Closes#168 by the route-split path from #194's review. #167 put PUT
/canvas/viewport behind strict AdminAuth, breaking canvas drag/zoom
persist because the canvas uses session cookies not bearer tokens.
New narrow middleware CanvasOrBearer:
- Accepts a valid bearer (same contract as AdminAuth) OR
- Accepts a request whose Origin exactly matches CORS_ORIGINS
- Lazy-bootstrap fail-open preserved for fresh installs
Applied ONLY to PUT /canvas/viewport. The softer check is acceptable
there because viewport corruption is cosmetic-only — worst case a
user refreshes the page. This middleware must NOT be used on routes
that leak prompts (#165), create resources (#164), or write files
(#190) — see #194 review for why.
The other canvas-facing routes mentioned in #168 (Events tab, Bundle
Export/Import) remain behind strict AdminAuth pending a proper
session-cookie-accepting AdminAuth (#168 follow-up for Phase H).
6 new tests cover: bootstrap fail-open, no-creds 401, canvas origin
match, wrong origin 401, empty origin rejected, localhost default.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes#168 by the route-split path from #194's review. #167 put PUT
/canvas/viewport behind strict AdminAuth, breaking canvas drag/zoom
persist because the canvas uses session cookies not bearer tokens.
New narrow middleware CanvasOrBearer:
- Accepts a valid bearer (same contract as AdminAuth) OR
- Accepts a request whose Origin exactly matches CORS_ORIGINS
- Lazy-bootstrap fail-open preserved for fresh installs
Applied ONLY to PUT /canvas/viewport. The softer check is acceptable
there because viewport corruption is cosmetic-only — worst case a
user refreshes the page. This middleware must NOT be used on routes
that leak prompts (#165), create resources (#164), or write files
(#190) — see #194 review for why.
The other canvas-facing routes mentioned in #168 (Events tab, Bundle
Export/Import) remain behind strict AdminAuth pending a proper
session-cookie-accepting AdminAuth (#168 follow-up for Phase H).
6 new tests cover: bootstrap fail-open, no-creds 401, canvas origin
match, wrong origin 401, empty origin rejected, localhost default.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes#190 (HIGH). The route was registered on the root router with no
auth middleware, letting any unauthenticated caller write arbitrary files
into configsDir via a crafted template. Same vulnerability class as #164
(bundles/import) and path-traversal risk same as #103 (org/import).
One-line gate via the existing wsAdmin pattern. Lazy-bootstrap fail-open
preserved for fresh installs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes#190 (HIGH). The route was registered on the root router with no
auth middleware, letting any unauthenticated caller write arbitrary files
into configsDir via a crafted template. Same vulnerability class as #164
(bundles/import) and path-traversal risk same as #103 (org/import).
One-line gate via the existing wsAdmin pattern. Lazy-bootstrap fail-open
preserved for fresh installs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
#186's squash-merge commit (3ff40c4b) took 15e15a21 (AGENT_TOOLSDIRECTORY
override) but missed a6cfc5f (bypass setup-python entirely) which was
pushed to the PR branch after the merge was initiated. The merge
commit still has the old setup-python@v5 job config.
Applies a6cfc5f's ci.yml verbatim via git checkout. Restores the
Homebrew-python3.11 bypass path that the user prototyped. No other
changes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
#186's squash-merge commit (aa419477) took 15e15a21 (AGENT_TOOLSDIRECTORY
override) but missed a6cfc5f (bypass setup-python entirely) which was
pushed to the PR branch after the merge was initiated. The merge
commit still has the old setup-python@v5 job config.
Applies a6cfc5f's ci.yml verbatim via git checkout. Restores the
Homebrew-python3.11 bypass path that the user prototyped. No other
changes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
#173 — implement cancel() in LangGraphA2AExecutor: emits
TaskStatusUpdateEvent(state=canceled, final=True) so clients see the
state transition rather than silence. Removes pragma: no cover.
Test: test_cancel_emits_canceled_event.
#174 — add stateTransitionHistory=True to AgentCapabilities in main.py
so microsoft/agent-framework clients know they can request full task
history via the A2A protocol.
#175 — wire InMemoryPushNotificationConfigStore and PushNotificationSender
into DefaultRequestHandler so the advertised pushNotifications capability
is backed by a real store. Both classes live in a2a.server.tasks (a2a-sdk
0.3.25); import confirmed by probe.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
#173 — implement cancel() in LangGraphA2AExecutor: emits
TaskStatusUpdateEvent(state=canceled, final=True) so clients see the
state transition rather than silence. Removes pragma: no cover.
Test: test_cancel_emits_canceled_event.
#174 — add stateTransitionHistory=True to AgentCapabilities in main.py
so microsoft/agent-framework clients know they can request full task
history via the A2A protocol.
