b2f8997afe
Workspace agents could previously call PATCH /workspaces/:id/budget with their own bearer token and set budget_limit=null, defeating the entire spend enforcement feature. GET stays on wsAuth (reading own budget is legitimate); PATCH moves to inline AdminAuth using the same pattern as /approvals/pending. No existing tests needed updating — all budget PATCH tests call the handler directly and are unaffected by router-level middleware changes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
509 lines
21 KiB
Go
509 lines
21 KiB
Go
package router
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import (
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"context"
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"os"
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"path/filepath"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"github.com/Molecule-AI/molecule-monorepo/platform/internal/channels"
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"github.com/Molecule-AI/molecule-monorepo/platform/internal/db"
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"github.com/Molecule-AI/molecule-monorepo/platform/internal/events"
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"github.com/Molecule-AI/molecule-monorepo/platform/internal/handlers"
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"github.com/Molecule-AI/molecule-monorepo/platform/internal/metrics"
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"github.com/Molecule-AI/molecule-monorepo/platform/internal/middleware"
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"github.com/Molecule-AI/molecule-monorepo/platform/internal/provisioner"
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"github.com/Molecule-AI/molecule-monorepo/platform/internal/supervised"
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"github.com/Molecule-AI/molecule-monorepo/platform/internal/ws"
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"github.com/docker/docker/client"
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"github.com/gin-contrib/cors"
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"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
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)
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func Setup(hub *ws.Hub, broadcaster *events.Broadcaster, prov *provisioner.Provisioner, platformURL, configsDir string, wh *handlers.WorkspaceHandler, channelMgr *channels.Manager) *gin.Engine {
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r := gin.Default()
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// Issue #179 — trust no reverse-proxy headers. Without this call Gin's
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// default is to trust ALL X-Forwarded-For values, which lets any caller
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// spoof their IP and bypass per-IP rate limiting. With nil, c.ClientIP()
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// always returns the real TCP RemoteAddr.
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if err := r.SetTrustedProxies(nil); err != nil {
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panic("router: SetTrustedProxies: " + err.Error())
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}
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// CORS origins — configurable via CORS_ORIGINS env var (comma-separated)
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corsOrigins := []string{"http://localhost:3000", "http://localhost:3001"}
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if v := os.Getenv("CORS_ORIGINS"); v != "" {
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corsOrigins = strings.Split(v, ",")
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}
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r.Use(cors.New(cors.Config{
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AllowOrigins: corsOrigins,
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AllowMethods: []string{"GET", "POST", "PUT", "PATCH", "DELETE", "OPTIONS"},
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AllowHeaders: []string{"Origin", "Content-Type", "X-Workspace-ID", "Authorization"},
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AllowCredentials: true,
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}))
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// Rate limiting — configurable via RATE_LIMIT env var (default 600 req/min)
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// 15 workspaces × 2 heartbeats/min + canvas polling + user actions needs headroom
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rateLimit := 600
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if v := os.Getenv("RATE_LIMIT"); v != "" {
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if n, err := strconv.Atoi(v); err == nil && n > 0 {
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rateLimit = n
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}
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}
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limiter := middleware.NewRateLimiter(rateLimit, time.Minute, context.Background())
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r.Use(limiter.Middleware())
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// Prometheus metrics middleware — records every request's method/path/status/latency.
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// Must be registered after rate limiter so aborted requests are also counted.
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r.Use(metrics.Middleware())
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// Tenant guard — the public repo's only SaaS hook. When MOLECULE_ORG_ID is
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// set (only by the private molecule-controlplane provisioner on tenant Fly
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// Machines), rejects requests whose X-Molecule-Org-Id header doesn't match.
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// Unset (self-hosted / dev / CI) → no-op. Registered after metrics so
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// rejected requests still land on the 4xx counter.
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r.Use(middleware.TenantGuard())
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// Security headers (#151) — sets X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options,
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// Referrer-Policy, Content-Security-Policy, Permissions-Policy, HSTS on
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// every response. Tests in securityheaders_test.go assert each header is
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// present and that handler-set headers are not overridden. Registered
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// last so a handler can still opt out by setting its own header before
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// c.Next() returns.
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r.Use(middleware.SecurityHeaders())
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// Health
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r.GET("/health", func(c *gin.Context) {
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c.JSON(200, gin.H{"status": "ok"})
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})
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// /admin/liveness — per-subsystem last-tick timestamps. Operators read this
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// to catch stuck-but-not-crashed goroutines (the failure mode that caused
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// the 12h scheduler outage of 2026-04-14, issue #85). Any subsystem whose
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// last tick is older than 2× its expected interval is stale.
