fix(workspace-server): #1644 — include auth_token in POST /workspaces 201 response
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Empirical trigger (issue #1644): staging peer-visibility E2E cannot mint an MCP bearer for managed runtimes. The create response shipped only {id, status, awareness_namespace, workspace_access} — no token. Callers had two fallbacks, both broken on staging: - POST /admin/workspaces/:id/tokens (AdminAuth-gated, canonical mint) — returns HTML 404 on staging because the CP-admin route prefix differs from local (`/cp/admin/...` per reference_controlplane_admin_api_access). - GET /admin/workspaces/:id/test-token (dev-only mint) — deliberately 404s when MOLECULE_ENV=production per admin_test_token.go::TestTokensEnabled. Per feedback_no_dev_only_routes_in_e2e (CTO 2026-05-21), E2E must use production paths only; this fallback was always wrong. Fix: mint the workspace's first bearer inline at the end of Create and return it as `auth_token` in the 201 response. Now every caller (canvas Save, org_import, E2E, third-party API) gets the bearer they need in the same round trip — single production path, no separate mint endpoint, no dev-only fallback, no path-prefix gotcha. Mirrors the existing pre-register external-workspace mint shape (lines ~605-615), where the create response already includes a `connection.token` field for the same reason. This commit extends the pattern to spawned-runtime workspaces. Failure mode: non-fatal. If wsauth.IssueToken errors (extremely rare — the workspace row just committed a microsecond ago), the 201 still ships without auth_token + a log line. Callers that need the bearer can recover via POST /admin/workspaces/:id/tokens (canonical admin mint). Returning the 201 without the field is friendlier than 500'ing a partial-success write. Tests: - New TestWorkspaceCreate_ReturnsAuthToken_201: asserts auth_token is present, non-empty, and >= 40 chars (sanity-bounds the wsauth.IssueToken base64-RawURL encoding of the 32-byte payload). Pins the INSERT INTO workspace_auth_tokens expectation so the inline mint path can't silently drop without surfacing as unexpected ExecQuery. - Existing TestWorkspaceCreate (and the broader Create test family) continue to pass — they don't assert auth_token, and the non-fatal error branch keeps the 201 shape stable. Verified: `go test -count=1 -short ./internal/handlers/... → OK`. Coordinated follow-ups: - Part A (in molecule-core test E2E scripts): once this lands + deploys, update `test_peer_visibility_mcp_local.sh` / `test_peer_visibility_mcp_staging.sh` to consume the inline auth_token instead of the GET /test-token fallback. Tracked separately; gated on Engineer-A (Kimi) Gitea persona token injection per the production-team auth-block surface 2026-05-22. - Drop the dev-only GET /admin/workspaces/:id/test-token route in a follow-up once all E2E callers migrate to the inline shape. Memory refs: feedback_no_dev_only_routes_in_e2e, reference_controlplane_admin_api_access, feedback_workspace_model_required_no_platform_default_dynamic_credential_intake (this PR is the "production credential path" sibling of the model SSOT in PR#1667). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -415,6 +415,76 @@ func TestWorkspaceCreate(t *testing.T) {
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}
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}
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// TestWorkspaceCreate_ReturnsAuthToken_201 pins the inline-auth_token
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// behaviour added for #1644. Pre-fix, the 201 response was
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// {id, status, awareness_namespace, workspace_access} — callers had to
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// make a separate POST to /admin/workspaces/:id/tokens (AdminAuth-gated,
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// path-prefix differs in CP-admin deploys) OR fall back to the dev-only
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// GET /admin/workspaces/:id/test-token (deliberately 404s on
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// MOLECULE_ENV=production per feedback_no_dev_only_routes_in_e2e).
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//
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// Post-fix: every Create response includes an `auth_token` field with
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// the freshly-minted plaintext bearer (returned once, never recoverable).
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// This is the SSOT path — production E2E + canvas + org_import all
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// get the bearer they need in the same round trip.
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//
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// Failure path is non-fatal: if the IssueToken DB call fails, the 201
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// still goes out without auth_token + a fallback log line. That branch
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// is exercised by sqlmock returning a non-INSERT-INTO-workspace_auth_tokens
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// path here — the test asserts presence on the happy path.
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func TestWorkspaceCreate_ReturnsAuthToken_201(t *testing.T) {
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mock := setupTestDB(t)
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setupTestRedis(t)
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broadcaster := newTestBroadcaster()
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handler := NewWorkspaceHandler(broadcaster, nil, "http://localhost:8080", "/tmp/configs")
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mock.ExpectBegin()
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mock.ExpectExec("INSERT INTO workspaces").
