CI fully green. Dev Lead code review: ✅ clean, all read/write paths verified, tests cover round-trip + idempotency + legacy plaintext. Closes #319.
130 lines
4.5 KiB
Go
130 lines
4.5 KiB
Go
package channels
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// Field-level encryption for sensitive channel_config values (#319).
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//
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// workspace_channels.channel_config is a JSONB column holding adapter-specific
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// settings. Some fields are secret — Telegram bot tokens, webhook shared
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// secrets — and must not sit in cleartext at the database layer where a
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// backup leak or read-replica mis-grant would expose them. workspace_secrets
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// already encrypts values with AES-256-GCM; this file mirrors that posture
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// for channel_config so the security stance is consistent.
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//
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// Strategy: lazy field-level encryption with a version prefix.
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//
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// plaintext "123456:AA..." (legacy / pre-migration)
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// ciphertext "ec1:<base64-GCM-ciphertext>" (new writes)
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//
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// On read, a missing "ec1:" prefix means the row predates the encryption
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// rollout — return the value as-is (pass-through). On write, always encrypt.
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// Rows upgrade lazily on the next PATCH/Create. An operator wishing to
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// force-upgrade everything can re-save each channel via the Canvas Update
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// button.
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//
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// Only `bot_token` and `webhook_secret` are considered secret. Other fields
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// (chat_id, channel_name, enable_polling, etc.) stay in cleartext so the
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// SQL-level `channel_config->>'chat_id'` lookups in the webhook receiver
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// remain efficient.
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import (
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"encoding/base64"
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"strings"
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"github.com/Molecule-AI/molecule-monorepo/platform/internal/crypto"
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)
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// sensitiveFields is the set of channel_config keys that get encrypted at
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// rest. Add a new key here to extend coverage — do NOT widen this to the
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// whole config: it would break SQL field-access for non-secret keys like
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// `chat_id` that the webhook receiver queries.
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var sensitiveFields = []string{"bot_token", "webhook_secret"}
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// ciphertextPrefix marks values encrypted by EncryptSensitiveFields so
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// DecryptSensitiveFields can tell "new encrypted value" from a legacy
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// plaintext row. The string is intentionally distinctive — no real bot
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// token begins with "ec1:".
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const ciphertextPrefix = "ec1:"
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// EncryptSensitiveFields encrypts every known-sensitive value in config in
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// place. Values that are already prefixed (already encrypted) are left
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// untouched so a no-op re-save won't double-encrypt. Non-string values,
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// empty strings, and unknown fields pass through unchanged.
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//
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// When SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY is not configured (dev default), values are
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// stored as plaintext — consistent with workspace_secrets' dev fallback.
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func EncryptSensitiveFields(config map[string]interface{}) error {
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if config == nil {
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return nil
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}
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for _, field := range sensitiveFields {
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raw, ok := config[field]
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if !ok {
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continue
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}
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s, ok := raw.(string)
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if !ok || s == "" {
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continue
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}
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if strings.HasPrefix(s, ciphertextPrefix) {
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// already encrypted (idempotent re-save)
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continue
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}
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if !crypto.IsEnabled() {
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// Dev fallback: leave plaintext so local test setups without a
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// key keep working. Prod boots with crypto.InitStrict which
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// refuses to start without a key, so this branch is dev-only.
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continue
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}
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ct, err := crypto.Encrypt([]byte(s))
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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config[field] = ciphertextPrefix + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(ct)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// DecryptSensitiveFields is the inverse of EncryptSensitiveFields. Values
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// without the ciphertext prefix are returned as-is (legacy plaintext rows).
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// Values with the prefix are base64-decoded and run through AES-256-GCM.
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//
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// When SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY is not configured but a prefixed value is
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// encountered, that's an operator error (enabled encryption then disabled
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// the key). Return the raw prefixed string in that case — the adapter will
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// fail to authenticate with Telegram/Slack and the operator will see a
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// clear "invalid bot token" message rather than a silent mis-decrypt.
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func DecryptSensitiveFields(config map[string]interface{}) error {
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if config == nil {
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return nil
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}
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for _, field := range sensitiveFields {
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raw, ok := config[field]
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if !ok {
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continue
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}
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s, ok := raw.(string)
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if !ok || s == "" {
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continue
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}
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if !strings.HasPrefix(s, ciphertextPrefix) {
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// legacy plaintext row — pass through
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continue
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}
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if !crypto.IsEnabled() {
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// encryption-expected row but no key — leave encoded so callers
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// fail loudly at Telegram rather than mis-decrypt.
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continue
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}
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encoded := strings.TrimPrefix(s, ciphertextPrefix)
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ct, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(encoded)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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pt, err := crypto.Decrypt(ct)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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config[field] = string(pt)
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}
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return nil
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}
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