package handlers

// a2a_proxy.go — A2A JSON-RPC proxy: routes canvas and agent-to-agent
// requests to workspace containers. Core proxy path, URL resolution,
// payload normalization, and HTTP dispatch. Error handling, logging, and
// SSRF helpers live in a2a_proxy_helpers.go.

import (
	"bytes"
	"context"
	"database/sql"
	"encoding/json"
	"errors"
	"io"
	"log"
	"net"
	"net/http"
	"os"
	"strconv"
	"strings"
	"time"

	"github.com/Molecule-AI/molecule-monorepo/platform/internal/db"
	"github.com/Molecule-AI/molecule-monorepo/platform/internal/events"
	"github.com/Molecule-AI/molecule-monorepo/platform/internal/models"
	"github.com/Molecule-AI/molecule-monorepo/platform/internal/provisioner"
	"github.com/Molecule-AI/molecule-monorepo/platform/internal/registry"
	"github.com/Molecule-AI/molecule-monorepo/platform/internal/wsauth"
	"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
	"github.com/google/uuid"
)

// platformInDocker caches whether THIS process is running inside a
// Docker container. The a2a proxy uses this to decide whether stored
// agent URLs like "http://127.0.0.1:<ephemeral>" need to be rewritten
// to the Docker-DNS form "http://ws-<id>:8000". When the platform is
// on the host, 127.0.0.1 IS the host and the ephemeral-port URL works
// as-is; rewriting to container DNS would then break (host can't
// resolve Docker bridge hostnames).
//
// Detection: /.dockerenv is the canonical marker inside the default
// Docker runtime. MOLECULE_IN_DOCKER is an explicit override for
// environments where /.dockerenv is absent (Podman, custom runtimes).
// Accepts any value strconv.ParseBool recognises — 1, 0, t, f, T, F,
// true, false, TRUE, FALSE, True, False. Anything else (including
// "yes"/"on") is treated as unset and falls through to the /.dockerenv
// check.
//
// Exposed as a var (not a const) so tests can toggle it via
// setPlatformInDockerForTest without fiddling with real filesystem
// markers or env vars. Production callers never mutate it.
var platformInDocker = detectPlatformInDocker()

func detectPlatformInDocker() bool {
	if v := os.Getenv("MOLECULE_IN_DOCKER"); v != "" {
		if b, err := strconv.ParseBool(v); err == nil {
			return b
		}
	}
	if _, err := os.Stat("/.dockerenv"); err == nil {
		return true
	}
	return false
}

// setPlatformInDockerForTest overrides platformInDocker for the duration of
// a test and returns a function to restore the previous value. Use with
// defer in *_test.go only.
func setPlatformInDockerForTest(v bool) func() {
	prev := platformInDocker
	platformInDocker = v
	return func() { platformInDocker = prev }
}

// maxProxyRequestBody is the maximum size of an A2A proxy request body (1MB).
const maxProxyRequestBody = 1 << 20

// systemCallerPrefixes are caller IDs that bypass workspace access control.
// These are non-workspace internal callers (webhooks, system services, tests).
var systemCallerPrefixes = []string{"webhook:", "system:", "test:", "channel:"}

// isSystemCaller returns true if callerID is a non-workspace internal caller.
func isSystemCaller(callerID string) bool {
	for _, prefix := range systemCallerPrefixes {
		if strings.HasPrefix(callerID, prefix) {
			return true
		}
	}
	return false
}

// maxProxyResponseBody is the maximum size of an A2A proxy response body (10MB).
const maxProxyResponseBody = 10 << 20

// a2aClient is a shared HTTP client for proxying A2A requests to workspace agents.
//
// Timeout model — three independent budgets, none of which gets in each other's way:
//
//   1. Client.Timeout — DELIBERATELY UNSET. Client.Timeout is a hard wall on
//      the entire request including streamed body reads, and would pre-empt
//      legitimate slow cold-start flows (Claude Code first-token over OAuth
//      can take 30-60s on boot; long-running agent synthesis can stream
//      tokens for minutes). Total-request budget is enforced per-request
//      via context deadline (canvas = idle-only, agent-to-agent = 30 min ceiling).
//
//   2. Transport.DialContext — 10s connect timeout. When a workspace's EC2
//      black-holes TCP connects (instance terminated mid-flight, security group
//      flipped, NACL bug), the OS default is 75s on Linux / 21s on macOS — long
//      enough that Cloudflare's ~100s edge timeout can fire first and surface
//      a generic 502 page to canvas. 10s is well above realistic intra-region
//      latencies and well below CF's edge timeout.
//
//   3. Transport.ResponseHeaderTimeout — 60s. From request-body-end to
//      response-headers-start. Covers cold-start first-byte (the 30-60s OAuth
//      flow above), with margin. Body streaming after headers is governed by
//      the per-request context deadline, NOT this timeout — so multi-minute
//      agent responses still work fine.
//
// The point of (2) and (3) is to surface a *structured* 503 from
// handleA2ADispatchError when the workspace agent is unreachable, so canvas
// gets `{"error":"workspace agent unreachable","restarting":true}` instead
// of Cloudflare's opaque 502 error page. Without these, dead workspaces hang
// long enough that CF gives up first and shows its own page.
var a2aClient = &http.Client{
	Transport: &http.Transport{
		DialContext: (&net.Dialer{
			Timeout:   10 * time.Second,
			KeepAlive: 30 * time.Second,
		}).DialContext,
		ResponseHeaderTimeout: 60 * time.Second,
		TLSHandshakeTimeout:   10 * time.Second,
		// MaxIdleConns / IdleConnTimeout: stdlib defaults are fine; agent
		// fan-in is bounded by the platform's broadcaster fan-out, not by
		// connection-pool sizing.
	},
}

