Commit Graph

3 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Hongming Wang
c636022d2f fix(runtime): auto-fallback CONFIGS_DIR for non-container hosts (closes #2458)
The runtime persists per-workspace state (`.auth_token`,
`.platform_inbound_secret`, `.mcp_inbox_cursor`) under `/configs` —
the workspace-EC2 mount path. Inside a container that's writable,
agent-owned. Outside a container, `/configs` either doesn't exist or
isn't writable by an unprivileged user.

The default broke the external-runtime path (`pip install
molecule-ai-workspace-runtime` + `molecule-mcp` on a Mac/Linux
laptop). First heartbeat tries to persist `.platform_inbound_secret`
and crashes:

    [Errno 30] Read-only file system: '/configs'

The heartbeat thread logs and dies. Workspace flips offline within
a minute. Operator sees no actionable error.

Adds workspace/configs_dir.py — single resolution point with a tiered
fallback:

  1. CONFIGS_DIR env var, if set — explicit operator override
     (preserves existing tests + custom deployments verbatim).
  2. /configs — if it exists AND is writable. In-container default;
     unchanged behavior for every prod workspace.
  3. ~/.molecule-workspace — created with mode 0700 so per-file 0600
     perms aren't undermined by a world-readable parent.

Migrates the four readers (platform_auth, platform_inbound_auth,
mcp_cli, inbox) to call configs_dir.resolve() instead of
inlining `Path(os.environ.get("CONFIGS_DIR", "/configs"))`.

Existing tests that assert the old `/configs`-as-default contract
updated to assert the new contract: when CONFIGS_DIR is unset, path
resolves to a writable location — `/configs` if present, fallback
otherwise. Tests skip the fallback branch on hosts that DO have a
writable `/configs` (CI containers).

Verified the original repro is fixed: with no CONFIGS_DIR set on
macOS, configs_dir.resolve() returns ~/.molecule-workspace, the dir
exists, and writes succeed.

Test suite: 1454 passed, 3 skipped, 2 xfailed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-01 13:07:55 -07:00
Hongming Wang
055e447355 feat(saas): deliver platform_inbound_secret via /registry/register (RFC #2312, PR-F)
Closes the SaaS-side gap that PR-A acknowledged but didn't fix: SaaS
workspaces have no persistent /configs volume, so the platform_inbound_secret
that PR-A's provisioner wrote at workspace creation never reaches the
runtime. Without this, even after the entire RFC #2312 stack lands,
SaaS chat upload would 401 (workspace fails-closed when /configs/.platform_inbound_secret
is missing).

Solution: return the secret in the /registry/register response body
on every register call. The runtime extracts it and persists to
/configs/.platform_inbound_secret at mode 0600. Idempotent — Docker-
mode workspaces also receive it and overwrite the value the provisioner
already wrote (same value until rotation).

Why on every register, not just first-register:
  * SaaS containers can be restarted (deploys, drains, EBS detach/
    re-attach) — /configs is rebuilt empty on each fresh start.
  * The auth_token is "issue once" because re-issuing rotates and
    invalidates the previous one. The inbound secret has no rotation
    flow yet (#2318) so re-sending the same value is harmless.
  * Eliminates the bootstrap window where a restarted SaaS workspace
    has no inbound secret on disk and would 401 every platform call.

Changes:
  * workspace-server/internal/handlers/registry.go — Register handler
    reads workspaces.platform_inbound_secret via wsauth.ReadPlatformInboundSecret
    and includes it in the response body. Legacy workspaces (NULL
    column) get a successful registration with the field omitted.
  * workspace-server/internal/handlers/registry_test.go — two new tests:
      - TestRegister_ReturnsPlatformInboundSecret_RFC2312_PRF: secret
        present in DB → secret in response, alongside auth_token.
      - TestRegister_NoInboundSecret_OmitsField: NULL column → field
        omitted, registration still 200.
  * workspace/platform_inbound_auth.py — adds save_inbound_secret(secret).
    Atomic write via tmp + os.replace, mode 0600 from os.open(O_CREAT,
    0o600) so a concurrent reader never sees 0644-default. Resets the
    in-process cache after write so the next get_inbound_secret() returns
    the freshly-written value (rotation-safe when it lands).
  * workspace/main.py — register-response handler extracts
    platform_inbound_secret alongside auth_token and persists via
    save_inbound_secret. Mirrors the existing save_token pattern.
  * workspace/tests/test_platform_inbound_auth.py — 6 new tests for
    save_inbound_secret: writes file, mode 0600, overwrite-existing,
    cache invalidation after save, empty-input no-op, parent-dir creation
    for fresh installs.

Test results:
  * go test ./internal/handlers/ ./internal/wsauth/ — all green
  * pytest workspace/tests/ — 1272 passed (was 1266 before this PR)

Refs #2312 (parent RFC), #2308 (chat upload 503 incident).
Stacks: PR-A #2313 → PR-B #2314 → PR-C #2315 → this PR.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-29 15:12:34 -07:00
Hongming Wang
d1de330152 feat(workspace): /internal/chat/uploads/ingest endpoint (RFC #2312, PR-B)
Stacked on PR-A (#2313). The platform-side rewrite that actually calls
this endpoint lands in PR-C; this PR adds the workspace-side consumer
+ hardening so PR-C is a small Go-only diff.

What this adds:

  * platform_inbound_auth.py — auth gate mirroring transcript_auth.py.
    Reads /configs/.platform_inbound_secret (delivered by the PR-A
    provisioner). Fail-closed when the file is missing/empty/unreadable.
    Constant-time compare via hmac.compare_digest.

  * internal_chat_uploads.py — POST /internal/chat/uploads/ingest.
    Multipart parse → sanitize each filename → write to
    /workspace/.molecule/chat-uploads/<random>-<name> with
    O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_NOFOLLOW. Same response shape (uri/name/mimeType/
    size + workspace: URI scheme) as the legacy Go handler — canvas /
    agent code that resolves "workspace:..." paths keeps working.

  * Wired into workspace/main.py via starlette_app.add_route alongside
    the existing /transcript route.

  * python-multipart>=0.0.18 added to requirements.txt (Starlette's
    Request.form() needs it; ≥ 0.0.18 closes CVE-2024-53981).

Test coverage (36 tests, all green; full workspace suite 1266 passed):

  * test_platform_inbound_auth.py — 14 tests:
      happy path, fail-closed on missing file, empty file, whitespace-
      only file, missing/case-wrong/empty Bearer prefix, in-process
      cache, default CONFIGS_DIR fallback, end-to-end file → authorized.

  * test_internal_chat_uploads.py — 22 tests:
      sanitize_filename matrix (incl. ../traversal, CJK chars, length
      truncation), 401 on missing/wrong/no-secret-file bearer, single +
      batch upload happy paths, unique random prefix on duplicate names,
      mimetype guess fallback, 400 on missing files field, 413 on per-
      file + total-body oversize, symlink-at-target refusal (with
      sentinel-content unchanged assertion).

Why this is safe to ship before PR-C:

  * No platform-side caller yet → no behavior change visible to users.
  * Auth fails closed; nothing on the network can hit a write path
    until the platform forwards with the matching bearer.
  * Workspace's existing routes (/health, /transcript, /handle/*) are
    unchanged.

Refs #2312 (parent RFC), #2308 (chat upload 503 incident).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-29 14:16:32 -07:00