Molecule AI Core-DevOps
4474ddc189
Issue #212: POST /workspaces with runtime=external and a URL wrote the URL directly to the DB without validateAgentURL checking (the same check that registry.go:324 applies to the heartbeat path). An attacker with AdminAuth could register a workspace URL at a cloud metadata endpoint (169.254.169.254) and exfiltrate IAM credentials when the platform fires pre-restart drain signals. Changes: - workspace.go: add validateAgentURL(payload.URL) guard before the UPDATE at line 386. 400 on unsafe URL, no DB write occurs. - workspace_test.go: add 3 regression tests: - TestWorkspaceCreate_ExternalURL_SSRFSafe: safe public URL → 201 - TestWorkspaceCreate_ExternalURL_SSRFMetadataBlocked: 169.254.169.254 → 400 - TestWorkspaceCreate_ExternalURL_SSRFLoopbackBlocked: 127.0.0.1 → 400 Both unsafe tests assert zero DB calls (the handler rejects before any transaction). Ref: issue #212. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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| pkg/provisionhook | ||
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| .ci-force | ||
| .gitignore | ||
| .golangci.yaml | ||
| Dockerfile | ||
| Dockerfile.dev | ||
| Dockerfile.tenant | ||
| entrypoint-tenant.sh | ||
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