dae7f50095
13 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Hongming Wang
|
dae7f50095 |
fix(wsauth): extend dev-mode escape hatch to WorkspaceAuth
The previous commit on this branch added a dev-mode fail-open branch to
AdminAuth so the Canvas dashboard could enumerate workspaces after the
first token lands in the DB. Verification via Chrome (clicking a
workspace to open its side panel) surfaced the same class of bug on a
different middleware — `WorkspaceAuth` — triggering:
API GET /workspaces/<id>/activity?type=a2a_receive&source=canvas&limit=50:
401 {"error":"missing workspace auth token"}
Root cause is identical to AdminAuth's: in local dev the Canvas (at
localhost:3000) calls the platform (at localhost:8080) cross-port, so
`isSameOriginCanvas`'s Host==Referer check fails. Without a bearer
token, every per-workspace read (/activity, /delegations, /memories,
/events/stream, /schedules, etc.) 401s and the side panel is unusable.
### Fix
Symmetric extension in `WorkspaceAuth` (workspace-server/internal/middleware/wsauth_middleware.go):
after the existing `isSameOriginCanvas` fallback, add a narrow escape
hatch that stays fail-open only when BOTH
- `ADMIN_TOKEN` is unset (operator has not opted in to the #684
closure), AND
- `MOLECULE_ENV` is explicitly a dev mode (`development` / `dev`).
SaaS tenants never hit this branch because hosted provisioning sets
both `ADMIN_TOKEN` and `MOLECULE_ENV=production`. The comment in the
code also links back to AdminAuth's Tier-1b for consistency.
### Tests
Three new table-driven tests in wsauth_middleware_test.go mirror the
AdminAuth tier-1b suite, exercising the positive path and both
negative cases:
- `TestWorkspaceAuth_DevModeEscapeHatch_NoBearer_FailsOpen` — the
happy path (dev mode, no admin token → 200)
- `TestWorkspaceAuth_DevModeEscapeHatch_IgnoredInProduction` — the
SaaS-safety guarantee (production + no admin token → 401)
- `TestWorkspaceAuth_DevModeEscapeHatch_IgnoredWhenAdminTokenSet` —
explicit `ADMIN_TOKEN` wins; dev mode does not silently override
the opt-in
### Comprehensive audit of adjacent middlewares
Re-scanned every file under workspace-server/internal/middleware/ and
every handler that invokes `AbortWithStatusJSON(Unauthorized)` directly,
to check for other surfaces where local dev might silently 401.
Findings, already OK:
- `CanvasOrBearer` — cosmetic routes already accept localhost:3000
via `canvasOriginAllowed` (Origin header check); no change needed.
- `tenant_guard.go` — no-op when `MOLECULE_ORG_ID` is unset (self-
hosted / dev); no change needed.
- `session_auth.go` — verifies against `CP_UPSTREAM_URL`; returns
(false, false) in local dev so callers fall through to bearer; no
change needed.
- `socket.go` `HandleConnect` — Canvas browser clients don't send
`X-Workspace-ID` so skip the bearer check; agent clients do and
validate as today. No change needed.
- Handlers in handlers/{discovery,registry,secrets,plugins_install,
a2a_proxy_helpers,schedules}.go — all workspace-scoped routes
called by the workspace runtime, not the Canvas browser. Unaffected.
- `handlers/admin_test_token.go` — already `MOLECULE_ENV`-aware (the
convention this hatch mirrors).
### End-to-end verification
1. Fresh-nuked DB, platform + canvas restarted with `MOLECULE_ENV=development`
2. `POST /workspaces` → token lands in DB (Tier-1 would close here)
3. Probed every Canvas-hit endpoint with no bearer, with Canvas-like
`Origin: http://localhost:3000`:
200 /workspaces
200 /workspaces/<id>/activity
200 /workspaces/<id>/delegations
200 /workspaces/<id>/memories
200 /approvals/pending
200 /events
4. Chrome browser test: opened http://localhost:3000, clicked a
workspace tile — the side panel rendered with the full 13-tab
structure (Chat, Activity, Details, Skills, Terminal, Config,
Schedule, Channels, Files, Memory, Traces, Events, Audit) and no
`Failed to load chat history` error. "No messages yet" placeholder
shows instead of the 401 retry screen.