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//
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// #166: gated behind AdminAuth. Internal health state is an ops-intel leak
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// in production (scheduler tick cadence reveals fleet size + work pattern).
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r.GET("/admin/liveness", middleware.AdminAuth(db.DB), func(c *gin.Context) {
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snap := supervised.Snapshot()
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out := make(map[string]interface{}, len(snap))
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now := time.Now()
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for name, last := range snap {
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out[name] = gin.H{
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"last_tick_at": last,
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"seconds_ago": int(now.Sub(last).Seconds()),
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}
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}
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c.JSON(200, gin.H{"subsystems": out})
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})
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// Prometheus metrics — exempt from rate limiter via separate registration
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// (registered before Use(limiter) takes effect on this specific route — the
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// middleware.Middleware() still records it for observability).
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// Scrape with: curl http://localhost:8080/metrics
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r.GET("/metrics", metrics.Handler())
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// Single-workspace read — open so canvas nodes can fetch their own state
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// without a token (used by WorkspaceNode polling and health checks).
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r.GET("/workspaces/:id", wh.Get)
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// PATCH /workspaces/:id — back on the open router per #138. Canvas
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// drag-reposition uses session cookies not bearer tokens; gating the
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// whole route behind AdminAuth broke drag-to-reposition and inline
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// rename. Field-level authz lives inside WorkspaceHandler.Update:
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// - {x, y, canvas} only → passthrough (canvas position persist)
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// - name / role → passthrough (inline rename)
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// - tier / parent_id / runtime / workspace_dir → require bearer token
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// The #120 escalation vectors stay locked; only cosmetic fields are open.
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r.PATCH("/workspaces/:id", wh.Update)
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// C1 + C20: workspace list and life-cycle mutations gated behind AdminAuth.
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// Fail-open when no tokens exist anywhere (fresh install / pre-Phase-30).
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// Blocks:
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// C1 — unauthenticated GET /workspaces (workspace topology exposure)
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// C20 — unauthenticated DELETE /workspaces/:id (mass-deletion attack)
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// unauthenticated POST /workspaces (workspace creation)
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{
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wsAdmin := r.Group("", middleware.AdminAuth(db.DB))
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wsAdmin.GET("/workspaces", wh.List)
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wsAdmin.POST("/workspaces", wh.Create)
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wsAdmin.DELETE("/workspaces/:id", wh.Delete)
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}
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// A2A proxy — registered outside the auth group; already enforces CanCommunicate access control.
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r.POST("/workspaces/:id/a2a", wh.ProxyA2A)
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// Auth-gated workspace sub-routes — ALL /workspaces/:id/* paths except /a2a.
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// Fix A (Cycle 5): single WorkspaceAuth middleware blocks C2-C5, C7-C9, C12, C13
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// by requiring a valid bearer token for any workspace that has one on file.
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// Legacy workspaces (no token) are grandfathered to allow rolling upgrades.
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wsAuth := r.Group("/workspaces/:id", middleware.WorkspaceAuth(db.DB))
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{
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// Lifecycle
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wsAuth.GET("/state", wh.State)
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wsAuth.POST("/restart", wh.Restart)
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wsAuth.POST("/pause", wh.Pause)
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wsAuth.POST("/resume", wh.Resume)
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// Async Delegation
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delh := handlers.NewDelegationHandler(wh, broadcaster)
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wsAuth.POST("/delegate", delh.Delegate)
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wsAuth.GET("/delegations", delh.ListDelegations)
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// Record-only endpoint for agent-initiated delegations (#64). Agent-side
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// delegate_to_workspace fires A2A directly for speed + OTEL propagation;
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// this endpoint just adds an activity_logs row so GET /delegations returns
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// the same set the agent's local `check_delegation_status` sees.
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wsAuth.POST("/delegations/record", delh.Record)
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wsAuth.POST("/delegations/:delegation_id/update", delh.UpdateStatus)
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// Traces (Langfuse proxy)
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trh := handlers.NewTracesHandler()
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wsAuth.GET("/traces", trh.List)
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// Live agent transcript proxy — surfaces the runtime-specific session
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// log (claude-code reads ~/.claude/projects/<cwd>/<session>.jsonl).
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// Lets canvas / operators see live tool calls + AI thinking instead
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// of waiting for the high-level activity log to flush.
