IMPACT WITHOUT THIS FIX: deploying PR #31 (WorkspaceAuth middleware on
/workspaces/*) without this patch causes EVERY delegation cycle to silently
break — the heartbeat poll returns 401, the self-message A2A POST returns
401, agents never wake up after task completion, and memory consolidation
stops. The entire multi-agent coordination system degrades to single-shot
interactions with no result delivery.
Changes (all using the existing platform_auth.auth_headers() pattern
already used for POST /registry/heartbeat):
heartbeat.py — 5 calls fixed:
- GET /workspaces/:id/delegations (delegation poll)
- GET /workspaces/:id (self workspace info for parent lookup)
- GET /workspaces/{parent_id} (parent workspace name lookup)
- POST /workspaces/:id/a2a (self-message to wake agent on results)
- POST /workspaces/:id/notify (canvas delegation result notification)
Also moved `from platform_auth import auth_headers` from inline (per-call)
to module-level import so _check_delegations() can use it without re-importing.
consolidation.py — 4 calls fixed:
- GET /workspaces/:id/memories (fetch memories for consolidation)
- POST /workspaces/:id/memories (write consolidated summary — agent path)
- DELETE /workspaces/:id/memories/:id (delete original memories post-consolidation)
- POST /workspaces/:id/memories (write consolidated summary — fallback path)
a2a_client.py — 1 call fixed:
- GET /workspaces/:id (get_workspace_info())
⚠️ DEPLOYMENT NOTE: This PR MUST be merged and deployed at the same time as
PR #31 (WorkspaceAuth middleware). Deploying #31 without this fix will
immediately break all delegation result delivery.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Fix A — platform/internal/middleware/wsauth_middleware.go (NEW):
WorkspaceAuth() gin middleware enforces per-workspace bearer-token auth on
ALL /workspaces/:id/* sub-routes. Same lazy-bootstrap contract as
secrets.Values: workspaces with no live token are grandfathered through.
Blocks C2, C3, C4, C5, C7, C8, C9, C12, C13 simultaneously.
Fix A — platform/internal/router/router.go:
Reorganised route registration: bare CRUD (/workspaces, /workspaces/:id)
and /a2a remain on root router; all other /workspaces/:id/* sub-routes
moved into wsAuth = r.Group("/workspaces/:id", middleware.WorkspaceAuth(db.DB)).
CORS AllowHeaders updated to include Authorization so browser/agent callers
can send the bearer token cross-origin.
Fix B — workspace-template/heartbeat.py:
_check_delegations(): validate source_id == self.workspace_id before
accepting a delegation result. Attacker-crafted records with a foreign
source_id are silently skipped with a WARNING log (injection attempt).
trigger_msg no longer embeds raw response_preview text; references
delegation_id + status only — removes the prompt-injection vector.
Fix C — workspace-template/skill_loader/loader.py:
load_skill_tools(): before exec_module(), verify script is within
scripts_dir (path traversal guard) and temporarily scrub sensitive env
vars (CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN, ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, OPENAI_API_KEY,
WORKSPACE_AUTH_TOKEN, GITHUB_TOKEN, GH_TOKEN) from os.environ; restore
in finally block. Defence-in-depth even if /plugins auth gate is bypassed.
Fix D — platform/internal/handlers/socket.go:
HandleConnect(): agent connections (X-Workspace-ID present) validated via
wsauth.HasAnyLiveToken + wsauth.ValidateToken before WebSocket upgrade.
Canvas clients (no X-Workspace-ID) remain unauthenticated.
Fix D — workspace-template/events.py:
PlatformEventSubscriber._connect(): include platform_auth bearer token in
WebSocket upgrade headers alongside X-Workspace-ID.
Fix E — workspace-template/executor_helpers.py:
recall_memories() and commit_memory() now pass platform_auth bearer token
in Authorization header so WorkspaceAuth middleware allows access.
Fix F — workspace-template/a2a_client.py:
send_a2a_message(): timeout=None → httpx.Timeout(connect=30, read=300,
write=30, pool=30). Resolves H2 flagged across 5 consecutive audits.
Tests: 149/149 Python tests pass (test_heartbeat + test_events updated to
assert new source_id validation behaviour and allow Authorization header).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