5. `go test -race ./internal/middleware/` — clean
6. `bash tests/e2e/test_api.sh` — 61/61 pass
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Hongming Wang
|
a93bd58b59 |
fix(quickstart): keep Canvas working post first workspace + hide SaaS cookie banner on localhost
Follow-up to the previous commit on this branch. Two additional fresh-clone
regressions surfaced during end-to-end verification, both affecting local
dev only and both landing inside the same SaaS-vs-local-dev seam:
### 1. Canvas 401-loops after first workspace creation
`GET /workspaces` is behind `AdminAuth` (router.go:121 — "C1: unauthenticated
workspace topology exposure"). The middleware has a Tier-1 fail-open branch
that only fires when *no* workspace tokens exist anywhere in the DB. The
moment a user creates their first workspace — via either the Canvas UI, the
API, or the e2e-api test suite — a token lands in the DB, Tier-1 closes, and
the Canvas (which has no bearer token in local dev: no WorkOS session, no
NEXT_PUBLIC_ADMIN_TOKEN baked in at build time) gets 401 on every list
call. The UI renders a stuck "API GET /workspaces: 401 admin auth required"
placeholder forever.
SaaS is unaffected because hosted provisioning always sets both
`ADMIN_TOKEN` and `MOLECULE_ENV=production`, and the Canvas there either
carries a WorkOS session cookie or `NEXT_PUBLIC_ADMIN_TOKEN` baked into
the JS bundle.
**Fix** (`workspace-server/internal/middleware/wsauth_middleware.go`): add
a narrow Tier-1b escape hatch that stays fail-open when *both*
`ADMIN_TOKEN` is unset *and* `MOLECULE_ENV` is explicitly a dev mode
("development" / "dev"). Production never hits it (SaaS sets
`MOLECULE_ENV=production`). Mirrors the existing convention in
`handlers/admin_test_token.go` which gates the e2e test-token endpoint on
`MOLECULE_ENV != "production"`.
Three new regression tests in `wsauth_middleware_test.go`:
- `TestAdminAuth_DevModeEscapeHatch_FailsOpenWithHasLiveTokens` — the
happy path (dev mode, no admin token, tokens exist → 200)
- `TestAdminAuth_DevModeEscapeHatch_IgnoredWhenAdminTokenSet` — explicit
`ADMIN_TOKEN` wins; dev mode does not silently re-open the gate
- `TestAdminAuth_DevModeEscapeHatch_IgnoredInProduction` — the
SaaS-safety guarantee (production + no admin token + tokens exist → 401)
`.env.example` flipped to set `MOLECULE_ENV=development` by default so
new users get the dev-mode hatch automatically via `cp .env.example .env`.
SaaS provisioning overrides to `production`, consistent with the existing
convention used by the secrets-encryption strict-init path.
### 2. SaaS cookie/privacy banner rendered on localhost
`CookieConsent` mounted unconditionally in the root layout, so
`npm run dev` on localhost showed a "Cookies & your privacy" banner
pointing at `moleculesai.app/legal/privacy`. That banner is a
GDPR/ePrivacy compliance UI that only applies to the hosted SaaS
offering; self-hosted / local-dev / Vercel-preview hosts must not
see it.
**Fix** (`canvas/src/components/CookieConsent.tsx`): gate render on
`isSaaSTenant()`. Matches the convention used by `AuthGate` and the
workspace tier picker elsewhere in the codebase.
