CWE-22 path traversal in restartTemplateInput Tier 4: dbRuntime was joined directly into the template path without sanitisation. runtimeTemplate := filepath.Join(configsDir, dbRuntime+"-default") An attacker holding a workspace token could set runtime to a path-traversal string (e.g. "../../../etc") via the PATCH /workspaces/:id Update handler, which only validates length and newlines. If a matching directory existed on the host (e.g. /configs/../../../etc-default), the restart would load files from an arbitrary host path into the workspace container. Fix: call sanitizeRuntime(dbRuntime) — the existing allowlist in workspace_provision.go — before filepath.Join. Unknown values are remapped to "langgraph", so the attacker cannot choose an arbitrary host path. Defense-in-depth: the path is still inside configsDir after sanitisation. Regression tests added: - CWE-22 traversal strings fall through to existing-volume - langgraph-default is used when traversal string is sanitised to langgraph Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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