c1a94deabc
7 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4dce9800a5 |
fix(handlers): OFFSEC-001 — scrub req.Method from dispatchRPC default error
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Line 443 of mcp.go concatenated user-controlled req.Method into the
JSON-RPC -32601 error message, allowing an agent or canvas client to
inject arbitrary strings into the response via the method field.
Fix: replace "method not found: " + req.Method with the constant
"method not found" — matching the OFFSEC-001 scrub contract applied
to the InvalidParams (line 428) and UnknownTool (line 433) paths.
Test: extend TestMCPHandler_UnknownMethod_Returns32601 with two new
assertions:
1. resp.Error.Message == "method not found"
2. defence-in-depth check that the sent method name never appears
in the response (strings.Contains guard)
Issue: #684
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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| 7d1a189f2e |
fix(mcp): scrub err.Error() from JSON-RPC error messages (OFFSEC-001)
Replace all three err.Error() leaks in mcp.go with constant strings, consistent with the same fix applied to 22 other files in PRs #1193/1206/1219/#168. - Call handler (line ~329): "parse error: " + err.Error() → "parse error" - dispatchRPC params unmarshal (line ~417): "invalid params: " + err.Error() → "invalid parameters" - dispatchRPC tool call (line ~422): err.Error() → "tool call failed" + log.Printf server-side for forensics Routes protected by WorkspaceAuth (C1) and MCPRateLimiter (C2) — this is defence-in-depth per OFFSEC-001 / #259. Tests added: - TestMCPHandler_Call_MalformedJSON_ReturnsConstantParseError - TestMCPHandler_dispatchRPC_InvalidParams_ReturnsConstantMessage - TestMCPHandler_dispatchRPC_UnknownTool_ReturnsConstantMessage - TestMCPHandler_dispatchRPC_InvalidParams_ArrayInsteadOfObject Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Hongming Wang
|
899c53550d |
test(mcp): comprehensive coverage for send_message_to_user persistence + AST gate (reno-stars followup)
Per user request: audit all similar tools + write comprehensive tests
including E2E for the persistence-of-AGENT_MESSAGE-broadcasts contract.
Audit (all BroadcastOnly call sites in workspace-server/internal/):
| Site | Event | Persisted? | Notes |
|---|---|:---:|---|
| a2a_proxy_helpers.go:275 | A2A_RESPONSE | ✓ | LogActivity above |
| activity.go:486 (Notify) | AGENT_MESSAGE | ✓ | INSERT line 535 |
| activity.go:701 (LogActivity) | ACTIVITY_LOGGED | ✓ | self-emits inside DB write |
| mcp_tools.go:341 (toolSendMessageToUser) | AGENT_MESSAGE | ✓ NEW (this PR) |
| registry.go:575 | TASK_UPDATED | N/A | transient progress, not chat |
| registry.go:596 | WORKSPACE_HEARTBEAT | N/A | infra ping, not chat |
Only one chat-bearing broadcast was missing persistence (the just-
fixed mcp bridge path). No other regressions found.
Tests added (4 new, total 5 send_message_to_user tests):
1. TestAgentMessageBroadcastsArePersisted — AST gate that walks every
non-test .go in the package, finds funcs that BroadcastOnly with
"AGENT_MESSAGE", asserts each ALSO contains an
"INSERT INTO activity_logs". Forward-looking regression block:
any future chat tool that broadcasts without persisting fails the
test with a clear file:func diagnostic. Mutation-tested locally:
removing the INSERT block from toolSendMessageToUser reliably
produces the expected failure.
2. TestMCPHandler_SendMessageToUser_DBErrorLogsAndStill200s — pins
the "best-effort persistence" contract. DB INSERT failures must
NOT abort the tool response (the WS broadcast already succeeded;
retrying would double-render in the live chat). Matches /notify.
3. TestMCPHandler_SendMessageToUser_ResponseBodyShape — pins the
exact `{"result": "<message>"}` JSON shape stored in
response_body. The canvas hydrater (extractResponseText in
historyHydration.ts) reads body.result; any drift here silently
breaks chat history without failing the INSERT. Per memory
feedback_assert_exact_not_substring.md, asserts the literal JSON
shape, not a substring.
4. TestMCPHandler_SendMessageToUser_PersistsToActivityLog (existing,
from previous commit) — pins INSERT shape with regex on
'a2a_receive' + 'notify' literals.
