0b979aed78
Two trust-boundary leaks surfaced in code review of the channel-envelope
enrichment work:
1. _agent_card_url_for(peer_id) interpolated raw input into
${PLATFORM_URL}/registry/discover/<peer_id> with no UUID guard. An
upstream row with peer_id=`../../foo` produced an agent-visible URL
pointing at a sibling registry path. Same trust-boundary rationale
discover_peer's docstring already calls out: "never interpolate
path-traversal characters into the URL". Now gated by _validate_peer_id;
returns "" on validation failure.
2. _build_channel_notification echoed raw peer_id back into
meta["peer_id"], which on the push path renders inside the agent's
<channel peer_id="..." kind="..."> XML-attribute context. Attacker
bytes (control chars, embedded quotes) would land in agent-rendered
text wired into the next conversation turn. Now canonicalised through
_validate_peer_id before any meta write; on validation failure we
set "" rather than reflecting the raw bytes.
Defense-in-depth — both layers gate independently. Mutation-verified by
stashing both prod-side files and confirming both regression tests fail.
Tests:
- test_envelope_enrichment_invalid_peer_id_skips_lookup: updated to
pin the safe behavior (peer_id="" + agent_card_url absent), not the
prior leak shape.
- test_envelope_enrichment_strips_path_traversal_peer_id: NEW. Hard
regression for peer_id="../../foo" — pins both the URL-builder and
the meta echo against this specific exploit shape.
- Two existing tests updated to use UUID-shape placeholders instead
of "ws-peer-uuid" / "peer-ws-uuid" since those non-UUIDs now correctly
get stripped by the validator.
Resolves the Required-grade finding from the multi-axis review on PR #2471.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
490 lines
21 KiB
Python
490 lines
21 KiB
Python
"""A2A protocol client — peer discovery, messaging, and workspace info.
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Shared constants (WORKSPACE_ID, PLATFORM_URL) live here so that
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a2a_tools and a2a_mcp_server can import them from a single place.
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"""
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import asyncio
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import logging
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import os
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import random
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import re
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import time
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import uuid
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import httpx
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from platform_auth import auth_headers, self_source_headers
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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_WORKSPACE_ID_raw = os.environ.get("WORKSPACE_ID")
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if not _WORKSPACE_ID_raw:
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raise RuntimeError("WORKSPACE_ID environment variable is required but not set")
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WORKSPACE_ID = _WORKSPACE_ID_raw
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if os.path.exists("/.dockerenv") or os.environ.get("DOCKER_VERSION"):
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PLATFORM_URL = os.environ.get("PLATFORM_URL", "http://host.docker.internal:8080")
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else:
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PLATFORM_URL = os.environ.get("PLATFORM_URL", "http://localhost:8080")
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# Cache workspace ID → name mappings (populated by list_peers calls)
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_peer_names: dict[str, str] = {}
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# Cache workspace ID → full peer record (id, name, role, status, url, ...).
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# Populated by tool_list_peers and by the lazy registry lookup in
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# enrich_peer_metadata. The notification-callback path (channel envelope
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# enrichment) reads this cache on every inbound peer_agent push, so a
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# bare ``dict[str, tuple[float, dict | None]]`` is the fastest read
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# shape; entries carry their fetched-at timestamp so TTL eviction is
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# in-line with the lookup. ``None`` as the record is the negative-cache
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# sentinel: registry failure is cached for one TTL window so we don't
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# re-fire the 2s-bounded GET on every push from a flaky peer.
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_peer_metadata: dict[str, tuple[float, dict | None]] = {}
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# How long an entry in ``_peer_metadata`` is treated as fresh. 5 minutes
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# is the same window we use for delegation routing — long enough that a
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# busy agent receiving repeated pushes from one peer doesn't hit the
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# registry on every push, short enough that role/name renames propagate
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# within a single agent session.
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_PEER_METADATA_TTL_SECONDS = 300.0
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def enrich_peer_metadata(peer_id: str, *, now: float | None = None) -> dict | None:
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"""Return cached or freshly-fetched metadata for ``peer_id``.
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Sync helper — safe to call from the inbox poller's notification
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callback thread (which is not async). Hits the in-process cache
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first; on miss or TTL expiry, GETs ``/registry/discover/<peer_id>``
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synchronously with a tight timeout. Returns None on validation
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failure, network failure, or non-200 response so callers can
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degrade gracefully (the channel envelope falls back to the raw
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``peer_id`` instead of crashing the push path).