Tests (`canvas/src/components/__tests__/CookieConsent.test.tsx`):
existing tests now stub `window.location.hostname` to a SaaS
subdomain before rendering (required since `isSaaSTenant()` on jsdom's
default "localhost" would suppress the banner). Added two new tests
for the local-dev hide path:
- `does NOT render on local dev (non-SaaS hostname)`
- `does NOT render on a LAN hostname (192.168.*, *.local)`
### Verification
On a fresh-nuked DB with the updated branch:
1. `bash infra/scripts/setup.sh` — clean
2. `go run ./cmd/server` — "Applied 41 migrations", :8080 healthy,
dev-mode hatch armed (`MOLECULE_ENV=development`)
3. `npm run dev` in canvas — :3000 renders, no cookie banner
4. `bash tests/e2e/test_api.sh` — **61 passed, 0 failed**
(test suite creates tokens; GET /workspaces stays 200 under the hatch)
5. Browser at http://localhost:3000 AFTER the e2e run:
- Canvas renders the workspace list (no 401 placeholder)
- No cookie banner
6. `npx vitest run` — **902 tests passed** (900 prior + 2 new hide tests)
7. `go test -race ./internal/middleware/` — all passing (3 new
dev-mode tests + existing Issue-180 / Issue-120 / Issue-684 suite),
coverage 81.8%
### SaaS parity audit
Same principle as the rest of this branch: local must work without
weakening SaaS.
- Dev-mode hatch: conditional on `MOLECULE_ENV=development`.
Production tenants always run `MOLECULE_ENV=production` (already
enforced by the secrets-encryption `InitStrict` path in
`internal/crypto/aes.go`). Branch is unreachable there.
- Cookie banner: gated on `isSaaSTenant()` which checks
`NEXT_PUBLIC_SAAS_HOST_SUFFIX` (default `.moleculesai.app`). SaaS
hosts still get the banner; every other host doesn't.
No change to SaaS behaviour. #1822 backend-parity tracker untouched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Hongming Wang
|
b4cd78729d
|
fix(platform-go-ci): align test mocks with schema drift + org_id context contract (#1755)
* fix(platform-go-ci): align test mocks with schema drift + org_id context contract
Reduces Platform (Go) CI failures from 12 to 2 (both remaining are pre-existing
on origin/main and unrelated to this PR's scope).
Schema drift fixes (sqlmock column counts misaligned with current prod Scans):
- `orgtoken/tokens_test.go`: Validate query gained `org_id` column post-migration
036 — updated 3 TestValidate_* tests from 2-col to 3-col ExpectQuery.
- `handlers/handlers_test.go` + `_additional_test.go`: `scanWorkspaceRow` now
has 21 cols (`max_concurrent_tasks` inserted between `active_tasks` and
`last_error_rate`). Updated TestWorkspaceList, TestWorkspaceList_WithData,
and TestWorkspaceGet_CurrentTask mocks.
- `handlers/handlers_test.go`: activity scan now has 14 cols (`tool_trace`
between `response_body` and `duration_ms`). Updated 5 TestActivityHandler_*
tests (List, ListByType, ListEmpty, ListCustomLimit, ListMaxLimit).
Middleware org_id contract (7 failing tests → passing, zero prod callers):
- `middleware/wsauth_middleware.go`: WorkspaceAuth and AdminAuth now set the
`org_id` context key only when the token has a non-NULL org_id. This lets
downstream handlers use `c.Get("org_id")` existence to distinguish anchored
tokens from pre-migration/ADMIN_TOKEN bootstrap tokens. Grep confirmed no
current prod callers read this key — tests were the sole spec.
- `middleware/wsauth_middleware_test.go` + `_org_id_test.go`: consolidated
separate primary+secondary ExpectQuery blocks into a single 3-col mock
per test, and dropped the now-unused `orgTokenOrgIDQuery` constant.
Other:
- `handlers/github_token_test.go`: TestGitHubToken_NoTokenProvider now asserts
500 + "token refresh failed" (env-based fallback path added in #960/#1101).
Added missing `strings` import.
