Adds HERMES_API_KEY to .env.example with a cross-reference to the
OPENROUTER_API_KEY fallback, and adds the hermes runtime row to the
CLAUDE.md runtime table so the new adapter is discoverable alongside
its siblings (langgraph, claude-code, openclaw, crewai, autogen,
deepagents).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Resolves#17.
Part A: scripts/cleanup-rogue-workspaces.sh deletes workspaces whose id
or name starts with known test placeholder prefixes (aaaaaaaa-, etc.)
and force-removes the paired Docker container. Documented in
tests/README.md.
Part B: add a pre-flight check in provisionWorkspace() — when neither a
template path nor in-memory configFiles supplies config.yaml, probe the
existing named volume via a throwaway alpine container. If the volume
lacks config.yaml, mark the workspace status='failed' with a clear
last_sample_error instead of handing it to Docker's unless-stopped
restart policy (which otherwise loops forever on FileNotFoundError).
New pure helper provisioner.ValidateConfigSource + unit tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
On Docker Desktop (macOS/Windows), host-path bind mounts often appear
root-owned inside the container. The previous entrypoint only chowned
/workspace top-level, so agents (uid 1000) still couldn't write to
/workspace/repo/* — git clone, pip install, and file edits failed with
EACCES and fell back to /tmp. Detect the root-owned-contents case by
sampling the first entry; if it's root-owned, recursively chown the
tree. On normal Linux Docker with matching uids this is a no-op, so the
fast-startup path is preserved for the common case.
Part B of the issue (private-repo initial_prompt clone) was addressed
by PR #20.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
get_peers() was sending no auth headers to /registry/:id/peers — this would
return 401 for every workspace agent after PR #31 (WorkspaceAuth middleware)
deploys, breaking peer discovery entirely.
discover_peer() had X-Workspace-ID but was missing the bearer token, also
required by Phase 30.6 for /registry/discover/:id.
Both functions now send {"X-Workspace-ID": WORKSPACE_ID, **auth_headers()}.
get_workspace_info() was already correct (auth_headers() present since PR #39).
Adds test_request_sends_workspace_id_header to TestGetPeers; hardens the
discover_peer header assertion to use presence-check rather than exact equality.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds Z as a keyboard equivalent for the existing double-click zoom-to-team
gesture (WCAG 2.1.1). When a team node is selected, pressing Z dispatches
molecule:zoom-to-team, which fitBounds to the parent and all children.
Input elements are guarded so Z still types normally in text fields.
Adds a 6th help panel entry documenting the Dbl-click / Z gesture.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
globals.css: append @media (prefers-reduced-motion: reduce) block that zeroes
animation/transition durations, disables .animate-in/.slide-in-from-* entry
animations (Toaster, ApprovalBanner, SidePanel slide), strips dashdraw and
node-appear keyframes from React Flow elements.
Components: replace all bare animate-pulse (13 occurrences across WorkspaceNode,
StatusDot, Toolbar, SidePanel, Legend, SearchDialog, TerminalTab, TemplatePalette)
with motion-safe:animate-pulse so status indicator pulsing stops for users with
vestibular disorders. Replace 3 animate-bounce occurrences in ChatTab typing
indicator with motion-safe:animate-bounce.
Tests: new canvas/src/__tests__/reduced-motion.test.ts (12 tests) verifies the
@media block is present in globals.css and that every component file uses the
motion-safe: variant rather than bare animation classes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
H3 (compliance.py): GitHub fine-grained PATs use the github_pat_ prefix
with an 82-character alphanumeric+underscore suffix — different from
classic tokens (36 chars). Add the missing pattern to _PII_PATTERNS so
fine-grained PATs are redacted in compliance logs alongside classic tokens.
M4 (platform_auth.py): Replace write_text()+chmod() in save_token() with
os.open(O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0o600) + os.write(). The old approach
had a TOCTOU window where a concurrent reader could access the token file
before chmod restricted permissions. os.open with explicit mode creates the
file with 0600 permissions atomically in a single syscall.
H2 (a2a_client.py): Already fixed in commit bea0e96 (Cycle 5); no-op.
Tests: 1136 passed, 2 skipped (workspace-template pytest suite)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
IMPACT WITHOUT THIS FIX: deploying PR #31 (WorkspaceAuth middleware on
/workspaces/*) without this patch causes EVERY delegation cycle to silently
break — the heartbeat poll returns 401, the self-message A2A POST returns
401, agents never wake up after task completion, and memory consolidation
stops. The entire multi-agent coordination system degrades to single-shot
interactions with no result delivery.