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Negative caching: failure outcomes (4xx/5xx/non-JSON/network
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exception) are stored as ``(now, None)`` and treated as
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fresh-but-empty for the TTL window. Without this, a peer with a
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flaky/missing registry record would re-fire the 2s-bounded GET on
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EVERY push — turning the cache into a no-op for the exact failure
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scenarios it most needs to defend against.
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The fetched dict is stored as-is, so callers can read whatever
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fields the platform exposes (currently: ``id``, ``name``, ``role``,
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``status``, ``url``). New fields surface automatically without a
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code change here.
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"""
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canon = _validate_peer_id(peer_id)
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if canon is None:
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return None
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current = now if now is not None else time.monotonic()
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cached = _peer_metadata.get(canon)
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if cached is not None:
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fetched_at, record = cached
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if current - fetched_at < _PEER_METADATA_TTL_SECONDS:
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# Fresh entry — return whatever's there. ``None`` is the
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# negative-cache sentinel: caller treats absence of fields
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# the same as a registry miss, which is the desired UX.
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return record
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url = f"{PLATFORM_URL}/registry/discover/{canon}"
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try:
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with httpx.Client(timeout=2.0) as client:
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resp = client.get(url, headers={"X-Workspace-ID": WORKSPACE_ID, **auth_headers()})
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except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
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logger.debug("enrich_peer_metadata: GET %s failed: %s", url, exc)
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_peer_metadata[canon] = (current, None)
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return None
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if resp.status_code != 200:
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logger.debug(
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"enrich_peer_metadata: %s returned HTTP %d", url, resp.status_code
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)
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_peer_metadata[canon] = (current, None)
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return None
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try:
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data = resp.json()
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except Exception: # noqa: BLE001
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_peer_metadata[canon] = (current, None)
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return None
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if not isinstance(data, dict):
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_peer_metadata[canon] = (current, None)
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return None
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_peer_metadata[canon] = (current, data)
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if name := data.get("name"):
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_peer_names[canon] = name
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return data
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def _agent_card_url_for(peer_id: str) -> str:
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"""Construct the platform-side agent-card URL for ``peer_id``.
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Returns the empty string when ``peer_id`` is not a UUID — same
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trust-boundary rationale as ``discover_peer``: never interpolate
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path-traversal characters into a URL. An invalid id reflected back
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to the receiving agent as ``…/registry/discover/../../foo`` is a
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foothold we close at construction time.
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Uses the registry's discovery path so the agent receiving a push
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can hit a single endpoint to enumerate the sender's capabilities
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+ role + URL. Same shape every workspace exposes regardless of
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runtime — claude-code, hermes, langchain wrappers all register
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through ``/registry/register`` and surface through ``/registry/discover``.
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"""
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safe_id = _validate_peer_id(peer_id)
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if safe_id is None:
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return ""
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return f"{PLATFORM_URL}/registry/discover/{safe_id}"
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# Sentinel prefix for errors originating from send_a2a_message / child agents.
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# Used by delegate_task to distinguish real errors from normal response text.
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_A2A_ERROR_PREFIX = "[A2A_ERROR] "
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# Workspace IDs are UUIDs everywhere we generate them (platform's
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# workspaces.id column, /registry/discover/:id route param, etc.) but
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# the agent-facing tool surface receives them as free-form strings via
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# tool args. ``_validate_peer_id`` enforces UUID-shape at the
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# trust boundary so we never interpolate `..` or `/` into a URL path,
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# never silently coerce malformed input into a 404, and surface a
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# clear error to the agent rather than letting an HTTP 4xx bubble up
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# from the platform with a generic error message.
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#
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# Lenient on case + whitespace because real-world peer-id strings
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# come from list_peers/discover_peer responses (canonical lowercase)
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# or hand-typed agent input (mixed-case acceptable). Strict on
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# everything else.
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_UUID_RE = re.compile(
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r"^[0-9a-fA-F]{8}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{12}$"
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)
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def _validate_peer_id(peer_id: str) -> str | None:
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"""Return the canonicalised peer_id if valid, else None.
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Returning None instead of raising so callers in tool surfaces can
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convert to a friendly agent-facing string ("workspace_id is not a
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valid UUID") rather than crashing with a stack trace.
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"""
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if not isinstance(peer_id, str):
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return None
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pid = peer_id.strip()
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if not _UUID_RE.match(pid):
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return None
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return pid.lower()
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async def discover_peer(target_id: str) -> dict | None:
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"""Discover a peer workspace's URL via the platform registry.