type proxyA2AError struct {
	Status   int
	Response gin.H
	// Optional response headers (e.g. Retry-After on 503-busy). Kept separate
	// from Response so the handler can set real HTTP headers, not just JSON.
	Headers map[string]string
}

// busyRetryAfterSeconds is the Retry-After hint returned with 503-busy
// responses when an upstream workspace agent is overloaded (single-threaded
// mid-synthesis). Chosen to be long enough for typical PM synthesis work
// to complete but short enough that a caller's retry loop won't stall
// coordination. See issue #110.
const busyRetryAfterSeconds = 30

// isUpstreamBusyError classifies an http.Client.Do error as a transient
// "upstream busy" condition — a timeout or connection-reset while the
// container is still alive. Distinguishes legitimate busy-agent failures
// from fatal network errors so callers can retry with Retry-After.
func isUpstreamBusyError(err error) bool {
	if err == nil {
		return false
	}
	// Typed sentinels propagate cleanly through *url.Error.Unwrap
	// since Go 1.13, so errors.Is is the primary check for both
	// DeadlineExceeded and Canceled. The substring fallbacks below
	// stay only for shapes net/http does NOT type — bare "EOF" /
	// "connection reset" can arrive as plain *net.OpError with no
	// errors.Is hook to the stdlib sentinels.
	if errors.Is(err, context.DeadlineExceeded) {
		return true
	}
	// applyIdleTimeout uses context.WithCancel; surfaces here as
	// Canceled, distinct from DeadlineExceeded but the same "upstream
	// busy" class — caller produces a 503 + Retry-After.
	if errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
		return true
	}
	if errors.Is(err, io.EOF) || errors.Is(err, io.ErrUnexpectedEOF) {
		return true
	}
	msg := err.Error()
	return strings.Contains(msg, "EOF") ||
		strings.Contains(msg, "connection reset")
}

// isUpstreamDeadStatus returns true when the upstream HTTP status indicates
// the workspace agent is unreachable / unresponsive at the network layer
// (vs an agent-authored 5xx with a real body). Used by the proxy to gate
// reactive container-dead detection + auto-restart.
//
//   - 502 Bad Gateway, 503 Service Unavailable, 504 Gateway Timeout: standard
//     proxy-layer "upstream is broken" codes (Cloudflare, ELB, agent tunnel).
//   - 521 Web Server Is Down: Cloudflare can't open TCP to origin (most
//     direct dead-EC2 signal).
//   - 522 Connection Timed Out: Cloudflare opened TCP but no response within
//     ~15s — typical of SG/NACL flap or agent process hung.
//   - 523 Origin Is Unreachable: Cloudflare can't route to origin (DNS or
//     network-path failure).
//   - 524 A Timeout Occurred: TCP succeeded, but origin didn't return
//     headers within ~100s — agent process alive but wedged.
//
// We always probe IsRunning before acting, so a transient false positive
// from this set just costs one CP API call.
func isUpstreamDeadStatus(status int) bool {
	switch status {
	case http.StatusBadGateway, // 502
		http.StatusServiceUnavailable, // 503
		http.StatusGatewayTimeout,     // 504
		521, 522, 523, 524:            // CF dead-origin family
		return true
	}
	return false
}

func (e *proxyA2AError) Error() string {
	if e == nil || e.Response == nil {
		return "proxy a2a error"
	}
	if msg, ok := e.Response["error"].(string); ok && msg != "" {
		return msg
	}
	return "proxy a2a error"
}

