due-ness every interval and on a permanent
// failure waits permanentFailureBackoff before the next check (never a tight
// retry of a burned token).
func (r *refresher) run(ctx context.Context, interval time.Duration) {
// Check once promptly on boot, then on the interval.
for {
wait := interval
if perm := r.refreshOnce(ctx); perm {
// Permanent failure this cycle — the seed is burned. Back off hard;
// a human must re-seed. We keep ticking (a re-seed CHANGES the blob,
// which clears the latch) but slowly.
wait = permanentFailureBackoff
}
timer := time.NewTimer(wait)
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
timer.Stop()
log.Printf("codexauth: context done; stopping refresher")
return
case <-timer.C:
}
}
}
// refreshOnce performs ONE due-check + at most one refresh POST. It returns
// permanentFailure=true iff the refresh_token was permanently rejected this
// cycle (the caller backs off). All other outcomes (inert/skip/rotated/transient
// error) return false.
//
// It is single-flight: the package mutex is held for the whole read→decide→
// POST→write-back so two callers cannot both POST the (single-use) refresh_token.
func (r *refresher) refreshOnce(ctx context.Context) (permanentFailure bool) {
mu.Lock()
defer mu.Unlock()
blob, found, err := r.store.Get(ctx, CodexAuthSecretKey)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("codexauth: read CODEX_AUTH_JSON failed: %v (skipping this cycle)", err)
return false
}
if !found || strings.TrimSpace(blob) == "" {
// INERT: no shared codex seed in this deployment. Cheap no-op.
log.Printf("codexauth: no CODEX_AUTH_JSON in global_secrets — refresher inert")
// A previously-failed seed that has since been DELETED clears the latch.
r.failedSeed = ""
return false
}
// Anti-storm latch: if THIS exact blob already failed permanently, do not
// re-POST its dead refresh_token. A re-seed changes the blob and clears it.
if r.failedSeed != "" && r.failedSeed == blob {
return false
}
if r.failedSeed != "" && r.failedSeed != blob {
// The seed changed out of band (human re-login) — give it a fresh chance.
r.failedSeed = ""
}
tokens, err := parseTokens(blob)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("codexauth: CODEX_AUTH_JSON is not parseable codex auth json: %v (skipping)", err)
return false
}
if tokens.RefreshToken == "" {
log.Printf("codexauth: CODEX_AUTH_JSON carries no refresh_token (skipping)")
return false
}
// Skip-when-fresh: only refresh within the safety margin of expiry. A blob
// with an unparseable/absent access_token exp is treated as DUE (better to
// refresh a token we cannot date than let the fleet lapse).
exp, haveExp := jwtExp(tokens.AccessToken)
if haveExp {
remaining := exp.Sub(r.now())
if remaining > refreshSafetyMargin {
// Fresh — nothing to do. No POST.
return false
}
}
// DUE: POST the refresh_token ONCE.
newTokens, perm, err := r.doRefresh(ctx, tokens.RefreshToken)
if err != nil {
if perm {
// Permanent: the seed is burned. Latch it so we don't re-POST, log
// ONCE, and DO NOT write anything back.
log.Printf("codexauth: PERMANENT refresh failure (refresh_token rejected): %v — "+
"NOT writing back; the shared CODEX_AUTH_JSON seed is burned and must be re-seeded "+
"via a fresh codex login. Backing off.", err)
r.failedSeed = blob
return true
}
// Transient (network/5xx): no write-back, retry next cycle (no backoff).
log.Printf("codexauth: transient refresh error: %v (will retry next cycle)", err)
return false
}
// Success: merge the rotated trio into the blob (preserving every other
// field) and write it back encrypted, bumping updated_at (last_refresh).
rotated, err := mergeTokens(blob, newTokens)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("codexauth: failed to merge rotated tokens into auth json: %v (NOT writing back)", err)
return false
}
if err := r.store.Put(ctx, CodexAuthSecretKey, rotated); err != nil {
log.Printf("codexauth: write-back of rotated CODEX_AUTH_JSON failed: %v", err)
return false
}
r.failedSeed = "" // success clears any stale latch
log.Printf("codexauth: rotated shared CODEX_AUTH_JSON (single-owner refresh)")
return false
}
// doRefresh POSTs the refresh_token to OpenAI's OAuth endpoint exactly once and
// returns the rotated trio. permanent=true marks an unrecoverable rejection
// (HTTP 400 invalid_grant / "refresh token already used") so the caller latches
// and backs off instead of retrying.
func (r *refresher) doRefresh(ctx context.Context, refreshToken string) (tokens oauthTokens, permanent bool, err error) {
body, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{
"grant_type": "refresh_token",
"client_id": codexOAuthClientID,
"refresh_token": refreshToken,
})
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost, oauthTokenURL, strings.NewReader(string(body)))
if err != nil {
return oauthTokens{}, false, err
}
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
req.Header.Set("Accept", "application/json")
resp, err := r.client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return oauthTokens{}, false, err // transient: network
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
respBody, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1<<20))
if resp.StatusCode == http.StatusOK {
var t oauthTokens
if err := json.Unmarshal(respBody, &t); err != nil {
return oauthTokens{}, false, fmt.Errorf("decode token response: %w", err)
}
if t.AccessToken == "" {
return oauthTokens{}, false, fmt.Errorf("token response missing access_token")
}
return t, false, nil
}
// Non-200. A 400 (and any body naming invalid_grant / already-used) is a
// PERMANENT rejection of the refresh_token. 401/403 likewise mean the seed
// is no good. Everything else (429/5xx/network-shaped) is transient.
lowerBody := strings.ToLower(string(respBody))
isInvalidGrant := strings.Contains(lowerBody, "invalid_grant") ||
strings.Contains(lowerBody, "refresh token already used") ||
strings.Contains(lowerBody, "already been used") ||
strings.Contains(lowerBody, "token has been revoked")
switch {
case resp.StatusCode == http.StatusBadRequest && isInvalidGrant:
return oauthTokens{}, true, fmt.Errorf("oauth %d: %s", resp.StatusCode, strings.TrimSpace(string(respBody)))
case resp.StatusCode == http.StatusUnauthorized || resp.StatusCode == http.StatusForbidden:
return oauthTokens{}, true, fmt.Errorf("oauth %d: %s", resp.StatusCode, strings.TrimSpace(string(respBody)))
default:
return oauthTokens{}, false, fmt.Errorf("oauth %d: %s", resp.StatusCode, strings.TrimSpace(string(respBody)))
}
}
// parseTokens extracts the OAuth trio from an auth.json blob, accepting both
// the nested `{"tokens":{...}}` shape the codex CLI writes and a flat top-level
// shape some seeds use.
func parseTokens(blob string) (oauthTokens, error) {
var top map[string]json.RawMessage
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(blob), &top); err != nil {
return oauthTokens{}, err
}
if nested, ok := top["tokens"]; ok {
var t oauthTokens
if err := json.Unmarshal(nested, &t); err != nil {
return oauthTokens{}, fmt.Errorf("decode nested tokens: %w", err)
}
return t, nil
}
var t oauthTokens
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(blob), &t); err != nil {
return oauthTokens{}, err
}
return t, nil
}
// mergeTokens writes the rotated trio back into the original blob in-place,
// preserving the blob's shape (nested-vs-flat) and every other field. A field
// in the OAuth response that is empty (e.g. id_token omitted) does NOT clobber
// the existing value.
func mergeTokens(blob string, rotated oauthTokens) (string, error) {
var top map[string]json.RawMessage
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(blob), &top); err != nil {
return "", err
}
applyTo := func(m map[string]json.RawMessage) error {
setStr := func(key, val string) error {
if val == "" {
return nil // don't clobber an existing value with an empty one
}
b, err := json.Marshal(val)
if err != nil {
return err
}
m[key] = b
return nil
}
if err := setStr("access_token", rotated.AccessToken); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := setStr("refresh_token", rotated.RefreshToken); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := setStr("id_token", rotated.IDToken); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
if nestedRaw, ok := top["tokens"]; ok {
var nested map[string]json.RawMessage
if err := json.Unmarshal(nestedRaw, &nested); err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("decode nested tokens for merge: %w", err)
}
if err := applyTo(nested); err != nil {
return "", err
}
nb, err := json.Marshal(nested)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
top["tokens"] = nb
} else {
if err := applyTo(top); err != nil {
return "", err
}
}
out, err := json.Marshal(top)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
return string(out), nil
}
// jwtExp decodes the `exp` claim (Unix seconds) from a JWT access token WITHOUT
// verifying the signature (we only need the expiry to decide due-ness; the
// token's validity is OpenAI's to enforce). Returns ok=false when the token is
// not a parseable 3-part JWT or carries no numeric exp.
func jwtExp(token string) (time.Time, bool) {
parts := strings.Split(token, ".")
if len(parts) != 3 {
return time.Time{}, false
}
payload, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[1])
if err != nil {
// Some encoders pad; tolerate standard base64url with padding too.
payload, err = base64.URLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[1])
if err != nil {
return time.Time{}, false
}
}
var claims struct {
Exp json.Number `json:"exp"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(payload, &claims); err != nil {
return time.Time{}, false
}
secs, err := claims.Exp.Int64()
if err != nil || secs <= 0 {
return time.Time{}, false
}
return time.Unix(secs, 0), true
}
// postgresStore is the production SecretStore backed by global_secrets, using
// the SAME crypto path the secrets handler uses (DecryptVersioned on read,
// Encrypt + CurrentEncryptionVersion on write).
type postgresStore struct {
db *sql.DB
}
func (s *postgresStore) Get(ctx context.Context, key string) (string, bool, error) {
var enc []byte
var ver int
err := s.db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
`SELECT encrypted_value, encryption_version FROM global_secrets WHERE key = $1`, key).
Scan(&enc, &ver)
if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
return "", false, nil
}
if err != nil {
return "", false, err
}
plain, err := crypto.DecryptVersioned(enc, ver)
if err != nil {
return "", false, err
}
return string(plain), true, nil
}
func (s *postgresStore) Put(ctx context.Context, key, value string) error {
enc, err := crypto.Encrypt([]byte(value))
if err != nil {
return err
}
ver := crypto.CurrentEncryptionVersion()
_, err = s.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
INSERT INTO global_secrets (key, encrypted_value, encryption_version)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3)
ON CONFLICT (key) DO UPDATE
SET encrypted_value = $2, encryption_version = $3, updated_at = now()
`, key, enc, ver)
return err
}
@@ -1,425 +0,0 @@
package codexauth
import (
"context"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"strings"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
)
// --- test doubles -----------------------------------------------------------
// fakeStore is an in-memory SecretStore. nil entry = absent key.
type fakeStore struct {
mu sync.Mutex
values map[string]string
getErr error
putErr error
puts int32 // count of successful Put calls
}
func newFakeStore() *fakeStore { return &fakeStore{values: map[string]string{}} }
func (f *fakeStore) Get(_ context.Context, key string) (string, bool, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
if f.getErr != nil {
return "", false, f.getErr
}
v, ok := f.values[key]
return v, ok, nil
}
func (f *fakeStore) Put(_ context.Context, key, value string) error {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
if f.putErr != nil {
return f.putErr
}
f.values[key] = value
atomic.AddInt32(&f.puts, 1)
return nil
}
func (f *fakeStore) get(key string) string {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
return f.values[key]
}
// fakeTransport records every request and returns a scripted response. It is
// the network seam — tests NEVER make a real request.
type fakeTransport struct {
mu sync.Mutex
calls int32
urls []string
methods []string
bodies []string
status int
respBody string
transport func(*http.Request) (*http.Response, error) // optional override
}
func (t *fakeTransport) Do(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
atomic.AddInt32(&t.calls, 1)
t.mu.Lock()
t.urls = append(t.urls, req.URL.String())
t.methods = append(t.methods, req.Method)
if req.Body != nil {
b, _ := io.ReadAll(req.Body)
t.bodies = append(t.bodies, string(b))
} else {
t.bodies = append(t.bodies, "")
}
t.mu.Unlock()
if t.transport != nil {
return t.transport(req)
}
status := t.status
if status == 0 {
status = http.StatusOK
}
return &http.Response{
StatusCode: status,
Body: io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader(t.respBody)),
Header: make(http.Header),
}, nil
}
func (t *fakeTransport) callCount() int { return int(atomic.LoadInt32(&t.calls)) }
// --- helpers ----------------------------------------------------------------
// makeJWT builds an unsigned-but-parseable JWT whose payload carries exp.
func makeJWT(exp time.Time) string {
header := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(`{"alg":"none","typ":"JWT"}`))
payload := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(
fmt.Sprintf(`{"exp":%d,"sub":"codex"}`, exp.Unix())))
sig := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte("sig"))
return header + "." + payload + "." + sig
}
// authBlob builds a nested codex auth.json blob with the given tokens.
func authBlob(access, refresh string) string {
b, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]any{
"tokens": map[string]any{
"access_token": access,
"refresh_token": refresh,
"id_token": "id-original",
},
"OPENAI_API_KEY": nil,
"last_refresh": "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z",
})
return string(b)
}
func newTestRefresher(store SecretStore, client httpDoer, now time.Time) *refresher {
return &refresher{
store: store,
client: client,
now: func() time.Time { return now },
}
}
func okRefreshResponse(access, refresh string) string {
b, _ := json.Marshal(oauthTokens{AccessToken: access, RefreshToken: refresh, IDToken: "id-new"})
return string(b)
}
// --- tests ------------------------------------------------------------------
// TestJWTExpParse covers the exp decode (valid, malformed, missing).
func TestJWTExpParse(t *testing.T) {
want := time.Now().Add(2 * time.Hour).Truncate(time.Second)
got, ok := jwtExp(makeJWT(want))
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("jwtExp(valid) ok=false, want true")
}
if !got.Equal(want) {
t.Errorf("jwtExp = %v, want %v", got, want)
}
if _, ok := jwtExp("not-a-jwt"); ok {
t.Errorf("jwtExp(non-jwt) ok=true, want false")
}
if _, ok := jwtExp("a.b.c"); ok {
t.Errorf("jwtExp(garbage parts) ok=true, want false")
}
// 3 parts but payload has no exp.
noExp := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte("{}"))
if _, ok := jwtExp("h." + noExp + ".s"); ok {
t.Errorf("jwtExp(no exp claim) ok=true, want false")
}
}
// TestRefreshOnce_SkipWhenFresh: a token well outside the safety margin is NOT
// refreshed — no POST, no write-back.
func TestRefreshOnce_SkipWhenFresh(t *testing.T) {
now := time.Now()
store := newFakeStore()
store.values[CodexAuthSecretKey] = authBlob(makeJWT(now.Add(2*time.Hour)), "rt-1")
tr := &fakeTransport{status: http.StatusOK, respBody: okRefreshResponse("new-at", "rt-2")}
r := newTestRefresher(store, tr, now)
if perm := r.refreshOnce(context.Background()); perm {
t.Fatalf("fresh token: permanentFailure=true, want false")
}
if tr.callCount() != 0 {
t.Errorf("fresh token: %d OAuth POSTs, want 0", tr.callCount())
}
if atomic.LoadInt32(&store.puts) != 0 {
t.Errorf("fresh token: %d write-backs, want 0", store.puts)
}
}
// TestRefreshOnce_RotateThenReskip: a token inside the margin is refreshed once
// (POST + write-back of the rotated blob); a subsequent call on the now-fresh
// rotated token skips (no second POST). Proves rotate→write-back→re-skip.
func TestRefreshOnce_RotateThenReskip(t *testing.T) {
now := time.Now()
store := newFakeStore()
// Expires in 5m — inside the 15m safety margin → DUE.
store.values[CodexAuthSecretKey] = authBlob(makeJWT(now.Add(5*time.Minute)), "rt-1")
// Rotated access token is fresh (2h out); rotated refresh is rt-2.
tr := &fakeTransport{status: http.StatusOK, respBody: okRefreshResponse(makeJWT(now.Add(2*time.Hour)), "rt-2")}
r := newTestRefresher(store, tr, now)
if perm := r.refreshOnce(context.Background()); perm {
t.Fatalf("due token: permanentFailure=true, want false")
}
if tr.callCount() != 1 {
t.Fatalf("due token: %d OAuth POSTs, want exactly 1", tr.callCount())
}
if atomic.LoadInt32(&store.puts) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("due token: %d write-backs, want exactly 1", store.puts)
}
// The written blob must carry the rotated refresh_token and preserve the
// non-token field.
rotated := store.get(CodexAuthSecretKey)
tokens, err := parseTokens(rotated)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parse rotated blob: %v", err)
}
if tokens.RefreshToken != "rt-2" {
t.Errorf("rotated refresh_token = %q, want rt-2", tokens.RefreshToken)
}
if !strings.Contains(rotated, "last_refresh") {
t.Errorf("rotated blob dropped the preserved last_refresh field: %s", rotated)
}
// Second call: the rotated access token is fresh → skip, no new POST.
if perm := r.refreshOnce(context.Background()); perm {
t.Fatalf("re-skip: permanentFailure=true, want false")
}
if tr.callCount() != 1 {
t.Errorf("re-skip: %d total OAuth POSTs, want still 1", tr.callCount())
}
if atomic.LoadInt32(&store.puts) != 1 {
t.Errorf("re-skip: %d total write-backs, want still 1", store.puts)
}
}
// TestRefreshOnce_NoSecretInert: absent CODEX_AUTH_JSON → inert (no POST, no
// write-back, no error/permanent).
func TestRefreshOnce_NoSecretInert(t *testing.T) {
store := newFakeStore() // empty
tr := &fakeTransport{}
r := newTestRefresher(store, tr, time.Now())
if perm := r.refreshOnce(context.Background()); perm {
t.Fatalf("no secret: permanentFailure=true, want false")
}
if tr.callCount() != 0 {
t.Errorf("no secret: %d POSTs, want 0", tr.callCount())
}
if atomic.LoadInt32(&store.puts) != 0 {
t.Errorf("no secret: %d write-backs, want 0", store.puts)
}
}
// TestRefreshOnce_PermanentFailNoWriteNoStorm: a 400 invalid_grant must (a) not
// write back, (b) return permanentFailure=true, and (c) NOT re-POST on the next
// cycle for the same (burned) seed — the anti-storm latch.
func TestRefreshOnce_PermanentFailNoWriteNoStorm(t *testing.T) {
now := time.Now()
store := newFakeStore()
store.values[CodexAuthSecretKey] = authBlob(makeJWT(now.Add(1*time.Minute)), "rt-burned")
tr := &fakeTransport{
status: http.StatusBadRequest,
respBody: `{"error":"invalid_grant","error_description":"refresh token already used"}`,
}
r := newTestRefresher(store, tr, now)
perm := r.refreshOnce(context.Background())
if !perm {
t.Fatalf("invalid_grant: permanentFailure=false, want true")
}
if tr.callCount() != 1 {
t.Fatalf("invalid_grant: %d POSTs, want exactly 1", tr.callCount())
}
if atomic.LoadInt32(&store.puts) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("invalid_grant: %d write-backs, want 0 (must NOT persist a failed refresh)", store.puts)
}
// Next cycle, SAME burned seed: must NOT re-POST (anti-storm latch).
perm2 := r.refreshOnce(context.Background())
if tr.callCount() != 1 {
t.Errorf("anti-storm: re-POSTed a burned refresh_token (%d total POSTs, want still 1)", tr.callCount())
}
_ = perm2 // latched cycle returns false (already-known failure, nothing new)
// A RE-SEED (blob changes) clears the latch and allows a fresh attempt.
store.mu.Lock()
store.values[CodexAuthSecretKey] = authBlob(makeJWT(now.Add(1*time.Minute)), "rt-freshly-seeded")
store.mu.Unlock()
tr.status = http.StatusOK
tr.respBody = okRefreshResponse(makeJWT(now.Add(2*time.Hour)), "rt-rotated")
if perm := r.refreshOnce(context.Background()); perm {
t.Fatalf("post-reseed: permanentFailure=true, want false")
}
if tr.callCount() != 2 {
t.Errorf("post-reseed: %d total POSTs, want 2 (latch should clear on re-seed)", tr.callCount())
}
}
// TestRefreshOnce_TransientNoWriteNoLatch: a 5xx is transient — no write-back,
// returns false (no hard backoff latch), and a later cycle retries.
func TestRefreshOnce_TransientNoWriteNoLatch(t *testing.T) {
now := time.Now()
store := newFakeStore()
store.values[CodexAuthSecretKey] = authBlob(makeJWT(now.Add(1*time.Minute)), "rt-1")
tr := &fakeTransport{status: http.StatusServiceUnavailable, respBody: "upstream down"}
r := newTestRefresher(store, tr, now)
if perm := r.refreshOnce(context.Background()); perm {
t.Fatalf("503: permanentFailure=true, want false (transient)")
}
if atomic.LoadInt32(&store.puts) != 0 {
t.Errorf("503: %d write-backs, want 0", store.puts)
}
// Retry next cycle succeeds (no latch on transient).
tr.status = http.StatusOK
tr.respBody = okRefreshResponse(makeJWT(now.Add(2*time.Hour)), "rt-2")
if perm := r.refreshOnce(context.Background()); perm {
t.Fatalf("retry after 503: permanentFailure=true, want false")
}
if tr.callCount() != 2 {
t.Errorf("transient retry: %d total POSTs, want 2", tr.callCount())
}
if atomic.LoadInt32(&store.puts) != 1 {
t.Errorf("transient retry: %d write-backs, want 1", store.puts)
}
}
// TestRefreshOnce_SingleFlight: concurrent refreshOnce calls on a DUE token must
// POST exactly once total — the package mutex serializes them and the second
// sees the freshly-rotated (now-fresh) token and skips. Structural single-flight.
func TestRefreshOnce_SingleFlight(t *testing.T) {
now := time.Now()
store := newFakeStore()
store.values[CodexAuthSecretKey] = authBlob(makeJWT(now.Add(1*time.Minute)), "rt-1")
// Every successful rotation yields a FRESH (2h) access token, so once one
// caller rotates, the other sees fresh and skips.
tr := &fakeTransport{status: http.StatusOK, respBody: okRefreshResponse(makeJWT(now.Add(2*time.Hour)), "rt-2")}
r := newTestRefresher(store, tr, now)
const n = 16
var wg sync.WaitGroup
wg.Add(n)
for i := 0; i < n; i++ {
go func() {
defer wg.Done()
r.refreshOnce(context.Background())
}()
}
wg.Wait()
if tr.callCount() != 1 {
t.Errorf("single-flight: %d OAuth POSTs across %d concurrent calls, want exactly 1", tr.callCount(), n)
}
if atomic.LoadInt32(&store.puts) != 1 {
t.Errorf("single-flight: %d write-backs, want exactly 1", store.puts)
}
}
// TestRefreshOnce_PostsExactlyOnceToOAuthEndpoint: when it DOES refresh, the
// single POST goes to the OAuth token URL with the refresh_token grant body.
func TestRefreshOnce_PostsExactlyOnceToOAuthEndpoint(t *testing.T) {
now := time.Now()
store := newFakeStore()
store.values[CodexAuthSecretKey] = authBlob(makeJWT(now.Add(1*time.Minute)), "rt-secret")
tr := &fakeTransport{status: http.StatusOK, respBody: okRefreshResponse(makeJWT(now.Add(2*time.Hour)), "rt-2")}
r := newTestRefresher(store, tr, now)
r.refreshOnce(context.Background())
if tr.callCount() != 1 {
t.Fatalf("%d POSTs, want exactly 1", tr.callCount())
}
if tr.urls[0] != oauthTokenURL {
t.Errorf("POST URL = %q, want %q", tr.urls[0], oauthTokenURL)
}
if tr.methods[0] != http.MethodPost {
t.Errorf("method = %q, want POST", tr.methods[0])
}
var body map[string]string
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(tr.bodies[0]), &body); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("request body not json: %v (%s)", err, tr.bodies[0])
}
if body["grant_type"] != "refresh_token" {
t.Errorf("grant_type = %q, want refresh_token", body["grant_type"])
}
if body["refresh_token"] != "rt-secret" {
t.Errorf("refresh_token = %q, want rt-secret", body["refresh_token"])
}
if body["client_id"] != codexOAuthClientID {
t.Errorf("client_id = %q, want %q", body["client_id"], codexOAuthClientID)
}
}
// TestRefreshOnce_ReadErrorSkips: a store read error is a transient skip (no
// POST, no permanent latch).
func TestRefreshOnce_ReadErrorSkips(t *testing.T) {
store := newFakeStore()
store.getErr = fmt.Errorf("db down")
tr := &fakeTransport{}
r := newTestRefresher(store, tr, time.Now())
if perm := r.refreshOnce(context.Background()); perm {
t.Errorf("read error: permanentFailure=true, want false")
}
if tr.callCount() != 0 {
t.Errorf("read error: %d POSTs, want 0", tr.callCount())
}
}
// TestMergeTokens_PreservesOtherFields proves the rotated write-back keeps every
// non-token field and does not clobber id_token with an empty rotated value.
func TestMergeTokens_PreservesOtherFields(t *testing.T) {
blob := authBlob("old-at", "old-rt")
out, err := mergeTokens(blob, oauthTokens{AccessToken: "new-at", RefreshToken: "new-rt"}) // no id_token
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("mergeTokens: %v", err)
}
tokens, err := parseTokens(out)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parse merged: %v", err)
}
if tokens.AccessToken != "new-at" || tokens.RefreshToken != "new-rt" {
t.Errorf("merged tokens = %+v, want new-at/new-rt", tokens)
}
if tokens.IDToken != "id-original" {
t.Errorf("empty rotated id_token clobbered the original: got %q, want id-original", tokens.IDToken)
}
if !strings.Contains(out, "last_refresh") {
t.Errorf("merge dropped preserved field: %s", out)
}
}
+14 -25
View File
@@ -334,39 +334,28 @@ func (h *WorkspaceHandler) ProxyA2A(c *gin.Context) {
c.Data(status, "application/json", respBody)
}
// checkWorkspaceBudget returns a proxyA2AError with 402 when the workspace has
// exceeded ANY of its configured per-period budget limits (hourly/daily/weekly/
// monthly — see budget_periods.go). Per-period spend is the rolling-window sum
// over the workspace_spend_events ledger. DB errors are logged and treated as
// fail-open — a budget check failure must not block legitimate A2A traffic.
// checkWorkspaceBudget returns a proxyA2AError with 402 when the workspace
// has a budget_limit set and monthly_spend has reached or exceeded it.
// DB errors are logged and treated as fail-open — a budget check failure
// must not block legitimate A2A traffic.
func (h *WorkspaceHandler) checkWorkspaceBudget(ctx context.Context, workspaceID string) *proxyA2AError {
var limitsRaw []byte
if err := db.DB.QueryRowContext(ctx,
`SELECT COALESCE(budget_limits, '{}'::jsonb) FROM workspaces WHERE id = $1`,
var budgetLimit sql.NullInt64
var monthlySpend int64
err := db.DB.QueryRowContext(ctx,
`SELECT budget_limit, COALESCE(monthly_spend, 0) FROM workspaces WHERE id = $1`,
workspaceID,
).Scan(&limitsRaw); err != nil {
).Scan(&budgetLimit, &monthlySpend)
if err != nil {
if err != sql.ErrNoRows {
log.Printf("ProxyA2A: budget check failed for %s: %v", workspaceID, err)
}
return nil // fail-open
}
limits := parseBudgetLimits(limitsRaw)
if len(limits) == 0 {
return nil // no limits configured
}
spend, err := spendByPeriod(ctx, db.DB, workspaceID)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("ProxyA2A: budget spend query failed for %s: %v", workspaceID, err)
return nil // fail-open
}
if over := exceededPeriods(limits, spend); len(over) > 0 {
log.Printf("ProxyA2A: budget exceeded for %s (periods=%v limits=%v spend=%v)", workspaceID, over, limits, spend)
if budgetLimit.Valid && monthlySpend >= budgetLimit.Int64 {
log.Printf("ProxyA2A: budget exceeded for %s (spend=%d limit=%d)", workspaceID, monthlySpend, budgetLimit.Int64)
return &proxyA2AError{
Status: http.StatusPaymentRequired,
Response: gin.H{
"error": "workspace budget limit exceeded",
"exceeded_periods": over,
},
Status: http.StatusPaymentRequired,
Response: gin.H{"error": "workspace budget limit exceeded"},
}
}
return nil
@@ -16,9 +16,9 @@ import (
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/DATA-DOG/go-sqlmock"
"git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-core/workspace-server/internal/models"
"git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-core/workspace-server/internal/provisioner"
"github.com/DATA-DOG/go-sqlmock"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
)
@@ -2117,10 +2117,6 @@ func (f *fakeCPProv) Stop(_ context.Context, _ string) error {
f.stopCalls++
return nil
}
func (f *fakeCPProv) StopAndPrune(_ context.Context, _ string) error {
f.stopCalls++
return nil
}
func (f *fakeCPProv) GetConsoleOutput(_ context.Context, _ string) (string, error) {
return "", nil
}
@@ -246,6 +246,20 @@ func MarkQueueItemFailed(ctx context.Context, id, errMsg string) {
}
}
// QueueDepth returns the number of currently-queued (not dispatched/completed)
// items for a workspace. Used by the busy-return response body so callers
// can see how many ahead of them.
func QueueDepth(ctx context.Context, workspaceID string) int {
var n int
if err := db.DB.QueryRowContext(ctx,
`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM a2a_queue WHERE workspace_id = $1 AND status = 'queued'`,
workspaceID,
).Scan(&n); err != nil {
log.Printf("A2AQueue: QueueDepth query failed for workspace %s: %v", workspaceID, err)
}
return n
}
// DropStaleQueueItems marks queued items older than maxAge as 'dropped' with a
// system-generated reason so PM agents stop processing stale post-incident noise.
// Called with a workspaceID to scope cleanup to one workspace, or empty to sweep
@@ -18,8 +18,8 @@ import (
"testing"
"time"
"git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-core/workspace-server/internal/db"
"github.com/DATA-DOG/go-sqlmock"
"git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-core/workspace-server/internal/db"
"github.com/alicebob/miniredis/v2"
)
@@ -209,12 +209,10 @@ func drainSetup(t *testing.T, workspaceID string) (sqlmock.Sqlmock, *WorkspaceHa
// Named distinctly from handlers_test.go's expectBudgetCheck (which uses MatchPsql
// escaped-regex and cannot be reused with QueryMatcherEqual tests).
func expectQueueBudgetCheck(mock sqlmock.Sqlmock, workspaceID string) {
// Multi-period (#49): exact-match the budget_limits read; "{}" → no limits →
// checkWorkspaceBudget returns early (no spend query).
mock.ExpectQuery(
"SELECT COALESCE(budget_limits, '{}'::jsonb) FROM workspaces WHERE id = $1",
"SELECT budget_limit, COALESCE(monthly_spend, 0) FROM workspaces WHERE id = $1",
).WithArgs(workspaceID).
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"budget_limits"}).AddRow([]byte("{}")))
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"budget_limit", "monthly_spend"}))
}
// seedRedisURL puts the agent server URL into the Redis cache so resolveAgentURL
@@ -148,135 +148,6 @@ func (h *AdminSchedulesHealthHandler) Health(c *gin.Context) {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, entries)
}
// orphanScheduleEntry is one row in the Orphans response.
type orphanScheduleEntry struct {
WorkspaceID string `json:"workspace_id"`
WorkspaceStatus string `json:"workspace_status"` // "removed" | "missing"
ScheduleID string `json:"schedule_id"`
ScheduleName string `json:"schedule_name"`
Source string `json:"source"`
Enabled bool `json:"enabled"`
CronExpr string `json:"cron_expr"`
}
// Orphans handles GET /admin/schedules/orphans — the monitor surface for
// internal#2006. Health (above) reports only LIVE workspaces' schedules, so a
// schedule left on a removed/recreated workspace silently stops firing and
// never appears there. This endpoint lists exactly those orphans (workspace
// removed OR missing) so an operator/monitor can alert. Returns 200 + JSON
// array (empty when none). Auth via adminAuth() in router.go.
func (h *AdminSchedulesHealthHandler) Orphans(c *gin.Context) {
ctx := c.Request.Context()
rows, err := db.DB.QueryContext(ctx, `
SELECT s.workspace_id,
CASE WHEN w.id IS NULL THEN 'missing' ELSE 'removed' END AS ws_status,
s.id, s.name, COALESCE(s.source, ''), s.enabled, s.cron_expr
FROM workspace_schedules s
LEFT JOIN workspaces w ON w.id = s.workspace_id
WHERE w.id IS NULL OR w.status = 'removed'
ORDER BY s.name ASC
`)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("AdminSchedulesOrphans: query error: %v", err)
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": "failed to query orphans"})
return
}
defer rows.Close()
out := make([]orphanScheduleEntry, 0)
for rows.Next() {
var e orphanScheduleEntry
if err := rows.Scan(&e.WorkspaceID, &e.WorkspaceStatus, &e.ScheduleID, &e.ScheduleName, &e.Source, &e.Enabled, &e.CronExpr); err != nil {
log.Printf("AdminSchedulesOrphans: scan error: %v", err)
continue
}
out = append(out, e)
}
if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
log.Printf("AdminSchedulesOrphans: rows iteration error: %v", err)
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, out)
}
// ReapOrphans handles POST /admin/schedules/reap-orphans — the orphan cleaner
// (internal#2006). For every schedule bound to a removed/nonexistent workspace
// it re-points runtime-created schedules onto the live successor agent (matched
// by role+parent, falling back to name+parent) when one exists and doesn't
// already carry a same-named schedule; schedules with no live successor are
// disabled (enabled=false) so the scheduler stops firing into a dead workspace.
// Idempotent: re-running with no orphans is a no-op. Returns a summary count.
// Auth is enforced by the adminAuth() middleware registered in router.go.
func (h *AdminSchedulesHealthHandler) ReapOrphans(c *gin.Context) {
ctx := c.Request.Context()
// 1. Re-point runtime schedules onto a live successor (same role+parent,
// else same name+parent). Skip names already present on the successor.
repointed, err := db.DB.ExecContext(ctx, `
WITH orphan AS (
SELECT s.id, s.name, s.workspace_id, prev.role AS role, prev.parent_id AS parent_id
FROM workspace_schedules s
JOIN workspaces prev ON prev.id = s.workspace_id
WHERE prev.status = 'removed' AND s.source = 'runtime'
),
successor AS (
SELECT o.id AS schedule_id, o.name AS schedule_name,
(
SELECT w.id FROM workspaces w
WHERE w.status != 'removed'
AND w.parent_id IS NOT DISTINCT FROM o.parent_id
AND ((o.role IS NOT NULL AND w.role = o.role))
ORDER BY w.updated_at DESC NULLS LAST LIMIT 1
) AS live_id
FROM orphan o
)
UPDATE workspace_schedules s
SET workspace_id = su.live_id, updated_at = now()
FROM successor su
WHERE s.id = su.schedule_id
AND su.live_id IS NOT NULL
AND NOT EXISTS (
SELECT 1 FROM workspace_schedules t
WHERE t.workspace_id = su.live_id AND t.name = su.schedule_name
)
`)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("ReapOrphans: re-point error: %v", err)
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": "re-point failed"})
return
}
repointedN, err := repointed.RowsAffected()
if err != nil {
log.Printf("ReapOrphans: repointed rows affected: %v", err)
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": "re-point failed"})
return
}
// 2. Disable any remaining schedules still bound to a removed/missing
// workspace (no live successor, or template schedules on a dead row).
disabled, err := db.DB.ExecContext(ctx, `
UPDATE workspace_schedules s
SET enabled = false, updated_at = now()
WHERE s.enabled = true
AND NOT EXISTS (
SELECT 1 FROM workspaces w
WHERE w.id = s.workspace_id AND w.status != 'removed'
)
`)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("ReapOrphans: disable error: %v", err)
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": "disable failed"})
return
}
disabledN, err := disabled.RowsAffected()
if err != nil {
log.Printf("ReapOrphans: disabled rows affected: %v", err)
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": "disable failed"})
return
}
log.Printf("ReapOrphans: re-pointed %d, disabled %d orphaned schedule(s)", repointedN, disabledN)
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"repointed": repointedN, "disabled": disabledN})
}
// classifyScheduleStatus returns the health status string for a schedule.
// - "never_run" — last_run_at is NULL (schedule has never fired)
// - "stale" — now - last_run_at > staleThreshold (and threshold > 0)
@@ -444,72 +444,3 @@ func TestAdminSchedulesHealth_ResponseFields(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("unmet expectations: %v", err)
}
}
// ==================== Orphans + ReapOrphans (internal#2006) ====================
// TestAdminSchedulesOrphans verifies the monitor surface lists schedules bound
// to a removed/missing workspace (the recreate-orphan failure mode).
func TestAdminSchedulesOrphans(t *testing.T) {
mock := setupTestDB(t)
handler := NewAdminSchedulesHealthHandler()
mock.ExpectQuery(`LEFT JOIN workspaces`).
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{
"workspace_id", "ws_status", "id", "name", "source", "enabled", "cron_expr",
}).AddRow("dead-ws", "removed", "sched-1", "minimax-autonomous-tick", "runtime", false, "*/5 * * * *"))
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
c, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(w)
c.Request = httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/admin/schedules/orphans", nil)
handler.Orphans(c)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
var resp []orphanScheduleEntry
if err := json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &resp); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parse response: %v", err)
}
if len(resp) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected 1 orphan, got %d", len(resp))
}
if resp[0].ScheduleName != "minimax-autonomous-tick" || resp[0].WorkspaceStatus != "removed" || resp[0].Source != "runtime" {
t.Errorf("unexpected orphan entry: %+v", resp[0])
}
if err := mock.ExpectationsWereMet(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unmet expectations: %v", err)
}
}
// TestReapOrphans verifies the cleaner re-points runtime schedules onto a live
// successor then disables any remaining dead-bound schedules, returning counts.
func TestReapOrphans(t *testing.T) {
mock := setupTestDB(t)
handler := NewAdminSchedulesHealthHandler()
mock.ExpectExec(`UPDATE workspace_schedules s\s+SET workspace_id`).
WillReturnResult(sqlmock.NewResult(0, 2))
mock.ExpectExec(`UPDATE workspace_schedules s\s+SET enabled = false`).
WillReturnResult(sqlmock.NewResult(0, 1))
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
c, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(w)
c.Request = httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/admin/schedules/reap-orphans", nil)
handler.ReapOrphans(c)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
var resp map[string]int64
if err := json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &resp); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parse response: %v", err)
}
if resp["repointed"] != 2 || resp["disabled"] != 1 {
t.Errorf("expected repointed=2 disabled=1, got %+v", resp)
}
if err := mock.ExpectationsWereMet(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unmet expectations: %v", err)
}
}
@@ -252,9 +252,6 @@ func scanAuditRows(rows *sql.Rows) ([]auditEventRow, error) {
}
result = append(result, ev)
}
if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return result, nil
}
+80 -123
View File
@@ -1,9 +1,7 @@
package handlers
import (
"context"
"database/sql"
"encoding/json"
"log"
"net/http"
@@ -14,79 +12,42 @@ import (
// BudgetHandler exposes per-workspace budget read/write endpoints.
// Routes (all behind WorkspaceAuth middleware):
//
// GET /workspaces/:id/budget — per-period limits, spend, remaining
// PATCH /workspaces/:id/budget — set/clear per-period limits
//
// Multi-period (#49): the budget is now four independent rolling windows —
// hourly/daily/weekly/monthly (budget_periods.go is the SSOT for the set). The
// canonical config is workspaces.budget_limits (JSONB, USD cents per period);
// per-period spend is the rolling-window sum over workspace_spend_events. The
// legacy single monthly budget_limit / monthly_spend are still emitted (and
// budget_limit kept in sync to the monthly period) for back-compat with
// pre-deploy canvas/agent builds during the rollout window.
// GET /workspaces/:id/budget — current budget_limit, monthly_spend, budget_remaining
// PATCH /workspaces/:id/budget — set or clear budget_limit
type BudgetHandler struct{}
func NewBudgetHandler() *BudgetHandler { return &BudgetHandler{} }
// periodBudget is the per-period view: configured ceiling (null = no limit),
// rolling-window spend, and remaining headroom (null when no limit; may go
// negative so callers see how far over a period is).
type periodBudget struct {
Limit *int64 `json:"limit"`
Spend int64 `json:"spend"`
Remaining *int64 `json:"remaining"`
}
// budgetResponse is the canonical JSON shape for GET and PATCH.
// budgetResponse is the canonical JSON shape for both GET and PATCH responses.
type budgetResponse struct {
// Periods is keyed by BudgetPeriod ("hourly"/"daily"/"weekly"/"monthly").
Periods map[string]periodBudget `json:"periods"`
// --- back-compat (monthly), for pre-multi-period clients ---
BudgetLimit *int64 `json:"budget_limit"`
MonthlySpend int64 `json:"monthly_spend"`
// BudgetLimit is the monthly spend ceiling in USD cents (null = no limit).
// budget_limit=500 means $5.00/month.
BudgetLimit *int64 `json:"budget_limit"`
// MonthlySpend is the agent's self-reported accumulated LLM API spend
// for the current month (USD cents). Incremented via heartbeat.
MonthlySpend int64 `json:"monthly_spend"`
// BudgetRemaining is null when BudgetLimit is null, otherwise
// max(0, budget_limit - monthly_spend). Can be negative — we store the
// actual value so callers can see how far over-budget a workspace is.
BudgetRemaining *int64 `json:"budget_remaining"`
}
// buildBudgetResponse assembles the per-period view from the stored limits +
// the ledger spend. Single place so GET and PATCH return identical shapes.
func buildBudgetResponse(ctx context.Context, workspaceID string, limitsRaw []byte) (budgetResponse, error) {
limits := parseBudgetLimits(limitsRaw)
spend, err := spendByPeriod(ctx, db.DB, workspaceID)
if err != nil {
return budgetResponse{}, err
}
periods := make(map[string]periodBudget, len(budgetPeriods))
for _, def := range budgetPeriods {
pb := periodBudget{Spend: spend[def.Name]}
if lim, ok := limits[def.Name]; ok {
l := lim
pb.Limit = &l
r := lim - spend[def.Name]
pb.Remaining = &r
}
periods[string(def.Name)] = pb
}
resp := budgetResponse{Periods: periods, MonthlySpend: spend[PeriodMonthly]}
if m := periods[string(PeriodMonthly)]; m.Limit != nil {
resp.BudgetLimit = m.Limit
resp.BudgetRemaining = m.Remaining
}
return resp, nil
}
// GetBudget handles GET /workspaces/:id/budget.
// Returns the workspace's current budget ceiling, accumulated spend, and
// computed remaining headroom. Both budget_limit and budget_remaining are
// null when no limit has been configured for the workspace.
func (h *BudgetHandler) GetBudget(c *gin.Context) {
workspaceID := c.Param("id")
ctx := c.Request.Context()
var limitsRaw []byte
var budgetLimit sql.NullInt64
var monthlySpend int64
err := db.DB.QueryRowContext(ctx,
`SELECT COALESCE(budget_limits, '{}'::jsonb)
`SELECT budget_limit, COALESCE(monthly_spend, 0)
FROM workspaces
WHERE id = $1 AND status != 'removed'`,
workspaceID,
).Scan(&limitsRaw)
).Scan(&budgetLimit, &monthlySpend)
if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
c.JSON(http.StatusNotFound, gin.H{"error": "workspace not found"})
return
@@ -97,80 +58,66 @@ func (h *BudgetHandler) GetBudget(c *gin.Context) {
return
}
resp, err := buildBudgetResponse(ctx, workspaceID, limitsRaw)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("GetBudget: spend query failed for %s: %v", workspaceID, err)
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": "query failed"})
return
resp := budgetResponse{
MonthlySpend: monthlySpend,
}
if budgetLimit.Valid {
limit := budgetLimit.Int64
resp.BudgetLimit = &limit
remaining := limit - monthlySpend
resp.BudgetRemaining = &remaining
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, resp)
}
// PatchBudget handles PATCH /workspaces/:id/budget. Accepts EITHER the
// multi-period shape
//
// {"budget_limits": {"hourly": 100, "daily": null, "weekly": 500, "monthly": 2000}}
//
// (a per-period value of null/absent clears that period; a positive int sets it)
// OR the legacy single-monthly shape {"budget_limit": 2000} / {"budget_limit": null}.
// PatchBudget handles PATCH /workspaces/:id/budget.
// Accepts {"budget_limit": <int64>} to set a new ceiling, or
// {"budget_limit": null} to remove an existing ceiling.
// Returns the updated budget state in the same shape as GetBudget.
func (h *BudgetHandler) PatchBudget(c *gin.Context) {
workspaceID := c.Param("id")
ctx := c.Request.Context()
var raw map[string]json.RawMessage
// We need to distinguish between "field absent" and "field = null",
// so we unmarshal into a raw map first.
var raw map[string]interface{}
if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&raw); err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "invalid request body"})
return
}
_, hasLimits := raw["budget_limits"]
_, hasLegacy := raw["budget_limit"]
if !hasLimits && !hasLegacy {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "budget_limits or budget_limit field is required"})
budgetLimitRaw, ok := raw["budget_limit"]
if !ok {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "budget_limit field is required"})
return
}
limits := make(map[BudgetPeriod]int64, len(budgetPeriods))
known := make(map[string]bool, len(budgetPeriods))
for _, def := range budgetPeriods {
known[string(def.Name)] = true
}
if hasLimits {
var m map[string]*int64
if err := json.Unmarshal(raw["budget_limits"], &m); err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "budget_limits must be an object of period→int|null"})
return
}
for k, v := range m {
if !known[k] {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "unknown budget period: " + k + " (allowed: hourly, daily, weekly, monthly)"})
return
}
if v == nil {
continue // clear this period (null = no limit)
}
if *v < 0 {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "budget limit for " + k + " must be >= 0 (USD cents)"})
return
}
limits[BudgetPeriod(k)] = *v // 0 is valid = block-all for this period
}
} else { // legacy single-monthly
var v *int64
if err := json.Unmarshal(raw["budget_limit"], &v); err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "budget_limit must be an integer (USD cents) or null"})
return
}
if v != nil {
if *v < 0 {
// Validate and convert the value. JSON numbers decode as float64.
var budgetArg interface{} // nil → SQL NULL, int64 → new ceiling
if budgetLimitRaw != nil {
switch v := budgetLimitRaw.(type) {
case float64:
if v < 0 {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "budget_limit must be >= 0 (USD cents)"})
return
}
limits[PeriodMonthly] = *v // 0 is valid = block-all (legacy semantics)
cv := int64(v)
budgetArg = cv
case int64:
if v < 0 {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "budget_limit must be >= 0 (USD cents)"})
return
}
budgetArg = v
default:
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "budget_limit must be an integer (USD cents) or null"})
return
}
}
// budgetArg == nil means "clear the ceiling"
// Existence check — 404 for non-existent / removed workspaces.
// Existence check — return 404 for non-existent / removed workspaces.
var exists bool
if err := db.DB.QueryRowContext(ctx,
`SELECT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM workspaces WHERE id = $1 AND status != 'removed')`,
@@ -180,28 +127,38 @@ func (h *BudgetHandler) PatchBudget(c *gin.Context) {
return
}
// Persist: budget_limits is the SSOT; keep the legacy budget_limit column
// synced to the monthly period so pre-deploy enforcement paths stay coherent
// during the rollout window.
var legacyMonthly interface{}
if m, ok := limits[PeriodMonthly]; ok {
legacyMonthly = m
}
encoded := encodeBudgetLimits(limits)
if _, err := db.DB.ExecContext(ctx,
`UPDATE workspaces SET budget_limits = $2, budget_limit = $3, updated_at = now() WHERE id = $1`,
workspaceID, encoded, legacyMonthly,
`UPDATE workspaces SET budget_limit = $2, updated_at = now() WHERE id = $1`,
workspaceID, budgetArg,
); err != nil {
log.Printf("PatchBudget: update failed for %s: %v", workspaceID, err)
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": "update failed"})
return
}
resp, err := buildBudgetResponse(ctx, workspaceID, encoded)
if err != nil {
// Re-read the current state so the response reflects exactly what is in
// the DB, including the monthly_spend the agent has already accumulated.
var newLimit sql.NullInt64
var monthlySpend int64
if err := db.DB.QueryRowContext(ctx,
`SELECT budget_limit, COALESCE(monthly_spend, 0) FROM workspaces WHERE id = $1`,
workspaceID,
).Scan(&newLimit, &monthlySpend); err != nil {
log.Printf("PatchBudget: re-read failed for %s: %v", workspaceID, err)
// Still success — just omit the echo.
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"status": "updated"})
return
}
resp := budgetResponse{
MonthlySpend: monthlySpend,
}
if newLimit.Valid {
limit := newLimit.Int64
resp.BudgetLimit = &limit
remaining := limit - monthlySpend
resp.BudgetRemaining = &remaining
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, resp)
}
@@ -1,160 +0,0 @@
package handlers
import (
"context"
"database/sql"
"encoding/json"
"strconv"
"time"
)
// budget_periods.go — SINGLE SOURCE OF TRUTH for the multi-period per-workspace
// LLM budget (#49 follow-up). The supported periods, their rolling windows, the
// per-period spend computation (from the workspace_spend_events ledger), and the
// over-budget decision all live here so the config endpoint (GetBudget/PatchBudget),
// the display, and enforcement (checkWorkspaceBudget) can never drift.
//
// Spend model: the heartbeat records each observed spend INCREMENT into
// workspace_spend_events (recordSpendDelta). Per-period spend is a rolling-window
// SUM over that ledger — so the SERVER owns windowing (the agent keeps reporting
// its cumulative figure unchanged). Rolling (not calendar) windows: no fragile
// month-boundary reset, and "monthly" = a 30-day trailing window.
// BudgetPeriod is one of the supported rolling budget windows.
type BudgetPeriod string
const (
PeriodHourly BudgetPeriod = "hourly"
PeriodDaily BudgetPeriod = "daily"
PeriodWeekly BudgetPeriod = "weekly"
PeriodMonthly BudgetPeriod = "monthly"
)
// budgetPeriodDef pairs a period with its rolling window.
type budgetPeriodDef struct {
Name BudgetPeriod
Window time.Duration
}
// budgetPeriods is the canonical ordered list. ADD A PERIOD = one line here;
// every consumer iterates this slice, so nothing else needs to change.
var budgetPeriods = []budgetPeriodDef{
{PeriodHourly, time.Hour},
{PeriodDaily, 24 * time.Hour},
{PeriodWeekly, 7 * 24 * time.Hour},
{PeriodMonthly, 30 * 24 * time.Hour}, // rolling 30-day window
}
// spendLedgerRetention bounds the ledger: rows older than the largest window
// (+ slack) are never read, so the recorder opportunistically prunes them.
var spendLedgerRetention = 35 * 24 * time.Hour
// parseBudgetLimits decodes the workspaces.budget_limits JSONB into a map of
// period → limit (USD cents). A limit of ZERO is valid and means "block all
// spend for that period" (a $0 ceiling); absent / null / negative / unknown
// keys mean "no limit for that period". Tolerant of a NULL/empty column.
func parseBudgetLimits(raw []byte) map[BudgetPeriod]int64 {
out := make(map[BudgetPeriod]int64, len(budgetPeriods))
if len(raw) == 0 {
return out
}
var m map[string]*int64
if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &m); err != nil {
return out
}
for _, def := range budgetPeriods {
if v, ok := m[string(def.Name)]; ok && v != nil && *v >= 0 {
out[def.Name] = *v
}
}
return out
}
// encodeBudgetLimits renders a period→limit map back to the canonical JSONB
// shape, keeping only KNOWN periods with a non-negative limit (0 = block-all is
// preserved; a period absent from the map = no limit). Always returns valid JSON.
func encodeBudgetLimits(limits map[BudgetPeriod]int64) []byte {
m := make(map[string]int64, len(limits))
for _, def := range budgetPeriods {
if v, ok := limits[def.Name]; ok && v >= 0 {
m[string(def.Name)] = v
}
}
b, err := json.Marshal(m)
if err != nil {
return []byte("{}")
}
return b
}
// recordSpendDelta appends a positive spend increment to the ledger and
// opportunistically prunes rows past the retention horizon for this workspace.
// No-op for delta <= 0. Errors are returned for the caller to log (non-fatal).
func recordSpendDelta(ctx context.Context, q *sql.DB, workspaceID string, deltaCents int64) error {
if deltaCents <= 0 {
return nil
}
if _, err := q.ExecContext(ctx,
`INSERT INTO workspace_spend_events (workspace_id, delta_cents) VALUES ($1, $2)`,
workspaceID, deltaCents,
); err != nil {
return err
}
// Opportunistic prune (cheap; index-backed). Best-effort — ignore error.
_, _ = q.ExecContext(ctx,
`DELETE FROM workspace_spend_events
WHERE workspace_id = $1 AND occurred_at < now() - $2::interval`,
workspaceID, pgInterval(spendLedgerRetention),
)
return nil
}
// spendByPeriod returns the rolling-window spend (USD cents) for every period,
// computed in a SINGLE query over the ledger. The outer predicate bounds to the
// largest window; per-period FILTERs sum each sub-window. A period with no ledger
// rows reports 0. This is THE spend computation — used by both display + enforcement.
func spendByPeriod(ctx context.Context, q *sql.DB, workspaceID string) (map[BudgetPeriod]int64, error) {
out := make(map[BudgetPeriod]int64, len(budgetPeriods))
for _, def := range budgetPeriods {
out[def.Name] = 0
}
row := q.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
SELECT
COALESCE(SUM(delta_cents) FILTER (WHERE occurred_at > now() - interval '1 hour'), 0),
COALESCE(SUM(delta_cents) FILTER (WHERE occurred_at > now() - interval '24 hours'), 0),
COALESCE(SUM(delta_cents) FILTER (WHERE occurred_at > now() - interval '7 days'), 0),
COALESCE(SUM(delta_cents) FILTER (WHERE occurred_at > now() - interval '30 days'), 0)
FROM workspace_spend_events
WHERE workspace_id = $1 AND occurred_at > now() - interval '30 days'
`, workspaceID)
var h, d, w, mo int64
if err := row.Scan(&h, &d, &w, &mo); err != nil {
return out, err
}
out[PeriodHourly], out[PeriodDaily], out[PeriodWeekly], out[PeriodMonthly] = h, d, w, mo
return out, nil
}
// exceededPeriods is PURE: given the configured limits and observed spend, it
// returns the periods whose spend has reached/exceeded their limit (in
// budgetPeriods order). Only periods WITH a positive limit are considered.
// Used by enforcement to decide whether to block.
func exceededPeriods(limits map[BudgetPeriod]int64, spend map[BudgetPeriod]int64) []BudgetPeriod {
var over []BudgetPeriod
for _, def := range budgetPeriods {
limit, ok := limits[def.Name]
if !ok {
continue // no limit configured for this period
}
// limit >= 0 is a real ceiling (0 = block-all). spend >= limit → over.
if spend[def.Name] >= limit {
over = append(over, def.Name)
}
}
return over
}
// pgInterval renders a Go duration as a Postgres-interval string ("N seconds").
func pgInterval(d time.Duration) string {
return strconv.FormatInt(int64(d.Seconds()), 10) + " seconds"
}
@@ -1,99 +0,0 @@
package handlers
import (
"reflect"
"testing"
)
// Pure-logic tests for the multi-period budget SSOT (budget_periods.go). The
// DB-touching helpers (spendByPeriod / recordSpendDelta) are exercised via the
// handler sqlmock tests; here we pin the parsing + the over-budget decision,
// which is where the per-period semantics actually live.
func TestParseBudgetLimits(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
raw string
want map[BudgetPeriod]int64
}{
{"empty", "", map[BudgetPeriod]int64{}},
{"empty-object", "{}", map[BudgetPeriod]int64{}},
{"all-four", `{"hourly":100,"daily":200,"weekly":300,"monthly":400}`,
map[BudgetPeriod]int64{PeriodHourly: 100, PeriodDaily: 200, PeriodWeekly: 300, PeriodMonthly: 400}},
{"null-dropped-zero-kept", `{"hourly":null,"daily":0,"weekly":500}`,
map[BudgetPeriod]int64{PeriodDaily: 0, PeriodWeekly: 500}}, // 0 = block-all, kept
{"negative-dropped", `{"monthly":-5}`, map[BudgetPeriod]int64{}},
{"unknown-key-ignored", `{"yearly":999,"daily":10}`, map[BudgetPeriod]int64{PeriodDaily: 10}},
{"malformed-json", `{not json`, map[BudgetPeriod]int64{}},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got := parseBudgetLimits([]byte(tc.raw))
if !reflect.DeepEqual(got, tc.want) {
t.Errorf("parseBudgetLimits(%q) = %v, want %v", tc.raw, got, tc.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestEncodeBudgetLimits_RoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
in := map[BudgetPeriod]int64{PeriodHourly: 100, PeriodMonthly: 400}
enc := encodeBudgetLimits(in)
got := parseBudgetLimits(enc)
if !reflect.DeepEqual(got, in) {
t.Errorf("round-trip: encode→parse = %v, want %v (enc=%s)", got, in, enc)
}
// unknown periods dropped; 0 (block-all) kept
enc2 := encodeBudgetLimits(map[BudgetPeriod]int64{PeriodDaily: 0, "yearly": 9})
if got := parseBudgetLimits(enc2); !reflect.DeepEqual(got, map[BudgetPeriod]int64{PeriodDaily: 0}) {
t.Errorf("encode kept 0/dropped unknown: parse(%s) = %v, want {daily:0}", enc2, got)
}
}
func TestExceededPeriods(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
limits map[BudgetPeriod]int64
spend map[BudgetPeriod]int64
want []BudgetPeriod
}{
{"no-limits", map[BudgetPeriod]int64{}, map[BudgetPeriod]int64{PeriodHourly: 999}, nil},
{"zero-limit-blocks-all", map[BudgetPeriod]int64{PeriodHourly: 0}, map[BudgetPeriod]int64{PeriodHourly: 0}, []BudgetPeriod{PeriodHourly}},
{"under-all", map[BudgetPeriod]int64{PeriodDaily: 100}, map[BudgetPeriod]int64{PeriodDaily: 50}, nil},
{"at-limit-is-exceeded", map[BudgetPeriod]int64{PeriodDaily: 100}, map[BudgetPeriod]int64{PeriodDaily: 100}, []BudgetPeriod{PeriodDaily}},
{"over-limit", map[BudgetPeriod]int64{PeriodHourly: 10}, map[BudgetPeriod]int64{PeriodHourly: 11}, []BudgetPeriod{PeriodHourly}},
{"only-hourly-over", map[BudgetPeriod]int64{PeriodHourly: 10, PeriodMonthly: 1000},
map[BudgetPeriod]int64{PeriodHourly: 50, PeriodMonthly: 200}, []BudgetPeriod{PeriodHourly}},
{"multiple-over-in-order", map[BudgetPeriod]int64{PeriodHourly: 10, PeriodWeekly: 100},
map[BudgetPeriod]int64{PeriodHourly: 99, PeriodWeekly: 100}, []BudgetPeriod{PeriodHourly, PeriodWeekly}},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got := exceededPeriods(tc.limits, tc.spend)
if !reflect.DeepEqual(got, tc.want) {
t.Errorf("exceededPeriods(%v,%v) = %v, want %v", tc.limits, tc.spend, got, tc.want)
}
})
}
}
// TestBudgetPeriods_AllReachable guards the SSOT list: every declared period has
// a positive window and a unique name (a typo'd duplicate would silently break
// per-period accounting).
func TestBudgetPeriods_Wellformed(t *testing.T) {
seen := map[BudgetPeriod]bool{}
for _, d := range budgetPeriods {
if d.Window <= 0 {
t.Errorf("period %s has non-positive window %v", d.Name, d.Window)
}
if seen[d.Name] {
t.Errorf("duplicate period name %s", d.Name)
}
seen[d.Name] = true
}
for _, p := range []BudgetPeriod{PeriodHourly, PeriodDaily, PeriodWeekly, PeriodMonthly} {
if !seen[p] {
t.Errorf("period %s missing from budgetPeriods SSOT list", p)
}
}
}
+89 -191
View File
@@ -12,25 +12,15 @@ import (
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
)
// Multi-period budget (#49): GET/PATCH now read workspaces.budget_limits (jsonb)
// and compute per-period spend from the workspace_spend_events ledger
// (spendByPeriod — matched here by the "FROM workspace_spend_events" fragment).
// The legacy budget_limit/monthly_spend response fields are still emitted
// (monthly period) for rollout back-compat, and the legacy {"budget_limit":N}
// PATCH shape still works.
// spendRows builds the 4-column row spendByPeriod scans (hourly,daily,weekly,monthly).
func spendRows(h, d, w, m int64) *sqlmock.Rows {
return sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"h", "d", "w", "mo"}).AddRow(h, d, w, m)
}
// ==================== GET /workspaces/:id/budget ====================
// TestBudgetGet_NotFound verifies that GET /budget returns 404 for an unknown
// workspace ID (ErrNoRows from the budget query).
func TestBudgetGet_NotFound(t *testing.T) {
mock := setupTestDB(t)
setupTestRedis(t)
mock.ExpectQuery(`SELECT COALESCE\(budget_limits`).
mock.ExpectQuery(`SELECT budget_limit, COALESCE\(monthly_spend, 0\)`).
WithArgs("ws-not-there").
WillReturnError(sql.ErrNoRows)
@@ -39,7 +29,8 @@ func TestBudgetGet_NotFound(t *testing.T) {
c.Params = gin.Params{{Key: "id", Value: "ws-not-there"}}
c.Request = httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/workspaces/ws-not-there/budget", nil)
NewBudgetHandler().GetBudget(c)
h := NewBudgetHandler()
h.GetBudget(c)
if w.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
t.Errorf("expected 404, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
@@ -49,11 +40,12 @@ func TestBudgetGet_NotFound(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestBudgetGet_DBError verifies that a non-ErrNoRows DB error returns 500.
func TestBudgetGet_DBError(t *testing.T) {
mock := setupTestDB(t)
setupTestRedis(t)
mock.ExpectQuery(`SELECT COALESCE\(budget_limits`).
mock.ExpectQuery(`SELECT budget_limit, COALESCE\(monthly_spend, 0\)`).
WithArgs("ws-db-err").
WillReturnError(sql.ErrConnDone)
@@ -62,7 +54,8 @@ func TestBudgetGet_DBError(t *testing.T) {
c.Params = gin.Params{{Key: "id", Value: "ws-db-err"}}
c.Request = httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/workspaces/ws-db-err/budget", nil)
NewBudgetHandler().GetBudget(c)
h := NewBudgetHandler()
h.GetBudget(c)
if w.Code != http.StatusInternalServerError {
t.Errorf("expected 500, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
@@ -72,23 +65,24 @@ func TestBudgetGet_DBError(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestBudgetGet_NoLimit verifies that budget_limit and budget_remaining are
// null when the workspace has no budget ceiling configured.
func TestBudgetGet_NoLimit(t *testing.T) {
mock := setupTestDB(t)
setupTestRedis(t)
mock.ExpectQuery(`SELECT COALESCE\(budget_limits`).
mock.ExpectQuery(`SELECT budget_limit, COALESCE\(monthly_spend, 0\)`).
WithArgs("ws-free").
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"budget_limits"}).AddRow([]byte(`{}`)))
mock.ExpectQuery(`FROM workspace_spend_events`).
WithArgs("ws-free").
WillReturnRows(spendRows(0, 0, 0, 42))
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"budget_limit", "monthly_spend"}).
AddRow(nil, int64(42)))
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
c, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(w)
c.Params = gin.Params{{Key: "id", Value: "ws-free"}}
c.Request = httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/workspaces/ws-free/budget", nil)
NewBudgetHandler().GetBudget(c)
h := NewBudgetHandler()
h.GetBudget(c)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
@@ -111,23 +105,24 @@ func TestBudgetGet_NoLimit(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestBudgetGet_WithLimit verifies that budget_limit, monthly_spend, and
// budget_remaining are all returned correctly when a ceiling is set.
func TestBudgetGet_WithLimit(t *testing.T) {
mock := setupTestDB(t)
setupTestRedis(t)
mock.ExpectQuery(`SELECT COALESCE\(budget_limits`).
mock.ExpectQuery(`SELECT budget_limit, COALESCE\(monthly_spend, 0\)`).
WithArgs("ws-capped").
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"budget_limits"}).AddRow([]byte(`{"monthly":500}`)))
mock.ExpectQuery(`FROM workspace_spend_events`).
WithArgs("ws-capped").
WillReturnRows(spendRows(0, 0, 0, 123))
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"budget_limit", "monthly_spend"}).
AddRow(int64(500), int64(123)))
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
c, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(w)
c.Params = gin.Params{{Key: "id", Value: "ws-capped"}}
c.Request = httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/workspaces/ws-capped/budget", nil)
NewBudgetHandler().GetBudget(c)
h := NewBudgetHandler()
h.GetBudget(c)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
@@ -142,6 +137,7 @@ func TestBudgetGet_WithLimit(t *testing.T) {
if resp["monthly_spend"] != float64(123) {
t.Errorf("expected monthly_spend=123, got %v", resp["monthly_spend"])
}
// budget_remaining = 500 - 123 = 377
if resp["budget_remaining"] != float64(377) {
t.Errorf("expected budget_remaining=377, got %v", resp["budget_remaining"])
}
@@ -150,23 +146,24 @@ func TestBudgetGet_WithLimit(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestBudgetGet_OverBudget verifies that budget_remaining can be negative
// when monthly_spend has already exceeded budget_limit.
func TestBudgetGet_OverBudget(t *testing.T) {
mock := setupTestDB(t)
setupTestRedis(t)
mock.ExpectQuery(`SELECT COALESCE\(budget_limits`).
mock.ExpectQuery(`SELECT budget_limit, COALESCE\(monthly_spend, 0\)`).
WithArgs("ws-over").
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"budget_limits"}).AddRow([]byte(`{"monthly":100}`)))
mock.ExpectQuery(`FROM workspace_spend_events`).
WithArgs("ws-over").
WillReturnRows(spendRows(0, 0, 0, 150))
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"budget_limit", "monthly_spend"}).
AddRow(int64(100), int64(150)))
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
c, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(w)
c.Params = gin.Params{{Key: "id", Value: "ws-over"}}
c.Request = httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/workspaces/ws-over/budget", nil)
NewBudgetHandler().GetBudget(c)
h := NewBudgetHandler()
h.GetBudget(c)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
@@ -175,6 +172,7 @@ func TestBudgetGet_OverBudget(t *testing.T) {
if err := json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &resp); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parse response: %v", err)
}
// budget_remaining = 100 - 150 = -50 (negative, but we store actual value)
if resp["budget_remaining"] != float64(-50) {
t.Errorf("expected budget_remaining=-50, got %v", resp["budget_remaining"])
}
@@ -183,59 +181,10 @@ func TestBudgetGet_OverBudget(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestBudgetGet_MultiPeriod pins the new per-period shape: each period reports
// its own limit/spend/remaining, and an over-budget sub-period is visible.
func TestBudgetGet_MultiPeriod(t *testing.T) {
mock := setupTestDB(t)
setupTestRedis(t)
mock.ExpectQuery(`SELECT COALESCE\(budget_limits`).
WithArgs("ws-mp").
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"budget_limits"}).
AddRow([]byte(`{"hourly":100,"daily":1000}`)))
mock.ExpectQuery(`FROM workspace_spend_events`).
WithArgs("ws-mp").
WillReturnRows(spendRows(120, 300, 300, 300)) // hourly over (120>=100)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
c, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(w)
c.Params = gin.Params{{Key: "id", Value: "ws-mp"}}
c.Request = httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/workspaces/ws-mp/budget", nil)
NewBudgetHandler().GetBudget(c)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
var resp struct {
Periods map[string]struct {
Limit *int64 `json:"limit"`
Spend int64 `json:"spend"`
Remaining *int64 `json:"remaining"`
} `json:"periods"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &resp); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parse response: %v", err)
}
if resp.Periods["hourly"].Limit == nil || *resp.Periods["hourly"].Limit != 100 {
t.Errorf("hourly.limit: want 100, got %v", resp.Periods["hourly"].Limit)
}
if resp.Periods["hourly"].Spend != 120 {
t.Errorf("hourly.spend: want 120, got %d", resp.Periods["hourly"].Spend)
}
if r := resp.Periods["hourly"].Remaining; r == nil || *r != -20 {
t.Errorf("hourly.remaining: want -20, got %v", r)
}
if resp.Periods["weekly"].Limit != nil {
t.Errorf("weekly.limit: want null (unset), got %v", resp.Periods["weekly"].Limit)
}
if err := mock.ExpectationsWereMet(); err != nil {
t.Errorf("sqlmock expectations not met: %v", err)
}
}
// ==================== PATCH /workspaces/:id/budget ====================
// TestBudgetPatch_MissingField verifies that PATCH /budget with no budget_limit
// field in the body returns 400.
func TestBudgetPatch_MissingField(t *testing.T) {
setupTestDB(t)
setupTestRedis(t)
@@ -247,13 +196,15 @@ func TestBudgetPatch_MissingField(t *testing.T) {
bytes.NewBufferString(`{"other_field":123}`))
c.Request.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
NewBudgetHandler().PatchBudget(c)
h := NewBudgetHandler()
h.PatchBudget(c)
if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Errorf("expected 400, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
// TestBudgetPatch_InvalidBody verifies that a malformed JSON body returns 400.
func TestBudgetPatch_InvalidBody(t *testing.T) {
setupTestDB(t)
setupTestRedis(t)
@@ -265,13 +216,15 @@ func TestBudgetPatch_InvalidBody(t *testing.T) {
bytes.NewBufferString(`not json`))
c.Request.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
NewBudgetHandler().PatchBudget(c)
h := NewBudgetHandler()
h.PatchBudget(c)
if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Errorf("expected 400, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
// TestBudgetPatch_NegativeValue verifies that a negative budget_limit is rejected.
func TestBudgetPatch_NegativeValue(t *testing.T) {
setupTestDB(t)
setupTestRedis(t)
@@ -283,13 +236,15 @@ func TestBudgetPatch_NegativeValue(t *testing.T) {
bytes.NewBufferString(`{"budget_limit":-1}`))
c.Request.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
NewBudgetHandler().PatchBudget(c)
h := NewBudgetHandler()
h.PatchBudget(c)
if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Errorf("expected 400 for negative budget_limit, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
// TestBudgetPatch_InvalidType verifies that a non-numeric budget_limit returns 400.
func TestBudgetPatch_InvalidType(t *testing.T) {
setupTestDB(t)
setupTestRedis(t)
@@ -301,32 +256,16 @@ func TestBudgetPatch_InvalidType(t *testing.T) {
bytes.NewBufferString(`{"budget_limit":"not-a-number"}`))
c.Request.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
NewBudgetHandler().PatchBudget(c)
h := NewBudgetHandler()
h.PatchBudget(c)
if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Errorf("expected 400 for string budget_limit, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
// TestBudgetPatch_UnknownPeriod rejects an unsupported period key.
func TestBudgetPatch_UnknownPeriod(t *testing.T) {
setupTestDB(t)
setupTestRedis(t)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
c, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(w)
c.Params = gin.Params{{Key: "id", Value: "ws-badperiod"}}
c.Request = httptest.NewRequest("PATCH", "/workspaces/ws-badperiod/budget",
bytes.NewBufferString(`{"budget_limits":{"yearly":100}}`))
c.Request.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
NewBudgetHandler().PatchBudget(c)
if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Errorf("expected 400 for unknown period, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
// TestBudgetPatch_WorkspaceNotFound verifies that PATCH /budget returns 404
// when the workspace doesn't exist.
func TestBudgetPatch_WorkspaceNotFound(t *testing.T) {
mock := setupTestDB(t)
setupTestRedis(t)
@@ -342,7 +281,8 @@ func TestBudgetPatch_WorkspaceNotFound(t *testing.T) {
bytes.NewBufferString(`{"budget_limit":500}`))
c.Request.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
NewBudgetHandler().PatchBudget(c)
h := NewBudgetHandler()
h.PatchBudget(c)
if w.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
t.Errorf("expected 404, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
@@ -352,20 +292,25 @@ func TestBudgetPatch_WorkspaceNotFound(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestBudgetPatch_SetLimit (legacy monthly shape) updates + returns new state.
// TestBudgetPatch_SetLimit verifies that PATCH /budget with a positive value
// updates the DB and returns the new budget state.
func TestBudgetPatch_SetLimit(t *testing.T) {
mock := setupTestDB(t)
setupTestRedis(t)
// Existence probe
mock.ExpectQuery(`SELECT EXISTS.*status != 'removed'`).
WithArgs("ws-set-limit").
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"exists"}).AddRow(true))
mock.ExpectExec(`UPDATE workspaces SET budget_limits`).
WithArgs("ws-set-limit", sqlmock.AnyArg(), int64(500)).
// UPDATE
mock.ExpectExec(`UPDATE workspaces SET budget_limit`).
WithArgs("ws-set-limit", int64(500)).
WillReturnResult(sqlmock.NewResult(0, 1))
mock.ExpectQuery(`FROM workspace_spend_events`).
// Re-read for response
mock.ExpectQuery(`SELECT budget_limit, COALESCE\(monthly_spend, 0\) FROM workspaces WHERE id`).
WithArgs("ws-set-limit").
WillReturnRows(spendRows(0, 0, 0, 200))
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"budget_limit", "monthly_spend"}).
AddRow(int64(500), int64(200)))
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
c, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(w)
@@ -374,7 +319,8 @@ func TestBudgetPatch_SetLimit(t *testing.T) {
bytes.NewBufferString(`{"budget_limit":500}`))
c.Request.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
NewBudgetHandler().PatchBudget(c)
h := NewBudgetHandler()
h.PatchBudget(c)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
@@ -389,6 +335,7 @@ func TestBudgetPatch_SetLimit(t *testing.T) {
if resp["monthly_spend"] != float64(200) {
t.Errorf("expected monthly_spend=200, got %v", resp["monthly_spend"])
}
// budget_remaining = 500 - 200 = 300
if resp["budget_remaining"] != float64(300) {
t.Errorf("expected budget_remaining=300, got %v", resp["budget_remaining"])
}
@@ -397,59 +344,8 @@ func TestBudgetPatch_SetLimit(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestBudgetPatch_SetMultiPeriod sets several periods at once and verifies the
// per-period response.
func TestBudgetPatch_SetMultiPeriod(t *testing.T) {
mock := setupTestDB(t)
setupTestRedis(t)
mock.ExpectQuery(`SELECT EXISTS.*status != 'removed'`).
WithArgs("ws-mp-set").
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"exists"}).AddRow(true))
// no monthly in payload → legacy budget_limit column set to NULL
mock.ExpectExec(`UPDATE workspaces SET budget_limits`).
WithArgs("ws-mp-set", sqlmock.AnyArg(), nil).
WillReturnResult(sqlmock.NewResult(0, 1))
mock.ExpectQuery(`FROM workspace_spend_events`).
WithArgs("ws-mp-set").
WillReturnRows(spendRows(10, 20, 30, 40))
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
c, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(w)
c.Params = gin.Params{{Key: "id", Value: "ws-mp-set"}}
c.Request = httptest.NewRequest("PATCH", "/workspaces/ws-mp-set/budget",
bytes.NewBufferString(`{"budget_limits":{"hourly":100,"daily":200,"monthly":null}}`))
c.Request.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
NewBudgetHandler().PatchBudget(c)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
var resp struct {
Periods map[string]struct {
Limit *int64 `json:"limit"`
Spend int64 `json:"spend"`
} `json:"periods"`
BudgetLimit *int64 `json:"budget_limit"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &resp); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parse response: %v", err)
}
if resp.Periods["hourly"].Limit == nil || *resp.Periods["hourly"].Limit != 100 {
t.Errorf("hourly.limit want 100, got %v", resp.Periods["hourly"].Limit)
}
if resp.Periods["daily"].Limit == nil || *resp.Periods["daily"].Limit != 200 {
t.Errorf("daily.limit want 200, got %v", resp.Periods["daily"].Limit)
}
if resp.BudgetLimit != nil {
t.Errorf("monthly cleared → budget_limit should be null, got %v", *resp.BudgetLimit)
}
if err := mock.ExpectationsWereMet(); err != nil {
t.Errorf("sqlmock expectations not met: %v", err)
}
}
// TestBudgetPatch_ClearLimit verifies that PATCH /budget with budget_limit=null
// clears the ceiling, making budget_limit and budget_remaining null in the response.
func TestBudgetPatch_ClearLimit(t *testing.T) {
mock := setupTestDB(t)
setupTestRedis(t)
@@ -457,12 +353,15 @@ func TestBudgetPatch_ClearLimit(t *testing.T) {
mock.ExpectQuery(`SELECT EXISTS.*status != 'removed'`).
WithArgs("ws-clear-limit").
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"exists"}).AddRow(true))
mock.ExpectExec(`UPDATE workspaces SET budget_limits`).
WithArgs("ws-clear-limit", sqlmock.AnyArg(), nil).
// UPDATE with NULL
mock.ExpectExec(`UPDATE workspaces SET budget_limit`).
WithArgs("ws-clear-limit", nil).
WillReturnResult(sqlmock.NewResult(0, 1))
mock.ExpectQuery(`FROM workspace_spend_events`).
// Re-read — budget_limit is now NULL
mock.ExpectQuery(`SELECT budget_limit, COALESCE\(monthly_spend, 0\) FROM workspaces WHERE id`).
WithArgs("ws-clear-limit").
WillReturnRows(spendRows(0, 0, 0, 50))
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"budget_limit", "monthly_spend"}).
AddRow(nil, int64(50)))
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
c, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(w)
@@ -471,7 +370,8 @@ func TestBudgetPatch_ClearLimit(t *testing.T) {
bytes.NewBufferString(`{"budget_limit":null}`))
c.Request.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
NewBudgetHandler().PatchBudget(c)
h := NewBudgetHandler()
h.PatchBudget(c)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
@@ -491,6 +391,8 @@ func TestBudgetPatch_ClearLimit(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestBudgetPatch_UpdateDBError verifies that a DB error during the UPDATE
// returns 500.
func TestBudgetPatch_UpdateDBError(t *testing.T) {
mock := setupTestDB(t)
setupTestRedis(t)
@@ -498,8 +400,8 @@ func TestBudgetPatch_UpdateDBError(t *testing.T) {
mock.ExpectQuery(`SELECT EXISTS.*status != 'removed'`).
WithArgs("ws-patch-dberr").
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"exists"}).AddRow(true))
mock.ExpectExec(`UPDATE workspaces SET budget_limits`).
WithArgs("ws-patch-dberr", sqlmock.AnyArg(), int64(500)).
mock.ExpectExec(`UPDATE workspaces SET budget_limit`).
WithArgs("ws-patch-dberr", int64(500)).
WillReturnError(sql.ErrConnDone)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
@@ -509,7 +411,8 @@ func TestBudgetPatch_UpdateDBError(t *testing.T) {
bytes.NewBufferString(`{"budget_limit":500}`))
c.Request.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
NewBudgetHandler().PatchBudget(c)
h := NewBudgetHandler()
h.PatchBudget(c)
if w.Code != http.StatusInternalServerError {
t.Errorf("expected 500 on UPDATE error, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
@@ -519,8 +422,8 @@ func TestBudgetPatch_UpdateDBError(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestBudgetPatch_ZeroLimit verifies budget_limit=0 is accepted + stored (0 =
// block-all: every period call is blocked — pauses the workspace's spend).
// TestBudgetPatch_ZeroLimit verifies that budget_limit=0 is accepted (it means
// every A2A call is blocked — useful to pause a workspace's LLM spend entirely).
func TestBudgetPatch_ZeroLimit(t *testing.T) {
mock := setupTestDB(t)
setupTestRedis(t)
@@ -528,12 +431,13 @@ func TestBudgetPatch_ZeroLimit(t *testing.T) {
mock.ExpectQuery(`SELECT EXISTS.*status != 'removed'`).
WithArgs("ws-zero-limit").
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"exists"}).AddRow(true))
mock.ExpectExec(`UPDATE workspaces SET budget_limits`).
WithArgs("ws-zero-limit", sqlmock.AnyArg(), int64(0)).
mock.ExpectExec(`UPDATE workspaces SET budget_limit`).
WithArgs("ws-zero-limit", int64(0)).
WillReturnResult(sqlmock.NewResult(0, 1))
mock.ExpectQuery(`FROM workspace_spend_events`).
mock.ExpectQuery(`SELECT budget_limit, COALESCE\(monthly_spend, 0\) FROM workspaces WHERE id`).
WithArgs("ws-zero-limit").
WillReturnRows(spendRows(0, 0, 0, 0))
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"budget_limit", "monthly_spend"}).
AddRow(int64(0), int64(0)))
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
c, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(w)
@@ -542,17 +446,11 @@ func TestBudgetPatch_ZeroLimit(t *testing.T) {
bytes.NewBufferString(`{"budget_limit":0}`))
c.Request.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
NewBudgetHandler().PatchBudget(c)
h := NewBudgetHandler()
h.PatchBudget(c)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200 for zero budget_limit, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
var resp map[string]interface{}
if err := json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &resp); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parse response: %v", err)
}
if resp["budget_limit"] != float64(0) {
t.Errorf("expected budget_limit=0 (block-all), got %v", resp["budget_limit"])
t.Errorf("expected 200 for zero budget_limit, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
if err := mock.ExpectationsWereMet(); err != nil {
t.Errorf("sqlmock expectations not met: %v", err)
@@ -196,15 +196,10 @@ func resolveWorkspaceForwardCreds(c *gin.Context, ctx context.Context, workspace
c.JSON(http.StatusServiceUnavailable, gin.H{"error": "workspace url not registered yet"})
return "", "", false
}
// Defense-in-depth for #2316: workspaces.url is validated at
// registration time, but the DB row can be stale/tampered and the
// SSRF policy can tighten. Re-validate immediately before attaching
// the inbound secret to an outbound forward.
if err := isSafeURL(wsURL); err != nil {
log.Printf("chat_files %s: unsafe workspace URL for %s rejected: %v", op, workspaceID, err)
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "workspace URL not allowed"})
return "", "", false
}
// Trust note: workspaces.url passes validateAgentURL at /registry/
// register write time, blocking SSRF-shaped URLs. We rely on that
// upstream gate rather than re-validating here. Tracked at #2316
// for follow-up: forward-time re-validation as defense-in-depth.
secret, healed, err := readOrLazyHealInboundSecret(ctx, workspaceID, "chat_files "+op)
if err != nil {
@@ -414,56 +414,6 @@ func TestChatUpload_WorkspaceUnreachable(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestChatUpload_RejectsMetadataWorkspaceURL(t *testing.T) {
mock := setupTestDB(t)
setupTestRedis(t)
restore := setSSRFCheckForTest(true)
t.Cleanup(restore)
wsID := "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000047"
expectURL(mock, wsID, "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data")
h := NewChatFilesHandler(NewTemplatesHandler(t.TempDir(), nil, nil))
body, ct := uploadFixture(t)
c, w := makeUploadRequest(t, wsID, body, ct)
h.Upload(c)
if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Fatalf("expected 400 for metadata workspace URL, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
if !strings.Contains(w.Body.String(), "workspace URL not allowed") {
t.Errorf("expected unsafe URL error, got: %s", w.Body.String())
}
if err := mock.ExpectationsWereMet(); err != nil {
t.Errorf("sqlmock expectations not met: %v", err)
}
}
func TestChatUpload_RejectsNonHTTPWorkspaceURL(t *testing.T) {
mock := setupTestDB(t)
setupTestRedis(t)
restore := setSSRFCheckForTest(true)
t.Cleanup(restore)
wsID := "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000048"
expectURL(mock, wsID, "file:///etc/passwd")
h := NewChatFilesHandler(NewTemplatesHandler(t.TempDir(), nil, nil))
body, ct := uploadFixture(t)
c, w := makeUploadRequest(t, wsID, body, ct)
h.Upload(c)
if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Fatalf("expected 400 for non-HTTP workspace URL, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
if !strings.Contains(w.Body.String(), "workspace URL not allowed") {
t.Errorf("expected unsafe URL error, got: %s", w.Body.String())
}
if err := mock.ExpectationsWereMet(); err != nil {
t.Errorf("sqlmock expectations not met: %v", err)
}
}
// TestChatUpload_BodyUnderCap_Forwards pins the lower edge of the new
// 100 MB body cap (CTO 2026-05-19 directive on forensic a99ab0a1).
// A multipart payload comfortably under the cap must reach the
@@ -696,54 +646,6 @@ func TestChatDownload_NoInboundSecret_LazyHealFailure(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestChatDownload_RejectsMetadataWorkspaceURL(t *testing.T) {
mock := setupTestDB(t)
setupTestRedis(t)
restore := setSSRFCheckForTest(true)
t.Cleanup(restore)
wsID := "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000054"
expectURL(mock, wsID, "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data")
h := NewChatFilesHandler(NewTemplatesHandler(t.TempDir(), nil, nil))
c, w := makeDownloadRequest(t, wsID, "/workspace/foo.txt")
h.Download(c)
if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Fatalf("expected 400 for metadata workspace URL, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
if !strings.Contains(w.Body.String(), "workspace URL not allowed") {
t.Errorf("expected unsafe URL error, got: %s", w.Body.String())
}
if err := mock.ExpectationsWereMet(); err != nil {
t.Errorf("sqlmock expectations not met: %v", err)
}
}
func TestChatDownload_RejectsNonHTTPWorkspaceURL(t *testing.T) {
mock := setupTestDB(t)
setupTestRedis(t)
restore := setSSRFCheckForTest(true)
t.Cleanup(restore)
wsID := "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000055"
expectURL(mock, wsID, "file:///etc/passwd")
h := NewChatFilesHandler(NewTemplatesHandler(t.TempDir(), nil, nil))
c, w := makeDownloadRequest(t, wsID, "/workspace/foo.txt")
h.Download(c)
if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Fatalf("expected 400 for non-HTTP workspace URL, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
if !strings.Contains(w.Body.String(), "workspace URL not allowed") {
t.Errorf("expected unsafe URL error, got: %s", w.Body.String())
}
if err := mock.ExpectationsWereMet(); err != nil {
t.Errorf("sqlmock expectations not met: %v", err)
}
}
func TestChatDownload_ForwardsToWorkspace_HappyPath(t *testing.T) {
mock := setupTestDB(t)
setupTestRedis(t)
@@ -294,9 +294,8 @@ func TestProxyA2A_CrossTenant_RoutingDenied(t *testing.T) {
// A URL exists for the target; the guard must deny BEFORE it is used.
mr.Set(fmt.Sprintf("ws:%s:url", target), "http://localhost:1")
// Post-#1955: CanCommunicate no longer has the root-sibling bypass.
// Both root-level (parent_id NULL) but unrelated org roots → hierarchy
// check DENIES with 403 BEFORE the org-scope guard or resolveAgentURL.
// CanCommunicate: both root-level (parent_id NULL) → its weak "root-level
// siblings" rule ALLOWS this. The org guard must catch it afterward.
mock.ExpectQuery("SELECT id, parent_id FROM workspaces WHERE id = ").
WithArgs(caller).
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"id", "parent_id"}).AddRow(caller, nil))
@@ -304,6 +303,15 @@ func TestProxyA2A_CrossTenant_RoutingDenied(t *testing.T) {
WithArgs(target).
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"id", "parent_id"}).AddRow(target, nil))
// #1953 org-scope guard: caller resolves to org-a-root, target to org-b-root
// → different orgs → 403. (Each org root resolves to itself.)
mock.ExpectQuery("WITH RECURSIVE org_chain AS").
WithArgs(caller).
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"root_id"}).AddRow(caller))
mock.ExpectQuery("WITH RECURSIVE org_chain AS").
WithArgs(target).
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"root_id"}).AddRow(target))
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
c, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(w)
c.Params = gin.Params{{Key: "id", Value: target}}
@@ -321,8 +329,8 @@ func TestProxyA2A_CrossTenant_RoutingDenied(t *testing.T) {
if err := json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &resp); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("body not JSON: %v", err)
}
if msg, _ := resp["error"].(string); !strings.Contains(msg, "cannot communicate") {
t.Errorf("expected hierarchy denial message, got %v", resp["error"])
if msg, _ := resp["error"].(string); !strings.Contains(msg, "different org") {
t.Errorf("expected cross-org denial message, got %v", resp["error"])
}
if err := mock.ExpectationsWereMet(); err != nil {
t.Errorf("unmet sqlmock expectations: %v", err)

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