3 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
hongming-codex-laptop	ad7acd30db	fix(platform): clear golangci-lint findings	2026-05-12 22:53:22 -07:00
Hongming Wang	656a02fae4	fix(textutil): SSOT for rune-safe string truncation, fix 3 audit-gap bugs ... Closes #2962. ## Why Six per-package `truncate` helpers had drifted into independent re-implementations of the same idea. Three of them (delegation.go, memory/client/client.go, memory-backfill/verify.go) used `s[:max] + "…"` byte-slice form, which on a multi-byte codepoint at byte `max` produces invalid UTF-8 → Postgres `text`/`jsonb` rejects the INSERT silently → `delegation` / `activity_logs` row never lands → audit gap. Three other helpers (delegation_ledger.go #2962, agent_message_writer.go #2959, scheduler.go #2026) had each been fixed in isolation with three slightly different rune-safe shapes — confirming this is a class of bug, not a single instance. ## What New package `internal/textutil` with three rune-safe functions: - `TruncateBytes(s, maxBytes)` — byte-cap, "…" marker. Used by 5 callers writing into byte-bounded columns / log lines. - `TruncateBytesNoMarker(s, maxBytes)` — byte-cap, no marker. Used by delegation_ledger.go where the storage already conveys "preview" and an extra ellipsis would push the result over the column cap. - `TruncateRunes(s, maxRunes)` — rune-cap, "…" marker. Used by agent_message_writer.go where the cap is in display chars (UI summary), not bytes. All three guarantee `utf8.ValidString(out)` for any `utf8.ValidString(in)`. Inputs already invalid go through `sanitizeUTF8` at the call site boundary (scheduler.go preserved this defense-in-depth). ## Migration map | Old | New | Behavior change | |---|---|---| | `delegation_ledger.truncatePreview` | `textutil.TruncateBytesNoMarker(s, 4096)` | none | | `agent_message_writer.truncatePreviewRunes` | `textutil.TruncateRunes(s, n)` | none | | `scheduler.truncate` | `textutil.TruncateBytes(s, n)` | "..." → "…" (3 bytes either way; single-glyph display) | | `delegation.truncate` | `textutil.TruncateBytes(s, n)` | bug fix + ellipsis swap | | `memory/client.truncate` | `textutil.TruncateBytes(s, n)` | bug fix | | `memory-backfill.truncate` | `textutil.TruncateBytes(s, n)` | bug fix | Five separate `truncate*` helpers + their per-package tests removed. Net: 12 files / +427 / -255. ## Tests - `internal/textutil/truncate_test.go` — 27 table-test cases + 145 fuzz-invariant cases asserting `utf8.ValidString` and byte-cap invariants on every output. - `delegation_ledger_test.go TestLedgerInsert_TruncatesOversizedPreview` strengthened with `capValidUTF8Matcher` so the SQL-write argument is asserted to be valid UTF-8 + within cap (not just `AnyArg()`). Mutation-tested: replacing the SSOT call with byte-slice form makes this test fail loud. ## Compatibility - All callers internal; no external API surface change. - Ellipsis swap "..." → "…": same byte budget (3 bytes), single-glyph display. No alerting/grep on either marker in this codebase (verified). Canvas renders both correctly. - DB column widths unchanged (4096 / 80 / 200 / 256 / 300 — all preserved in the migrations). ## Security Fixes a silent INSERT-failure mode that hid `activity_logs` / `delegations` rows containing peer-controlled text. The class of input that triggered it (CJK, emoji, accented Latin) is normal user content, not malicious — but the symptom (audit gap) makes incident reconstruction harder. Helper is pure-function over `string`; no secrets / PII / auth handling involved. Untrusted input is handled identically to before, just rune-aligned now. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-05-05 23:01:21 -07:00
Hongming Wang	c1cff3169f	Memory v2 PR-2: HTTP plugin client + breaker + capability negotiation ... Builds on PR-1 (#2729). Implements every endpoint in the OpenAPI spec plus two operational concerns the agent never sees: 1. Capability negotiation. Boot/Refresh probes /v1/health and captures the plugin's capability list. MCP handlers (PR-5) ask SupportsCapability before exposing capability-gated features — e.g., agents can only request semantic search when "embedding" is reported. 2. Circuit breaker. Three consecutive failures open the breaker for 60 seconds; while open, calls fail fast with ErrBreakerOpen. Picked these constants because: - 3 failures: long enough to skip transient blips, short enough to react before all in-flight handlers stack on the timeout - 60s cooldown: long enough to back off a flapping plugin, short enough that recovery is felt within a single session 4xx responses do NOT count toward the breaker (those are client bugs, not plugin health issues); 5xx + transport errors do. What ships: - workspace-server/internal/memory/client/client.go - client_test.go: 100% statement coverage Coverage corner cases pinned: - env-var success branches in New (parseDurationEnv applied) - json.Marshal error (via channel in Propagation) - http.NewRequestWithContext error (via unbalanced bracket in BaseURL) - 204 NoContent on endpoint that normally has a body - 4xx vs 5xx breaker behavior (4xx must NOT trip) - breaker cooldown elapsed → reset on next success - all 6 public endpoints fail-fast when breaker is open This package has no callers in this PR; integration starts in PR-5.	2026-05-04 06:57:24 -07:00