a363b56f25
Single-container tenant architecture: Go platform (:8080) + Canvas Node.js (:3000) in one Fly machine, with Go's NoRoute handler reverse- proxying non-API routes to the canvas. Browser only talks to :8080. Changes: platform/Dockerfile.tenant — multi-stage build (Go + Node + runtime). Bakes workspace-configs-templates/ + org-templates/ into the image. Build context: repo root. platform/entrypoint-tenant.sh — starts both processes, kills both if either exits. Fly health check on :8080 covers the Go binary; canvas health is implicit (proxy returns 502 if canvas is down). platform/internal/router/canvas_proxy.go — httputil.ReverseProxy that forwards unmatched routes to CANVAS_PROXY_URL (http://localhost:3000). Activated by NoRoute when CANVAS_PROXY_URL env is set. platform/internal/router/router.go — wire NoRoute → canvasProxy when CANVAS_PROXY_URL is present; no-op otherwise (local dev unchanged). platform/internal/middleware/securityheaders.go — relaxed CSP to allow Next.js inline scripts/styles/eval + WebSocket + data: URIs. The strict `default-src 'self'` was blocking all canvas rendering. canvas/src/lib/api.ts — changed `||` to `??` for NEXT_PUBLIC_PLATFORM_URL so empty string means "same-origin" (combined image) instead of falling back to localhost:8080. canvas/src/components/tabs/TerminalTab.tsx — same `??` fix for WS URL. Verified: tenant machine boots, canvas renders, 8 runtime templates + 4 org templates visible, API routes work through the same port. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
54 lines
2.7 KiB
Go
54 lines
2.7 KiB
Go
package middleware
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import "github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
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// SecurityHeaders returns a Gin middleware that sets standard HTTP security
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// headers on every response to mitigate common web-application attacks:
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//
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// - X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff — prevents MIME-type sniffing
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// - X-Frame-Options: DENY — blocks iframe embedding (clickjacking)
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// - Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self' — restricts resource loading to same origin
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// - Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains — enforces HTTPS for 1 year
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// - Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin — avoids leaking full paths/queries in Referer
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// - Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=() — denies sensor access for embedded content
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func SecurityHeaders() gin.HandlerFunc {
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return func(c *gin.Context) {
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c.Header("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
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c.Header("X-Frame-Options", "DENY")
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c.Header("Strict-Transport-Security", "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains")
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// #282: these two were documented in CLAUDE.md but missing from
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// the middleware. Referrer-Policy prevents browsers from leaking
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// the full Referer URL to cross-origin resources (which can
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// expose internal paths/queries). Permissions-Policy denies
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// sensor access by default — especially relevant because the
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// canvas embeds iframes for Langfuse traces.
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c.Header("Referrer-Policy", "strict-origin-when-cross-origin")
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c.Header("Permissions-Policy", "camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()")
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// CSP: only apply to API responses. Canvas-proxied routes
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// (NoRoute → reverse-proxy to Next.js) serve HTML with inline
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// scripts + styles that `default-src 'self'` blocks. Next.js
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// sets its own CSP via <meta> tags. The Go middleware should
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// not override it for proxied HTML responses.
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//
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// Detection: API routes are registered explicitly in the router;
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// canvas-proxied routes hit NoRoute. We can't detect NoRoute
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// before c.Next() fires, so instead we check the response
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// Content-Type after Next() — but that's too late for headers.
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//
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// Simpler: apply a permissive CSP that allows Next.js to work.
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// 'unsafe-inline' + 'unsafe-eval' are needed for Next.js dev
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// hydration; in production Next.js uses nonces but we don't
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// propagate them through the proxy. This is acceptable because
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// the canvas is our own code, not user-generated content.
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c.Header("Content-Security-Policy",
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"default-src 'self'; "+
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"script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval'; "+
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"style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; "+
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"img-src 'self' data: blob:; "+
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"connect-src 'self' ws: wss:; "+
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"font-src 'self' data:")
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c.Next()
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}
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}
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