5. TestMCPHandler_SendMessageToUser_Blocked_WhenEnvNotSet (existing)
— env-gate aborts before DB.
Test fixture cleanup: newMCPHandler now uses newTestBroadcaster (real
ws.Hub) instead of events.NewBroadcaster(nil) — the latter nil-panics
inside hub.Broadcast on the AGENT_MESSAGE path. Same broadcaster
shape every other handler test uses.
E2E note: the AST gate is the strongest forward-looking guarantee.
A real-DB integration test would add value for CI but is largely
duplicative of the sqlmock contract tests above (sqlmock pins SQL
shape with much faster feedback). Left as a future enhancement when
the handlers Postgres-integration suite extends MCP coverage.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Hongming Wang
|
cdfc9f743f |
fix(mcp): persist send_message_to_user pushes to activity_log (reno-stars data loss)
Reported on production tenant reno-stars: an external claude-code agent
(CEO Ryan PC workspace) sent a long-form message via send_message_to_user;
the user saw it live in the chat panel but it vanished after a refresh.
Confirmed via direct production query — the message is NOT in
activity_logs at all (only short test pings around it are persisted).
Root cause: there are TWO server-side handlers for send_message_to_user:
1. HTTP `/workspaces/:id/notify` (activity.go:Notify) — broadcasts WS
AND inserts a row into activity_logs. This is the path the
in-container runtime's tool_send_message_to_user calls.
2. MCP-bridge `tools/call name=send_message_to_user`
(mcp_tools.go:toolSendMessageToUser) — broadcasts WS only,
**never persisted**. This is the path EXTERNAL agents using
molecule-mcp's send_message_to_user tool route through.
The persistence fix landed for path 1 months ago but was never mirrored
on path 2. External agents — exactly the case in reno-stars/CEO Ryan PC
— have been silently losing every long-form notification on reload.
Fix: mirror the activity.go INSERT shape inside toolSendMessageToUser:
INSERT INTO activity_logs
(workspace_id, activity_type, method, summary, response_body, status)
VALUES ($1, 'a2a_receive', 'notify', $2, $3::jsonb, 'ok')
Same wire shape as /notify so the canvas's chat-history hydration
(`type=a2a_receive&source=canvas`) treats both writers identically.
Errors are log-only — broadcast already succeeded, persistence failure
shouldn't block the tool response (matches /notify behavior; downside
is the same data-loss-on-DB-error risk, surfaced via log.Printf).
Tests
-----
- `TestMCPHandler_SendMessageToUser_PersistsToActivityLog` — pins both
the workspace-name lookup AND the INSERT shape. Regex-matches
`'a2a_receive'` + `'notify'` literals so a future refactor that
changes activity_type or method breaks the test loud, not silently
re-introducing the data-loss bug.
- Updated newMCPHandler to use newTestBroadcaster() (real ws.Hub) —
events.NewBroadcaster(nil) crashes inside hub.Broadcast in the
send_message_to_user path. Same shape every other handler test uses.
Verified `go test ./internal/handlers/ -run TestMCPHandler_SendMessage`
green; full vet clean.