#175 — wire InMemoryPushNotificationConfigStore and PushNotificationSender
into DefaultRequestHandler so the advertised pushNotifications capability
is backed by a real store. Both classes live in a2a.server.tasks (a2a-sdk
0.3.25); import confirmed by probe.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore(ci): migrate all jobs to self-hosted macOS arm64 runner
Switches every job in `ci.yml` and `publish-platform-image.yml` from
`ubuntu-latest` to `[self-hosted, macos, arm64]` to avoid GitHub-hosted
minute rate limits. All jobs run on a single Apple-silicon self-hosted
runner registered at the Molecule-AI org level.
Notable non-trivial adaptations (macOS runners can't use `services:` and
some GHA marketplace actions are Linux-only):
- e2e-api: `services: postgres/redis` replaced with inline `docker run`
steps. Ports remapped to 15432/16379 to avoid collision with anything
the host may already expose on the standard ports. Containers are named
(`molecule-ci-postgres` / `molecule-ci-redis`) and torn down in an
`if: always()` step. Postgres readiness is still gated on pg_isready
via `docker exec`.
- shellcheck: `ludeeus/action-shellcheck` is a Docker action, Linux-only.
Replaced with a direct `shellcheck` invocation (pre-installed on the
runner) that scans `tests/e2e/*.sh` with `--severity=warning`.
- publish-platform-image: added `docker/setup-qemu-action@v3` and an
explicit `platforms: linux/amd64` on both `docker/build-push-action`
invocations. The runner is arm64 but Fly tenant machines pull amd64,
so QEMU-emulated cross-arch builds are required. GHA cache-from/cache-to
behavior is unchanged.
Runner prereqs (one-time host setup):
- Docker Desktop installed and running (for e2e-api + image publish)
- `shellcheck` on PATH
- `docker` on PATH
- Go / Node / gh / Python are installed via setup-* actions per job
* fix(ci): set AGENT_TOOLSDIRECTORY for python-lint on self-hosted runner
setup-python@v5 defaults to /Users/runner/hostedtoolcache which doesn't
exist on the hongming-claw self-hosted runner. AGENT_TOOLSDIRECTORY tells
the action to use a writable path under the runner user's home directory.
Fixes the only failing job in CI run 24469156329 on PR #186.
---------
Co-authored-by: Hongming Wang <HongmingWang-Rabbit@users.noreply.github.com>
* chore(ci): migrate all jobs to self-hosted macOS arm64 runner
Switches every job in `ci.yml` and `publish-platform-image.yml` from
`ubuntu-latest` to `[self-hosted, macos, arm64]` to avoid GitHub-hosted
minute rate limits. All jobs run on a single Apple-silicon self-hosted
runner registered at the Molecule-AI org level.
Notable non-trivial adaptations (macOS runners can't use `services:` and
some GHA marketplace actions are Linux-only):
- e2e-api: `services: postgres/redis` replaced with inline `docker run`
steps. Ports remapped to 15432/16379 to avoid collision with anything
the host may already expose on the standard ports. Containers are named
(`molecule-ci-postgres` / `molecule-ci-redis`) and torn down in an
`if: always()` step. Postgres readiness is still gated on pg_isready
via `docker exec`.
- shellcheck: `ludeeus/action-shellcheck` is a Docker action, Linux-only.
Replaced with a direct `shellcheck` invocation (pre-installed on the
runner) that scans `tests/e2e/*.sh` with `--severity=warning`.
- publish-platform-image: added `docker/setup-qemu-action@v3` and an
explicit `platforms: linux/amd64` on both `docker/build-push-action`
invocations. The runner is arm64 but Fly tenant machines pull amd64,
so QEMU-emulated cross-arch builds are required. GHA cache-from/cache-to
behavior is unchanged.
Runner prereqs (one-time host setup):
- Docker Desktop installed and running (for e2e-api + image publish)
- `shellcheck` on PATH
- `docker` on PATH
- Go / Node / gh / Python are installed via setup-* actions per job
* fix(ci): set AGENT_TOOLSDIRECTORY for python-lint on self-hosted runner
setup-python@v5 defaults to /Users/runner/hostedtoolcache which doesn't
exist on the hongming-claw self-hosted runner. AGENT_TOOLSDIRECTORY tells
the action to use a writable path under the runner user's home directory.
Fixes the only failing job in CI run 24469156329 on PR #186.
---------
Co-authored-by: Hongming Wang <HongmingWang-Rabbit@users.noreply.github.com>
The route wsAuth.DELETE("/secrets/:key", sech.Delete) was already moved
inside the WorkspaceAuth group in a prior commit, closing the CWE-306
unauthenticated-delete vector. This commit adds two regression tests to
lock that in:
- TestWorkspaceAuth_Issue170_SecretDelete_NoBearer_Returns401: workspace
with live tokens, no bearer header → 401 (blocks the attack).
- TestWorkspaceAuth_Issue170_SecretDelete_FailOpen_NoTokens: workspace
with no tokens (bootstrap/legacy) → 200 (fail-open preserved).