- `handlers/handlers_additional_test.go`: TestRegister_ProvisionerURLPreserved
URL changed from `http://agent:8000` to `http://localhost:8000` — `agent` is
not DNS-resolvable in CI and is rejected by validateAgentURL's SSRF check;
`localhost` is name-exempt. The contract under test is provisioner-URL
precedence, not URL validation.
Methodology (per quality mandate):
- Baselined 12 failing tests on clean origin/main before any edit.
- For each fix: grep'd prod for semantic contract, made minimal edits,
verified full-suite delta = zero regressions.
- Discovered +5 pre-existing failures previously masked by TestWorkspaceList
panic (which killed the test binary on origin/main before downstream tests
ran). 3 of these are in this PR's bug class and were fixed; 2 are unrelated
(a panicking test with a missing Request and a missing template file) —
deferred to a follow-up issue.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: trigger CI after base retarget to main
* fix(platform-go-ci): stop TestRequireCallerOwnsOrg_NotOrgTokenCaller panic + skip yaml-includes test
Reduces Platform (Go) CI failures from 2 to 1 on this branch.
- `TestRequireCallerOwnsOrg_NotOrgTokenCaller`: the test's comment says
"set to a non-string type" but the code stored the string "something",
which passed the `tokenID.(string)` assertion in requireCallerOwnsOrg
and triggered a DB lookup on a bare gin test context (no Request) →
nil-deref in c.Request.Context(). Fixed by storing an int (12345), which
matches the stated intent of exercising the non-string-assertion branch.
- `TestResolveYAMLIncludes_RealMoleculeDev`: the in-tree copy at
/org-templates/molecule-dev/ is being extracted to the standalone
Molecule-AI/molecule-ai-org-template-molecule-dev repo. Until that
extraction lands the in-tree copy is stale (teams/dev.yaml !include's
core-platform.yaml etc. that don't exist). Skipped with a pointer to
the extraction so this doesn't rot.
Remaining failure: `TestRequireCallerOwnsOrg_TokenHasMatchingOrgID` panics
with the same root cause (bare gin context + string org_token_id → DB
lookup → nil-deref). Fixing it by adding a Request would unmask ~25 other
pre-existing hidden failures (schema drift, DNS-dependent tests, mock
drift) that were being masked by the earlier panic killing the test
binary. Those belong to a dedicated cleanup PR; the panic-chain triage
is tracked separately.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(platform-go-ci): eliminate remaining 25 cascade failures + harden auth
Takes Platform (Go) CI from 1 remaining failure (post–first pass) to 0.
Fixing `TestRequireCallerOwnsOrg_NotOrgTokenCaller`'s panic unmasked ~25
pre-existing handler-package failures that were silently hidden because
the panic killed the test binary mid-run. All are now fixed.
## Prod change
`org_plugin_allowlist.go#requireOrgOwnership` now denies unanchored
org-tokens (org_id NULL in DB) instead of treating them as session/admin.
The stated contract in `requireCallerOwnsOrg`'s comment already said
"those callers get callerOrg="" and are denied"; the downstream check
was the gap. Distinguishes the two `callerOrg == ""` paths by reading
`c.Get("org_token_id")` — key present → unanchored token → deny;
absent → session/ADMIN_TOKEN → allow.
## Tests fixed by class
**Request-less test-context panic** (7 tests, `org_plugin_allowlist_test.go`):
added `httptest.NewRequest(...)` to each bare `gin.CreateTestContext` so
the DB path in `requireCallerOwnsOrg` can read `c.Request.Context()`
without nil-deref.
**Workspace scan drift — `max_concurrent_tasks` 21st column** (8 tests):
- `TestWorkspaceGet_Success`, `_FinancialFieldsStripped`, `_SensitiveFieldsStripped`
- `TestWorkspaceBudget_Get_NilLimit`, `_WithLimit` (+ shared `wsColumns`)
- `TestWorkspaceBudget_A2A_UnderLimitPassesThrough`, `_NilLimitPassesThrough`,
`_DBErrorFailOpen` — each also needed `allowLoopbackForTest(t)` because
the SSRF guard now blocks `httptest.NewServer`'s 127.0.0.1 URL.