// ProxyA2ARequest is the public wrapper for proxyA2ARequest, used by the
// cron scheduler and other internal callers that need to send A2A messages
// to workspaces programmatically (not from an HTTP handler).
func (h *WorkspaceHandler) ProxyA2ARequest(ctx context.Context, workspaceID string, body []byte, callerID string, logActivity bool) (int, []byte, error) {
	status, resp, proxyErr := h.proxyA2ARequest(ctx, workspaceID, body, callerID, logActivity)
	if proxyErr != nil {
		return status, resp, proxyErr
	}
	return status, resp, nil
}

// ProxyA2A handles POST /workspaces/:id/a2a
// Proxies A2A JSON-RPC requests from the canvas to workspace agents,
// avoiding CORS and Docker network issues.
func (h *WorkspaceHandler) ProxyA2A(c *gin.Context) {
	workspaceID := c.Param("id")
	ctx := c.Request.Context()

	// X-Timeout: caller-specified timeout in seconds (0 = no timeout).
	// Overrides the default canvas (5 min) / agent (30 min) timeouts.
	if tStr := c.GetHeader("X-Timeout"); tStr != "" {
		if tSec, err := strconv.Atoi(tStr); err == nil && tSec > 0 {
			var cancel context.CancelFunc
			ctx, cancel = context.WithTimeout(ctx, time.Duration(tSec)*time.Second)
			defer cancel()
		}
		// tSec == 0 means no timeout — use the raw context (no deadline)
	}

	// Read the incoming request body (capped at 1MB)
	body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(c.Request.Body, maxProxyRequestBody))
	if err != nil {
		c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "failed to read request body"})
		return
	}

	callerID := c.GetHeader("X-Workspace-ID")

	// #2306: when X-Workspace-ID isn't set, derive callerID from the bearer
	// token's owning workspace. External callers (third-party SDKs, the
	// channel plugin, etc.) authenticate purely via bearer and frequently
	// don't set the header — without this, activity_logs.source_id ends up
	// NULL and downstream consumers (notification peer_id, "Agent Comms by
	// peer" tab, analytics) can't identify the sender. The bearer is the
	// authoritative caller identity per the wsauth contract; the header is
	// just a display/routing hint that must agree with it.
	//
	// Skip when an org-level token is in play (canvas/admin path) — those
	// tokens grant org-wide access and don't bind to a single workspace.
	if callerID == "" {
		if _, isOrg := c.Get("org_token_id"); !isOrg {
			if tok := wsauth.BearerTokenFromHeader(c.GetHeader("Authorization")); tok != "" {
				if wsID, err := wsauth.WorkspaceFromToken(ctx, db.DB, tok); err == nil {
					callerID = wsID
				}
			}
		}
	}

	// #761 SECURITY: reject requests where the client-supplied X-Workspace-ID
	// contains a system-caller prefix. isSystemCaller() bypasses both token
	// validation and CanCommunicate. On the public /a2a endpoint, system-caller
	// semantics only apply to callerIDs set by trusted server-side code
	// (ProxyA2ARequest), never to HTTP header values. Legitimate system callers
	// (webhooks, scheduler, restart_context) call proxyA2ARequest directly and
	// never go through this HTTP handler.
	if isSystemCaller(callerID) {
		log.Printf("security: system-caller prefix forge attempt — remote=%q header=%q",
			c.ClientIP(), callerID)
		c.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{"error": "invalid caller ID"})
		return
	}

	// Phase 30.5 — validate the caller's auth token when the caller IS
	// a workspace (not canvas or a system caller). Canvas requests have
	// no X-Workspace-ID so they bypass this check (the existing
	// access-control layer already trusts them). System callers
	// (webhook:* / system:* / test:*) only reach proxyA2ARequest via
	// the server-side ProxyA2ARequest wrapper, never via this HTTP path.
	//
	// The bind is strict: the token must match `callerID`, not
	// `workspaceID` (the target). A compromised token from workspace A
	// must never authenticate calls from A pretending to be B.
	if callerID != "" && callerID != workspaceID {
		if err := validateCallerToken(ctx, c, callerID); err != nil {
			return // response already written with 401
		}
	}

	status, respBody, proxyErr := h.proxyA2ARequest(ctx, workspaceID, body, callerID, true)
	if proxyErr != nil {
		for k, v := range proxyErr.Headers {
			c.Header(k, v)
		}
		c.JSON(proxyErr.Status, proxyErr.Response)
		return
	}

