Merge branch 'main' into fix/a2a-compat-batch-173-174-175

This commit is contained in:
Hongming Wang 2026-04-15 11:01:54 -07:00
commit d24d385a1b
6 changed files with 286 additions and 64 deletions

View File

@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ on:
jobs:
platform-build:
name: Platform (Go)
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
runs-on: [self-hosted, macos, arm64]
defaults:
run:
working-directory: platform
@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ jobs:
canvas-build:
name: Canvas (Next.js)
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
runs-on: [self-hosted, macos, arm64]
defaults:
run:
working-directory: canvas
@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ jobs:
mcp-server-build:
name: MCP Server (Node.js)
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
runs-on: [self-hosted, macos, arm64]
defaults:
run:
working-directory: mcp-server
@ -75,37 +75,17 @@ jobs:
e2e-api:
name: E2E API Smoke Test
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 10
services:
postgres:
# Credentials match .env.example (dev:dev) so local reproduction is
# identical to CI. POSTGRES_DB matches the default there too.
image: postgres:16
env:
POSTGRES_USER: dev
POSTGRES_PASSWORD: dev
POSTGRES_DB: molecule
ports:
- 5432:5432
options: >-
--health-cmd "pg_isready -U dev"
--health-interval 10s
--health-timeout 5s
--health-retries 5
redis:
image: redis:7
ports:
- 6379:6379
options: >-
--health-cmd "redis-cli ping"
--health-interval 10s
--health-timeout 5s
--health-retries 5
runs-on: [self-hosted, macos, arm64]
timeout-minutes: 15
# `services:` is Linux-only on self-hosted runners — we start postgres
# and redis via `docker run` instead. Ports 15432/16379 avoid collision
# with anything the host may already have on the standard ports.
env:
DATABASE_URL: postgres://dev:dev@localhost:5432/molecule?sslmode=disable
REDIS_URL: redis://localhost:6379
DATABASE_URL: postgres://dev:dev@localhost:15432/molecule?sslmode=disable
REDIS_URL: redis://localhost:16379
PORT: "8080"
PG_CONTAINER: molecule-ci-postgres
REDIS_CONTAINER: molecule-ci-redis
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: actions/setup-go@v5
@ -113,6 +93,38 @@ jobs:
go-version: 'stable'
cache: true
cache-dependency-path: platform/go.sum
- name: Start Postgres (docker)
run: |
docker rm -f "$PG_CONTAINER" 2>/dev/null || true
docker run -d --name "$PG_CONTAINER" \
-e POSTGRES_USER=dev \
-e POSTGRES_PASSWORD=dev \
-e POSTGRES_DB=molecule \
-p 15432:5432 \
postgres:16
for i in $(seq 1 30); do
if docker exec "$PG_CONTAINER" pg_isready -U dev >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "Postgres ready after ${i}s"
exit 0
fi
sleep 1
done
echo "::error::Postgres did not become ready in 30s"
docker logs "$PG_CONTAINER" || true
exit 1
- name: Start Redis (docker)
run: |
docker rm -f "$REDIS_CONTAINER" 2>/dev/null || true
docker run -d --name "$REDIS_CONTAINER" -p 16379:6379 redis:7
for i in $(seq 1 15); do
if docker exec "$REDIS_CONTAINER" redis-cli ping 2>/dev/null | grep -q PONG; then
echo "Redis ready after ${i}s"
exit 0
fi
sleep 1
done
echo "::error::Redis did not become ready in 15s"
exit 1
- name: Build platform
working-directory: platform
run: go build -o platform-server ./cmd/server
@ -135,17 +147,9 @@ jobs:
exit 1
- name: Assert migrations applied
# Migrations auto-run at platform boot. Fail fast if they silently
# didn't — catches future migration-author mistakes (e.g. a new
# privileged op Postgres "dev" can't execute) before the E2E run.
# Uses docker exec into the service container's own psql — avoids
# a 10-20s apt-install step in the runner.
# didn't — catches future migration-author mistakes before the E2E run.
run: |
pg_container=$(docker ps --filter "ancestor=postgres:16" --format "{{.ID}}" | head -1)
if [ -z "$pg_container" ]; then
echo "::error::Could not find postgres service container"
exit 1
fi
tables=$(docker exec "$pg_container" psql -U dev -d molecule -tAc "SELECT count(*) FROM information_schema.tables WHERE table_schema='public' AND table_name='workspaces'")
tables=$(docker exec "$PG_CONTAINER" psql -U dev -d molecule -tAc "SELECT count(*) FROM information_schema.tables WHERE table_schema='public' AND table_name='workspaces'")
if [ "$tables" != "1" ]; then
echo "::error::Migrations did not apply — 'workspaces' table missing"
cat platform/platform.log || true
@ -163,22 +167,31 @@ jobs:
if [ -f platform/platform.pid ]; then
kill "$(cat platform/platform.pid)" 2>/dev/null || true
fi
- name: Stop service containers
if: always()
run: |
docker rm -f "$PG_CONTAINER" 2>/dev/null || true
docker rm -f "$REDIS_CONTAINER" 2>/dev/null || true
shellcheck:
name: Shellcheck (E2E scripts)
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
runs-on: [self-hosted, macos, arm64]
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Run shellcheck on tests/e2e/*.sh
uses: ludeeus/action-shellcheck@master
env:
SHELLCHECK_OPTS: --severity=warning
with:
scandir: tests/e2e
# `ludeeus/action-shellcheck` is a Docker action (Linux-only). We rely
# on shellcheck being pre-installed on the self-hosted runner instead.
run: |
if ! command -v shellcheck >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "::error::shellcheck is not installed on the runner"
exit 1
fi
find tests/e2e -type f -name '*.sh' -print0 \
| xargs -0 shellcheck --severity=warning
canvas-deploy-reminder:
name: Canvas Deploy Reminder
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
runs-on: [self-hosted, macos, arm64]
needs: canvas-build
# Only fires on direct pushes to main (i.e. after a PR merges).
# PRs get canvas-build CI but no reminder — no deployment happens on PRs.
@ -216,19 +229,24 @@ jobs:
python-lint:
name: Python Lint & Test
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
runs-on: [self-hosted, macos, arm64]
defaults:
run:
working-directory: workspace-template
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: actions/setup-python@v5
with:
python-version: '3.11'
cache: pip
cache-dependency-path: workspace-template/requirements.txt
- run: pip install -r requirements.txt pytest pytest-asyncio pytest-cov
- run: python -m pytest --tb=short -q --cov=. --cov-report=term-missing
# setup-python@v5 cannot write to /Users/runner (GitHub-hosted path) on
# the self-hosted macOS arm64 runner (user: hongming-claw) and also hits
# EACCES on /usr/local/bin due to macOS SIP. Skip it — Homebrew installs
# Python 3.11 at /opt/homebrew/opt/python@3.11 which is already on PATH.
- name: Verify Python 3.11 (Homebrew)
run: |
export PATH="/opt/homebrew/opt/python@3.11/bin:/opt/homebrew/bin:$PATH"
python3.11 --version
echo "/opt/homebrew/opt/python@3.11/bin" >> "$GITHUB_PATH"
echo "/opt/homebrew/bin" >> "$GITHUB_PATH"
- run: pip3.11 install -r requirements.txt pytest pytest-asyncio pytest-cov
- run: python3.11 -m pytest --tb=short -q --cov=. --cov-report=term-missing
# Lint first-party plugins. The validator checks each plugin
# against the format it declares — currently agentskills.io for all
@ -236,10 +254,10 @@ jobs:
# under a sibling adapter (MCP, DeepAgents sub-agent, etc.).
- name: Install molecule-plugin SDK
working-directory: sdk/python
run: pip install -e .
run: pip3.11 install -e .
- name: Lint first-party plugins
working-directory: ${{ github.workspace }}
run: python -m molecule_plugin validate plugins/molecule-dev plugins/superpowers plugins/ecc
run: python3.11 -m molecule_plugin validate plugins/molecule-dev plugins/superpowers plugins/ecc
- name: Run SDK tests
working-directory: sdk/python
run: python -m pytest --tb=short -q
run: python3.11 -m pytest --tb=short -q