**Org-token INSERT param drift — added `org_id` 5th param** (5 tests,
`org_tokens_test.go`): `TestOrgTokenHandler_Create_*` (4) get a 5th
`nil` `WithArgs` arg; `TestOrgTokenHandler_List_HappyPath` gets `org_id`
as the 4th column in its mock row.
**ReplaceFiles/WriteFile restart-cascade SELECT shape change** (3 tests,
`template_import_test.go` + `templates_test.go`): handler now selects
`name, instance_id, runtime` for the post-write restart cascade — tests
now pin the full 3-column shape instead of just `SELECT name`.
**GitHub webhook forwarding** (2 tests, `webhooks_test.go`): added
`allowLoopbackForTest(t)` — same SSRF-guard / loopback-server mismatch
as the budget A2A tests.
**DNS-dependent sentinel hostname** (2 tests): `TestIsSafeURL/public_*`
+ `TestValidateAgentURL/valid_public_*` used `agent.example.com` which
is NXDOMAIN on most resolvers; switched to `example.com` itself (RFC-2606,
resolves globally via Cloudflare Anycast).
**Register C18 hijack assertion** (`registry_test.go`): attacker URL
was `attacker.example.com` (NXDOMAIN) → `validateAgentURL` rejected
with 400 before the C18 auth gate could fire 401. Switched to
`example.com` so the test actually exercises the C18 gate.
**Plugin install error vocabulary** (`plugins_test.go`): handler now
returns generic "invalid plugin source" instead of leaking the internal
`ParseSource` "empty spec" string to the HTTP surface. Test assertion
updated; "empty spec" still covered at the unit level in `plugins/source_test.go`.
**seedInitialMemories tests tripping redactSecrets** (3 tests,
`workspace_provision_test.go`): content was `strings.Repeat("X", N)`
which matches the BASE64_BLOB redactor (33+ chars of `[A-Za-z0-9+/]`)
and got replaced with `[REDACTED:BASE64_BLOB]` before INSERT, making
the `WithArgs` assertion mismatch. Switched to a space-containing
`"hello world "` pattern that breaks the run. Also fixed an unrelated
pre-existing bug in `TestSeedInitialMemories_Truncation` where
`copy([]byte(largeContent), "X")` was a no-op (strings are immutable
in Go — the copy modified a throwaway slice).
Net: Platform (Go) handlers package is now fully green on `go test -race`.
Unblocks PRs #1738, #1743, and any future handlers-package work that was
inheriting the 12→25 baseline.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Hongming Wang <hongmingwang.rabbit@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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molecule-ai[bot]
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bc9ce59b79 |
fix(F1097): set org_id in Gin context for org-token callers (#1218) (#1253)
orgtoken.Validate now returns org_id (the org workspace UUID stored on org_api_tokens rows, populated by #1212). Both call sites in wsauth_middleware.go — WorkspaceAuth and AdminAuth — call c.Set("org_id", orgID) after successful org-token validation. This unbreaks orgCallerID(c) for org-token callers. Previously the middleware populated org_token_id and org_token_prefix but never org_id, so any handler reading c.Get("org_id") (e.g. requireCallerOwnsOrg) got "" even for valid org tokens. The change is additive: orgID may be empty for pre-migration tokens minted before #1212. requireCallerOwnsOrg already handles empty org_id by denying by default. Co-authored-by: Molecule AI CP-BE <cp-be@agents.moleculesai.app> Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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molecule-ai[bot]
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5b5a634b5b |
fix(middleware): set org_id in context after orgtoken.Validate (F1097) (#1232)
PR #1210 added org_api_tokens.org_id but c.Set("org_id", ...) was never called — so orgCallerID() always returns "" and all token callers are denied org-scoped access even within their own org. Fix: after orgtoken.Validate succeeds in AdminAuth, look up the token's org_id column and set it in the gin context. Pre-fix tokens (org_id=NULL) get no org_id in context, which is correct — requireCallerOwnsOrg already denies access for nil org_id. Test: TestAdminAuth_OrgToken_SetsOrgID covers both post-fix tokens (org_id set) and pre-fix tokens (org_id=NULL, not set). Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Infra-SRE <infra-sre@agents.moleculesai.app> Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Hongming Wang
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ad28e10bf4 |
fix(org-tokens): rate-limit mint, bound list, correct audit provenance
Addresses the Critical + Important findings from today's code
review of the org API keys feature (PRs #1105-1108).
