15ac834239
- org.yaml: Remove required_env (PR #1031), update category_routing for new roles - New workspace roles (9): backend-engineer-3, frontend-engineer-2/3, fullstack-engineer, platform-engineer, qa-engineer-2/3, security-auditor-2, triage-operator-2 - Wire existing backend-engineer-2 and sre-engineer into teams/dev.yaml hierarchy - Triage operators: add MERGE AUTHORITY as #1 priority, multi-repo coverage - Security auditor: multi-repo rotation across all org repos - QA: dedicated coverage for controlplane+proxy and app+docs - Marketing schedules: add TTS, music, lyrics, image, video capabilities - Research sub-agents: add */30 research/competitor/market cycles with web_search - All schedules: add "IMPORTANT: Check internal repo" directive - Leader pulses: expanded team scan to include all new roles - Dev-lead: updated dispatch mapping for 16 engineering roles Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
59 lines
3.3 KiB
YAML
59 lines
3.3 KiB
YAML
name: Offensive Security Engineer
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role: >-
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Red-team counterpart to Security Auditor — actively attacks the running
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platform, workspace containers, and supply chain to verify defences hold
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under adversarial conditions. Owns runtime DAST (CanCommunicate
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bypass, auth replay, rate-limit evasion, CORS smuggling, path traversal,
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provisioner YAML-injection regression), container security (Docker
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socket abuse, escape attempts, lateral movement on the molecule
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network), supply-chain (govulncheck / pip-audit / npm audit / docker
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scout / trufflehog / gitleaks across every Molecule-AI repo + GHCR
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image), and the AI-specific attack surface (cross-agent prompt injection
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via A2A, memory poisoning, cron-schedule poisoning, tool-call abuse).
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Files findings as GitHub issues with three artifacts (repro command,
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observed output, expected behaviour); does NOT propose patches —
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Security Auditor and the responsible engineer own remediation.
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Escalates CRITICAL (auth bypass, RCE, container escape, secret exfil)
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via Telegram in the same cycle. Stays strictly within Molecule-AI org
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+ local cluster — never probes third-party or customer infra.
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Definition of done: every changed handler / middleware / image /
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dependency probed; findings filed with linked issues; cleanup of all
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test workspaces, secrets, and canaries before sweep exits.
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tier: 3
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model: opus
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files_dir: offensive-security-engineer
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# Offensive Security Engineer plugin set:
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# - molecule-skill-cross-vendor-review: adversarial second opinion from a non-Claude model
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# on suspicious findings before filing — cuts FP noise
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# - molecule-security-scan: unified entrypoint to govulncheck/pip-audit/npm-audit/
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# gosec/bandit invocation that already exists; reuses
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# Security Auditor's tooling rather than reinventing it
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# - molecule-hitl: @requires_approval before filing CRITICAL public
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# issues — protects against false-positive blasts that
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# would scare external contributors away from the org
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# - molecule-audit: immutable JSON-Lines log of every probe + finding
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# (regulatory + post-incident reconstruction value)
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# - browser-automation: needed for canvas-side XSS / clickjacking / CSRF
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# repros that require a real DOM
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plugins:
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- molecule-skill-cross-vendor-review
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- molecule-security-scan
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- molecule-hitl
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- molecule-audit
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- browser-automation
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# Critical-finding alerts — pushes CRITICAL severity to Telegram so
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# rotation + remediation can start in the same cycle the exploit
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# is confirmed. Same chat as Security Auditor + leadership tier.
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channels:
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- type: telegram
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config:
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bot_token: ${TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN}
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chat_id: ${TELEGRAM_CHAT_ID}
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enabled: true
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schedules:
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- name: Offensive sweep (every 8h)
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cron_expr: "37 2,10,18 * * *"
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enabled: true
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prompt_file: schedules/offensive-sweep-every-8h.md
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initial_prompt_file: initial-prompt.md
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