diff --git a/known-issues.md b/known-issues.md
index fb7ca8b..dce21a2 100644
--- a/known-issues.md
+++ b/known-issues.md
@@ -83,19 +83,22 @@ the server that needs to honor it.
 ## KI-003 — `_safe_extract_tar` silently skips all symlinks
 
 **File:** `molecule_agent/client.py:_safe_extract_tar`  
-**Status:** By design (security posture)  
+**Status:** ✅ Resolved  
 **Severity:** Low (misleading behavior)
 
-### Symptom
-When extracting plugin tarballs, `_safe_extract_tar` silently skips any entry
-that is a symlink. This means plugin tarballs that legitimately use symlinks
-for shared assets (e.g., `assets/logo.png -> ../shared/logo.png`) will be
-silently omitted from the extracted plugin directory with no error or warning.
+### Resolution
+`_safe_extract_tar` now emits a `logger.warning` for every skipped symlink:
 
-### Impact
-Some valid plugins may appear to install successfully but be missing files at
-runtime. This can manifest as confusing "file not found" errors that are hard to
-trace to the install step.
+```
+skipping symlink in plugin tarball (not supported for security): <name> -> <target>
+```
+
+The file is still skipped (symlinks are a security risk in untrusted tarballs).
+The warning lets operators audit what was dropped without changing the security
+posture.
+
+Added `test_safe_extract_logs_warning_for_skipped_symlink` in
+`tests/test_remote_agent.py` asserting the warning is emitted.
 
 ### Suggested fix
 Emit a `logger.warning()` for each skipped symlink so operators can see what
diff --git a/molecule_agent/client.py b/molecule_agent/client.py
index 2ae0bc6..8f4263e 100644
--- a/molecule_agent/client.py
+++ b/molecule_agent/client.py
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ _RETRY_JITTER_FRAC = 0.25            # ±25% jitter around base delay
 
 def _safe_extract_tar(tf: tarfile.TarFile, dest: Path) -> None:
     """Extract a tarfile, refusing entries that would escape `dest`
-    and silently skipping symlinks/hardlinks.
+    and logging skipped symlinks/hardlinks.
 
     Tar archives can include ``..`` and absolute paths. Without explicit
     rejection we'd risk the classic "tar slip" CVE — a malicious plugin
@@ -68,12 +68,22 @@ def _safe_extract_tar(tf: tarfile.TarFile, dest: Path) -> None:
     entry's target to an absolute path, verify it lives inside dest, and
     extract one-by-one so the symlink-skip actually takes effect (a bare
     ``extractall`` would still write the symlinks we marked as skipped).
+
+    Symlinks and hardlinks are skipped and a ``logger.warning`` is emitted
+    for each one so operators can audit what was dropped.
     """
     dest_abs = dest.resolve()
     for member in tf.getmembers():
         # Symlinks and hardlinks could point outside the staged tree;
-        # skip them entirely (matches the platform-side tar producer).
+        # skip them entirely (matches the platform-side tar producer) but
+        # warn so the operator knows what was dropped.
         if member.issym() or member.islnk():
+            link_target = member.linkname
+            logger.warning(
+                "skipping symlink in plugin tarball (not supported for security): %s -> %s",
+                member.name,
+                link_target,
+            )
             continue
         target = (dest / member.name).resolve()
         try:
diff --git a/tests/test_remote_agent.py b/tests/test_remote_agent.py
index f54ec81..e33ca1b 100644
--- a/tests/test_remote_agent.py
+++ b/tests/test_remote_agent.py
@@ -755,6 +755,26 @@ def test_safe_extract_skips_symlinks_silently(tmp_path: Path):
     assert not (tmp_path / "link.lnk").exists()
 
 
+def test_safe_extract_logs_warning_for_skipped_symlink(tmp_path: Path, caplog):
+    buf = io.BytesIO()
+    with tarfile.open(fileobj=buf, mode="w") as tf:
+        sym = tarfile.TarInfo(name="link.lnk")
+        sym.type = tarfile.SYMTYPE
+        sym.linkname = "/etc/passwd"
+        tf.addfile(sym)
+        info = tarfile.TarInfo(name="real.md")
+        info.size = 2
+        tf.addfile(info, io.BytesIO(b"ok"))
+    buf.seek(0)
+    with tarfile.open(fileobj=buf, mode="r") as tf:
+        _safe_extract_tar(tf, tmp_path)
+    assert (tmp_path / "real.md").exists()
+    assert not (tmp_path / "link.lnk").exists()
+    # A warning must be emitted so operators know what was dropped.
+    assert any("link.lnk" in r.message and "/etc/passwd" in r.message for r in caplog.records)
+    assert any(r.levelname == "WARNING" for r in caplog.records)
+
+
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # verify_plugin_sha256 + content integrity
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------