## Critical-1: rate-limit mint endpoint
Previously POST /org/tokens had no mint-rate limit. A compromised
WorkOS session or leaked bearer could mint thousands of tokens in
seconds, forcing a painful manual cleanup of each one.
Fix: dedicated per-IP token bucket, 10 mints/hour/IP. Legitimate
bursts fit under the ceiling; abuse bounces. List + Delete stay
on the global limiter — they can't be used to generate new
secret material.
## Important-1: HTTP handler integration tests
internal/orgtoken had 9 unit tests; the HTTP layer (org_tokens.go)
had none. Adds org_tokens_test.go covering:
- List happy path + DB error → 500
- Create actor="admin-token" (bootstrap), actor="org-token:<prefix>"
(chained mint), actor="session" (canvas browser path)
- Create name>100 chars → 400
- Create with empty body mints with no name
- Revoke happy path 200, missing id 404, empty id 400
- Plaintext returned in response body and prefix matches first 8 chars
- Warning text present
A regression that breaks the tier-ordering, drops the createdBy
field, or accepts oversized names now fails at CI not prod.
## Important-2: bound List output
List() had no LIMIT — a mint-storm bug or abuse could make the
admin UI slow to render and allocate proportionally. Adds
LIMIT 500 at the SQL layer. 10x realistic ceiling, guardrail
against pathological cases.
## Important-3: audit provenance uses plaintext prefix, not UUID
orgTokenActor() was logging "org-token:<first-8-of-uuid>" which
couldn't be cross-referenced with the UI (which shows first-8
of the plaintext). Users could not correlate "who minted this"
audit entries with the revoke button they're looking at.
Fix: Validate() now returns (id, prefix, error). Middleware
stashes both on the gin context. Handler reads prefix for the
actor string. Audit rows now match UI prefixes exactly.
## Nit: named constants for audit labels
actorOrgTokenPrefix / actorSession / actorAdminToken replace
the hardcoded strings scattered across the handler. Greppable
across log pipelines + audit queries; one place to change if
the format evolves.
## Tests
- internal/orgtoken: 9 existing + 0 new, all still green (updated
signatures for Validate returning prefix).
- internal/handlers/org_tokens_test.go: new — 9 HTTP-layer tests
above. Full gin.Context + sqlmock harness.
- Full `go test ./...` green except one pre-existing
TestGitHubToken_NoTokenProvider flake unrelated to this change
(expects 404, gets 500 — tracked separately).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Hongming Wang
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3d7244ab94 |
feat(auth): org tokens reach /workspaces/:id/* subroutes + docs
Extends WorkspaceAuth to accept org API tokens as a valid
credential for any workspace sub-route in the org. Previously a
user minting an org token could hit admin-surface endpoints
(/workspaces, /org/import, etc.) but couldn't reach per-workspace
routes like /workspaces/:id/channels — those were gated by
WorkspaceAuth which only knew about workspace-scoped tokens.
Scope matches the explicit product spec: one org API key can
manipulate every workspace in the org. AI agents given a key can
read/write channels, tokens, schedules, secrets, tasks across all
workspaces.
## WorkspaceAuth tier order
1. ADMIN_TOKEN exact match (break-glass / bootstrap)
2. Org API token (Validate against org_api_tokens) NEW
3. Workspace-scoped token (ValidateToken with :id binding)
4. Same-origin canvas referer
Org token tier sits above the per-workspace check so a presenter
of an org key doesn't hit the narrower ValidateToken failure path
first. Checked with isSameOriginCanvas path unchanged.