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Validates ``target_id`` is a UUID before constructing the URL — a
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malformed id can't reach the platform handler now, which both
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short-circuits an avoidable round-trip AND ensures we never
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interpolate path-traversal characters into the URL.
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"""
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safe_id = _validate_peer_id(target_id)
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if safe_id is None:
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return None
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async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=10.0) as client:
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try:
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resp = await client.get(
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f"{PLATFORM_URL}/registry/discover/{safe_id}",
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headers={"X-Workspace-ID": WORKSPACE_ID, **auth_headers()},
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)
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if resp.status_code == 200:
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return resp.json()
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return None
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except Exception as e:
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logger.error(f"Discovery failed for {target_id}: {e}")
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return None
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# httpx exception classes that indicate a transient transport-layer
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# failure worth retrying — the request never produced an application
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# response, so a fresh attempt has a real chance of succeeding. Any
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# error not in this tuple is treated as deterministic (HTTP-status,
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# JSON parse, runtime-returned JSON-RPC error, etc.) and surfaced to
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# the caller on the first try.
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#
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# Why each one belongs here:
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# - ConnectError / ConnectTimeout: peer's listening socket wasn't
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# ready (mid-restart, not yet bound). Fast failure, fast recovery.
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# - RemoteProtocolError: peer closed the TCP connection without
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# writing a response — observed on 2026-04-27 when a peer's prior
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# in-flight Claude SDK session aborted and the new request's
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# connection was reset mid-handler.
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# - ReadError / WriteError: TCP read/write socket error mid-flight,
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# typically a network blip on the Docker bridge or a peer worker
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# crash.
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# - ReadTimeout: peer didn't write ANY response bytes within the
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# 300s read budget. Distinct from "peer is slow but progressing"
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# (which httpx surfaces as a successful read with chunked bytes).
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# Retry budget caps the worst case — see _DELEGATE_TOTAL_BUDGET_S.
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_TRANSIENT_HTTP_ERRORS: tuple[type[Exception], ...] = (
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httpx.ConnectError,
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httpx.ConnectTimeout,
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httpx.ReadError,
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httpx.WriteError,
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httpx.RemoteProtocolError,
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httpx.ReadTimeout,
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)
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# Retry budget. Up to 5 attempts (1 initial + 4 retries) with
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# exponential backoff (1, 2, 4, 8 seconds), each backoff jittered ±25%
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# to prevent synchronized retry storms across siblings if a peer flaps.
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# _DELEGATE_TOTAL_BUDGET_S caps cumulative wall-clock so a string of
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# ReadTimeouts can't make the caller wait 25 minutes — once the
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# deadline elapses we stop retrying even if attempts remain. 600s = 10
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# minutes is the agreed worst case the caller can tolerate before
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# falling back to "peer unavailable" handling in tool_delegate_task.
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_DELEGATE_MAX_ATTEMPTS = 5
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_DELEGATE_BACKOFF_BASE_S = 1.0
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_DELEGATE_BACKOFF_CAP_S = 16.0
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_DELEGATE_TOTAL_BUDGET_S = 600.0
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def _delegate_backoff_seconds(attempt_zero_indexed: int) -> float:
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"""Return the (jittered) backoff delay before retrying after the
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given attempt index (0 = backoff before retry #1).
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Pure function so the schedule is unit-testable without monkey-
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patching asyncio.sleep. Jitter is symmetric ±25% on top of the
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capped exponential — enough to break sync across simultaneous
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callers without making the schedule unpredictable.
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"""
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base = min(_DELEGATE_BACKOFF_BASE_S * (2 ** attempt_zero_indexed), _DELEGATE_BACKOFF_CAP_S)
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jitter = base * (0.5 * random.random() - 0.25)
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return max(0.0, base + jitter)
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def _format_a2a_error(exc: BaseException, target_url: str) -> str:
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"""Format an httpx exception as an [A2A_ERROR] string.
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Some httpx exceptions stringify to empty (RemoteProtocolError,
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ConnectionReset variants) — the canvas would then render
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"[A2A_ERROR] " with no detail and the operator has no signal to
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act on. Always include the exception class name and the target
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URL so the activity log + Agent Comms panel have actionable
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information without a trip through container logs.
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"""
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msg = str(exc).strip()
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type_name = type(exc).__name__
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if not msg:
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detail = f"{type_name} (no message — likely connection reset or silent timeout)"
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elif msg.startswith(f"{type_name}:") or msg.startswith(f"{type_name} "):
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# Already prefixed with the type — don't double-prefix.
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# Prefix-anchored check (not substring) so a message that
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# happens to mention some OTHER class name mid-string
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# (e.g. "got OSError on read") doesn't suppress our own
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# type prefix and lose the diagnostic signal.
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detail = msg
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else:
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detail = f"{type_name}: {msg}"
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return f"{_A2A_ERROR_PREFIX}{detail} [target={target_url}]"
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async def send_a2a_message(peer_id: str, message: str) -> str:
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"""Send an A2A ``message/send`` to a peer workspace via the platform proxy.
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The target URL is constructed internally as
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``${PLATFORM_URL}/workspaces/{peer_id}/a2a``. Going through the
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platform's A2A proxy is the only path that works for both
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in-container and external runtimes — see
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a2a_tools.tool_delegate_task for the rationale.
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Auto-retries up to _DELEGATE_MAX_ATTEMPTS times on transient
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transport-layer errors (RemoteProtocolError, ConnectError,
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ReadTimeout, etc.) with exponential-backoff + jitter, capped by
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_DELEGATE_TOTAL_BUDGET_S. Application-level failures (HTTP 4xx,
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JSON-RPC error response, malformed JSON) are NOT retried — they
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indicate a deterministic problem retry won't fix.
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"""
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safe_id = _validate_peer_id(peer_id)
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if safe_id is None:
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return f"{_A2A_ERROR_PREFIX}invalid peer_id (expected UUID): {peer_id!r}"
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target_url = f"{PLATFORM_URL}/workspaces/{safe_id}/a2a"
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# Fix F (Cycle 5 / H2 — flagged 5 consecutive audits): timeout=None allowed
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# a hung upstream to block the agent indefinitely. Use a generous but bounded
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# timeout: 30s connect + 300s read (long enough for slow LLM responses).
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timeout_cfg = httpx.Timeout(connect=30.0, read=300.0, write=30.0, pool=30.0)
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deadline = time.monotonic() + _DELEGATE_TOTAL_BUDGET_S
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last_exc: BaseException | None = None
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for attempt in range(_DELEGATE_MAX_ATTEMPTS):
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async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=timeout_cfg) as client:
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try:
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# self_source_headers() includes X-Workspace-ID so the
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# platform's a2a_receive logger records source_id =
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# WORKSPACE_ID. Otherwise peer-A2A messages — including
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# the case where target_url resolves to this workspace's
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# own /a2a — get logged with source_id=NULL and surface
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# in the recipient's My Chat tab as user-typed input.
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resp = await client.post(
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target_url,
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headers=self_source_headers(WORKSPACE_ID),
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json={
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"jsonrpc": "2.0",
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"id": str(uuid.uuid4()),
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"method": "message/send",
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"params": {
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"message": {
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"role": "user",
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"messageId": str(uuid.uuid4()),
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"parts": [{"kind": "text", "text": message}],
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}
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},
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},
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)
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data = resp.json()
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if "result" in data:
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parts = data["result"].get("parts", [])
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text = parts[0].get("text", "") if parts else "(no response)"
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# Tag child-reported errors so the caller can detect them reliably
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if text.startswith("Agent error:"):
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return f"{_A2A_ERROR_PREFIX}{text}"
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return text
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elif "error" in data:
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err = data["error"]
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msg = (err.get("message") or "").strip()
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code = err.get("code")
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if msg and code is not None:
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detail = f"{msg} (code={code})"
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elif msg:
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detail = msg
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elif code is not None:
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detail = f"JSON-RPC error with no message (code={code})"
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else:
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detail = "JSON-RPC error with no message"
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return f"{_A2A_ERROR_PREFIX}{detail} [target={target_url}]"
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return f"{_A2A_ERROR_PREFIX}unexpected response shape (no result, no error): {str(data)[:200]} [target={target_url}]"
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except _TRANSIENT_HTTP_ERRORS as e:
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last_exc = e
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attempts_remaining = _DELEGATE_MAX_ATTEMPTS - (attempt + 1)
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if attempts_remaining <= 0 or time.monotonic() >= deadline:
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# Out of attempts OR out of total budget — surface
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# the last error to the caller.
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break
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delay = _delegate_backoff_seconds(attempt)
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# Don't sleep past the deadline — clamp.
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remaining = deadline - time.monotonic()
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if delay > remaining:
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delay = max(0.0, remaining)
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logger.warning(
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"send_a2a_message: transient %s on attempt %d/%d, retrying in %.1fs (target=%s)",
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type(e).__name__,
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attempt + 1,
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_DELEGATE_MAX_ATTEMPTS,
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delay,
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target_url,
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)
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await asyncio.sleep(delay)
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continue
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except Exception as e:
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# Non-transient (HTTP-status, JSON parse, etc.) — don't retry.