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trsh := handlers.NewTranscriptHandler()
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wsAuth.GET("/transcript", trsh.Get)
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// Agent Memories (HMA)
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memsh := handlers.NewMemoriesHandler()
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wsAuth.POST("/memories", memsh.Commit)
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wsAuth.GET("/memories", memsh.Search)
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wsAuth.DELETE("/memories/:memoryId", memsh.Delete)
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// Approvals
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apph := handlers.NewApprovalsHandler(broadcaster)
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wsAuth.POST("/approvals", apph.Create)
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wsAuth.GET("/approvals", apph.List)
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wsAuth.POST("/approvals/:approvalId/decide", apph.Decide)
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// /approvals/pending is a cross-workspace admin path; WorkspaceAuth cannot
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// be used here (no workspace scope), but it still needs auth so an
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// unauthenticated caller cannot enumerate all pending approvals across the
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// entire platform. Gated behind AdminAuth (issue #180).
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r.GET("/approvals/pending", middleware.AdminAuth(db.DB), apph.ListAll)
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// Team Expansion
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teamh := handlers.NewTeamHandler(broadcaster, prov, platformURL, configsDir)
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wsAuth.POST("/expand", teamh.Expand)
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wsAuth.POST("/collapse", teamh.Collapse)
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// Agents
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ah := handlers.NewAgentHandler(broadcaster)
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wsAuth.POST("/agent", ah.Assign)
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wsAuth.PATCH("/agent", ah.Replace)
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wsAuth.DELETE("/agent", ah.Remove)
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wsAuth.POST("/agent/move", ah.Move)
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}
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// Registry
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rh := handlers.NewRegistryHandler(broadcaster)
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r.POST("/registry/register", rh.Register)
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r.POST("/registry/heartbeat", rh.Heartbeat)
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r.POST("/registry/update-card", rh.UpdateCard)
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// Webhooks
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whh := handlers.NewWebhookHandlerWithWorkspace(wh)
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r.POST("/webhooks/github", whh.GitHub)
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r.POST("/webhooks/github/:id", whh.GitHub)
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// Discovery
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dh := handlers.NewDiscoveryHandler()
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r.GET("/registry/discover/:id", dh.Discover)
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r.GET("/registry/:id/peers", dh.Peers)
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r.POST("/registry/check-access", dh.CheckAccess)
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// Events — #165: gated behind AdminAuth. The raw event log contains org
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// topology, workspace names, and agent-card fragments; an unauth read
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// leaks the entire fleet structure. GET /events/:workspaceId is still
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// a cross-workspace read so it uses AdminAuth, not WorkspaceAuth.
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eh := handlers.NewEventsHandler()
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{
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eventsAdmin := r.Group("", middleware.AdminAuth(db.DB))
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eventsAdmin.GET("/events", eh.List)
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eventsAdmin.GET("/events/:workspaceId", eh.ListByWorkspace)
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}
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// Remaining auth-gated workspace sub-routes — appended to wsAuth group declared above.
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{
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// Activity Logs
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acth := handlers.NewActivityHandler(broadcaster)
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wsAuth.GET("/activity", acth.List)
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wsAuth.GET("/session-search", acth.SessionSearch)
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wsAuth.POST("/activity", acth.Report)
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wsAuth.POST("/notify", acth.Notify)
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// Config
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cfgh := handlers.NewConfigHandler()
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wsAuth.GET("/config", cfgh.Get)
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wsAuth.PATCH("/config", cfgh.Patch)
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// Schedules (cron tasks)
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schedh := handlers.NewScheduleHandler()
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wsAuth.GET("/schedules", schedh.List)
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wsAuth.POST("/schedules", schedh.Create)
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wsAuth.PATCH("/schedules/:scheduleId", schedh.Update)
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wsAuth.DELETE("/schedules/:scheduleId", schedh.Delete)
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wsAuth.POST("/schedules/:scheduleId/run", schedh.RunNow)
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wsAuth.GET("/schedules/:scheduleId/history", schedh.History)
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// Schedule health — open to CanCommunicate peers (no workspace bearer token
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// required) so peer agents can detect silent cron failures without admin auth.
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// Auth is enforced inside the handler via X-Workspace-ID + CanCommunicate
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// (mirrors the /workspaces/:id/a2a pattern). Issue #249.
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r.GET("/workspaces/:id/schedules/health", schedh.Health)
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// Budget — per-workspace spend ceiling and current usage (#541).