Mirrors the TestAdminAuth_Issue120_* and TestWorkspaceAuth_C4_C8_* patterns.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The route wsAuth.DELETE("/secrets/:key", sech.Delete) was already moved
inside the WorkspaceAuth group in a prior commit, closing the CWE-306
unauthenticated-delete vector. This commit adds two regression tests to
lock that in:
- TestWorkspaceAuth_Issue170_SecretDelete_NoBearer_Returns401: workspace
with live tokens, no bearer header → 401 (blocks the attack).
- TestWorkspaceAuth_Issue170_SecretDelete_FailOpen_NoTokens: workspace
with no tokens (bootstrap/legacy) → 200 (fail-open preserved).
Mirrors the TestAdminAuth_Issue120_* and TestWorkspaceAuth_C4_C8_* patterns.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every-10-min cadence introduced in PR #159 increased Security Auditor
from 2 runs/day to 144 runs/day (144x). Combined with PM, Research Lead,
Dev Lead, and other hourly evolution-lever crons, this is the likely
root cause of the P0 OAuth quota exhaustion (#160, resets Apr 17 23:00 UTC).
Restored: cron_expr 7 6,18 * * * (twice daily, 12-hour interval)
Schedule name updated to match new cadence.
Audit prompt content (DAST teardown, PM routing, PM deliverable) retained.
Every-10-min cadence introduced in PR #159 increased Security Auditor
from 2 runs/day to 144 runs/day (144x). Combined with PM, Research Lead,
Dev Lead, and other hourly evolution-lever crons, this is the likely
root cause of the P0 OAuth quota exhaustion (#160, resets Apr 17 23:00 UTC).
Restored: cron_expr 7 6,18 * * * (twice daily, 12-hour interval)
Schedule name updated to match new cadence.
Audit prompt content (DAST teardown, PM routing, PM deliverable) retained.
PR #167 gated /events and /bundles/export/:id behind AdminAuth. The e2e
script's 3 calls to these routes were unauthenticated and broke when the
runner picked them up for the first time on PR #186 (self-hosted runner
migration). Same admin-gate contract, same fix pattern as the #99/#110
e2e hotfixes.
POST /bundles/import is left unauthenticated because by that point in
the script both workspaces have been deleted and #110 revoked their
tokens, so HasAnyLiveTokenGlobal=0 and AdminAuth fails-open.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
PR #167 gated /events and /bundles/export/:id behind AdminAuth. The e2e
script's 3 calls to these routes were unauthenticated and broke when the
runner picked them up for the first time on PR #186 (self-hosted runner
migration). Same admin-gate contract, same fix pattern as the #99/#110
e2e hotfixes.
POST /bundles/import is left unauthenticated because by that point in
the script both workspaces have been deleted and #110 revoked their
tokens, so HasAnyLiveTokenGlobal=0 and AdminAuth fails-open.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Without this call Gin's default trusts all X-Forwarded-For headers, letting
any caller rotate their effective IP and bypass per-IP rate limiting.
SetTrustedProxies(nil) forces c.ClientIP() to always return the real
TCP RemoteAddr.
Adds two regression tests: one documenting the pre-fix bypass, one
asserting the spoofed header is ignored after the fix.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Without this call Gin's default trusts all X-Forwarded-For headers, letting
any caller rotate their effective IP and bypass per-IP rate limiting.
SetTrustedProxies(nil) forces c.ClientIP() to always return the real
TCP RemoteAddr.
Adds two regression tests: one documenting the pre-fix bypass, one
asserting the spoofed header is ignored after the fix.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
GET /approvals/pending was registered on the open router with no
middleware, allowing any unauthenticated caller to enumerate all pending
approvals across every workspace on the platform.
Fix: add inline middleware.AdminAuth(db.DB) to the route registration,
matching the pattern used in PR #167 for bundles, events, and viewport.
The three workspace-scoped approvals routes (POST/GET /approvals,
POST /approvals/:id/decide) were already correctly behind WorkspaceAuth
inside the wsAuth group — no change needed there.
Tests: two new regression tests in wsauth_middleware_test.go —
TestAdminAuth_Issue180_ApprovalsListing_NoBearer_Returns401
TestAdminAuth_Issue180_ApprovalsListing_FailOpen_NoTokens
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
GET /approvals/pending was registered on the open router with no
middleware, allowing any unauthenticated caller to enumerate all pending
approvals across every workspace on the platform.
Fix: add inline middleware.AdminAuth(db.DB) to the route registration,
matching the pattern used in PR #167 for bundles, events, and viewport.
The three workspace-scoped approvals routes (POST/GET /approvals,
POST /approvals/:id/decide) were already correctly behind WorkspaceAuth
inside the wsAuth group — no change needed there.
Tests: two new regression tests in wsauth_middleware_test.go —
TestAdminAuth_Issue180_ApprovalsListing_NoBearer_Returns401
TestAdminAuth_Issue180_ApprovalsListing_FailOpen_NoTokens
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
