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Molecule AI Dev Engineer A (Kimi) 13bfa663dd fix(broadcast): correct org-root CTE for non-root senders (#1959)
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The first CTE in workspace_broadcast.go still used the OLD buggy pattern
from before #1954: it carried `id AS root_id` from the recursive seed.
For a non-root sender this resolved root_id to itself instead of the true
org root, so the broadcast would under-deliver to siblings in the same org.

Replace with the canonical orgRootSubtreeCTE shape from org_scope.go:
- Seed with `SELECT id, parent_id` (no root_id alias)
- Walk up via `JOIN ... ON w.id = c.parent_id`
- Extract root with `SELECT id AS root_id FROM org_chain WHERE parent_id IS NULL`

The second CTE (recipient collection) already does the correct thing — it
seeds from `parent_id IS NULL` and walks downward, so `id AS root_id` is
actually the root id there.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-27 19:36:30 +00:00
hongming 9deb8e9ea6 Merge pull request 'fix(security): scope peer discovery + a2a routing to caller org (#1953)' (#1954) from fix/1953-scope-peer-discovery-a2a-to-org into main
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2026-05-27 17:51:46 +00:00
core-be 69391595f3 fix(e2e): delete child before parent in test_api delete/round-trip (#1953)
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The #1953 fixture re-seed made Summarizer a CHILD of Echo (same-org) so
the peer-discovery assertions exercise legit same-org enumeration. But
Test 21 still deleted the PARENT (Echo) first and asserted the other
workspace survives (count=1). CascadeDelete walks the recursive parent_id
CTE, so deleting Echo also removed its child Summarizer -> "List after
delete" saw 0, and Test 22 then hit 410 Gone deleting an already-removed
Summarizer ("got: {error: workspace removed}").

Fix: capture Summarizer's bundle, delete the CHILD (Summarizer) first
(child delete does not cascade upward so Echo survives -> count=1), then
delete the parent Echo in the round-trip block and re-import the captured
bundle. Cross-tenant isolation and the same-org parent/child relationship
are unchanged; only the delete ordering is corrected.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-27 17:42:44 +00:00
hongming 46606801c6 Merge pull request 'fix(ci): add explicit utf-8 encoding to Python open() calls' (#1920) from fix/python-open-encoding into main
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2026-05-27 17:01:54 +00:00
hongming cd671e1263 Merge pull request 'fix(memory): upsert namespace before v2 commit' (#1925) from fix/memory-v2-upsert-namespace-20260526 into main
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2026-05-27 16:43:49 +00:00
core-be 51f74e9d8a fix(security): correct org-root CTE so same-org a2a routing works (#1953)
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The #1953 sameOrg() guard over-blocked legitimate SAME-ORG a2a routing:
orgRootSubtreeCTE carried `id AS root_id` from the recursive SEED, so a
non-root workspace resolved to ITSELF instead of its topmost ancestor.
sameOrg(child, root) therefore compared child-id vs root-id, reported the
pair as DIFFERENT orgs, and 403'd a legitimate same-org delegation. The
cross-org case was unaffected (two distinct roots already resolve to
different ids), so isolation stayed closed — but real same-org delegation
broke. Caught only by the real-Postgres integration suite: the sqlmock
unit tests hand-feed sameOrg() a root_id row and so structurally cannot
exercise the CTE.

Fix: select the parentless chain row's own `id` (aliased root_id) instead
of the seed-carried value. A node that already IS an org root has a
one-row chain and still resolves to itself.

Why the two required checks were red:

- handlers-postgres-integration (real CTE): the executeDelegation
  success-path fixtures seeded source AND target both parent_id=NULL —
  two DISTINCT org roots, i.e. a CROSS-tenant pair that only ever
  "communicated" via the OLD leaky root-sibling behavior #1953 closes.
  Re-seeded target as a CHILD of source (same org). With the same-org
  fixture, the CTE bug surfaced and is now fixed; all 5 ExecuteDelegation
  tests pass (success + failure paths). Added
  TestIntegration_SameOrg_RealCTE_ResolvesAncestorChain as the real-SQL
  regression gate for root→child→grandchild resolution + cross-org denial.

- e2e-api (test_api.sh): created Echo + Summarizer both as org roots and
  asserted they appear in each other's /registry/:id/peers — that
  enumeration WAS the cross-tenant leak (org root seeing another org
  root). Re-created Summarizer as a child of Echo so the peer assertions
  exercise legitimate same-org parent/child enumeration.

Cross-tenant isolation remains closed (all cross-org negative tests pass);
same-org peers + a2a now work. go build ./... + go test ./internal/handlers/...
green; integration suite green.

Refs #1953

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-27 09:41:44 -07:00
core-be 6211d27bc7 fix(security): scope peer discovery + a2a routing to caller org (#1953)
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Three workspace-server paths computed an "org-root sibling set" as
`WHERE parent_id IS NULL`, which matches EVERY tenant's org root (the
workspaces table has no org_id column) → cross-tenant data exposure:

  1. GET /registry/:id/peers (discovery.Peers) — returned peer
     id/name/role/url/agent_card across ALL tenants when the caller
     was itself an org root.
  2. MCP toolListPeers (mcp_tools.go) — same cross-tenant peer
     enumeration via the MCP bridge.
  3. a2a routing (a2a_proxy.proxyA2ARequest → resolveAgentURL) —
     CanCommunicate's "root-level siblings, both no parent" rule treats
     every tenant's org root as a sibling, and resolveAgentURL accepts
     ANY workspace id with no org check, so an org root could resolve
     and route a2a to another tenant's org root.

Fix — reuse the OFFSEC-015 broadcast scoping (commit 5a05302c,
workspace_broadcast.go): the org is the parent_id-chain subtree from a
single org root. New org_scope.go centralises that recursive CTE
(orgRootID / sameOrg) so all paths derive "the caller's org" the same way:

  - discovery.Peers + toolListPeers: drop the `parent_id IS NULL`
    sibling branch entirely. An org root has no siblings inside its own
    org; its peers are its children (still enumerated). Only the
    parent_id-bound sibling branch remains, already scoped to one tenant.
  - a2a proxyA2ARequest: after CanCommunicate, add a sameOrg() guard that
    rejects (403) before resolveAgentURL when caller and target resolve
    to different org roots. Fail-closed: a DB error denies routing.

No org_id column is added — that is a separate architecture decision
pending CTO. This uses the existing parent_id-chain scoping.

Tests (cross_tenant_isolation_test.go): per-path cross-tenant regression
— a DIFFERENT-org workspace must NOT appear in /registry peers, must NOT
appear in toolListPeers, and a2a MUST reject resolving/routing to a
workspace outside the caller's org; plus same-org positive tests. The
three negative tests were verified to FAIL against the pre-fix code.
Existing peer/a2a/delegation tests updated to the org-scoped behavior.

Follow-up for CTO: registry.CanCommunicate still treats any two org
roots as siblings, so discovery.Discover and CheckAccess share the same
root-sibling weakness. Scoping CanCommunicate itself (registry package)
would close that class fully; flagged separately as it is outside the
three #1953 paths.