	c.Data(status, "application/json", respBody)
}

// checkWorkspaceBudget returns a proxyA2AError with 402 when the workspace
// has a budget_limit set and monthly_spend has reached or exceeded it.
// DB errors are logged and treated as fail-open — a budget check failure
// must not block legitimate A2A traffic.
func (h *WorkspaceHandler) checkWorkspaceBudget(ctx context.Context, workspaceID string) *proxyA2AError {
	var budgetLimit sql.NullInt64
	var monthlySpend int64
	err := db.DB.QueryRowContext(ctx,
		`SELECT budget_limit, COALESCE(monthly_spend, 0) FROM workspaces WHERE id = $1`,
		workspaceID,
	).Scan(&budgetLimit, &monthlySpend)
	if err != nil {
		if err != sql.ErrNoRows {
			log.Printf("ProxyA2A: budget check failed for %s: %v", workspaceID, err)
		}
		return nil // fail-open
	}
	if budgetLimit.Valid && monthlySpend >= budgetLimit.Int64 {
		log.Printf("ProxyA2A: budget exceeded for %s (spend=%d limit=%d)", workspaceID, monthlySpend, budgetLimit.Int64)
		return &proxyA2AError{
			Status:   http.StatusPaymentRequired,
			Response: gin.H{"error": "workspace budget limit exceeded"},
		}
	}
	return nil
}

func (h *WorkspaceHandler) proxyA2ARequest(ctx context.Context, workspaceID string, body []byte, callerID string, logActivity bool) (int, []byte, *proxyA2AError) {
	// Access control: workspace-to-workspace requests must pass CanCommunicate check.
	// Canvas requests (callerID == "") and system callers (webhook:*, system:*, test:*)
	// are trusted. Self-calls (callerID == workspaceID) are always allowed.
	if callerID != "" && callerID != workspaceID && !isSystemCaller(callerID) {
		if !registry.CanCommunicate(callerID, workspaceID) {
			log.Printf("ProxyA2A: access denied %s → %s", callerID, workspaceID)
			return 0, nil, &proxyA2AError{
				Status:   http.StatusForbidden,
				Response: gin.H{"error": "access denied: workspaces cannot communicate per hierarchy rules"},
			}
		}
	}

	// Budget enforcement: reject A2A calls when the workspace has exceeded its
	// monthly spend ceiling. Checked after access control so unauthorized calls
	// are rejected first (403 > 429 in the denial hierarchy). Fail-open on DB
	// errors so a budget check failure never blocks legitimate traffic.
	if proxyErr := h.checkWorkspaceBudget(ctx, workspaceID); proxyErr != nil {
		return 0, nil, proxyErr
	}

	// Normalize the JSON-RPC envelope BEFORE the poll-mode short-circuit
	// so the activity_logs entry carries the protocol method name (initialize,
	// message/send, etc.) — the polling agent uses that to dispatch the
	// request body to the right handler. Doing it here also means a
	// malformed payload fails the same way for push and poll callers
	// (consistent 400 instead of "queued garbage").
	normalizedBody, a2aMethod, proxyErr := normalizeA2APayload(body)
	if proxyErr != nil {
		return 0, nil, proxyErr
	}
	body = normalizedBody

	// #2339 PR 2 — poll-mode short-circuit. When the target workspace
	// is registered as delivery_mode=poll (e.g. an operator's laptop
	// running molecule-mcp-claude-channel), the platform does NOT
	// dispatch over HTTP — the agent has no public URL. Instead we record
	// the A2A request to activity_logs and the agent picks it up via
	// GET /activity?since_id= (PR 3).
	//
	// Returning here means we skip resolveAgentURL entirely (no SSRF check
	// needed — there's no URL to validate; no DNS lookup against potentially-
	// changing operator-side IPs) and skip the dispatch path completely
	// (no Do(), no maybeMarkContainerDead). The response is a synthetic
	// {status:"queued"} envelope so the caller (canvas, another workspace)
	// knows delivery is acknowledged but pending consumption.
	if lookupDeliveryMode(ctx, workspaceID) == models.DeliveryModePoll {
		if logActivity {
			h.logA2AReceiveQueued(ctx, workspaceID, callerID, body, a2aMethod)
		}
		respBody, marshalErr := json.Marshal(gin.H{
			"status":        "queued",
			"delivery_mode": models.DeliveryModePoll,
			"method":        a2aMethod,
		})
		if marshalErr != nil {
			return 0, nil, &proxyA2AError{
				Status:   http.StatusInternalServerError,
				Response: gin.H{"error": "failed to marshal poll-mode response"},
			}
		}
		return http.StatusOK, respBody, nil
	}

	agentURL, proxyErr := h.resolveAgentURL(ctx, workspaceID)
	if proxyErr != nil {
		return 0, nil, proxyErr
	}

	startTime := time.Now()
	resp, cancelFwd, err := h.dispatchA2A(ctx, workspaceID, agentURL, body, callerID)
	if cancelFwd != nil {
		defer cancelFwd()
	}
	durationMs := int(time.Since(startTime).Milliseconds())
	if err != nil {
		return h.handleA2ADispatchError(ctx, workspaceID, callerID, body, a2aMethod, err, durationMs, logActivity)
	}
	defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()