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// GET stays on wsAuth — a workspace agent reading its own budget is legitimate.
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// PATCH is admin-only — workspace agents must not be able to self-clear their
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// spending ceiling (that would defeat the entire budget enforcement feature).
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budgeth := handlers.NewBudgetHandler()
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wsAuth.GET("/budget", budgeth.GetBudget)
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r.PATCH("/workspaces/:id/budget", middleware.AdminAuth(db.DB), budgeth.PatchBudget)
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// Token management (user-facing create/list/revoke)
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tokh := handlers.NewTokenHandler()
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wsAuth.GET("/tokens", tokh.List)
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wsAuth.POST("/tokens", tokh.Create)
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wsAuth.DELETE("/tokens/:tokenId", tokh.Revoke)
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// Memory
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memh := handlers.NewMemoryHandler()
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wsAuth.GET("/memory", memh.List)
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wsAuth.GET("/memory/:key", memh.Get)
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wsAuth.POST("/memory", memh.Set)
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wsAuth.DELETE("/memory/:key", memh.Delete)
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// Secrets (auto-restart workspace after secret change)
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sech := handlers.NewSecretsHandler(wh.RestartByID)
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wsAuth.GET("/secrets", sech.List)
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// Phase 30.2 — decrypted values pull, token-gated. Canvas uses List
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// (keys + metadata only); remote agents use Values to bootstrap env.
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wsAuth.GET("/secrets/values", sech.Values)
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wsAuth.POST("/secrets", sech.Set)
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wsAuth.PUT("/secrets", sech.Set)
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wsAuth.DELETE("/secrets/:key", sech.Delete)
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wsAuth.GET("/model", sech.GetModel)
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// Token usage metrics — cost transparency (#593).
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// WorkspaceAuth middleware (on wsAuth) binds the bearer to :id.
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mtrh := handlers.NewMetricsHandler()
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wsAuth.GET("/metrics", mtrh.GetMetrics)
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}
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// Global secrets — /settings/secrets is the canonical path; /admin/secrets kept for backward compat.
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// Fix (Cycle 7): protected by AdminAuth — any valid workspace bearer token grants access.
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// Fail-open when no tokens exist (fresh install / pre-Phase-30 upgrade).
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{
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adminAuth := r.Group("", middleware.AdminAuth(db.DB))
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sechGlobal := handlers.NewSecretsHandler(wh.RestartByID)
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adminAuth.GET("/settings/secrets", sechGlobal.ListGlobal)
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adminAuth.PUT("/settings/secrets", sechGlobal.SetGlobal)
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adminAuth.POST("/settings/secrets", sechGlobal.SetGlobal)
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adminAuth.DELETE("/settings/secrets/:key", sechGlobal.DeleteGlobal)
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adminAuth.GET("/admin/secrets", sechGlobal.ListGlobal)
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adminAuth.POST("/admin/secrets", sechGlobal.SetGlobal)
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adminAuth.DELETE("/admin/secrets/:key", sechGlobal.DeleteGlobal)
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}
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// Admin — test token minting (issue #6). Hidden in production via TestTokensEnabled().
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// AdminAuth is a second defence-in-depth layer: on a fresh install with no tokens yet,
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// AdminAuth is fail-open (HasAnyLiveTokenGlobal == 0), so the bootstrap still works.
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// Once any token exists, callers must present a valid bearer — unauthenticated workspace-
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// UUID enumeration is blocked even on non-production instances.
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{
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tokh := handlers.NewAdminTestTokenHandler()
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r.GET("/admin/workspaces/:id/test-token", middleware.AdminAuth(db.DB), tokh.GetTestToken)
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}
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// Admin — GitHub App installation token refresh (issue #547).
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// Long-running workspaces (>60 min) use this endpoint to refresh
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// GH_TOKEN without restarting. Returns the current installation token
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// from the github-app-auth plugin's in-process cache (which proactively
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// refreshes 5 min before expiry). 404 when no GitHub App is configured
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// (dev / self-hosted without GITHUB_APP_ID).
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{
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ghTokH := handlers.NewGitHubTokenHandler(wh.TokenRegistry())
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r.GET("/admin/github-installation-token", middleware.AdminAuth(db.DB), ghTokH.GetInstallationToken)
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}
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// Terminal — shares Docker client with provisioner
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var dockerCli *client.Client
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if prov != nil {
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dockerCli = prov.DockerClient()
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}
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th := handlers.NewTerminalHandler(dockerCli)
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wsAuth.GET("/terminal", th.HandleConnect)
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// Canvas Viewport — #166 + #168: GET stays fully open for bootstrap.
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// PUT uses CanvasOrBearer (accepts Origin-match OR bearer token) so the
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// browser canvas can persist drag/zoom state without a bearer, while
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// bearer-carrying clients (molecli, integration tests) still work.
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// Viewport corruption is cosmetic-only — worst case a user refreshes
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// the page — so the softer check is acceptable here. This middleware
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// MUST NOT be used on routes that leak prompts, create workspaces,
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// or write files (#164/#165/#190 class).
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vh := handlers.NewViewportHandler()
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r.GET("/canvas/viewport", vh.Get)
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r.PUT("/canvas/viewport", middleware.CanvasOrBearer(db.DB), vh.Save)
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// Templates
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tmplh := handlers.NewTemplatesHandler(configsDir, dockerCli)
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r.GET("/templates", tmplh.List)
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// #190: POST /templates/import writes arbitrary files into configsDir.
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// Must be admin-gated — same class as /bundles/import (#164) and /org/import.
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{
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tmplAdmin := r.Group("", middleware.AdminAuth(db.DB))
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tmplAdmin.POST("/templates/import", tmplh.Import)
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}
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wsAuth.GET("/shared-context", tmplh.SharedContext)
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wsAuth.PUT("/files", tmplh.ReplaceFiles)
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wsAuth.GET("/files", tmplh.ListFiles)
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wsAuth.GET("/files/*path", tmplh.ReadFile)
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wsAuth.PUT("/files/*path", tmplh.WriteFile)
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wsAuth.DELETE("/files/*path", tmplh.DeleteFile)
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// Plugins
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pluginsDir := findPluginsDir(configsDir)
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// Runtime lookup lets the plugins handler filter the registry to plugins
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// that declare support for the workspace's runtime, without taking a
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// direct DB dependency in the handler package.
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runtimeLookup := func(workspaceID string) (string, error) {
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var runtime string
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err := db.DB.QueryRowContext(
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context.Background(),
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`SELECT COALESCE(runtime, 'langgraph') FROM workspaces WHERE id = $1`,
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workspaceID,
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).Scan(&runtime)
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return runtime, err
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}
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plgh := handlers.NewPluginsHandler(pluginsDir, dockerCli, wh.RestartByID).
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WithRuntimeLookup(runtimeLookup)
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r.GET("/plugins", plgh.ListRegistry)
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r.GET("/plugins/sources", plgh.ListSources)
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wsAuth.GET("/plugins", plgh.ListInstalled)
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wsAuth.GET("/plugins/available", plgh.ListAvailableForWorkspace)
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wsAuth.GET("/plugins/compatibility", plgh.CheckRuntimeCompatibility)
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wsAuth.POST("/plugins", plgh.Install)
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wsAuth.DELETE("/plugins/:name", plgh.Uninstall)
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// Phase 30.3 — stream plugin as tar.gz so remote agents can pull +
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// unpack locally instead of going through Docker exec.
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wsAuth.GET("/plugins/:name/download", plgh.Download)
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// Bundles — #164 + #165: both gated behind AdminAuth.
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// POST /bundles/import — CRITICAL: anon creation of arbitrary workspaces
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// with user-supplied config (system prompts,
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// plugins, secrets envelope). #164.
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// GET /bundles/export/:id — HIGH: full system prompts + memory for any
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// workspace by UUID probe. #165.
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||
bh := handlers.NewBundleHandler(broadcaster, prov, platformURL, configsDir, dockerCli)
|
||
{
|
||
bundleAdmin := r.Group("", middleware.AdminAuth(db.DB))
|
||
bundleAdmin.GET("/bundles/export/:id", bh.Export)
|
||
bundleAdmin.POST("/bundles/import", bh.Import)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Org Templates
|
||
orgDir := findOrgDir(configsDir)
|
||
orgh := handlers.NewOrgHandler(wh, broadcaster, prov, channelMgr, configsDir, orgDir)
|
||
r.GET("/org/templates", orgh.ListTemplates)
|
||
// /org/import can create arbitrary workspaces from an uploaded YAML — it
|
||
// must be an admin-gated route. The handler also path-sanitizes
|
||
// `dir`/`template`/`files_dir` via resolveInsideRoot, but defence-in-
|
||
// depth keeps the route behind AdminAuth regardless.
