fix(mcp): scrub secrets in commit_memory MCP tool path (#838 sibling)

PR #881 closed SAFE-T1201 (#838) on the HTTP path by wiring redactSecrets()
into MemoriesHandler.Commit — but the sibling code path on the MCP bridge
(MCPHandler.toolCommitMemory) was left with only the TODO comment. Agents
calling commit_memory via the MCP tool bridge are the PRIMARY attack vector
for #838 (confused / prompt-injected agent pipes raw tool-response text
containing plain-text credentials into agent_memories, leaking into shared
TEAM scope). The HTTP path is only exercised by canvas UI posts, so the MCP
gap was the hotter one.

Change:

  workspace-server/internal/handlers/mcp.go:725
    - TODO(#838): run _redactSecrets(content) before insert — plain-text
    - API keys from tool responses must not land in the memories table.
    + SAFE-T1201 (#838): scrub known credential patterns before persistence…
    + content, _ = redactSecrets(workspaceID, content)

Reuses redactSecrets (same package) so there's no duplicated pattern list —
a future-added pattern in memories.go automatically covers the MCP path too.

Tests added in mcp_test.go:

  - TestMCPHandler_CommitMemory_SecretInContent_IsRedactedBeforeInsert
      Exercises three patterns (env-var assignment, Bearer token, sk-…)
      and uses sqlmock's WithArgs to bind the exact REDACTED form — so a
      regression (removing the redactSecrets call) fails with arg-mismatch
      rather than silently persisting the secret.

  - TestMCPHandler_CommitMemory_CleanContent_PassesThrough
      Regression guard — benign content must NOT be altered by the redactor.

NOTE: unable to run `go test -race ./...` locally (this container has no Go
toolchain). The change is mechanical reuse of an already-shipped function in
the same package; CI must validate. The sqlmock patterns mirror the existing
TestMCPHandler_CommitMemory_LocalScope_Success test exactly.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Molecule AI Backend Engineer 2026-04-19 17:52:52 +00:00
parent 393ecc74e3
commit 818d5cde91
2 changed files with 101 additions and 2 deletions

View File

@ -723,8 +723,12 @@ func (h *MCPHandler) toolCommitMemory(ctx context.Context, workspaceID string, a
}
memoryID := uuid.New().String()
// TODO(#838): run _redactSecrets(content) before insert — plain-text API keys
// from tool responses must not land in the memories table.
// SAFE-T1201 (#838): scrub known credential patterns before persistence so
// plain-text API keys pulled in via tool responses can't land in the
// memories table (and leak into shared TEAM scope). Reuses redactSecrets
// already shipped for the HTTP path in PR #881 — this was the MCP-bridge
// sibling the original fix missed. Runs on every write regardless of scope.
content, _ = redactSecrets(workspaceID, content)
_, err := h.database.ExecContext(ctx, `
INSERT INTO agent_memories (id, workspace_id, content, scope, namespace)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5)

View File

@ -433,6 +433,101 @@ func TestMCPHandler_CommitMemory_GlobalScope_Blocked(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestMCPHandler_CommitMemory_SecretInContent_IsRedactedBeforeInsert verifies
// the SAFE-T1201 (#838) fix on the MCP bridge path. PR #881 closed the HTTP
// handler but missed this one — an agent tool-call carrying plain-text
// credentials must have them scrubbed before the INSERT reaches the DB.
//
// The test asserts via the sqlmock `WithArgs` matcher that the content column
// binds the REDACTED form, not the raw input. sqlmock verifies the exact arg
// values, so a regression (removing the redactSecrets call) would fail with
// "argument mismatch" rather than silently persisting the secret.
func TestMCPHandler_CommitMemory_SecretInContent_IsRedactedBeforeInsert(t *testing.T) {
h, mock := newMCPHandler(t)
// Content with three distinct secret patterns covered by redactSecrets:
// - env-var assignment (ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=)
// - Bearer token
// - sk-… prefixed key
rawContent := "key=ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=sk-ant-xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx auth=Bearer ghp_yyyyyyyyyyyyy note=sk-proj-zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz"
// Derive what redactSecrets will produce so the sqlmock arg match is
// exact. This keeps the test brittle-on-purpose: if redactSecrets's
// output shape changes, this test must be re-derived, which surfaces
// the change during review.
expected, changed := redactSecrets("ws-1", rawContent)
if !changed {
t.Fatalf("precondition failed — redactSecrets must change the test content; got unchanged %q", expected)
}
if bytes.Contains([]byte(expected), []byte("sk-ant-xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx")) {
t.Fatalf("precondition failed — redacted content still contains raw secret: %s", expected)
}
mock.ExpectExec("INSERT INTO agent_memories").
WithArgs(sqlmock.AnyArg(), "ws-1", expected, "LOCAL", "ws-1").
WillReturnResult(sqlmock.NewResult(1, 1))
w := mcpPost(t, h, "ws-1", map[string]interface{}{
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"id": 99,
"method": "tools/call",
"params": map[string]interface{}{
"name": "commit_memory",
"arguments": map[string]interface{}{
"content": rawContent,
"scope": "LOCAL",
},
},
})
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
var resp mcpResponse
json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &resp)
if resp.Error != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected JSON-RPC error: %+v", resp.Error)
}
if err := mock.ExpectationsWereMet(); err != nil {
t.Errorf("sqlmock mismatch — content was NOT redacted before insert: %v", err)
}
}
// TestMCPHandler_CommitMemory_CleanContent_PassesThrough confirms that the
// redactor is a no-op on content with no credentials — a regression where
// redactSecrets corrupted benign content would be a user-visible bug.
func TestMCPHandler_CommitMemory_CleanContent_PassesThrough(t *testing.T) {
h, mock := newMCPHandler(t)
cleanContent := "the quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog — no secrets here"
// Bind the exact string — no wildcards — so that any transformation
// (whitespace, case, truncation) would fail the arg match.
mock.ExpectExec("INSERT INTO agent_memories").
WithArgs(sqlmock.AnyArg(), "ws-1", cleanContent, "TEAM", "ws-1").
WillReturnResult(sqlmock.NewResult(1, 1))
w := mcpPost(t, h, "ws-1", map[string]interface{}{
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"id": 100,
"method": "tools/call",
"params": map[string]interface{}{
"name": "commit_memory",
"arguments": map[string]interface{}{
"content": cleanContent,
"scope": "TEAM",
},
},
})
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
if err := mock.ExpectationsWereMet(); err != nil {
t.Errorf("clean content should pass through unchanged: %v", err)
}
}
// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// tools/call — recall_memory
// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────