	// Read agent response (capped at 10MB).
	// #689: Do() succeeded, which means the target received the request and sent
	// back response headers — delivery is confirmed. The body couldn't be
	// fully read (connection drop, timeout mid-stream). Surface
	// delivery_confirmed so callers can distinguish "not delivered" from
	// "delivered, but response body lost". When delivery is confirmed,
	// log the activity as successful (delivery happened) rather than leaving
	// a false "failed" entry in the audit trail.
	respBody, readErr := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, maxProxyResponseBody))
	if readErr != nil {
		deliveryConfirmed := resp.StatusCode >= 200 && resp.StatusCode < 400
		log.Printf("ProxyA2A: body read failed for %s (status=%d delivery_confirmed=%v bytes_read=%d): %v",
			workspaceID, resp.StatusCode, deliveryConfirmed, len(respBody), readErr)
		if logActivity && deliveryConfirmed {
			h.logA2ASuccess(ctx, workspaceID, callerID, body, respBody, a2aMethod, resp.StatusCode, durationMs)
		}
		return 0, nil, &proxyA2AError{
			Status: http.StatusBadGateway,
			Response: gin.H{
				"error":              "failed to read agent response",
				"delivery_confirmed": deliveryConfirmed,
			},
		}
	}

	if logActivity {
		h.logA2ASuccess(ctx, workspaceID, callerID, body, respBody, a2aMethod, resp.StatusCode, durationMs)
	}

	// Track LLM token usage for cost transparency (#593).
	// Fires in a detached goroutine so token accounting never adds latency
	// to the critical A2A path.
	go extractAndUpsertTokenUsage(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), workspaceID, respBody)

	// Non-2xx agent response: the agent received the request but returned an
	// error status. Return a proxyErr so the caller (DrainQueueForWorkspace)
	// can call MarkQueueItemFailed rather than silently marking completed.
	// 3xx is also treated as failure here (A2A does not follow redirects).
	// Extract a meaningful error from the response body if present.
	if resp.StatusCode >= 300 {
		errMsg := ""
		if len(respBody) > 0 {
			var top map[string]json.RawMessage
			if json.Unmarshal(respBody, &top) == nil {
				if e, ok := top["error"]; ok {
					// Prefer string errors from the agent's JSON body.
					// e is json.RawMessage ([]byte); try to unmarshal as string.
					var errStr string
					if json.Unmarshal(e, &errStr) == nil {
						errMsg = errStr
					}
				}
			}
		}
		if errMsg == "" {
			errMsg = http.StatusText(resp.StatusCode)
		}

		// Upstream returned 502/503/504 (gateway/proxy failure). This is
		// the "agent process is dead but the tunnel between us and the
		// workspace is still up" signal — handleA2ADispatchError's
		// network-error path doesn't run because Do() succeeded at the
		// HTTP layer. Without this branch, the dead-agent failure mode
		// surfaces to canvas as a generic 502 (and CF in front of the
		// platform masks it with its own error page, hiding any
		// structured response we might write).
		//
		// Treatment matches handleA2ADispatchError's container-dead path:
		//   1. Probe IsRunning via maybeMarkContainerDead. If the
		//      container truly is dead, mark workspace offline + kick
		//      a restart goroutine.
		//   2. Return a structured 503 with restarting=true + Retry-After
		//      so canvas shows a useful "agent is restarting" message
		//      (and CF doesn't intercept the 503 the way it does 502).
		// If IsRunning reports the container is alive, we leave the
		// upstream status untouched — the agent legitimately returned
		// 502/503/504 (e.g. it's returning its own Bad-Gateway from
		// some downstream call) and we shouldn't mistakenly recycle it.
		//
		// Empty body is the strong signal here — a CF-tunnel "no-origin"
		// 502 has 0 bytes; an agent-authored 502 typically has a JSON
		// error body. We probe IsRunning regardless (it's the
		// authoritative check) but the empty-body case is what makes
		// this fix necessary.
		if isUpstreamDeadStatus(resp.StatusCode) {
			if h.maybeMarkContainerDead(ctx, workspaceID) {
				return 0, nil, &proxyA2AError{
					Status:   http.StatusServiceUnavailable,
					Headers:  map[string]string{"Retry-After": "15"},
					Response: gin.H{"error": "workspace agent unreachable — container restart triggered", "restarting": true, "retry_after": 15},
				}
			}
		}

		return resp.StatusCode, respBody, &proxyA2AError{
			Status:   resp.StatusCode,
			Response: gin.H{"error": errMsg},
		}
	}