Changes (all using the existing platform_auth.auth_headers() pattern
already used for POST /registry/heartbeat):
heartbeat.py — 5 calls fixed:
- GET /workspaces/:id/delegations (delegation poll)
- GET /workspaces/:id (self workspace info for parent lookup)
- GET /workspaces/{parent_id} (parent workspace name lookup)
- POST /workspaces/:id/a2a (self-message to wake agent on results)
- POST /workspaces/:id/notify (canvas delegation result notification)
Also moved `from platform_auth import auth_headers` from inline (per-call)
to module-level import so _check_delegations() can use it without re-importing.
consolidation.py — 4 calls fixed:
- GET /workspaces/:id/memories (fetch memories for consolidation)
- POST /workspaces/:id/memories (write consolidated summary — agent path)
- DELETE /workspaces/:id/memories/:id (delete original memories post-consolidation)
- POST /workspaces/:id/memories (write consolidated summary — fallback path)
a2a_client.py — 1 call fixed:
- GET /workspaces/:id (get_workspace_info())
⚠️ DEPLOYMENT NOTE: This PR MUST be merged and deployed at the same time as
PR #31 (WorkspaceAuth middleware). Deploying #31 without this fix will
immediately break all delegation result delivery.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds a `canvas-deploy-reminder` job to ci.yml that fires on every
push to main once `canvas-build` passes. It posts a commit comment via
the built-in GITHUB_TOKEN (no new secrets needed) reminding whoever
monitors CI to run:
cd /g/personal_programs/molecule-monorepo
git pull origin main
docker compose build canvas && docker compose up -d canvas
The comment includes the commit SHA and a direct link to the build log.
Rationale: 5 consecutive merge cycles (PRs #21, #25, #30, #32, #34)
went undeployed because there is no auto-deploy hook and the manual
step was silently forgotten. A commit comment on the merge commit is
the lowest-friction reminder that requires no external secrets or infra.
Does NOT run on PRs — only on direct pushes to main (i.e. post-merge).
Uses `needs: canvas-build` so the reminder only fires after build+tests
pass; a failing build produces no comment.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Gap 1 — WS_URL now derives from NEXT_PUBLIC_PLATFORM_URL when
NEXT_PUBLIC_WS_URL is not set (http→ws, appends /ws; https→wss).
Operators need only one env var. NEXT_PUBLIC_WS_URL remains an explicit
override escape hatch.
Gap 2 — Add canvas/.env.example documenting NEXT_PUBLIC_PLATFORM_URL
(required) and NEXT_PUBLIC_WS_URL (optional override, commented out).
Gap 3 — Toolbar fires showToast("Live updates restored", "success")
when wsStatus transitions connecting→connected. mountedRef (set after
2 s) suppresses the toast on the very first page-load connection so
only genuine reconnects notify the user.
Gap 4 — New canvas/src/store/__tests__/socket.url.test.ts (6 tests):
· fallback to ws://localhost:8080/ws when no env set
· http→ws derivation from NEXT_PUBLIC_PLATFORM_URL
· https→wss derivation
· NEXT_PUBLIC_WS_URL override takes precedence
· api.ts PLATFORM_URL fallback
· api.ts reads NEXT_PUBLIC_PLATFORM_URL
375/375 tests passing, production build clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This PR gates DELETE /workspaces/:id behind AdminAuth. The E2E smoke
test's three DELETE calls (cleanup of echo, summarizer, re-imported
bundle) need to send Authorization: Bearer <token>. Any valid live
token is accepted — use the token issued to each workspace at
/registry/register.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds a live/reconnecting/offline pill to the Toolbar so users can see
at a glance whether the canvas is receiving real-time updates.
Changes:
- canvas/src/store/canvas.ts: add wsStatus ('connected'|'connecting'|
'disconnected') field + setWsStatus action to CanvasState (initial:
'connecting')
- canvas/src/store/socket.ts: wire setWsStatus into ReconnectingSocket —
'connecting' on connect() call, 'connected' in onopen, 'connecting'
in onclose (will reconnect), 'disconnected' in disconnect()
- canvas/src/components/Toolbar.tsx: subscribe to wsStatus; render
WsStatusPill (green "Live" / amber pulsing "Reconnecting" / red
"Offline") after the workspace count section
- canvas/src/store/__tests__/socket.test.ts: add setWsStatus: vi.fn()
to the canvas store mock (global factory, beforeEach reset, and the
mid-test override in the onmessage test)
369/369 canvas tests passing, production build clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Both watcher.py (ConfigWatcher) and skill_loader/watcher.py
(SkillsWatcher) used hashlib.md5() for file-integrity change detection.
MD5 is collision-prone: a crafted config file could produce the same
hash as a benign one, silently suppressing the hot-reload callback and
preventing agents from picking up legitimate config changes.
Replace hashlib.md5 → hashlib.sha256 in both _hash_file() methods.
Update docstrings, comments, and the type-annotation comment
(rel_path → md5 hex → sha256 hex).
Test update: test_skills_watcher.py — rename helper _md5 → _sha256,
update the hash-length assertion from 32 (MD5) to 64 (SHA-256), and
rename the test from test_hash_file_returns_md5_for_existing_file to
test_hash_file_returns_sha256_for_existing_file. All 25 watcher tests
pass.
Note: H2 (a2a_client.py timeout=None) was already fixed in Cycle 5
(timeout=httpx.Timeout(connect=30.0, read=300.0, ...)) — confirmed by
code review before opening this PR.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
C18 — Workspace URL hijacking (CRITICAL, CONFIRMED LIVE):
POST /registry/register now calls requireWorkspaceToken() before
persisting anything. If the workspace has any live auth tokens, the
caller must supply a valid Bearer token matching that workspace ID.
First registration (no tokens yet) passes through — token is issued
at end of this function (unchanged bootstrap contract). Mirrors the
same pattern already applied to /registry/heartbeat and
/registry/update-card. Attacker POC — overwriting Backend Engineer URL
to http://attacker.example.com:9999/steal — now returns 401.
C20 — Unauthenticated workspace deletion (CRITICAL, CONFIRMED LIVE):
DELETE /workspaces/:id moved from bare router into AdminAuth group.
Any valid workspace bearer token grants access (same fail-open
bootstrap contract as /settings/secrets). Mass-deletion attack chain
(C19 list → C20 delete all) requires auth for the DELETE step.
POST /workspaces (create) also moved to AdminAuth to prevent
unauthenticated workspace creation.
C19 (GET /workspaces topology exposure) deferred — canvas browser
has no bearer token; fix requires canvas service-token refactor.
Tests: 2 new registry tests — C18 bootstrap (no tokens, passes
through and issues token), C18 hijack blocked (has tokens, no
bearer → 401).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace raw Parent Workspace ID text input with a <select> populated
from GET /workspaces (T{tier} · {name} format, graceful fallback on
fetch error). Raise all interactive button text from text-[8px]/[9px]
to text-[11px] across SkillsTab, ScheduleTab, secrets-section,
ActivityTab, SidePanel, ChatTab; non-interactive labels/badges to
text-[10px]. Adds 7 CreateWorkspaceDialog unit tests (372/372 passing).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
POST /registry/register accepted any URL string and persisted it as
the workspace's A2A endpoint — an attacker could register a workspace
with url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ and cause the platform
to proxy requests to the cloud metadata service when proxying A2A traffic.
Fix: validateAgentURL() helper rejects:
- empty URL
- non-http/https schemes (file://, ftp://, etc.)
- 169.254.0.0/16 link-local IPs (AWS/GCP/Azure IMDS endpoints)
Allows RFC-1918 private ranges (Docker networking uses 172.16-31.x.x).
Adds 12 unit tests covering valid Docker-internal URLs and all SSRF vectors.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three unauthenticated routes allowed arbitrary read/write/delete of all
global platform secrets (API keys, provider credentials) with zero auth:
- GET/PUT/POST /settings/secrets
- DELETE /settings/secrets/:key
- GET/POST/DELETE /admin/secrets (legacy aliases)
Fix: new AdminAuth middleware with same lazy-bootstrap contract as
WorkspaceAuth — fail-open when no tokens exist (fresh install / pre-Phase-30
upgrade), enforce once any workspace has a live token. Any valid workspace
bearer token grants access (platform-wide scope, no workspace binding needed).
Changes:
wsauth/tokens.go — HasAnyLiveTokenGlobal + ValidateAnyToken functions
wsauth/tokens_test.go — 5 new tests covering both new functions
middleware/wsauth_middleware.go — AdminAuth middleware
router/router.go — global secrets routes now registered under adminAuth group
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Wrap CanvasInner return in React Fragment to host skip-nav link as sibling of <main>
- Add <a href="#canvas-main"> skip link (sr-only, revealed on focus) before <main>
- Add id="canvas-main" to <main> element
- Add aria-label="Molecule AI workspace canvas" to ReactFlow wrapper
- Add Canvas.a11y.test.tsx: 4 jsdom tests covering all three a11y landmarks
369/369 tests pass; next build clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The WorkspaceAuth middleware (PR #31) now requires bearer tokens on all
/workspaces/:id/* sub-routes. The E2E test_api.sh already captured ECHO_TOKEN
and SUM_TOKEN from /registry/register but was not passing them to the ten
/activity curl calls, causing 10 FAIL assertions in CI.
