bea0e96a86
Fix A — platform/internal/middleware/wsauth_middleware.go (NEW):
WorkspaceAuth() gin middleware enforces per-workspace bearer-token auth on
ALL /workspaces/:id/* sub-routes. Same lazy-bootstrap contract as
secrets.Values: workspaces with no live token are grandfathered through.
Blocks C2, C3, C4, C5, C7, C8, C9, C12, C13 simultaneously.
Fix A — platform/internal/router/router.go:
Reorganised route registration: bare CRUD (/workspaces, /workspaces/:id)
and /a2a remain on root router; all other /workspaces/:id/* sub-routes
moved into wsAuth = r.Group("/workspaces/:id", middleware.WorkspaceAuth(db.DB)).
CORS AllowHeaders updated to include Authorization so browser/agent callers
can send the bearer token cross-origin.
Fix B — workspace-template/heartbeat.py:
_check_delegations(): validate source_id == self.workspace_id before
accepting a delegation result. Attacker-crafted records with a foreign
source_id are silently skipped with a WARNING log (injection attempt).
trigger_msg no longer embeds raw response_preview text; references
delegation_id + status only — removes the prompt-injection vector.
Fix C — workspace-template/skill_loader/loader.py:
load_skill_tools(): before exec_module(), verify script is within
scripts_dir (path traversal guard) and temporarily scrub sensitive env
vars (CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN, ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, OPENAI_API_KEY,
WORKSPACE_AUTH_TOKEN, GITHUB_TOKEN, GH_TOKEN) from os.environ; restore
in finally block. Defence-in-depth even if /plugins auth gate is bypassed.
Fix D — platform/internal/handlers/socket.go:
HandleConnect(): agent connections (X-Workspace-ID present) validated via
wsauth.HasAnyLiveToken + wsauth.ValidateToken before WebSocket upgrade.
Canvas clients (no X-Workspace-ID) remain unauthenticated.
Fix D — workspace-template/events.py:
PlatformEventSubscriber._connect(): include platform_auth bearer token in
WebSocket upgrade headers alongside X-Workspace-ID.
Fix E — workspace-template/executor_helpers.py:
recall_memories() and commit_memory() now pass platform_auth bearer token
in Authorization header so WorkspaceAuth middleware allows access.
Fix F — workspace-template/a2a_client.py:
send_a2a_message(): timeout=None → httpx.Timeout(connect=30, read=300,
write=30, pool=30). Resolves H2 flagged across 5 consecutive audits.
Tests: 149/149 Python tests pass (test_heartbeat + test_events updated to
assert new source_id validation behaviour and allow Authorization header).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
97 lines
2.8 KiB
Go
97 lines
2.8 KiB
Go
package handlers
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import (
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"log"
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"net/http"
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"os"
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"strings"
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"github.com/Molecule-AI/molecule-monorepo/platform/internal/db"
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"github.com/Molecule-AI/molecule-monorepo/platform/internal/metrics"
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"github.com/Molecule-AI/molecule-monorepo/platform/internal/ws"
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"github.com/Molecule-AI/molecule-monorepo/platform/internal/wsauth"
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"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
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"github.com/gorilla/websocket"
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)
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var upgrader = websocket.Upgrader{
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CheckOrigin: func(r *http.Request) bool {
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// In production, validate against CORS_ORIGINS. In dev, allow all.
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origins := os.Getenv("CORS_ORIGINS")
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if origins == "" {
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return true // dev mode — no restriction
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}
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origin := r.Header.Get("Origin")
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for _, allowed := range strings.Split(origins, ",") {
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if strings.EqualFold(strings.TrimSpace(allowed), origin) {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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},
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}
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type SocketHandler struct {
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hub *ws.Hub
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}
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func NewSocketHandler(hub *ws.Hub) *SocketHandler {
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return &SocketHandler{hub: hub}
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}
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// HandleConnect handles WebSocket upgrade at GET /ws.
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// Canvas clients connect without X-Workspace-ID — they receive all events.
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// Workspace agents send X-Workspace-ID — events are filtered by CanCommunicate.
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//
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// Fix D (Cycle 5): agent connections (X-Workspace-ID present) are now validated
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// via bearer token before the WebSocket upgrade. Canvas clients (no X-Workspace-ID)
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// remain unauthenticated. Pre-token workspaces are grandfathered through.
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func (h *SocketHandler) HandleConnect(c *gin.Context) {
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workspaceID := c.GetHeader("X-Workspace-ID")
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// Authenticate workspace agents (not canvas browser clients).
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if workspaceID != "" {
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ctx := c.Request.Context()
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hasLive, err := wsauth.HasAnyLiveToken(ctx, db.DB, workspaceID)
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if err != nil {
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log.Printf("wsauth: WebSocket HasAnyLiveToken(%s) failed: %v", workspaceID, err)
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c.AbortWithStatusJSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": "auth check failed"})
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return
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}
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if hasLive {
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tok := wsauth.BearerTokenFromHeader(c.GetHeader("Authorization"))
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if tok == "" {
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c.AbortWithStatusJSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{"error": "missing workspace auth token"})
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return
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}
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if err := wsauth.ValidateToken(ctx, db.DB, workspaceID, tok); err != nil {
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c.AbortWithStatusJSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{"error": "invalid workspace auth token"})
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return
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}
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}
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}
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conn, err := upgrader.Upgrade(c.Writer, c.Request, nil)
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if err != nil {
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log.Printf("WebSocket upgrade error: %v", err)
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return
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}
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client := &ws.Client{
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Conn: conn,
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WorkspaceID: workspaceID,
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Send: make(chan []byte, 256),
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}
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h.hub.Register <- client
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metrics.TrackWSConnect()
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// Wrap WritePump and ReadPump so the gauge is decremented exactly once
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// when the client's write goroutine exits (WritePump owns conn lifetime).
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go func() {
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ws.WritePump(client)
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metrics.TrackWSDisconnect()
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}()
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go ws.ReadPump(client, h.hub)
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}
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