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return _format_a2a_error(e, target_url)
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# Retries exhausted (or budget elapsed). last_exc must be set
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# because we only break out of the loop after assigning it.
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assert last_exc is not None # noqa: S101
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return _format_a2a_error(last_exc, target_url)
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async def get_peers_with_diagnostic() -> tuple[list[dict], str | None]:
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"""Get this workspace's peers, returning (peers, diagnostic).
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diagnostic is None when the call succeeded (status 200, even if the list
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is empty). When peers is [] for a non-trivial reason (auth failure,
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workspace-id missing from registry, platform error, network error),
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diagnostic is a short human-readable string explaining what went wrong
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so callers can surface it instead of "may be isolated" — see #2397.
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The legacy get_peers() shim below preserves the bare-list contract for
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non-tool callers.
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"""
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url = f"{PLATFORM_URL}/registry/{WORKSPACE_ID}/peers"
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async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=10.0) as client:
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try:
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resp = await client.get(
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|
url,
|
|
headers={"X-Workspace-ID": WORKSPACE_ID, **auth_headers()},
|
|
)
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
return [], f"Cannot reach platform at {PLATFORM_URL}: {e}"
|
|
|
|
if resp.status_code == 200:
|
|
try:
|
|
data = resp.json()
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
return [], f"Platform returned 200 but body was not JSON: {e}"
|
|
if not isinstance(data, list):
|
|
return [], f"Platform returned 200 but body was not a list: {type(data).__name__}"
|
|
return data, None
|
|
|
|
if resp.status_code in (401, 403):
|
|
return [], (
|
|
f"Authentication to platform failed (HTTP {resp.status_code}). "
|
|
"The workspace bearer token may be invalid — restarting the workspace usually re-mints it."
|
|
)
|
|
if resp.status_code == 404:
|
|
return [], (
|
|
f"Workspace ID {WORKSPACE_ID} is not registered with the platform (HTTP 404). "
|
|
"Re-registration via the platform's /registry/register endpoint is needed."
|
|
)
|
|
if 500 <= resp.status_code < 600:
|
|
return [], f"Platform error: HTTP {resp.status_code}."
|
|
return [], f"Unexpected platform response: HTTP {resp.status_code}."
|
|
|
|
|
|
async def get_peers() -> list[dict]:
|
|
"""Get this workspace's peers from the platform registry.
|
|
|
|
Bare-list shim over get_peers_with_diagnostic() — discards the diagnostic
|
|
so callers that don't care about the failure reason (e.g. system-prompt
|
|
bootstrap formatters) get the same shape they always had.
|
|
"""
|
|
peers, _ = await get_peers_with_diagnostic()
|
|
return peers
|
|
|
|
|
|
async def get_workspace_info() -> dict:
|
|
"""Get this workspace's info from the platform.
|
|
|
|
Distinguishes three failure shapes so callers can handle them
|
|
distinctly (#2429):
|
|
- 410 Gone → workspace was deleted; re-onboard required
|
|
- 404 / other → workspace never existed (or transient)
|
|
- exception → network / auth failure
|
|
"""
|
|
async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=10.0) as client:
|
|
try:
|
|
resp = await client.get(
|
|
f"{PLATFORM_URL}/workspaces/{WORKSPACE_ID}",
|
|
headers=auth_headers(),
|
|
)
|
|
if resp.status_code == 200:
|
|
return resp.json()
|
|
if resp.status_code == 410:
|
|
# #2429: platform returns 410 when status='removed'.
|
|
# Surface "removed" + the actionable hint so callers
|
|
# can prompt re-onboard instead of falling through to
|
|
# "not found" — which made the 2026-04-30 incident
|
|
# impossible to diagnose ("workspace not found" with
|
|
# a workspace_id we KNEW we'd just registered).
|
|
try:
|
|
body = resp.json()
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
body = {}
|
|
return {
|
|
"error": "removed",
|
|
"id": body.get("id", WORKSPACE_ID),
|
|
"removed_at": body.get("removed_at"),
|
|
"hint": body.get(
|
|
"hint",
|
|
"Workspace was deleted on the platform. "
|
|
"Regenerate workspace + token from the canvas → Tokens tab.",
|
|
),
|
|
}
|
|
return {"error": "not found"}
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
return {"error": str(e)}
|