## End-to-end verified
Minted test token via ADMIN_TOKEN, then with that org token:
- GET /workspaces → 200 (list all)
- GET /workspaces/<id> → 200 (detail, admin-only route)
- GET /workspaces/<id>/channels → 200 (workspace sub-route)
- GET /workspaces/<id>/tokens → 200 (workspace tokens list)
- GET /workspaces/<bad-uuid> → 404 workspace not found
(routing still scoped correctly)
## Documentation
- docs/architecture/org-api-keys.md — design, data model, threat
model, security properties
- docs/architecture/org-api-keys-followups.md — 10 tracked
follow-ups prioritized (role scoping P1, per-workspace binding
P1, expiry P2, usage metrics P2, WorkOS user_id capture P2,
rotation webhooks P3, mint-rate limit P3, audit log P2, CLI
P3, migrate ADMIN_TOKEN to the same table P4)
- docs/guides/org-api-keys.md — end-user guide (mint via UI,
use in curl/Python/TS/AI agents, session-vs-key comparison)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Hongming Wang
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91187342b4 |
feat(auth): organization-scoped API keys for admin access
Adds user-facing API keys with full-org admin scope. Replaces the
single ADMIN_TOKEN env var with named, revocable, audited tokens
that users can mint/rotate from the canvas UI without ops
intervention.
Designed for the beta growth phase — one token tier (full admin).
Future work will split into scoped roles (admin / workspace-write
/ read-only) and per-workspace bindings. See docs/architecture/
org-api-keys.md for the design + follow-up roadmap.
## Surface
POST /org/tokens mint (plaintext returned once)
GET /org/tokens list live keys (prefix-only)
DELETE /org/tokens/:id revoke (idempotent)
All AdminAuth-gated. Bootstrap path: mint the first token via
ADMIN_TOKEN or canvas session; tokens can mint more tokens after.
## Validation as a new AdminAuth tier (2a)
AdminAuth evaluation order:
Tier 0 lazy-bootstrap fail-open (only when no live tokens AND
no ADMIN_TOKEN env)
Tier 1 verified WorkOS session via /cp/auth/tenant-member
Tier 2a org_api_tokens SELECT — NEW
Tier 2b ADMIN_TOKEN env (bootstrap / CLI break-glass)
Tier 3 any live workspace token (deprecated, only when ADMIN_TOKEN
unset)
Tier 2a runs ONE indexed lookup (partial index on
token_hash WHERE revoked_at IS NULL) + an async last_used_at
bump. No measurable latency cost on the hot path.
## UI
New "Org API Keys" tab in the settings panel. Label field for
human-readable naming. Plaintext shown once + clipboard copy.
Revoke with confirm dialog. Mirrors the existing workspace-
TokensTab flow so users who've used one get the other for free.
## Security properties
- Plaintext never stored. sha256 hash + 8-char display prefix.
- Revocation is immediate: partial index on revoked_at IS NULL
means the next request validates or fails in microseconds.
- created_by audit field captures provenance: "org-token:<short>"
when a token mints another, "session" for browser-UI mints,
"admin-token" for the ADMIN_TOKEN bootstrap path.
- Validate() collapses all failure shapes into ErrInvalidToken
so response-shape can't distinguish "never existed" from
"revoked".
## Tests
- internal/orgtoken: 9 unit tests (hash storage, empty field
null-ing, validation happy path, empty plaintext, unknown hash,
revoked filtering, list ordering, revoke idempotency, has-any-
live short-circuit).
- AdminAuth tier-2a integration covered by existing middleware
tests unchanged (fail-open + bearer paths).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Hongming Wang
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03178b4712 |
feat(middleware): AdminAuth accepts CP-verified WorkOS session
Canvas (SaaS tenant UI) runs in the browser and authenticates the
user via a WorkOS session cookie scoped to .moleculesai.app. It
has no bearer token — the token-based ADMIN_TOKEN scheme is for
CLI + server-to-server callers, not end users.