Refs #1953

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-27 08:45:27 -07:00
claude-ceo-assistant 42b16b33fb fix(memory): upsert namespace before v2 commit
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15 changed files with 836 additions and 83 deletions
+43 -25
View File
@@ -73,7 +73,15 @@ else
fi
# Test 4: Create workspace B (needs bearer — tokens now exist in DB)
R=$(acurl -X POST "$BASE/workspaces" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"name":"Summarizer Agent","tier":1,"runtime":"external","external":true}')
# #1953 cross-tenant isolation: Summarizer is created as a CHILD of Echo so the
# two live in the SAME org (Echo is the org root; Summarizer hangs off it via
# parent_id). The peer-discovery tests below assert same-org peer enumeration
# (Echo sees its child, the child sees its parent). Previously both were created
# parent_id=NULL — two DISTINCT org roots — and "peers" only listed each other
# via the `WHERE parent_id IS NULL` branch that returned every tenant's org root.
# That branch WAS the cross-tenant leak (#1953) and is now removed, so two org
# roots no longer see each other; the assertions must run inside one org.
R=$(acurl -X POST "$BASE/workspaces" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d "{\"name\":\"Summarizer Agent\",\"tier\":1,\"runtime\":\"external\",\"external\":true,\"parent_id\":\"$ECHO_ID\"}")
check "POST /workspaces (create summarizer)" '"status":"awaiting_agent"' "$R"
SUM_ID=$(echo "$R" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['id'])")
@@ -133,21 +141,23 @@ check "Heartbeat updated uptime" '"uptime_seconds":120' "$R"
R=$(curl -s "$BASE/registry/discover/$ECHO_ID")
check "GET /registry/discover/:id (missing caller rejected)" 'X-Workspace-ID header is required' "$R"
# Test 12: Discover (from sibling — allowed)
# Test 12: Discover (from same-org child — allowed)
R=$(curl -s "$BASE/registry/discover/$ECHO_ID" -H "X-Workspace-ID: $SUM_ID" -H "Authorization: Bearer $SUM_TOKEN")
check "GET /registry/discover/:id (sibling)" '"url"' "$R"
check "GET /registry/discover/:id (same-org)" '"url"' "$R"
# Test 13: Peers (root siblings see each other)
# Test 13: Peers — same-org parent/child see each other (#1953). Echo is the org
# root and lists its child Summarizer; Summarizer lists its parent Echo. A
# cross-org workspace would NOT appear here (see cross_tenant_isolation_test.go).
R=$(curl -s "$BASE/registry/$ECHO_ID/peers" -H "Authorization: Bearer $ECHO_TOKEN")
check "GET /registry/:id/peers (has summarizer)" '"Summarizer' "$R"
R=$(curl -s "$BASE/registry/$SUM_ID/peers" -H "Authorization: Bearer $SUM_TOKEN")
check "GET /registry/:id/peers (has echo)" '"Echo Agent"' "$R"
# Test 14: Check access (root siblings)
# Test 14: Check access (same-org parent↔child — allowed)
R=$(curl -s -X POST "$BASE/registry/check-access" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{\"caller_id\":\"$ECHO_ID\",\"target_id\":\"$SUM_ID\"}")
check "POST /registry/check-access (siblings allowed)" '"allowed":true' "$R"
check "POST /registry/check-access (same-org allowed)" '"allowed":true' "$R"
# Test 15: PATCH workspace (update position)
R=$(acurl -X PATCH "$BASE/workspaces/$ECHO_ID" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"x":100,"y":200}')
@@ -289,32 +299,40 @@ R=$(curl -s "$BASE/workspaces" -H "Authorization: Bearer $ECHO_TOKEN")
check "current_task in list response" '"current_task"' "$R"
# Test 21: Delete
R=$(acurl -X DELETE "$BASE/workspaces/$ECHO_ID?confirm=true" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $ECHO_TOKEN" \
-H "X-Confirm-Name: Echo Agent v2")
check "DELETE /workspaces/:id" '"status":"removed"' "$R"
R=$(curl -s "$BASE/workspaces" -H "Authorization: Bearer $SUM_TOKEN")
COUNT=$(echo "$R" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(len(json.load(sys.stdin)))")
check "List after delete (count=1)" "1" "$COUNT"
# Test 22: Bundle round-trip — export → delete → import → verify same config
echo ""
echo "--- Bundle Round-Trip Test ---"
# Export the summarizer workspace (#165 / PR #167 — admin-gated)
# #1953: Summarizer is now a CHILD of Echo (same-org, for the peer-discovery
# tests above). DELETE on the *parent* (Echo) cascade-removes its descendants
# (CascadeDelete walks the recursive `parent_id` CTE), so deleting Echo first
# would also remove Summarizer and the "one survives" assertion would see 0.
# Delete the CHILD (Summarizer) here instead: a child delete does NOT cascade
# upward, so the parent Echo survives and count=1 holds. The bundle round-trip
# below needs Summarizer's exported config, so capture it BEFORE this delete.
BUNDLE=$(curl -s "$BASE/bundles/export/$SUM_ID" -H "Authorization: Bearer $SUM_TOKEN")
check "GET /bundles/export/:id" '"name":"Summarizer Agent"' "$BUNDLE"
# Capture original config for comparison
ORIG_NAME=$(echo "$BUNDLE" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['name'])")
ORIG_TIER=$(echo "$BUNDLE" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['tier'])")
# Delete the workspace — use SUM_TOKEN (per-workspace) for WorkspaceAuth
# and ADMIN_TOKEN for the AdminAuth layer.
R=$(curl -s -X DELETE "$BASE/workspaces/$SUM_ID?confirm=true" \
R=$(acurl -X DELETE "$BASE/workspaces/$SUM_ID?confirm=true" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $SUM_TOKEN" \
-H "X-Confirm-Name: Summarizer Agent")
check "DELETE /workspaces/:id" '"status":"removed"' "$R"
# Parent Echo must survive a child delete — list as Echo and expect count=1.
R=$(curl -s "$BASE/workspaces" -H "Authorization: Bearer $ECHO_TOKEN")
COUNT=$(echo "$R" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(len(json.load(sys.stdin)))")
check "List after delete (count=1)" "1" "$COUNT"
# Test 22: Bundle round-trip — export → delete → import → verify same config.
# Summarizer's bundle was captured above; now delete the parent Echo (the only
# remaining workspace) so the import lands in a clean org, then re-import the
# Summarizer bundle.
echo ""
echo "--- Bundle Round-Trip Test ---"
# Delete the remaining parent Echo — use ECHO_TOKEN (per-workspace) for
# WorkspaceAuth and ADMIN_TOKEN for the AdminAuth layer.
R=$(acurl -X DELETE "$BASE/workspaces/$ECHO_ID?confirm=true" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $ECHO_TOKEN" \
-H "X-Confirm-Name: Echo Agent v2")
check "Delete before re-import" '"status":"removed"' "$R"
# After deleting both workspaces, all per-workspace tokens are revoked.
@@ -375,6 +375,30 @@ func (h *WorkspaceHandler) proxyA2ARequest(ctx context.Context, workspaceID stri
Response: gin.H{"error": "access denied: workspaces cannot communicate per hierarchy rules"},
}
}
// #1953 cross-tenant isolation. CanCommunicate alone does NOT enforce
// org boundaries: its "root-level siblings — both have no parent" rule
// treats every tenant's org root as a sibling, so a caller that is an
// org root could resolve and route a2a to another tenant's org root
// (and resolveAgentURL accepts ANY workspace id with no org check).
// Gate on the SAME parent_id-chain org scoping the OFFSEC-015 broadcast
// fix uses: reject before resolveAgentURL when caller and target are in
// different orgs. Fail-closed — a DB error denies cross-org routing.
ok, err := sameOrg(ctx, db.DB, callerID, workspaceID)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("ProxyA2A: org-scope check failed %s → %s: %v — denying", callerID, workspaceID, err)
return 0, nil, &proxyA2AError{
Status: http.StatusForbidden,
Response: gin.H{"error": "access denied: org isolation check failed"},
}
}
if !ok {
log.Printf("ProxyA2A: cross-org routing denied %s → %s (#1953)", callerID, workspaceID)
return 0, nil, &proxyA2AError{
Status: http.StatusForbidden,
Response: gin.H{"error": "access denied: target workspace is in a different org"},
}
}
}
// Budget enforcement: reject A2A calls when the workspace has exceeded its
@@ -437,6 +437,10 @@ func TestProxyA2A_CallerIDPropagated(t *testing.T) {
WithArgs("ws-target").
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"id", "parent_id"}).AddRow("ws-target", "ws-parent"))
// #1953 cross-tenant guard: same-org check after CanCommunicate. Both
// workspaces resolve to the same org root → routing allowed.
mockSameOrg(mock, "ws-caller", "ws-target", true)
expectBudgetCheck(mock, "ws-target")
// Expect activity log with source_id set
@@ -465,6 +469,24 @@ func TestProxyA2A_CallerIDPropagated(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// mockSameOrg sets up the two org-root recursive-CTE expectations that the
// #1953 cross-tenant guard in proxyA2ARequest runs after CanCommunicate passes.
// sameOrg=true returns the SAME root_id for both caller and target (same tenant);
// sameOrg=false returns different root_ids (cross-tenant → routing must be denied).
func mockSameOrg(mock sqlmock.Sqlmock, caller, target string, sameOrg bool) {
callerRoot := "org-root-shared"
targetRoot := "org-root-shared"
if !sameOrg {
targetRoot = "org-root-other-tenant"
}
mock.ExpectQuery("WITH RECURSIVE org_chain AS").
WithArgs(caller).
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"root_id"}).AddRow(callerRoot))
mock.ExpectQuery("WITH RECURSIVE org_chain AS").
WithArgs(target).
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"root_id"}).AddRow(targetRoot))
}
// mockCanCommunicate sets up sqlmock expectations for CanCommunicate(caller, target).
// allowed=true sets up rows that satisfy the access policy (siblings under same parent).
// allowed=false sets up rows that don't (different parents).
@@ -659,6 +681,9 @@ func TestProxyA2A_CallerIDDerivedFromBearer(t *testing.T) {
WithArgs("ws-target").
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"id", "parent_id"}).AddRow("ws-target", "ws-parent"))
// 3b. #1953 cross-tenant guard — same org root → routing allowed.
mockSameOrg(mock, "ws-caller", "ws-target", true)
expectBudgetCheck(mock, "ws-target")
// 4. activity_logs INSERT — verify source_id arg is the derived ws-caller
@@ -0,0 +1,427 @@
package handlers
// cross_tenant_isolation_test.go — #1953 regression tests.
//
// Three workspace-server paths historically derived an "org-root sibling set"
// as `WHERE parent_id IS NULL`, which matches EVERY tenant's org root (the
// workspaces table has no org_id column) → cross-tenant data exposure:
//
// 1. GET /registry/:id/peers (discovery.Peers)
// 2. MCP toolListPeers (mcp_tools.toolListPeers)
// 3. a2a routing (a2a_proxy.proxyA2ARequest → resolveAgentURL)
//
// These tests assert that a workspace in a DIFFERENT org is never returned as a
// peer and that a2a refuses to resolve/route to a workspace outside the caller's
// org, while same-org peers/targets still work. They reuse the SAME parent_id-
// chain org scoping the OFFSEC-015 broadcast fix introduced (org_scope.go).
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"database/sql"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"git.moleculesai.app/molecule-ai/molecule-core/workspace-server/internal/db"
"github.com/DATA-DOG/go-sqlmock"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
)
// dbHandleForTest returns the global sqlmock-backed *sql.DB that setupTestDB
// installs, for tests that need to hand a *sql.DB to a component (e.g.
// MCPHandler.database, sameOrg) rather than relying on the package-global.
func dbHandleForTest() *sql.DB { return db.DB }
// peerColsForIsolation matches queryPeerMaps' SELECT column set.
var peerColsForIsolation = []string{
"id", "name", "role", "tier", "status", "agent_card", "url", "parent_id", "active_tasks",
}
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Path 1: GET /registry/:id/peers — discovery.Peers
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// TestPeers_CrossTenant_OrgRootNotLeaked is the core #1953 regression for the
// discovery path. The caller is an org root (parent_id IS NULL). Pre-fix the
// handler ran `SELECT ... WHERE w.parent_id IS NULL AND w.id != $1`, returning
// every OTHER tenant's org root as a "sibling" peer. Post-fix an org-root caller
// issues NO sibling query — its only peers are its own children. If the handler
// regressed and issued the cross-tenant sibling query, sqlmock would report an
// unexpected query (the expectation below is intentionally NOT registered) and
// the test fails.
func TestPeers_CrossTenant_OrgRootNotLeaked(t *testing.T) {
mock := setupTestDB(t)
setupTestRedis(t)
handler := NewDiscoveryHandler()
// Behavioural leak test: register the OLD leaky `parent_id IS NULL` sibling
// query so that IF the handler still issues it, it returns another tenant's
// org root (org-b-root). The fix removes that query for an org-root caller,
// so org-b-root must never appear in the output. Unordered matching makes
// the leaky-sibling expectation optional — the fix simply never consumes it.
mock.MatchExpectationsInOrder(false)
caller := "org-a-root" // parent_id IS NULL — an org root for tenant A
// parent_id lookup → NULL (caller is an org root)
mock.ExpectQuery("SELECT parent_id FROM workspaces WHERE id =").
WithArgs(caller).
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"parent_id"}).AddRow(nil))
// LEAKY sibling query (pre-fix). Returns a DIFFERENT tenant's org root.
// The fix must NOT issue this query; if it does, org-b-root leaks into the
// peer list and the output assertion below fails.
mock.ExpectQuery("SELECT w.id, w.name.*WHERE w.parent_id IS NULL AND w.id != \\$1").
WithArgs(caller).
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows(peerColsForIsolation).
AddRow("org-b-root", "Org B Root", "lead", 0, "online", []byte("null"), "http://b-root", nil, 0))
// Children query — caller's own org-A children only. Return one child.
mock.ExpectQuery("SELECT w.id, w.name.*WHERE w.parent_id = \\$1 AND w.id != \\$2").
WithArgs(caller, caller).
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows(peerColsForIsolation).
AddRow("org-a-child", "Org A Child", "worker", 1, "online", []byte("null"), "http://a-child", caller, 0))
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
c, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(w)
c.Params = gin.Params{{Key: "id", Value: caller}}
c.Request = httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/registry/"+caller+"/peers", nil)
handler.Peers(c)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
var peers []map[string]interface{}
if err := json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &peers); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to parse response: %v", err)
}
// The other-tenant org root must NEVER appear; only the same-org child.
for _, p := range peers {
if id, _ := p["id"].(string); id == "org-b-root" {
t.Fatalf("cross-tenant leak (#1953): org-b-root appeared in org-a-root's peer list: %v", peers)
}
}
if len(peers) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected exactly 1 peer (same-org child), got %d: %v", len(peers), peers)
}
// NOTE: ExpectationsWereMet is intentionally NOT asserted — the leaky
// sibling expectation is deliberately left unconsumed by the fixed path.
}
// TestPeers_SameOrg_SiblingsStillWork is the positive companion: a non-root
// child caller still sees its same-org siblings, children, and parent. This
// guards against the fix over-scoping and breaking legitimate intra-org
// discovery.
func TestPeers_SameOrg_SiblingsStillWork(t *testing.T) {
mock := setupTestDB(t)
setupTestRedis(t)
handler := NewDiscoveryHandler()
caller := "org-a-child-1"
parent := "org-a-root"
mock.ExpectQuery("SELECT parent_id FROM workspaces WHERE id =").
WithArgs(caller).
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"parent_id"}).AddRow(parent))
// Siblings — scoped to the shared parent (one tenant).
mock.ExpectQuery("SELECT w.id, w.name.*WHERE w.parent_id = \\$1 AND w.id != \\$2").
WithArgs(parent, caller).
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows(peerColsForIsolation).
AddRow("org-a-child-2", "Org A Sibling", "worker", 1, "online", []byte("null"), "http://a-sib", parent, 0))
// Children — none.
mock.ExpectQuery("SELECT w.id, w.name.*WHERE w.parent_id = \\$1 AND w.id != \\$2 AND w.status").
WithArgs(caller, caller).
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows(peerColsForIsolation))
// Parent.
mock.ExpectQuery("SELECT w.id, w.name.*WHERE w.id = \\$1 AND w.id != \\$2 AND w.status").
WithArgs(parent, caller).
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows(peerColsForIsolation).
AddRow(parent, "Org A Root", "lead", 0, "online", []byte("null"), "http://a-root", nil, 0))
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
c, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(w)
c.Params = gin.Params{{Key: "id", Value: caller}}
c.Request = httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/registry/"+caller+"/peers", nil)
handler.Peers(c)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
var peers []map[string]interface{}
if err := json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &peers); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to parse response: %v", err)
}
// Sibling + parent = 2 same-org peers.
if len(peers) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("expected 2 same-org peers (sibling + parent), got %d: %v", len(peers), peers)
}
names := map[string]bool{}
for _, p := range peers {
names[fmt.Sprint(p["name"])] = true
}
if !names["Org A Sibling"] || !names["Org A Root"] {
t.Errorf("expected same-org sibling + parent in peer list, got %v", names)
}
if err := mock.ExpectationsWereMet(); err != nil {
t.Errorf("unmet sqlmock expectations: %v", err)
}
}
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Path 2: MCP toolListPeers — mcp_tools.toolListPeers
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// mcpPeerCols matches toolListPeers' SELECT column set.
var mcpPeerCols = []string{"id", "name", "role", "status", "tier"}
// TestToolListPeers_CrossTenant_OrgRootNotLeaked is the #1953 regression for
// the MCP path. Same shape as the discovery test: an org-root caller must NOT
// enumerate other tenants' org roots. The cross-tenant `parent_id IS NULL`
// sibling query is intentionally not registered, so if it runs sqlmock fails.
func TestToolListPeers_CrossTenant_OrgRootNotLeaked(t *testing.T) {
mock := setupTestDB(t)
mock.MatchExpectationsInOrder(false)
h := &MCPHandler{database: dbHandleForTest()}
caller := "org-a-root"
mock.ExpectQuery("SELECT parent_id FROM workspaces WHERE id =").
WithArgs(caller).
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"parent_id"}).AddRow(nil))
// LEAKY sibling query (pre-fix). Returns another tenant's org root. The fix
// must NOT issue this for an org-root caller; if it does, org-b-root leaks
// into the output and the assertion below fails. Left optional via
// unordered matching, so the fixed path simply never consumes it.
mock.ExpectQuery("WHERE w.parent_id IS NULL AND w.id != \\$1").
WithArgs(caller).
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows(mcpPeerCols).
AddRow("org-b-root", "Org B Root", "lead", "online", 0))
// Children — caller's own org-A children only.
mock.ExpectQuery("WHERE w.parent_id = \\$1 AND w.status").
WithArgs(caller).
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows(mcpPeerCols).
AddRow("org-a-child", "Org A Child", "worker", "online", 1))
out, err := h.toolListPeers(context.Background(), caller)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("toolListPeers returned error: %v", err)
}
if strings.Contains(out, "org-b-root") || strings.Contains(out, "Org B Root") {
t.Fatalf("cross-tenant leak (#1953): another tenant's org root appeared in toolListPeers output:\n%s", out)
}
if !strings.Contains(out, "org-a-child") {
t.Errorf("same-org child missing from toolListPeers output:\n%s", out)
}
// ExpectationsWereMet intentionally NOT asserted — leaky sibling expectation
// is deliberately left unconsumed by the fixed path.
}
// TestToolListPeers_SameOrg_SiblingsStillWork — positive companion for the MCP
// path: a non-root child still enumerates its same-org siblings + children + parent.
func TestToolListPeers_SameOrg_SiblingsStillWork(t *testing.T) {
mock := setupTestDB(t)
h := &MCPHandler{database: dbHandleForTest()}
caller := "org-a-child-1"
parent := "org-a-root"
mock.ExpectQuery("SELECT parent_id FROM workspaces WHERE id =").
WithArgs(caller).
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"parent_id"}).AddRow(parent))
// Siblings — scoped to shared parent.
mock.ExpectQuery("WHERE w.parent_id = \\$1 AND w.id != \\$2 AND w.status").
WithArgs(parent, caller).
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows(mcpPeerCols).
AddRow("org-a-child-2", "Org A Sibling", "worker", "online", 1))
// Children — none.
mock.ExpectQuery("WHERE w.parent_id = \\$1 AND w.status").
WithArgs(caller).
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows(mcpPeerCols))
// Parent.
mock.ExpectQuery("WHERE w.id = \\$1 AND w.status").
WithArgs(parent).
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows(mcpPeerCols).
AddRow(parent, "Org A Root", "lead", "online", 0))
out, err := h.toolListPeers(context.Background(), caller)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("toolListPeers returned error: %v", err)
}
if !strings.Contains(out, "Org A Sibling") || !strings.Contains(out, "Org A Root") {
t.Errorf("expected same-org sibling + parent in toolListPeers output:\n%s", out)
}
if err := mock.ExpectationsWereMet(); err != nil {
t.Errorf("unmet sqlmock expectations: %v", err)
}
}
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Path 3: a2a routing — a2a_proxy.proxyA2ARequest / resolveAgentURL
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// TestProxyA2A_CrossTenant_RoutingDenied is the #1953 regression for a2a
// routing. Caller and target are both org roots (parent_id IS NULL) belonging
// to DIFFERENT tenants. Pre-fix, CanCommunicate's "root-level siblings" rule
// waved this through and resolveAgentURL routed to the foreign tenant. Post-fix
// the org-scope guard resolves each to a different org root and returns 403
// BEFORE resolveAgentURL/dispatch.
func TestProxyA2A_CrossTenant_RoutingDenied(t *testing.T) {
mock := setupTestDB(t)
mr := setupTestRedis(t)
broadcaster := newTestBroadcaster()
handler := NewWorkspaceHandler(broadcaster, nil, "http://localhost:8080", t.TempDir())
caller := "org-a-root"
target := "org-b-root" // different tenant
// A URL exists for the target; the guard must deny BEFORE it is used.
mr.Set(fmt.Sprintf("ws:%s:url", target), "http://localhost:1")
// CanCommunicate: both root-level (parent_id NULL) → its weak "root-level
// siblings" rule ALLOWS this. The org guard must catch it afterward.
mock.ExpectQuery("SELECT id, parent_id FROM workspaces WHERE id = ").
WithArgs(caller).
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"id", "parent_id"}).AddRow(caller, nil))
mock.ExpectQuery("SELECT id, parent_id FROM workspaces WHERE id = ").
WithArgs(target).
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"id", "parent_id"}).AddRow(target, nil))
// #1953 org-scope guard: caller resolves to org-a-root, target to org-b-root
// → different orgs → 403. (Each org root resolves to itself.)
mock.ExpectQuery("WITH RECURSIVE org_chain AS").
WithArgs(caller).
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"root_id"}).AddRow(caller))
mock.ExpectQuery("WITH RECURSIVE org_chain AS").
WithArgs(target).
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"root_id"}).AddRow(target))
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
c, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(w)
c.Params = gin.Params{{Key: "id", Value: target}}
body := `{"method":"message/send","params":{"message":{"role":"user","parts":[{"text":"cross-tenant"}]}}}`
c.Request = httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/workspaces/"+target+"/a2a", bytes.NewBufferString(body))
c.Request.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
c.Request.Header.Set("X-Workspace-ID", caller)
handler.ProxyA2A(c)
if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Fatalf("expected 403 for cross-tenant a2a routing, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
var resp map[string]interface{}
if err := json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &resp); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("body not JSON: %v", err)
}
if msg, _ := resp["error"].(string); !strings.Contains(msg, "different org") {
t.Errorf("expected cross-org denial message, got %v", resp["error"])
}
if err := mock.ExpectationsWereMet(); err != nil {
t.Errorf("unmet sqlmock expectations: %v", err)
}
}
// TestResolveAgentURL_CrossTenant_RejectedViaSameOrg is a direct unit test of
// the sameOrg primitive that gates resolveAgentURL: a target in a different org
// must be reported as NOT same-org, so the a2a guard rejects it before
// resolveAgentURL is ever called.
func TestResolveAgentURL_CrossTenant_RejectedViaSameOrg(t *testing.T) {
mock := setupTestDB(t)
caller := "org-a-root"
target := "org-b-root"
mock.ExpectQuery("WITH RECURSIVE org_chain AS").
WithArgs(caller).
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"root_id"}).AddRow(caller))
mock.ExpectQuery("WITH RECURSIVE org_chain AS").
WithArgs(target).
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"root_id"}).AddRow(target))
ok, err := sameOrg(context.Background(), dbHandleForTest(), caller, target)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("sameOrg returned unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if ok {
t.Errorf("expected cross-tenant workspaces to be reported as DIFFERENT orgs, got sameOrg=true")
}
if err := mock.ExpectationsWereMet(); err != nil {
t.Errorf("unmet sqlmock expectations: %v", err)
}
}
// TestProxyA2A_SameOrg_RoutingAllowed — positive companion for a2a: two
// same-org siblings route successfully (mirrors TestProxyA2A_CallerIDPropagated
// but named to document the #1953 same-org allow path).
func TestProxyA2A_SameOrg_RoutingAllowed(t *testing.T) {
mock := setupTestDB(t)
mr := setupTestRedis(t)
allowLoopbackForTest(t)
broadcaster := newTestBroadcaster()
handler := NewWorkspaceHandler(broadcaster, nil, "http://localhost:8080", t.TempDir())
waitForHandlerAsyncBeforeDBCleanup(t, handler)
caller := "org-a-child-1"
target := "org-a-child-2"
parent := "org-a-root"
agentServer := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
fmt.Fprint(w, `{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":"1","result":{}}`)
}))
defer agentServer.Close()
mr.Set(fmt.Sprintf("ws:%s:url", target), agentServer.URL)
// CanCommunicate — siblings under shared parent.
mock.ExpectQuery("SELECT id, parent_id FROM workspaces WHERE id = ").
WithArgs(caller).
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"id", "parent_id"}).AddRow(caller, parent))
mock.ExpectQuery("SELECT id, parent_id FROM workspaces WHERE id = ").
WithArgs(target).
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"id", "parent_id"}).AddRow(target, parent))
// #1953 org guard — both resolve to the same org root → allowed.
mock.ExpectQuery("WITH RECURSIVE org_chain AS").
WithArgs(caller).
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"root_id"}).AddRow(parent))
mock.ExpectQuery("WITH RECURSIVE org_chain AS").
WithArgs(target).
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"root_id"}).AddRow(parent))
expectBudgetCheck(mock, target)
mock.ExpectExec("INSERT INTO activity_logs").WillReturnResult(sqlmock.NewResult(0, 1))
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
c, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(w)
c.Params = gin.Params{{Key: "id", Value: target}}
body := `{"method":"message/send","params":{"message":{"role":"user","parts":[{"text":"same-org"}]}}}`
c.Request = httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/workspaces/"+target+"/a2a", bytes.NewBufferString(body))
c.Request.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
c.Request.Header.Set("X-Workspace-ID", caller)
handler.ProxyA2A(c)
time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond) // allow the async logA2ASuccess INSERT to flush
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200 for same-org a2a routing, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
if err := mock.ExpectationsWereMet(); err != nil {
t.Errorf("unmet sqlmock expectations: %v", err)
}
}
@@ -140,7 +140,14 @@ func buildHTTPResponse(statusCode int, body string) []byte {
}
// setupIntegrationFixtures inserts the rows executeDelegation requires:
// - workspaces: source and target (siblings, parent_id=NULL so CanCommunicate=true)
// - workspaces: source (org root) + target as its CHILD, so both live in the
// SAME org. CanCommunicate=true (parent↔child) AND the #1953 sameOrg() guard
// in proxyA2ARequest passes (both resolve to the same org root). A real
// delegation happens INSIDE one org. (Previously both were parent_id=NULL —
// two DISTINCT org roots — which only "communicated" via CanCommunicate's
// root-sibling rule; #1953 added a sameOrg() guard that now denies routing
// between two org roots as cross-tenant, so the success-path tests below
// must use a same-org source/target pair.)
// - activity_logs: the 'delegate' row that updateDelegationStatus UPDATE will find
// - delegations: the ledger row that recordLedgerStatus will UPDATE
//
@@ -148,13 +155,14 @@ func buildHTTPResponse(statusCode int, body string) []byte {
func setupIntegrationFixtures(t *testing.T, conn *sql.DB) func() {
t.Helper()
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
sourceID := integrationTestSourceID // org root (parent_id NULL); target hangs off it
for _, ws := range []struct {
id string
name string
parentID *string
}{
{integrationTestSourceID, "test-source", nil},
{integrationTestTargetID, "test-target", nil},
{integrationTestTargetID, "test-target", &sourceID}, // child of source → same org
} {
if _, err := conn.ExecContext(ctx,
`INSERT INTO workspaces (id, name, parent_id) VALUES ($1::uuid, $2, $3) ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING`,
@@ -510,6 +518,94 @@ func TestIntegration_ExecuteDelegation_RedisDown_FallsBackToDB(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestIntegration_SameOrg_RealCTE_ResolvesAncestorChain is the regression gate
// for the org_scope.go recursive-CTE bug (#1953 follow-up). The sqlmock unit
// tests feed sameOrg() a pre-computed root_id row, so they CANNOT catch a wrong
// CTE — they assume it already returns the right value. Only a real Postgres
// run exercises orgRootSubtreeCTE itself.
//
// The bug: the CTE carried `id AS root_id` from the recursive SEED, so a
// non-root workspace resolved to ITSELF instead of its topmost ancestor. That
// made sameOrg() return false for two genuinely same-org workspaces and 403 a
// legitimate same-org a2a route (over-block). This test seeds a real
// root → child → grandchild chain plus a separate org root, and asserts:
// - every node in the chain resolves to the SAME org root (root, child, grandchild)
// - two workspaces in the same chain are sameOrg (incl. grandchild ↔ root)
// - a workspace in a DIFFERENT chain is NOT sameOrg (cross-tenant stays closed)
func TestIntegration_SameOrg_RealCTE_ResolvesAncestorChain(t *testing.T) {
conn := integrationDB(t)
const (
rootA = "11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111"
childA = "22222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222"
grandchildA = "33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333"
rootB = "44444444-4444-4444-4444-444444444444"
)
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
defer cancel()
t.Cleanup(func() {
c2, cancel2 := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel2()
// Delete leaf-first to respect the parent_id self-FK.
for _, id := range []string{grandchildA, childA, rootA, rootB} {
conn.ExecContext(c2, `DELETE FROM workspaces WHERE id = $1`, id)
}
})
// Insert parent-before-child to satisfy the self-referential FK.
seed := []struct {
id, name string
parent *string
}{
{rootA, "org-a-root", nil},
{childA, "org-a-child", strPtr(rootA)},
{grandchildA, "org-a-grandchild", strPtr(childA)},
{rootB, "org-b-root", nil},
}
for _, s := range seed {
if _, err := conn.ExecContext(ctx,
`INSERT INTO workspaces (id, name, parent_id) VALUES ($1::uuid, $2, $3) ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING`,
s.id, s.name, s.parent); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("seed %s: %v", s.name, err)
}
}
// Every node in chain A must resolve to rootA via the REAL CTE.
for _, id := range []string{rootA, childA, grandchildA} {
got, err := orgRootID(ctx, conn, id)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("orgRootID(%s): %v", id, err)
}
if got != rootA {
t.Errorf("orgRootID(%s) = %q, want rootA %q (CTE must walk to topmost ancestor)", id, got, rootA)
}
}
// Same-org positives — including the grandchild↔root pair that the buggy
// CTE got wrong.
for _, pair := range [][2]string{{childA, grandchildA}, {rootA, grandchildA}, {rootA, childA}} {
ok, err := sameOrg(ctx, conn, pair[0], pair[1])
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("sameOrg(%s,%s): %v", pair[0], pair[1], err)
}
if !ok {
t.Errorf("sameOrg(%s,%s) = false, want true (same org chain)", pair[0], pair[1])
}
}
// Cross-org negative — isolation must stay closed.
for _, pair := range [][2]string{{rootA, rootB}, {grandchildA, rootB}, {childA, rootB}} {
ok, err := sameOrg(ctx, conn, pair[0], pair[1])
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("sameOrg(%s,%s): %v", pair[0], pair[1], err)
}
if ok {
t.Errorf("sameOrg(%s,%s) = true, want false (different orgs — cross-tenant must stay denied)", pair[0], pair[1])
}
}
}
// extractHostPort parses "http://127.0.0.1:PORT/" and returns "127.0.0.1:PORT".
func extractHostPort(rawURL string) string {
// Simple parse: strip "http://" prefix and trailing slash.
@@ -1059,13 +1059,25 @@ func expectExecuteDelegationBase(mock sqlmock.Sqlmock) {
WillReturnResult(sqlmock.NewResult(0, 1))
// CanCommunicate: getWorkspaceRef(source) + getWorkspaceRef(target).
// Both are root-level workspaces (parent_id=NULL) → root-level siblings → allowed.
// Source and target are siblings under one shared parent (one tenant) →
// CanCommunicate allowed. (#1953: they must NOT both be parent_id=NULL —
// two distinct org roots are now treated as DIFFERENT orgs and routing
// between them is denied. A real delegation happens inside one org.)
mock.ExpectQuery("SELECT id, parent_id FROM workspaces WHERE id = ").
WithArgs(testDeliverySourceID).
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"id", "parent_id"}).AddRow(testDeliverySourceID, nil))
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"id", "parent_id"}).AddRow(testDeliverySourceID, "ws-org-root-159"))
mock.ExpectQuery("SELECT id, parent_id FROM workspaces WHERE id = ").
WithArgs(testDeliveryTargetID).
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"id", "parent_id"}).AddRow(testDeliveryTargetID, nil))
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"id", "parent_id"}).AddRow(testDeliveryTargetID, "ws-org-root-159"))
// #1953 cross-tenant guard: same-org check after CanCommunicate. Both
// resolve to the same org root → routing allowed.
mock.ExpectQuery("WITH RECURSIVE org_chain AS").
WithArgs(testDeliverySourceID).
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"root_id"}).AddRow("ws-org-root-159"))
mock.ExpectQuery("WITH RECURSIVE org_chain AS").
WithArgs(testDeliveryTargetID).
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"root_id"}).AddRow("ws-org-root-159"))
// resolveAgentURL: test callers always set the URL in Redis (mr.Set ws:{id}:url),
// so resolveAgentURL gets a cache hit and never falls back to DB.
@@ -237,7 +237,17 @@ func (h *DiscoveryHandler) Peers(c *gin.Context) {
var peers []map[string]interface{}
// Siblings
// Siblings — workspaces sharing the caller's parent.
//
// #1953 cross-tenant isolation: the OLD code's else-branch handled the
// org-root caller (parent_id IS NULL) by returning EVERY workspace with
// parent_id IS NULL — i.e. every other tenant's org root, since the
// workspaces table has no org_id column. That leaked peer identities/URLs
// across tenants. An org root has no siblings inside its own org (each
// tenant is a distinct org root), so the org-root caller now gets an empty
// sibling set; its real peers are its children, returned below. Only the
// parent_id-bound branch enumerates siblings, and that is already scoped to
// one parent (one tenant).
if parentID.Valid {
siblings, _ := queryPeerMaps(`
SELECT w.id, w.name, COALESCE(w.role, ''), w.tier, w.status,
@@ -246,14 +256,6 @@ func (h *DiscoveryHandler) Peers(c *gin.Context) {
FROM workspaces w WHERE w.parent_id = $1 AND w.id != $2 AND w.status != 'removed'`,
parentID.String, workspaceID)
peers = append(peers, siblings...)
} else {
siblings, _ := queryPeerMaps(`
SELECT w.id, w.name, COALESCE(w.role, ''), w.tier, w.status,
COALESCE(w.agent_card, 'null'::jsonb), COALESCE(w.url, ''),
w.parent_id, w.active_tasks
FROM workspaces w WHERE w.parent_id IS NULL AND w.id != $1 AND w.status != 'removed'`,
workspaceID)
peers = append(peers, siblings...)
}
// Children — exclude self defensively. A child row whose parent_id
@@ -223,10 +223,10 @@ func TestPeers_RootWorkspace_NoPeers(t *testing.T) {
peerCols := []string{"id", "name", "role", "tier", "status", "agent_card", "url", "parent_id", "active_tasks"}
// Siblings (other root-level workspaces) — none
mock.ExpectQuery("SELECT w.id, w.name.*WHERE w.parent_id IS NULL AND w.id != \\$1").
WithArgs("ws-root-alone").
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows(peerCols))
// #1953: an org-root caller (parent_id IS NULL) now issues NO sibling
// query at all. The old `WHERE w.parent_id IS NULL` sibling read returned
// EVERY tenant's org root (cross-tenant leak); an org root has no siblings
// inside its own org, so the handler skips the sibling read entirely.
// Children — none. #383 added explicit `w.id != $2` self-filter.
mock.ExpectQuery("SELECT w.id, w.name.*WHERE w.parent_id = \\$1 AND w.id != \\$2").
@@ -453,6 +453,14 @@ func TestExtended_DiscoverMissingHeader(t *testing.T) {
// ---------- TestPeers (Extended) ----------
// TestExtended_Peers verifies a root-level (org-root) workspace's peer view.
//
// #1953: previously a root-level caller issued `WHERE w.parent_id IS NULL`
// for siblings, which returned EVERY other tenant's org root as a "peer"
// (cross-tenant leak, since the workspaces table has no org_id column). After
// the fix an org root has no cross-tenant siblings; its only peers are its own
// children. This test asserts the child is returned and that NO sibling query
// is issued (no `parent_id IS NULL` read).
func TestExtended_Peers(t *testing.T) {
mock := setupTestDB(t)
setupTestRedis(t)
@@ -463,17 +471,14 @@ func TestExtended_Peers(t *testing.T) {
WithArgs("ws-peer").
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"parent_id"}).AddRow(nil))
// Expect root-level siblings query (parent IS NULL, excluding self)
mock.ExpectQuery("SELECT w.id, w.name").
WithArgs("ws-peer").
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"id", "name", "role", "tier", "status", "agent_card", "url", "parent_id", "active_tasks"}).
AddRow("ws-sibling", "Sibling Agent", "worker", 1, "online", []byte("null"), "http://localhost:9001", nil, 0))
// NO root-level sibling query is issued for an org-root caller anymore.
// Expect children query (workspaces with parent_id = ws-peer, excluding self)
// Query now binds (parent_id, self_id) for the self-filter guard added in #383.
// Children query (workspaces with parent_id = ws-peer, excluding self).
// Query binds (parent_id, self_id) for the self-filter guard added in #383.
mock.ExpectQuery("SELECT w.id, w.name").
WithArgs("ws-peer", "ws-peer").
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"id", "name", "role", "tier", "status", "agent_card", "url", "parent_id", "active_tasks"}))
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"id", "name", "role", "tier", "status", "agent_card", "url", "parent_id", "active_tasks"}).
AddRow("ws-child", "Child Agent", "worker", 1, "online", []byte("null"), "http://localhost:9001", "ws-peer", 0))
// No parent query since workspace is root-level
@@ -493,10 +498,10 @@ func TestExtended_Peers(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("failed to parse response: %v", err)
}
if len(resp) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected 1 peer, got %d", len(resp))
t.Fatalf("expected 1 peer (the child), got %d", len(resp))
}
if resp[0]["name"] != "Sibling Agent" {
t.Errorf("expected peer name 'Sibling Agent', got %v", resp[0]["name"])
if resp[0]["name"] != "Child Agent" {
t.Errorf("expected peer name 'Child Agent', got %v", resp[0]["name"])
}
if err := mock.ExpectationsWereMet(); err != nil {
@@ -97,7 +97,15 @@ func (h *MCPHandler) toolListPeers(ctx context.Context, workspaceID string) (str
const cols = `SELECT w.id, w.name, COALESCE(w.role,''), w.status, w.tier`
// Siblings
// Siblings — workspaces sharing the caller's parent.
//
// #1953 cross-tenant isolation: the OLD else-branch returned every
// workspace with parent_id IS NULL when the caller was itself an org root,
// i.e. every other tenant's org root (the workspaces table has no org_id
// column). That leaked peer identities across tenants via MCP list_peers.
// An org root has no siblings inside its own org, so the org-root caller
// now gets no siblings; its peers are its children, enumerated below. Only
// the parent_id-bound branch enumerates siblings, scoped to one tenant.
if parentID.Valid {
rows, err := h.database.QueryContext(ctx,
cols+` FROM workspaces w WHERE w.parent_id = $1 AND w.id != $2 AND w.status != 'removed'`,
@@ -107,15 +115,6 @@ func (h *MCPHandler) toolListPeers(ctx context.Context, workspaceID string) (str
log.Printf("MCP toolListPeers: sibling scan error: %v", scanErr)
}
}
} else {
rows, err := h.database.QueryContext(ctx,
cols+` FROM workspaces w WHERE w.parent_id IS NULL AND w.id != $1 AND w.status != 'removed'`,
workspaceID)
if err == nil {
if scanErr := scanPeers(rows); scanErr != nil {
log.Printf("MCP toolListPeers: sibling scan error: %v", scanErr)
}
}
}
// Children
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ type memoryV2Deps struct {
// call. Defining an interface here lets handler tests stub the plugin
// without spinning up an HTTP server.
type memoryPluginAPI interface {
UpsertNamespace(ctx context.Context, name string, body contract.NamespaceUpsert) (*contract.Namespace, error)
CommitMemory(ctx context.Context, namespace string, body contract.MemoryWrite) (*contract.MemoryWriteResponse, error)
Search(ctx context.Context, body contract.SearchRequest) (*contract.SearchResponse, error)
ForgetMemory(ctx context.Context, id string, body contract.ForgetRequest) error
@@ -117,6 +118,9 @@ func (h *MCPHandler) toolCommitMemoryV2(ctx context.Context, workspaceID string,
if !ok {
return "", fmt.Errorf("workspace %s cannot write to namespace %s", workspaceID, ns)
}
if _, err := h.memv2.plugin.UpsertNamespace(ctx, ns, contract.NamespaceUpsert{Kind: kindFromNamespace(ns)}); err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("plugin upsert namespace: %w", err)
}
// SAFE-T1201: scrub credential-shaped strings BEFORE the plugin sees
// them. Non-negotiable; see memories.go:180.
@@ -171,6 +175,19 @@ func (h *MCPHandler) toolCommitMemoryV2(ctx context.Context, workspaceID string,
return string(out), nil
}
func kindFromNamespace(ns string) contract.NamespaceKind {
switch {
case strings.HasPrefix(ns, "workspace:"):
return contract.NamespaceKindWorkspace
case strings.HasPrefix(ns, "team:"):
return contract.NamespaceKindTeam
case strings.HasPrefix(ns, "org:"):
return contract.NamespaceKindOrg
default:
return contract.NamespaceKindCustom
}
}
// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// search_memory
// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -20,11 +20,18 @@ import (
// --- stubs ---
type stubMemoryPlugin struct {
upsertFn func(ctx context.Context, name string, body contract.NamespaceUpsert) (*contract.Namespace, error)
commitFn func(ctx context.Context, ns string, body contract.MemoryWrite) (*contract.MemoryWriteResponse, error)
searchFn func(ctx context.Context, body contract.SearchRequest) (*contract.SearchResponse, error)
forgetFn func(ctx context.Context, id string, body contract.ForgetRequest) error
}
func (s *stubMemoryPlugin) UpsertNamespace(ctx context.Context, name string, body contract.NamespaceUpsert) (*contract.Namespace, error) {
if s.upsertFn != nil {
return s.upsertFn(ctx, name, body)
}
return &contract.Namespace{Name: name, Kind: body.Kind}, nil
}
func (s *stubMemoryPlugin) CommitMemory(ctx context.Context, ns string, body contract.MemoryWrite) (*contract.MemoryWriteResponse, error) {
if s.commitFn != nil {
return s.commitFn(ctx, ns, body)
@@ -159,7 +166,15 @@ func TestMemoryV2Available(t *testing.T) {
func TestCommitMemoryV2_HappyPathDefaultNamespace(t *testing.T) {
db, _, _ := sqlmock.New()
defer db.Close()
gotUpsertNS := ""
h := newV2Handler(t, db, &stubMemoryPlugin{
upsertFn: func(_ context.Context, name string, body contract.NamespaceUpsert) (*contract.Namespace, error) {
gotUpsertNS = name
if body.Kind != contract.NamespaceKindWorkspace {
t.Errorf("upsert kind = %q, want workspace", body.Kind)
}
return &contract.Namespace{Name: name, Kind: body.Kind}, nil
},
commitFn: func(_ context.Context, ns string, body contract.MemoryWrite) (*contract.MemoryWriteResponse, error) {
if ns != "workspace:root-1" {
t.Errorf("ns = %q, want default workspace:root-1", ns)
@@ -180,6 +195,9 @@ func TestCommitMemoryV2_HappyPathDefaultNamespace(t *testing.T) {
if !strings.Contains(got, `"id":"mem-1"`) {
t.Errorf("got = %s", got)
}
if gotUpsertNS != "workspace:root-1" {
t.Errorf("upsert namespace = %q, want workspace:root-1", gotUpsertNS)
}
}
func TestCommitMemoryV2_NamespaceParamUsed(t *testing.T) {
@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ type fakePlugin struct {
forgetReq contract.ForgetRequest
}
func (f *fakePlugin) UpsertNamespace(ctx context.Context, name string, body contract.NamespaceUpsert) (*contract.Namespace, error) {