View File

@ -32,11 +32,19 @@ env:
jobs:
build-and-push:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
runs-on: [self-hosted, macos, arm64]
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Set up QEMU
# Required on the Apple-silicon self-hosted runner — Fly tenant machines
# pull linux/amd64, and buildx needs binfmt handlers in Docker Desktop's
# VM to emulate amd64 during the build.
uses: docker/setup-qemu-action@v3
with:
platforms: linux/amd64
- name: Set up Docker Buildx
# Buildx enables cache-from/cache-to via GHA cache and multi-arch
# builds without local docker daemon wrangling.
@ -75,10 +83,13 @@ jobs:
# GHCR (or vice versa) — each registry's failure mode is isolated.
# GHA cache is shared because both steps re-use the same Dockerfile
# context + build args.
# Explicit linux/amd64 target: the runner is Apple-silicon (arm64),
# but Fly tenant machines are amd64. QEMU handles the emulation.
uses: docker/build-push-action@v5
with:
context: ./platform
file: ./platform/Dockerfile
platforms: linux/amd64
push: true
tags: |
${{ env.IMAGE_NAME }}:latest
@ -99,6 +110,7 @@ jobs:
with:
context: ./platform
file: ./platform/Dockerfile
platforms: linux/amd64
push: true
tags: |
${{ env.FLY_IMAGE_NAME }}:latest

View File

@ -554,10 +554,10 @@ workspaces:
5. Use commit_memory to save security patterns and concerns
6. Wait for tasks from Dev Lead.
schedules:
- name: Hourly security audit
cron_expr: "1,11,21,31,41,51 * * * *"
- name: Security audit (every 12h)
cron_expr: "7 6,18 * * *"
prompt: |
Recurring hourly security audit. Be thorough on recently changed code.
Recurring security audit. Be thorough and incremental.
1. SETUP:
cd /workspace/repo && git pull 2>/dev/null || true

View File

@ -45,6 +45,107 @@ func TestRateLimit_HeadersPresentOnAllowedRequest(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestRateLimit_XFF_BypassDocumented shows that WITHOUT SetTrustedProxies(nil)
// a spoofed X-Forwarded-For header can rotate an attacker's effective IP and
// bypass per-IP rate limiting (documents the issue #179 vulnerability).
func TestRateLimit_XFF_BypassDocumented(t *testing.T) {
gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
t.Cleanup(cancel)
rl := NewRateLimiter(2, 5*time.Second, ctx)
r := gin.New()
// Intentionally NOT calling r.SetTrustedProxies(nil) — replicates the
// pre-fix behaviour where Gin trusts all proxies by default.
r.Use(rl.Middleware())
r.GET("/x", func(c *gin.Context) { c.String(http.StatusOK, "ok") })
// Exhaust both tokens for the real IP 10.0.0.1.
for i := 0; i < 2; i++ {
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/x", nil)
req.RemoteAddr = "10.0.0.1:1234"
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
r.ServeHTTP(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("setup request %d: want 200, got %d", i+1, w.Code)
}
}
// Third request without XFF must be rate-limited.
{
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/x", nil)
req.RemoteAddr = "10.0.0.1:1234"
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
r.ServeHTTP(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusTooManyRequests {
t.Fatalf("3rd request (no XFF): want 429, got %d", w.Code)
}
}
// With default proxy trust, spoofing X-Forwarded-For rotates the effective
// IP → new bucket → bypass succeeds (returns 200).
{
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/x", nil)
req.RemoteAddr = "10.0.0.1:1234"
req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", "20.0.0.1")
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
r.ServeHTTP(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Skipf("bypass no longer works without trusted-proxy config (Gin version changed?): got %d", w.Code)
}
}
}
// TestRateLimit_XFF_NoBypassWithTrustedProxiesNil is the regression test for
// issue #179: after r.SetTrustedProxies(nil) is added to router.Setup(), a
// spoofed X-Forwarded-For header is ignored and the real RemoteAddr is used,
// so the bypass no longer works.
func TestRateLimit_XFF_NoBypassWithTrustedProxiesNil(t *testing.T) {
gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
t.Cleanup(cancel)
rl := NewRateLimiter(2, 5*time.Second, ctx)
r := gin.New()
// Fix for issue #179 — mirror what router.Setup() now does.
if err := r.SetTrustedProxies(nil); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("SetTrustedProxies: %v", err)
}
r.Use(rl.Middleware())
r.GET("/x", func(c *gin.Context) { c.String(http.StatusOK, "ok") })
// Exhaust both tokens for RemoteAddr 10.0.0.2.
for i := 0; i < 2; i++ {
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/x", nil)
req.RemoteAddr = "10.0.0.2:9999"
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
r.ServeHTTP(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("setup request %d: want 200, got %d", i+1, w.Code)
}
}
// Third plain request must be rate-limited.
{
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/x", nil)
req.RemoteAddr = "10.0.0.2:9999"
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
r.ServeHTTP(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusTooManyRequests {
t.Fatalf("3rd plain request: want 429, got %d", w.Code)
}
}
// Spoofed XFF must NOT rotate the bucket — still 429 because
// SetTrustedProxies(nil) forces c.ClientIP() to return RemoteAddr.
{
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/x", nil)
req.RemoteAddr = "10.0.0.2:9999"
req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", "99.99.99.99")
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
r.ServeHTTP(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusTooManyRequests {
t.Errorf("XFF bypass still works after fix: want 429, got %d — SetTrustedProxies(nil) not effective", w.Code)
}
}
}
// TestRateLimit_RetryAfterOn429 — throttled responses must carry Retry-After
// per RFC 6585, so curl/fetch clients back off the exact required window.
func TestRateLimit_RetryAfterOn429(t *testing.T) {