|
||
r.POST("/org/import", middleware.AdminAuth(db.DB), orgh.Import)
|
||
|
||
// Org plugin allowlist — tool governance (#591).
|
||
// Both endpoints are admin-gated: reading the allowlist reveals approved
|
||
// tooling policy; writing it enforces org-level install governance.
|
||
{
|
||
allowlistAdmin := r.Group("", middleware.AdminAuth(db.DB))
|
||
aplh := handlers.NewOrgPluginAllowlistHandler()
|
||
allowlistAdmin.GET("/orgs/:id/plugins/allowlist", aplh.GetAllowlist)
|
||
allowlistAdmin.PUT("/orgs/:id/plugins/allowlist", aplh.PutAllowlist)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Channels (social integrations — Telegram, Slack, Discord, etc.)
|
||
chh := handlers.NewChannelHandler(channelMgr)
|
||
r.GET("/channels/adapters", chh.ListAdapters)
|
||
wsAuth.GET("/channels", chh.List)
|
||
wsAuth.POST("/channels", chh.Create)
|
||
wsAuth.PATCH("/channels/:channelId", chh.Update)
|
||
wsAuth.DELETE("/channels/:channelId", chh.Delete)
|
||
wsAuth.POST("/channels/:channelId/send", chh.Send)
|
||
wsAuth.POST("/channels/:channelId/test", chh.Test)
|
||
// #250: /channels/discover is an admin-setup helper (takes a bot
|
||
// token, asks the vendor "what chats is this token a member of?").
|
||
// Leaving it unauthenticated turned it into a bot-token oracle plus
|
||
// a drive-by deleteWebhook side effect against any valid token an
|
||
// attacker could probe. AdminAuth matches the intent — it's a
|
||
// platform-operator helper, not a per-workspace route.
|
||
r.POST("/channels/discover", middleware.AdminAuth(db.DB), chh.Discover)
|
||
r.POST("/webhooks/:type", chh.Webhook)
|
||
|
||
// SSE — AG-UI compatible event stream per workspace (#590).
|
||
// WorkspaceAuth middleware (on wsAuth) binds the bearer token to :id.
|
||
sseh := handlers.NewSSEHandler(broadcaster)
|
||
wsAuth.GET("/events/stream", sseh.StreamEvents)
|
||
|
||
// WebSocket
|
||
sh := handlers.NewSocketHandler(hub)
|
||
r.GET("/ws", sh.HandleConnect)
|
||
|
||
// Canvas reverse proxy — when running as a combined tenant image
|
||
// (Dockerfile.tenant), the Next.js canvas server runs on :3000 inside
|
||
// the same container. Any route not matched by the API handlers above
|
||
// gets proxied to the canvas so the browser only ever talks to :8080.
|
||
//
|
||
// When CANVAS_PROXY_URL is empty (self-hosted / local dev), this is a
|
||
// no-op and Gin returns its default 404. The canvas dev server runs
|
||
// separately on :3000 in that setup.
|
||
if canvasURL := os.Getenv("CANVAS_PROXY_URL"); canvasURL != "" {
|
||
canvasProxy := newCanvasProxy(canvasURL)
|
||
r.NoRoute(canvasProxy)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return r
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func findPluginsDir(configsDir string) string {
|
||
// configsDir-relative is most reliable; plugins live at repo-root plugins/
|
||
candidates := []string{
|
||
filepath.Join(configsDir, "..", "plugins"),
|
||
"../plugins",
|
||
"plugins",
|
||
}
|
||
for _, c := range candidates {
|
||
if info, err := os.Stat(c); err == nil && info.IsDir() {
|
||
// Must have at least one plugin subfolder to be valid
|
||
entries, _ := os.ReadDir(c)
|
||
for _, e := range entries {
|
||
if e.IsDir() {
|
||
abs, _ := filepath.Abs(c)
|
||
return abs
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
abs, _ := filepath.Abs(filepath.Join(configsDir, "..", "plugins"))
|
||
return abs
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func findOrgDir(configsDir string) string {
|
||
candidates := []string{
|
||
"org-templates",
|
||
"../org-templates",
|
||
filepath.Join(configsDir, "..", "org-templates"),
|
||
}
|
||
for _, c := range candidates {
|
||
if info, err := os.Stat(c); err == nil && info.IsDir() {
|
||
abs, _ := filepath.Abs(c)
|
||
return abs
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
return "org-templates"
|
||
}
|