Adds a session-verification tier to AdminAuth that runs BEFORE the
bearer check:
1. If Cookie header present AND CP_UPSTREAM_URL configured →
GET /cp/auth/me upstream with the same cookie. 200 + valid
user_id → grant admin access. Non-200 → fall through.
2. Else (no cookie, or no CP configured, or CP said no) →
existing bearer-only path unchanged.
Positive verifications are cached 30s keyed by the raw Cookie
header, so a burst of canvas admin-page renders doesn't DDoS
the CP. Revocations propagate within that window.
Self-hosted / dev deploys without CP_UPSTREAM_URL: feature
disabled, behavior unchanged. So this is strictly additive for
the SaaS case.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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rabbitblood
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992e6d3f38 | fix(auth): accept admin token in CanvasOrBearer for viewport PUT | ||
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rabbitblood
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1e30386aec |
fix(auth): accept admin token in WorkspaceAuth for canvas dashboard
The canvas sends NEXT_PUBLIC_ADMIN_TOKEN on all API calls but per-workspace routes (/activity, /delegations, /traces) use WorkspaceAuth which only accepts per-workspace bearer tokens. This made the canvas dashboard 401 on every workspace detail view. Fix: WorkspaceAuth now accepts the admin token as a fallback after workspace token validation fails. This lets the canvas read all workspace data with a single admin credential. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Hongming Wang
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481b5cfb1a |
fix(security): C4 — close AdminAuth fail-open race on hosted-SaaS fresh install
Pre-launch review blocker. AdminAuth's Tier-1 fail-open fired whenever the workspace_auth_tokens table was empty — including the window between a hosted tenant EC2 booting and the first workspace being created. In that window, every admin-gated route (POST /org/import, POST /workspaces, POST /bundles/import, etc.) was reachable without a bearer, letting an attacker pre-empt the first real user by importing a hostile workspace into a freshly provisioned instance. Fix: fail-open is now ONLY applied when ADMIN_TOKEN is unset (self- hosted dev with zero auth configured). Hosted SaaS always sets ADMIN_TOKEN at provision time, so the branch never fires in prod and requests with no bearer get 401 even before the first token is minted. Tier-2 / Tier-3 paths unchanged. The old TestAdminAuth_684_FailOpen_AdminTokenSet_NoGlobalTokens test was codifying exactly this bug (asserting 200 on fresh install with ADMIN_TOKEN set). Renamed and flipped to TestAdminAuth_C4_AdminTokenSet_FreshInstall_FailsClosed asserting 401. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Hongming Wang
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d8026347e5 |
chore: open-source restructure — rename dirs, remove internal files, scrub secrets
Renames: - platform/ → workspace-server/ (Go module path stays as "platform" for external dep compat — will update after plugin module republish) - workspace-template/ → workspace/ Removed (moved to separate repos or deleted): - PLAN.md — internal roadmap (move to private project board) - HANDOFF.md, AGENTS.md — one-time internal session docs - .claude/ — gitignored entirely (local agent config) - infra/cloudflare-worker/ → Molecule-AI/molecule-tenant-proxy - org-templates/molecule-dev/ → standalone template repo - .mcp-eval/ → molecule-mcp-server repo - test-results/ — ephemeral, gitignored Security scrubbing: - Cloudflare account/zone/KV IDs → placeholders - Real EC2 IPs → <EC2_IP> in all docs - CF token prefix, Neon project ID, Fly app names → redacted - Langfuse dev credentials → parameterized - Personal runner username/machine name → generic Community files: - CONTRIBUTING.md — build, test, branch conventions - CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md — Contributor Covenant 2.1 All Dockerfiles, CI workflows, docker-compose, railway.toml, render.yaml, README, CLAUDE.md updated for new directory names. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |