OFFSEC-003 / closes#330.
`loadWorkspaceEnv` used `filepath.Join(orgBaseDir, filesDir, ".env")`
without a resolveInsideRoot guard on filesDir — allowing malicious org YAML
to read files outside the org root (e.g. filesDir: "../../../etc").
Two locations patched:
1. org_helpers.go:loadWorkspaceEnv — wrap filesDir with resolveInsideRoot
before joining into the load path. On traversal rejection the org-root
.env is still loaded; the traversal path is silently skipped.
2. org_import.go:createWorkspaceTree — same unguarded Join at line 494
was patched with the identical guard.
resolveInsideRoot is already established in the codebase (used for
template and files_dir elsewhere in org_import.go), so no new primitives
are introduced.
Added org_helpers_test.go covering:
- Normal load of org-root + workspace .env (workspace overrides org)
- Traversal paths (../../../etc etc.) are silently rejected
- Non-existent workspace dir returns org-root vars only
- Empty orgBaseDir returns empty map
Molecule AI Fullstack Engineer
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