# Known Issues — molecule-sdk-python Issues identified in source but not yet filed as GitHub issues (GH_TOKEN unavailable in automated agent contexts). Each entry has: location, symptom, impact, suggested fix. Format per entry: ``` ## KI-N — Short title **File:** `:` **Status:** TODO comment / identified / partially fixed **Severity:** Critical / High / Medium / Low **Platform phase:** (optional — which Phase 30 sub-phase is affected) ### Symptom ... ### Impact ... ### Suggested fix ... --- ``` --- ## KI-001 — RemoteAgentClient does not implement inbound A2A server **File:** `molecule_agent/client.py`, `molecule_agent/a2a_server.py`, `molecule_agent/inbound.py` **Status:** ✅ Resolved **Severity:** Medium **Platform phase:** Phase 30.8b ### Resolution The SDK now ships two inbound delivery paths: **Push mode (`A2AServer`)** — `molecule_agent.a2a_server.A2AServer` exposes an HTTP server with a `POST /a2a/inbound` endpoint. It runs in a background daemon thread alongside the client's heartbeat loop. Use with `PushDelivery` from `inbound.py`: ```python from molecule_agent import RemoteAgentClient, A2AServer from molecule_agent.inbound import PushDelivery server = A2AServer(agent_id=workspace_id, inbound_url="https://...", message_handler=my_handler) server.start_in_background() client = RemoteAgentClient(workspace_id=workspace_id, platform_url=...) client.reported_url = server.inbound_url # register with this URL client.register() # Pass PushDelivery so run_agent_loop doesn't also poll client.run_agent_loop(handler=my_handler, delivery=PushDelivery(client, server)) ``` **Poll mode (`PollDelivery`)** — for agents behind NAT or without a public endpoint, the SDK's `PollDelivery` polls `GET /workspaces/:id/activity` on a configurable interval (default 5s). Both paths feed the same `MessageHandler` callback. `run_agent_loop` picks `PollDelivery` automatically when no explicit delivery is passed. ### Files added - `molecule_agent/a2a_server.py` — `A2AServer` class; `HTTPServer` + `_A2AHandler` running in a daemon thread; handles `POST /a2a/inbound`, async/sync handlers, graceful stop. - `molecule_agent/inbound.py` — `InboundDelivery` protocol, `PollDelivery`, `PushDelivery` (wraps `A2AServer`), `InboundMessage`, `MessageHandler`. - `RemoteAgentClient.run_agent_loop` updated to accept any `InboundDelivery`. --- ## KI-002 — Delegation has no server-side idempotency key enforcement **File:** `molecule_agent/client.py` (client-side SHA256 key) **Status:** Partially mitigated client-side (SHA256 rounded-to-minute) **Severity:** Medium **Platform phase:** Phase 30.6 ### Symptom The client generates an idempotency key as `SHA256(task + current_minute)`, but the platform's `POST /workspaces/:id/delegate` endpoint does not enforce idempotency server-side. Two identical tasks sent within the same calendar minute produce duplicate processing if the platform accepts both. ### Impact A workspace container restart mid-delegation (e.g. liveness probe restart) that fires the same delegation request twice will result in duplicate side-effects (double commits, double API calls, double messages) if the platform has not yet stored the first delegation's result. ### Suggested fix Platform-side: accept an optional `idempotency_key` field in `POST /workspaces/:id/delegate`, check for existing non-failed delegation with the same `(workspace_id, idempotency_key)`, return HTTP 200 with existing ID instead of creating a new row. Client-side key generation is correct; it is the server that needs to honor it. --- ## KI-003 — `_safe_extract_tar` silently skips all symlinks **File:** `molecule_agent/client.py:_safe_extract_tar` **Status:** ✅ Resolved **Severity:** Low (misleading behavior) ### Resolution `_safe_extract_tar` now emits a `logger.warning` for every skipped symlink: ``` skipping symlink in plugin tarball (not supported for security): -> ``` The file is still skipped (symlinks are a security risk in untrusted tarballs). The warning lets operators audit what was dropped without changing the security posture. Added `test_safe_extract_logs_warning_for_skipped_symlink` in `tests/test_remote_agent.py` asserting the warning is emitted. ### Suggested fix Emit a `logger.warning()` for each skipped symlink so operators can see what was dropped. Alternatively, allow safe relative symlinks (those resolving within the extraction root) while blocking absolute symlinks and `..`-escaping symlinks. Document the behavior in the plugin authoring guide. --- ## KI-004 — Token file races between concurrent instances of RemoteAgentClient **File:** `molecule_agent/client.py` (token caching) **Status:** ✅ Resolved **Severity:** Low ### Resolution Added `fcntl.flock` around token read/write operations in `load_token()` and `save_token()`: - `load_token()` — acquires a shared lock (`LOCK_SH | LOCK_NB`) before reading. Returns `None` immediately if the lock is contended rather than blocking. - `save_token()` — acquires an exclusive lock (`LOCK_EX | LOCK_NB`) before writing. If the lock is held by another writer, logs a warning and skips the write (the in-memory `_token` is still updated so this instance functions correctly). Releases the lock in a `finally` block. Concurrent readers are always safe (shared lock allows multiple simultaneous readers). Concurrent writers are serialised by the exclusive lock; if a writer cannot acquire the lock immediately it gracefully degrades rather than blocking. The platform's one-token-per-workspace invariant is preserved — no stale token overwrites. --- ## KI-005 — `validate_manifest` does not check for secrets in bundle manifests **File:** `molecule_plugin/manifest.py:validate_manifest` **Status:** ✅ Fixed — `_scan_for_secrets()` added; called from `validate_manifest` **Resolved in:** `fix/ki-005-ki-007` branch **Severity:** High ### Symptom `validate_manifest` does not scan the `env:` or `secrets:` fields of a `plugin.yaml` for hardcoded credentials (API keys, passwords, tokens). Plugin authors could accidentally commit secrets into what should be a generic bundle. ### Impact Secrets committed to a plugin manifest are visible in the repo and any tarball published to PyPI or the plugin registry. Per platform constraints (`constraints-and-rules.md`), bundles must never contain secrets. ### Suggested fix Add a `validate_no_secrets()` check in `validate_manifest` that scans all string values in the manifest for patterns matching common secret formats (`sk-`, `ghp_`, ` Bearer `, 32+ char hex strings, etc.). Return a `ValidationError` with level `HIGH` if any are found, even in example or placeholder values. Add a corresponding test with a manifest containing a known secret pattern. --- ## KI-006 — Plugin content integrity not verified client-side (RESOLVED) **File:** `molecule_agent/client.py:verify_plugin_sha256`, `molecule_plugin/manifest.py:validate_manifest` **Status:** ✅ Implemented — see SDK PR on `docs/add-claude-md` branch **Severity:** Medium (mitigated by platform-side pinned-ref enforcement from molecule-core PR #1019) ### Symptom `install_plugin()` downloaded and extracted plugin tarballs with no client-side content verification. A compromised platform registry serving a tampered tarball under a valid pinned-ref would pass `_safe_extract_tar` (no `..` or absolute paths) but could contain a malicious `setup.sh`. ### Resolution Added: - `verify_plugin_sha256(plugin_dir, expected)` — computes a content-addressed manifest hash over sorted `(relative_path, SHA256(content))` pairs; deterministic regardless of extraction order or timestamps. - `install_plugin()` reads `plugin.yaml → sha256` after atomic rename and before `setup.sh`; mismatches raise `ValueError` and delete the plugin directory. - `PLUGIN_YAML_SCHEMA` gains an optional `sha256` field (64-char lowercase hex). - `validate_manifest()` validates `sha256` format when present. Platform-side (molecule-core PR #1019) enforces source integrity (pinned git SHAs or semver tags). SDK-side closes the content-integrity gap. Together they cover both the "which code was fetched" and "did it arrive intact" axes. Authors should add `sha256` to their `plugin.yaml` (generate with `python -m molecule_agent verify-sha256 `) and commit it alongside the plugin content. --- ## KI-007 — `_is_hex` raises `TypeError` on non-string arguments instead of returning `False` **File:** `molecule_agent/client.py:_is_hex` **Status:** ✅ Fixed — isinstance guard added **Resolved in:** `fix/ki-005-ki-007` branch **Severity:** Low ### Symptom `_is_hex` is called inside `verify_plugin_sha256` after a length check. When passed a non-string argument (e.g. `None`, an `int`, a `list`), `int(value, 16)` raises `TypeError: int() can't convert non-string with explicit base` instead of returning `False`. `verify_plugin_sha256` would surface a confusing `TypeError` rather than a descriptive validation error. ### Impact Any bug passing a non-string `expected` to `verify_plugin_sha256` produces a confusing `TypeError` instead of the intended `ValueError`. Low-probability edge case (function is internal), but violates the principle that validator functions should never raise unexpected exceptions. ### Suggested fix Guard at the top of `_is_hex`: ```python def _is_hex(value: str) -> bool: if not isinstance(value, str): return False try: int(value, 16) return True except ValueError: return False ``` --- ## KI-008 — `test_call_peer_errors.py` fails collection due to missing `tests/conftest.py` **File:** `tests/test_call_peer_errors.py` **Status:** ✅ Resolved **Severity:** Low ### Resolution `tests/conftest.py` exists with the `_CaptureHandler` stub definition. `pytest tests/test_call_peer_errors.py` runs all 12 tests cleanly. `pytest tests/` collects all test files with no collection errors. --- ## KI-009 — `run_heartbeat_loop()` does not honour external stop signals **File:** `molecule_agent/client.py` (`RemoteAgentClient.run_heartbeat_loop`) **Status:** Identified **Severity:** Low ### Symptom `run_heartbeat_loop()` runs an unbounded `while True` loop with `sleep(heartbeat_interval)` between iterations. There is no mechanism for an external caller to signal the loop to exit cleanly. If the MCP client that launched the remote agent disconnects (e.g. via SSE stream close), the heartbeat loop continues indefinitely until `max_iterations` is reached or the process is killed externally. ### Impact Orphaned heartbeat processes continue consuming platform API quota after the controlling MCP client has disconnected. Each iteration sends a `POST /registry/heartbeat` and a `GET /workspaces/:id/state` call. Over time this accumulates unnecessary API calls. ### Suggested fix Add a `stop_event` parameter to `run_heartbeat_loop()` — a `threading.Event` or `asyncio.Event` that, when set, causes the loop to exit cleanly with a `stopped` return value: ```python def run_heartbeat_loop( self, max_iterations: int | None = None, task_supplier: "callable | None" = None, stop_event: threading.Event | None = None, ) -> str: i = 0 while True: if stop_event is not None and stop_event.is_set(): return "stopped" if max_iterations is not None and i >= max_iterations: return "max_iterations" # ... rest of loop ``` Callers (MCP client wrappers, shell scripts) can then call `stop_event.set()` on SIGTERM/SIGINT to achieve clean shutdown.