return &contract.Namespace{Name: name, Kind: body.Kind}, nil
}
func (f *fakePlugin) CommitMemory(ctx context.Context, ns string, body contract.MemoryWrite) (*contract.MemoryWriteResponse, error) {
return nil, errors.New("not implemented in fake")
}
@@ -511,11 +514,11 @@ func TestMemoriesV2_Forget_MissingMemoryID_400(t *testing.T) {
// DisplayName over UUID-prefix fallback (issue #2988).
func TestNamespaceLabelWithName_PrefersDisplayNameWhenSet(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
raw string
kind contract.NamespaceKind
display string
want string
name string
raw string
kind contract.NamespaceKind
display string
want string
}{
{"workspace with name", "workspace:abc-1234", contract.NamespaceKindWorkspace, "mac laptop", "Workspace (mac laptop)"},
{"team with name", "team:abc-1234", contract.NamespaceKindTeam, "Engineering", "Team (Engineering)"},
@@ -625,12 +628,12 @@ func TestParseLimit(t *testing.T) {
}{
{"", memoriesV2DefaultLimit},
{"10", 10},
{"0", memoriesV2DefaultLimit}, // ≤0 → default, not error
{"-5", memoriesV2DefaultLimit}, // negative → default
{"abc", memoriesV2DefaultLimit}, // non-numeric → default
{"99999", memoriesV2MaxLimit}, // over cap → clamped
{"100", memoriesV2MaxLimit}, // exactly cap → kept
{"99", 99}, // just under cap → kept
{"0", memoriesV2DefaultLimit}, // ≤0 → default, not error
{"-5", memoriesV2DefaultLimit}, // negative → default
{"abc", memoriesV2DefaultLimit}, // non-numeric → default
{"99999", memoriesV2MaxLimit}, // over cap → clamped
{"100", memoriesV2MaxLimit}, // exactly cap → kept
{"99", 99}, // just under cap → kept
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run("raw="+tc.raw, func(t *testing.T) {
@@ -741,11 +744,11 @@ func TestWithMemoryV2_FluentReturnsReceiver(t *testing.T) {
func TestShortID(t *testing.T) {
cases := map[string]string{
"": "",
"short": "short",
"exactly8": "exactly8",
"longer-than-eight": "longer-t",
"abc-1234-5678-90ab": "abc-1234",
"": "",
"short": "short",
"exactly8": "exactly8",
"longer-than-eight": "longer-t",
"abc-1234-5678-90ab": "abc-1234",
}
for in, want := range cases {
if got := shortID(in); got != want {
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
package handlers
// org_scope.go — cross-tenant isolation helpers (#1953).
//
// The `workspaces` table has no `org_id` column; an "org" is the subtree of
// workspaces reachable through the `parent_id` chain from a single org root
// (a row with parent_id IS NULL). Several code paths historically computed an
// org-root sibling set as `WHERE parent_id IS NULL`, which matches EVERY
// tenant's org root and therefore leaks peer metadata / routing across tenants.
//
// This file centralises the org-scoping primitive so peer discovery, the MCP
// list_peers tool, and a2a routing all derive "the caller's org" the SAME way
// the OFFSEC-015 broadcast fix (commit 5a05302c, workspace_broadcast.go) does:
// a recursive CTE that walks the parent_id chain up to the org root. Keeping
// the CTE in one place means there is a single, testable source of truth for
// tenant isolation rather than four hand-copied queries that can drift.
//
// NOTE: this is the parent_id-chain scoping that the broadcast fix already
// ships. It is deliberately NOT an `org_id` column — adding that column is a
// separate architecture decision pending CTO sign-off. See #1953.
import (
"context"
"database/sql"
"errors"
)
// errNoOrgRoot is returned by orgRootID when the workspace id has no row (and
// therefore no resolvable org root). Callers translate this into a 404/not-found
// at their own layer; it is distinct from a transient DB error so a missing
// workspace never gets treated as "belongs to every org".
var errNoOrgRoot = errors.New("org root not found for workspace")
// orgRootSubtreeCTE is the recursive CTE — identical in shape to the OFFSEC-015
// broadcast fix — that walks UP the parent_id chain from a single workspace to
// its org root. The org root is the row on the chain whose parent_id IS NULL.
//
// $1 = workspace id to resolve
//
// The recursive member walks UP the parent_id chain: each step joins to the row
// whose id is the current row's parent_id. The topmost ancestor is the single
// chain row with parent_id IS NULL — and THAT row's own `id` is the org root.
//
// We select that parentless row's `id` (aliased root_id). We must NOT carry a
// fixed `id AS root_id` from the recursive seed: that value is just the input
// workspace id, so a non-root caller (e.g. a child delegating to a sibling)
// would resolve to ITSELF instead of its org root, and sameOrg() would wrongly
// report two genuinely same-org workspaces as different orgs and 403 a
// legitimate a2a route. A workspace that already IS an org root has a one-row
// chain whose id == itself, so it correctly resolves to itself.
const orgRootSubtreeCTE = `
WITH RECURSIVE org_chain AS (
SELECT id, parent_id
FROM workspaces
WHERE id = $1
UNION ALL
SELECT w.id, w.parent_id
FROM workspaces w
JOIN org_chain c ON w.id = c.parent_id
)
SELECT id AS root_id FROM org_chain WHERE parent_id IS NULL LIMIT 1
`
// orgRootID resolves the org root of `workspaceID` by walking the parent_id
// chain via orgRootSubtreeCTE. Returns errNoOrgRoot when the workspace (or its
// chain) yields no org root row, and the underlying error on any DB failure.
//
// This is the SAME lookup the broadcast handler performs inline; the three
// leak paths in #1953 call this instead of re-deriving "the org" from
// `parent_id IS NULL` (which spans all tenants).
func orgRootID(ctx context.Context, database *sql.DB, workspaceID string) (string, error) {
var root string
err := database.QueryRowContext(ctx, orgRootSubtreeCTE, workspaceID).Scan(&root)
if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
return "", errNoOrgRoot
}
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
if root == "" {
return "", errNoOrgRoot
}
return root, nil
}
// sameOrg reports whether workspaces `a` and `b` share an org root, i.e. they
// belong to the same tenant. Used by a2a routing to reject resolving/dispatching
// to a workspace id outside the caller's org. Fail-CLOSED: any lookup error or
// missing org root yields (false, err) so a DB hiccup denies cross-tenant
// routing rather than allowing it.
func sameOrg(ctx context.Context, database *sql.DB, a, b string) (bool, error) {
if a == b {
return true, nil
}
rootA, err := orgRootID(ctx, database, a)
if err != nil {
return false, err
}
rootB, err := orgRootID(ctx, database, b)
if err != nil {
return false, err
}
return rootA == rootB, nil
}
@@ -82,18 +82,21 @@ func (h *BroadcastHandler) Broadcast(c *gin.Context) {
// Find the sender's org root by walking the parent_id chain.
// Workspaces with parent_id = NULL are org roots; every other workspace
// belongs to the org identified by its topmost ancestor.
// Uses the same CTE shape as org_scope.go (#1954) — the recursive seed
// must NOT carry `id AS root_id` because that resolves non-root senders
// to themselves instead of their true org root (availability bug #1959).
var orgRootID string
err = db.DB.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
WITH RECURSIVE org_chain AS (
SELECT id, parent_id, id AS root_id
SELECT id, parent_id
FROM workspaces
WHERE id = $1
UNION ALL
SELECT w.id, w.parent_id, c.root_id
SELECT w.id, w.parent_id
FROM workspaces w
JOIN org_chain c ON w.id = c.parent_id
)
SELECT root_id FROM org_chain WHERE parent_id IS NULL LIMIT 1
SELECT id AS root_id FROM org_chain WHERE parent_id IS NULL LIMIT 1
`, senderID).Scan(&orgRootID)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("Broadcast: org root lookup for %s: %v", senderID, err)