	return resp.StatusCode, respBody, nil
}

// resolveAgentURL returns a routable URL for the target workspace agent. It
// checks the Redis URL cache first, then falls back to a DB lookup, caching
// the result on success. When the platform runs inside Docker, 127.0.0.1:<host
// port> is rewritten to the container's Docker-bridge hostname (host-side
// platforms keep the original URL because the bridge name wouldn't resolve).
func (h *WorkspaceHandler) resolveAgentURL(ctx context.Context, workspaceID string) (string, *proxyA2AError) {
	agentURL, err := db.GetCachedURL(ctx, workspaceID)
	if err != nil {
		var urlNullable sql.NullString
		var status string
		err := db.DB.QueryRowContext(ctx,
			`SELECT url, status FROM workspaces WHERE id = $1`, workspaceID,
		).Scan(&urlNullable, &status)
		if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
			return "", &proxyA2AError{
				Status:   http.StatusNotFound,
				Response: gin.H{"error": "workspace not found"},
			}
		}
		if err != nil {
			log.Printf("ProxyA2A lookup error: %v", err)
			return "", &proxyA2AError{
				Status:   http.StatusInternalServerError,
				Response: gin.H{"error": "lookup failed"},
			}
		}
		if !urlNullable.Valid || urlNullable.String == "" {
			// Auto-wake hibernated workspace on incoming A2A message (#711).
			// Re-provision asynchronously and return 503 with a retry hint so
			// the caller can retry once the workspace is back online (~10s).
			if status == "hibernated" {
				log.Printf("ProxyA2A: waking hibernated workspace %s", workspaceID)
				go h.RestartByID(workspaceID)
				return "", &proxyA2AError{
					Status:  http.StatusServiceUnavailable,
					Headers: map[string]string{"Retry-After": "15"},
					Response: gin.H{
						"error":       "workspace is waking from hibernation — retry in ~15 seconds",
						"waking":      true,
						"retry_after": 15,
					},
				}
			}
			return "", &proxyA2AError{
				Status:   http.StatusServiceUnavailable,
				Response: gin.H{"error": "workspace has no URL", "status": status},
			}
		}
		agentURL = urlNullable.String
		_ = db.CacheURL(ctx, workspaceID, agentURL)
	}

	// When the platform runs inside Docker, 127.0.0.1:{host_port} is
	// unreachable (it's the platform container's own localhost, not the
	// Docker host). Rewrite to the container's Docker-bridge hostname.
	if strings.HasPrefix(agentURL, "http://127.0.0.1:") && h.provisioner != nil && platformInDocker {
		agentURL = provisioner.InternalURL(workspaceID)
	}
	// SSRF defence: reject private/metadata URLs before making outbound call.
	if err := isSafeURL(agentURL); err != nil {
		log.Printf("ProxyA2A: unsafe URL for workspace %s: %v", workspaceID, err)
		return "", &proxyA2AError{
			Status:   http.StatusBadGateway,
			Response: gin.H{"error": "workspace URL is not publicly routable"},
		}
	}
	return agentURL, nil
}

// normalizeA2APayload parses the incoming body, wraps it in a JSON-RPC 2.0
// envelope if absent, ensures params.message.messageId is set, and re-marshals
// to bytes. Also returns the A2A method name (for logging) extracted from the
// payload.
func normalizeA2APayload(body []byte) ([]byte, string, *proxyA2AError) {
	var payload map[string]interface{}
	if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &payload); err != nil {
		return nil, "", &proxyA2AError{
			Status:   http.StatusBadRequest,
			Response: gin.H{"error": "invalid JSON"},
		}
	}

	// Wrap in JSON-RPC envelope if missing
	if _, hasJSONRPC := payload["jsonrpc"]; !hasJSONRPC {
		payload = map[string]interface{}{
			"jsonrpc": "2.0",
			"id":      uuid.New().String(),
			"method":  payload["method"],
			"params":  payload["params"],
		}
	}

	// Ensure params.message.messageId exists (required by a2a-sdk)
	// AND v0.2→v0.3 compat (#2345): when sender supplies
	// params.message.content (v0.2) instead of params.message.parts
	// (v0.3), wrap the content as a single text Part so the downstream
	// a2a-sdk's v0.3 Pydantic validator accepts the message.
	//
	// Pre-fix: Design Director silently dropped briefs whose sender
	// used v0.2 shape — Pydantic rejected at parse time, the rejection
	// went only to logs, and the sender saw a happy 200/202.
	//
	// Reject loud (HTTP 400) when neither content nor parts is present;
	// previously the SDK's own rejection happened post-handler-dispatch
	// and was invisible to the original sender.
	if params, ok := payload["params"].(map[string]interface{}); ok {
		if msg, ok := params["message"].(map[string]interface{}); ok {
			if _, hasID := msg["messageId"]; !hasID {
				msg["messageId"] = uuid.New().String()
			}
			_, hasParts := msg["parts"]
			rawContent, hasContent := msg["content"]
			if !hasParts {
				if hasContent {
					switch v := rawContent.(type) {
					case string:
						msg["parts"] = []interface{}{
							map[string]interface{}{"kind": "text", "text": v},
						}
					case []interface{}:
						msg["parts"] = v
					default:
						return nil, "", &proxyA2AError{
							Status: http.StatusBadRequest,
							Response: gin.H{
								"error": "invalid params.message.content type",
								"hint":  "content must be a string (v0.2 compat) or omitted in favour of parts (v0.3)",
							},
						}
					}
					delete(msg, "content")
				} else {
					return nil, "", &proxyA2AError{
						Status: http.StatusBadRequest,
						Response: gin.H{
							"error": "params.message must contain either 'parts' (v0.3) or 'content' (v0.2 compat)",
							"hint":  "v0.3 example: {\"parts\":[{\"kind\":\"text\",\"text\":\"...\"}]}",
						},
					}
				}
			}
		}
	}