Add -H "Authorization: Bearer $ECHO_TOKEN" (or $SUM_TOKEN) to every
GET and POST /workspaces/:id/activity call in the Activity Log Tests section.
PATCH /workspaces/:id and DELETE /workspaces/:id remain unauthenticated (they
are on the root router, not the wsAuth group).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
UX Audit Run 6 critical finding: Legend panel and workspace node cards used 8px and 9px
text (6–7pt), which is physically unreadable and fails WCAG minimum guidelines.
- Legend.tsx: raise all text-[8px]/[9px]/[10px] → text-[11px] across every sub-component
(StatusItem labels, TierItem badge+label, CommItem icon+label, section headers)
- WorkspaceNode.tsx: raise text-[8px]/[9px] → text-[10px] for all readable labels in
the main card (status text, skill badges, task/error banners, tier badge, sub count,
Team Members header) and TeamMemberChip primary name/role text
Compact 7px elements inside TeamMemberChip (tier/sub badges, status micropills) retained
to preserve dense canvas layout — only human-readable labels were upgraded.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Follow-up to root-cause analysis in #17 (see 2026-04-14 02:14 UTC comment).
The Security Auditor's hourly DAST was creating test workspaces, secrets,
and plugins to probe auth/validation logic — but only secrets and plugins
had teardown in the prompt. Workspace-create probes leaked rows into
`workspaces` with sequential IDs aaaaaaaa- bbbbbbbb- cccccccc- dddddddd-,
each trapped in a restart loop on missing config.yaml. Four hourly runs,
four leaked workspaces.
Adds explicit step 4a: DAST TEARDOWN. Maintains three lists (workspaces,
secrets, plugins) populated as probes run, and iterates them at the end
with DELETE calls. Uses `|| true` so partial teardown failures don't
break the audit, but every created artifact gets a cleanup attempt.
Doesn't remove the cleanup the cron was already doing for secrets/plugins
— just formalises the pattern so workspace-create (and any future probe
surface) is covered by the same contract.
Related:
- #17 — rogue workspace restart loop (root cause was this)
- #26 — audit cron routing (this PR sits alongside that structure)
Fix A — platform/internal/middleware/wsauth_middleware.go (NEW):
WorkspaceAuth() gin middleware enforces per-workspace bearer-token auth on
ALL /workspaces/:id/* sub-routes. Same lazy-bootstrap contract as
secrets.Values: workspaces with no live token are grandfathered through.
Blocks C2, C3, C4, C5, C7, C8, C9, C12, C13 simultaneously.
Fix A — platform/internal/router/router.go:
Reorganised route registration: bare CRUD (/workspaces, /workspaces/:id)
and /a2a remain on root router; all other /workspaces/:id/* sub-routes
moved into wsAuth = r.Group("/workspaces/:id", middleware.WorkspaceAuth(db.DB)).
CORS AllowHeaders updated to include Authorization so browser/agent callers
can send the bearer token cross-origin.
Fix B — workspace-template/heartbeat.py:
_check_delegations(): validate source_id == self.workspace_id before
accepting a delegation result. Attacker-crafted records with a foreign
source_id are silently skipped with a WARNING log (injection attempt).
trigger_msg no longer embeds raw response_preview text; references
delegation_id + status only — removes the prompt-injection vector.
Fix C — workspace-template/skill_loader/loader.py:
load_skill_tools(): before exec_module(), verify script is within
scripts_dir (path traversal guard) and temporarily scrub sensitive env
vars (CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN, ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, OPENAI_API_KEY,
WORKSPACE_AUTH_TOKEN, GITHUB_TOKEN, GH_TOKEN) from os.environ; restore
in finally block. Defence-in-depth even if /plugins auth gate is bypassed.
Fix D — platform/internal/handlers/socket.go:
HandleConnect(): agent connections (X-Workspace-ID present) validated via
wsauth.HasAnyLiveToken + wsauth.ValidateToken before WebSocket upgrade.
Canvas clients (no X-Workspace-ID) remain unauthenticated.
Fix D — workspace-template/events.py:
PlatformEventSubscriber._connect(): include platform_auth bearer token in
WebSocket upgrade headers alongside X-Workspace-ID.
Fix E — workspace-template/executor_helpers.py:
recall_memories() and commit_memory() now pass platform_auth bearer token
in Authorization header so WorkspaceAuth middleware allows access.
Fix F — workspace-template/a2a_client.py:
send_a2a_message(): timeout=None → httpx.Timeout(connect=30, read=300,
write=30, pool=30). Resolves H2 flagged across 5 consecutive audits.
Tests: 149/149 Python tests pass (test_heartbeat + test_events updated to
assert new source_id validation behaviour and allow Authorization header).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