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WithArgs(sqlmock.AnyArg(), "Token Holder", nil, 3, "langgraph", sqlmock.AnyArg(), (*string)(nil), nil, "none", (*int64)(nil), models.DefaultMaxConcurrentTasks, "push").
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WillReturnResult(sqlmock.NewResult(0, 1))
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mock.ExpectCommit()
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mock.ExpectExec("INSERT INTO canvas_layouts").
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WillReturnResult(sqlmock.NewResult(0, 1))
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mock.ExpectExec("INSERT INTO structure_events").
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WillReturnResult(sqlmock.NewResult(0, 1))
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// The inline mint added in #1644 Part B — wsauth.IssueToken issues
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// a new bearer via INSERT INTO workspace_auth_tokens (workspace_id,
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// token_hash, prefix). This is the assertion that the new code path
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// reaches the DB.
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mock.ExpectExec("INSERT INTO workspace_auth_tokens").
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WithArgs(sqlmock.AnyArg(), sqlmock.AnyArg(), sqlmock.AnyArg()).
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WillReturnResult(sqlmock.NewResult(0, 1))
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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c, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(w)
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body := `{"name":"Token Holder","model":"anthropic:claude-opus-4-7"}`
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c.Request = httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/workspaces", bytes.NewBufferString(body))
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c.Request.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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handler.Create(c)
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if w.Code != http.StatusCreated {
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t.Fatalf("expected 201, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
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}
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var resp map[string]interface{}
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if err := json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &resp); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("parse response: %v", err)
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}
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tok, ok := resp["auth_token"].(string)
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if !ok || tok == "" {
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t.Fatalf("expected non-empty auth_token in 201 response (the #1644 SSOT inline mint), got: %s", w.Body.String())
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}
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// Sanity: tokens are base64-RawURL encoded 32-byte payloads (per
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// wsauth/tokens.go::tokenPayloadBytes), so a meaningful lower bound
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// is ~40 chars. If this fails, IssueToken's contract drifted.
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if len(tok) < 40 {
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t.Errorf("auth_token suspiciously short (%d chars) — wsauth.IssueToken contract drift?", len(tok))
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}
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if err := mock.ExpectationsWereMet(); err != nil {
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t.Errorf("unmet sqlmock expectations — inline mint path may have skipped IssueToken: %v", err)
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}
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}
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func TestBuildProvisionerConfig_IncludesAwarenessSettings(t *testing.T) {
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setupTestDB(t)
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// runtime_image_pins reader removed by RFC internal#617 / task #335
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@@ -639,12 +639,39 @@ func (h *WorkspaceHandler) Create(c *gin.Context) {
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}
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}
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c.JSON(http.StatusCreated, gin.H{
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// Mint the workspace's first bearer token and return it inline
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// (#1644). Pre-fix, callers had to make a separate POST to
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// /admin/workspaces/:id/tokens (production path, AdminAuth-gated,
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// but the path-prefix differs in CP-admin deploys so staging E2E
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// got HTML 404) OR fall back to GET /admin/workspaces/:id/test-token
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// (dev-only — deliberately 404s on MOLECULE_ENV=production per
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// admin_test_token.go::TestTokensEnabled, which violates
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// feedback_no_dev_only_routes_in_e2e). Inlining the first token here
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// makes the create response the SSOT — every caller (canvas Save,
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// org_import, E2E, third-party API) gets the bearer they need to
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// authenticate /activity, /a2a, /memory etc. without an extra
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// round trip to a separate mint endpoint.
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//
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// Failure is non-fatal: the workspace row already committed; the
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// operator can recover via POST /admin/workspaces/:id/tokens
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// (canonical admin mint) or POST /workspaces/:id/external/rotate
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// (already-used for the external pre-register path above). We log
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// the failure and return 201 without the field — callers that need
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// the token will get a clear-shaped fallback (auth_token absent
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// from response = use the admin mint path).
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resp := gin.H{
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"id": id,
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"status": "provisioning",
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"awareness_namespace": awarenessNamespace,
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"workspace_access": workspaceAccess,
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})
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}
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if authToken, tokErr := wsauth.IssueToken(ctx, db.DB, id); tokErr != nil {
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log.Printf("Create workspace %s: inline auth_token mint failed (non-fatal — caller can use POST /admin/workspaces/:id/tokens): %v", id, tokErr)
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} else {
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resp["auth_token"] = authToken
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}
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c.JSON(http.StatusCreated, resp)
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}
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// addProvisionTimeoutMs decorates a workspace response map with the
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