View File

@ -473,6 +473,89 @@ func TestAdminAuth_InvalidBearer_Returns401(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Issue #170 regression — unauthenticated DELETE /workspaces/:id/secrets/:key
//
// Before this fix, the route was registered as:
// r.DELETE("/workspaces/:id/secrets/:key", sech.Delete)
// on the bare Gin router — no auth at all. Any caller could delete a secret
// AND trigger a forced workspace restart (the handler calls go restartFunc(id)
// on every successful delete). CWE-306.
//
// The fix: move the route inside the wsAuth group so it matches all other
// /workspaces/:id/secrets mutations (POST + PUT are already auth-gated).
// ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// TestWorkspaceAuth_Issue170_SecretDelete_NoBearer_Returns401 is the primary
// regression test: when the workspace has live tokens, a DELETE /secrets/:key
// without a bearer token must be rejected with 401.
func TestWorkspaceAuth_Issue170_SecretDelete_NoBearer_Returns401(t *testing.T) {
mockDB, mock, err := sqlmock.New()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("sqlmock.New: %v", err)
}
defer mockDB.Close()
// HasAnyLiveToken returns 1 — workspace is token-enrolled.
mock.ExpectQuery(hasLiveTokenQuery).
WithArgs("ws-secret-owner").
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"count"}).AddRow(1))
r := gin.New()
// Mirror the fix: DELETE /secrets/:key is inside the wsAuth group.
r.DELETE("/workspaces/:id/secrets/:key",
WorkspaceAuth(mockDB),
func(c *gin.Context) { c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"status": "deleted"}) })
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
// #170 attack: no Authorization header.
req, _ := http.NewRequest(http.MethodDelete,
"/workspaces/ws-secret-owner/secrets/OPENAI_API_KEY", nil)
r.ServeHTTP(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Errorf("#170 secret delete no-bearer: expected 401, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
if err := mock.ExpectationsWereMet(); err != nil {
t.Errorf("unmet sqlmock expectations: %v", err)
}
}
// TestWorkspaceAuth_Issue170_SecretDelete_FailOpen_NoTokens verifies the
// fail-open contract is preserved: a workspace with NO tokens (bootstrap /
// rolling-upgrade path) lets the DELETE through so legacy workspaces aren't
// bricked.
func TestWorkspaceAuth_Issue170_SecretDelete_FailOpen_NoTokens(t *testing.T) {
mockDB, mock, err := sqlmock.New()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("sqlmock.New: %v", err)
}
defer mockDB.Close()
// HasAnyLiveToken returns 0 — no tokens on file (pre-Phase-30 workspace).
mock.ExpectQuery(hasLiveTokenQuery).
WithArgs("ws-legacy").
WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows([]string{"count"}).AddRow(0))
r := gin.New()
r.DELETE("/workspaces/:id/secrets/:key",
WorkspaceAuth(mockDB),
func(c *gin.Context) { c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"status": "deleted"}) })
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
req, _ := http.NewRequest(http.MethodDelete,
"/workspaces/ws-legacy/secrets/SOME_KEY", nil)
r.ServeHTTP(w, req)
// Fail-open: no tokens → must pass through (200).
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("#170 fail-open: expected 200, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
if err := mock.ExpectationsWereMet(); err != nil {
t.Errorf("unmet sqlmock expectations: %v", err)
}
}
// ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Issue #120 regression — unauthenticated PATCH /workspaces/:id
//

View File

@ -25,6 +25,14 @@ import (
func Setup(hub *ws.Hub, broadcaster *events.Broadcaster, prov *provisioner.Provisioner, platformURL, configsDir string, wh *handlers.WorkspaceHandler, channelMgr *channels.Manager) *gin.Engine {
r := gin.Default()
// Issue #179 — trust no reverse-proxy headers. Without this call Gin's
// default is to trust ALL X-Forwarded-For values, which lets any caller
// spoof their IP and bypass per-IP rate limiting. With nil, c.ClientIP()
// always returns the real TCP RemoteAddr.
if err := r.SetTrustedProxies(nil); err != nil {
panic("router: SetTrustedProxies: " + err.Error())
}
// CORS origins — configurable via CORS_ORIGINS env var (comma-separated)
corsOrigins := []string{"http://localhost:3000", "http://localhost:3001"}
if v := os.Getenv("CORS_ORIGINS"); v != "" {