	marshaledBody, marshalErr := json.Marshal(payload)
	if marshalErr != nil {
		return nil, "", &proxyA2AError{
			Status:   http.StatusInternalServerError,
			Response: gin.H{"error": "failed to marshal request"},
		}
	}

	var a2aMethod string
	if m, ok := payload["method"].(string); ok {
		a2aMethod = m
	}
	return marshaledBody, a2aMethod, nil
}

// idleTimeoutDuration is the per-dispatch silence window: if the
// platform's broadcaster emits no events for this workspace for the
// full duration, the dispatch ctx is cancelled. Resets on every
// broadcaster event for the workspace — including the WORKSPACE_HEARTBEAT
// fired by the registry's /heartbeat handler every 30s, so a runtime
// that's just thinking silently between tool calls keeps the connection
// alive without having to emit ACTIVITY_LOGGED noise.
//
// Pre-2026-04-26 this was 60s, picked when the platform only broadcast
// on TASK_UPDATED (which itself only fires when current_task CHANGES).
// A claude-code agent doing a long packaging step or a slow model thought
// kept the same current_task for >60s, fired no broadcast, got cancelled
// mid-flight. Bumped to 5min as a safety net AND the heartbeat handler
// now broadcasts unconditionally — together either one alone closes the
// gap, both together is defence in depth.
//
// Override via A2A_IDLE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS for ops who want to tune (e.g.
// shorter for canary/test runners that want fail-fast on wedge, longer
// for prod tenants running unusually slow plugins).
var idleTimeoutDuration = parseIdleTimeoutEnv(os.Getenv("A2A_IDLE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS"))

// defaultIdleTimeoutDuration is what parseIdleTimeoutEnv returns when
// the env var is unset or invalid. Pulled out as a const so tests can
// reference it without re-deriving the value.
const defaultIdleTimeoutDuration = 5 * time.Minute

// parseIdleTimeoutEnv parses the A2A_IDLE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS value, falling
// back to defaultIdleTimeoutDuration on empty / non-numeric / non-positive
// input. Bad-input cases LOG so an operator who set the wrong value
// doesn't silently get the default and waste hours debugging "why is my
// override not working." Without the log line, A2A_IDLE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS=foo
// or =-30 produces identical observable behaviour to leaving it unset.
func parseIdleTimeoutEnv(v string) time.Duration {
	if v == "" {
		return defaultIdleTimeoutDuration
	}
	n, err := strconv.Atoi(v)
	if err != nil {
		log.Printf("A2A_IDLE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS=%q is not a valid integer; using default %s", v, defaultIdleTimeoutDuration)
		return defaultIdleTimeoutDuration
	}
	if n <= 0 {
		log.Printf("A2A_IDLE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS=%d must be > 0; using default %s", n, defaultIdleTimeoutDuration)
		return defaultIdleTimeoutDuration
	}
	return time.Duration(n) * time.Second
}