Refs reno-stars production incident 2026-05-05.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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molecule-ai[bot]
|
8b24ac2174 |
fix(security): backport SSRF defence (CWE-918) to main — isSafeURL in a2a_proxy.go (#1292) (#1302)
* fix(security): backport SSRF defence (CWE-918) to main — isSafeURL in mcp.go and a2a_proxy.go Issue #1042: 3 CodeQL SSRF findings across mcp.go and a2a_proxy.go. staging already ships the fix (PRs #1147, #1154 → merged); main did not include it. - mcp.go: add isSafeURL() + isPrivateOrMetadataIP() helpers; validate agentURL before outbound calls in mcpCallTool (line ~529) and toolDelegateTaskAsync (line ~607) - a2a_proxy.go: add identical isSafeURL() + isPrivateOrMetadataIP() helpers; call isSafeURL() before dispatchA2A in resolveAgentURL() (blocks finding #1 at line 462) - mcp_test.go: 19 new tests covering all blocked URL patterns: file://, ftp://, 127.0.0.1, ::1, 169.254.169.254, 10.x.x.x, 172.16.x.x, 192.168.x.x, empty hostname, invalid URL, isPrivateOrMetadataIP across all private/CGNAT/metadata ranges 1. URL scheme enforcement — http/https only 2. IP literal blocking — loopback, link-local, RFC-1918, CGNAT, doc/test ranges 3. DNS hostname resolution — blocks internal hostnames resolving to private IPs Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(ci-blocker): remove duplicate isSafeURL/isPrivateOrMetadataIP from mcp.go Issue #1292: PR #1274 duplicated isSafeURL + isPrivateOrMetadataIP in mcp.go — both functions already exist on main at lines 829 and 876. Kept the mcp.go definitions (the originals) and removed the 70-line duplicate appended at end of file. a2a_proxy.go functions are unchanged — they serve the same purpose via a separate code path. * fix: remove orphaned commit-text lines from a2a_proxy.go Three lines from the PR/commit title were accidentally baked into the file during the rebase from #1274 to #1302, causing a Go syntax error (a bare string literal at statement level followed by dangling braces). Deletion restores: } return agentURL, nil } Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Infra-Runtime-BE <infra-runtime-be@agents.moleculesai.app> Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Core-BE <core-be@agents.moleculesai.app> Co-authored-by: Molecule AI SDK Lead <sdk-lead@agents.moleculesai.app> |
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Molecule AI Backend Engineer
|
818d5cde91 |
fix(mcp): scrub secrets in commit_memory MCP tool path (#838 sibling)
PR #881 closed SAFE-T1201 (#838) on the HTTP path by wiring redactSecrets() into MemoriesHandler.Commit — but the sibling code path on the MCP bridge (MCPHandler.toolCommitMemory) was left with only the TODO comment. Agents calling commit_memory via the MCP tool bridge are the PRIMARY attack vector for #838 (confused / prompt-injected agent pipes raw tool-response text containing plain-text credentials into agent_memories, leaking into shared TEAM scope). The HTTP path is only exercised by canvas UI posts, so the MCP gap was the hotter one. Change: workspace-server/internal/handlers/mcp.go:725 - TODO(#838): run _redactSecrets(content) before insert — plain-text - API keys from tool responses must not land in the memories table. + SAFE-T1201 (#838): scrub known credential patterns before persistence… + content, _ = redactSecrets(workspaceID, content) Reuses redactSecrets (same package) so there's no duplicated pattern list — a future-added pattern in memories.go automatically covers the MCP path too. Tests added in mcp_test.go: - TestMCPHandler_CommitMemory_SecretInContent_IsRedactedBeforeInsert Exercises three patterns (env-var assignment, Bearer token, sk-…) and uses sqlmock's WithArgs to bind the exact REDACTED form — so a regression (removing the redactSecrets call) fails with arg-mismatch rather than silently persisting the secret. - TestMCPHandler_CommitMemory_CleanContent_PassesThrough Regression guard — benign content must NOT be altered by the redactor. NOTE: unable to run `go test -race ./...` locally (this container has no Go toolchain). The change is mechanical reuse of an already-shipped function in the same package; CI must validate. The sqlmock patterns mirror the existing TestMCPHandler_CommitMemory_LocalScope_Success test exactly. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Hongming Wang
|
d8026347e5 |
chore: open-source restructure — rename dirs, remove internal files, scrub secrets
Renames: - platform/ → workspace-server/ (Go module path stays as "platform" for external dep compat — will update after plugin module republish) - workspace-template/ → workspace/ Removed (moved to separate repos or deleted): - PLAN.md — internal roadmap (move to private project board) - HANDOFF.md, AGENTS.md — one-time internal session docs - .claude/ — gitignored entirely (local agent config) - infra/cloudflare-worker/ → Molecule-AI/molecule-tenant-proxy - org-templates/molecule-dev/ → standalone template repo - .mcp-eval/ → molecule-mcp-server repo - test-results/ — ephemeral, gitignored Security scrubbing: - Cloudflare account/zone/KV IDs → placeholders - Real EC2 IPs → <EC2_IP> in all docs - CF token prefix, Neon project ID, Fly app names → redacted - Langfuse dev credentials → parameterized - Personal runner username/machine name → generic Community files: - CONTRIBUTING.md — build, test, branch conventions - CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md — Contributor Covenant 2.1 All Dockerfiles, CI workflows, docker-compose, railway.toml, render.yaml, README, CLAUDE.md updated for new directory names. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