// dispatchA2A POSTs `body` to `agentURL`. Uses WithoutCancel so delegation
// chains survive client disconnect (browser tab close). Two layers of
// timeout per dispatch:
//
//   - Idle timeout (always applied): cancels the dispatch when no
//     broadcaster events for the workspace fire for
//     idleTimeoutDuration. Any progress event resets the clock — so
//     a long but actively-streaming reply runs forever, while a
//     wedged runtime fails fast.
//   - Absolute ceiling (agent-to-agent only): 30 min cap as a
//     defence against runaway delegation loops. Canvas dispatches
//     have no absolute ceiling — the user can wait as long as they
//     want, the idle timer is the only hangup signal.
//
// Either layer is overridable by the X-Timeout header upstream in
// ProxyA2A; X-Timeout: 0 explicitly disables the absolute ceiling.
func (h *WorkspaceHandler) dispatchA2A(ctx context.Context, workspaceID, agentURL string, body []byte, callerID string) (*http.Response, context.CancelFunc, error) {
	// #1483 SSRF defense-in-depth: the primary call path through
	// proxyA2ARequest → resolveAgentURL already validates via isSafeURL
	// (a2a_proxy.go:424), but adding the check here closes the gap for
	// any future code path that calls dispatchA2A directly without
	// going through resolveAgentURL. Wrapping as proxyDispatchBuildError
	// keeps the caller's error-classification path unchanged — the same
	// shape it already produces a 500 for.
	if err := isSafeURL(agentURL); err != nil {
		return nil, nil, &proxyDispatchBuildError{err: err}
	}
	forwardCtx := context.WithoutCancel(ctx)
	var ceilingCancel context.CancelFunc
	if _, hasDeadline := ctx.Deadline(); !hasDeadline {
		if callerID != "" {
			forwardCtx, ceilingCancel = context.WithTimeout(forwardCtx, 30*time.Minute)
		}
		// callerID == "" (canvas): no absolute ceiling. The idle
		// timeout below is the only deadline.
	}
	// Idle timeout — cancels the dispatch ctx after
	// idleTimeoutDuration of broadcaster silence for this workspace.
	// Always applied (canvas + agent-to-agent both benefit; the
	// ceiling above is a separate runaway-loop cap that only fires
	// for agent traffic). Combines with the ceiling cancel into a
	// single returned cancel func that the caller defers.
	// applyIdleTimeout needs SubscribeSSE which only lives on the
	// concrete *Broadcaster, not on the EventEmitter interface the
	// handler now stores. Type-assert + fall through to a no-op idle
	// timer if the broadcaster doesn't support subscriptions (the
	// EventEmitter mock used by some tests, e.g.). Production wires
	// the concrete *Broadcaster, so the assertion always succeeds in
	// real deploys.
	var b *events.Broadcaster
	if concrete, ok := h.broadcaster.(*events.Broadcaster); ok {
		b = concrete
	}
	// Per-workspace idle-timeout override (capability primitive #2 —
	// see workspace/adapter_base.py:idle_timeout_override). The
	// adapter declares a longer/shorter window than the platform
	// default in its heartbeat; the heartbeat handler stashes it in
	// runtimeOverrides; we honor it here. Falls through to the global
	// default (env A2A_IDLE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS, default 5min) when no
	// override is registered for this workspace.
	idle := idleTimeoutDuration
	if perWorkspace, ok := runtimeOverrides.IdleTimeout(workspaceID); ok {
		idle = perWorkspace
	}
	forwardCtx, idleCancel := applyIdleTimeout(forwardCtx, b, workspaceID, idle)
	cancel := func() {
		idleCancel()
		if ceilingCancel != nil {
			ceilingCancel()
		}
	}
	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(forwardCtx, "POST", agentURL, bytes.NewReader(body))
	if err != nil {
		cancel()
		// Wrap the construction failure so the caller can distinguish it
		// from an upstream Do() error and produce the correct 500 response.
		return nil, nil, &proxyDispatchBuildError{err: err}
	}
	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
	resp, doErr := a2aClient.Do(req)
	return resp, cancel, doErr
}

// applyIdleTimeout returns a child ctx that gets cancelled when no
// broadcaster events for `workspaceID` arrive for `idle` duration.
// Any incoming event resets the clock. The returned cancel func
// MUST be called to clean up the goroutine + subscription.
//
// nil broadcaster or non-positive idle returns the parent ctx
// unchanged (and a no-op cancel) so test paths that don't wire a
// broadcaster keep working.
func applyIdleTimeout(parent context.Context, b *events.Broadcaster, workspaceID string, idle time.Duration) (context.Context, context.CancelFunc) {
	if b == nil || idle <= 0 || workspaceID == "" {
		return parent, func() {}
	}
	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(parent)
	sub, unsub := b.SubscribeSSE(workspaceID)
	go func() {
		defer unsub()
		timer := time.NewTimer(idle)
		defer timer.Stop()
		for {
			select {
			case <-ctx.Done():
				return
			case _, ok := <-sub:
				if !ok {
					// Subscription channel closed — fall back to
					// pure-timer mode. Don't cancel: another caller
					// may have closed our sub but the request itself
					// is still in flight. Let the timer or the
					// caller's defer drive cleanup.
					continue
				}
				// Stop+drain pattern so a fired-but-unread timer
				// doesn't double-cancel after the Reset.
				if !timer.Stop() {
					select {
					case <-timer.C:
					default:
					}
				}
				timer.Reset(idle)
			case <-timer.C:
				cancel()
				return
			}
		}
	}()
	return ctx, cancel
}