Commit Graph

5 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Hongming Wang
c275716005 harness(phase-2): multi-tenant compose + cross-tenant isolation replays
Brings the local harness from "single tenant covering the request path"
to "two tenants covering both the request path AND the per-tenant
isolation boundary" — the same shape production runs (one EC2 + one
Postgres + one MOLECULE_ORG_ID per tenant).

Why this matters: the four prior replays exercise the SaaS request
path against one tenant. They cannot prove that TenantGuard rejects
a misrouted request (production CF tunnel + AWS LB are the failure
surface), nor that two tenants doing legitimate work in parallel
keep their `activity_logs` / `workspaces` / connection-pool state
partitioned. Both are real bug classes — TenantGuard allowlist drift
shipped #2398, lib/pq prepared-statement cache collision is documented
as an org-wide hazard.

What changed:

1. compose.yml — split into two tenants.
   tenant-alpha + postgres-alpha + tenant-beta + postgres-beta + the
   shared cp-stub, redis, cf-proxy. Each tenant gets a distinct
   ADMIN_TOKEN + MOLECULE_ORG_ID and its own Postgres database. cf-proxy
   depends on both tenants becoming healthy.

2. cf-proxy/nginx.conf — Host-header → tenant routing.
   `map $host $tenant_upstream` resolves the right backend per request.
   Required `resolver 127.0.0.11 valid=30s ipv6=off;` because nginx
   needs an explicit DNS resolver to use a variable in `proxy_pass`
   (literal hostnames resolve once at startup; variables resolve per
   request — without the resolver nginx fails closed with 502).
   `server_name` lists both tenants + the legacy alias so unknown Host
   headers don't silently route to a default and mask routing bugs.

3. _curl.sh — per-tenant + cross-tenant-negative helpers.
   `curl_alpha_admin` / `curl_beta_admin` set the right
   Host + Authorization + X-Molecule-Org-Id triple.
   `curl_alpha_creds_at_beta` / `curl_beta_creds_at_alpha` exist
   precisely to make WRONG requests (replays use them to assert
   TenantGuard rejects). `psql_exec_alpha` / `psql_exec_beta` shell out
   per-tenant Postgres exec. Legacy aliases (`curl_admin`, `psql_exec`)
   keep the four pre-Phase-2 replays working without edits.

4. seed.sh — registers parent+child workspaces in BOTH tenants.
   Captures server-generated IDs via `jq -r '.id'` (POST /workspaces
   ignores body.id, so the older client-side mint silently desynced
   from the workspaces table and broke FK-dependent replays). Stashes
   `ALPHA_PARENT_ID` / `ALPHA_CHILD_ID` / `BETA_PARENT_ID` /
   `BETA_CHILD_ID` to .seed.env, plus legacy `ALPHA_ID` / `BETA_ID`
   aliases for backwards compat with chat-history / channel-envelope.

5. New replays.

   tenant-isolation.sh (13 assertions) — TenantGuard 404s any request
   whose X-Molecule-Org-Id doesn't match the container's
   MOLECULE_ORG_ID. Asserts the 404 body has zero
   tenant/org/forbidden/denied keywords (existence of a tenant must
   not be probable from the outside). Covers cross-tenant routing
   misconfigure + allowlist drift + missing-org-header.

   per-tenant-independence.sh (12 assertions) — both tenants seed
   activity_logs in parallel with distinct row counts (3 vs 5) and
   confirm each tenant's history endpoint returns exactly its own
   counts. Then a concurrent INSERT race (10 rows per tenant in
   parallel via `&` + wait) catches shared-pool corruption +
   prepared-statement cache poisoning + redis cross-keyspace bleed.

6. Bug fix: down.sh + dump-logs SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY validation.
   `docker compose down -v` validates the entire compose file even
   though it doesn't read the env. up.sh generates a per-run key into
   its own shell — down.sh runs in a fresh shell that wouldn't see it,
   so without a placeholder `compose down` exited non-zero before
   removing volumes. Workspaces silently leaked into the next
   ./up.sh + seed.sh boot. Caught when tenant-isolation.sh F1/F2 saw
   3× duplicate alpha-parent rows accumulated across three prior runs.
   Same fix applied to the workflow's dump-logs step.

7. requirements.txt — pin molecule-ai-workspace-runtime>=0.1.78.
   channel-envelope-trust-boundary.sh imports from `molecule_runtime.*`
   (the wheel-rewritten path) so it catches the failure mode where
   the wheel build silently strips a fix that unit tests on local
   source still pass. CI was failing this replay because the wheel
   wasn't installed — caught in the staging push run from #2492.

8. .github/workflows/harness-replays.yml — Phase 2 plumbing.
   * Removed /etc/hosts step (Host-header path eliminated the need;
     scripts already source _curl.sh).
   * Updated dump-logs to reference the new service names
     (tenant-alpha + tenant-beta + postgres-alpha + postgres-beta).
   * Added SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY placeholder env on the dump step.

Verified: ./run-all-replays.sh from a clean state — 6/6 passed
(buildinfo-stale-image, channel-envelope-trust-boundary, chat-history,
peer-discovery-404, per-tenant-independence, tenant-isolation).

Roadmap section updated: Phase 2 marked shipped. Phase 3 promoted to
"replace cp-stub with real molecule-controlplane Docker build + env
coherence lint."

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-01 21:36:40 -07:00
Hongming Wang
9dae0503ee fix(harness): generate SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY per-run instead of hardcoding
Replaces the hardcoded base64 sentinel (630dd0da) with a per-run
generation in up.sh, exported into compose's interpolation environment.

Why:
- Hardcoding a 32-byte base64 string in the repo, even one labelled
  "test-only", sets a bad muscle-memory pattern. The next agent or
  contributor copies the shape into another harness — or worse, into a
  staging .env — and the test-only sentinel turns into something
  someone treats as a real key.
- Secret scanners flag key-shaped values regardless of the surrounding
  comment claiming intent. Avoiding the literal entirely sidesteps the
  false-positive.
- A fresh key per harness lifetime more closely mimics prod's
  per-tenant isolation, exercising the same code paths without any
  pretense of stable encrypted-data fixtures (which the harness wipes
  on every ./down.sh anyway).

Implementation:
- up.sh: `openssl rand -base64 32` if SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY isn't
  already set in the caller's env. Honoring a pre-set value lets a
  debug session pin a key for reproducibility (e.g. when investigating
  encrypted-row corruption).
- compose.yml: `${SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY:?…}` makes a misuse loud —
  running `docker compose up` directly bypassing up.sh fails fast with
  a clear error pointing at the right entry point, rather than a 100s
  unhealthy-tenant timeout.

Both paths verified via `docker compose config`:
- with key exported: value interpolates cleanly
- without it: "required variable SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY is missing a
  value: must be set — run via tests/harness/up.sh, which generates
  one per run"
2026-04-30 13:30:14 -07:00
Hongming Wang
630dd0dae7 fix(harness): seed SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY so MOLECULE_ENV=production tenant boots
Found via the first run of the harness-replays-required-check workflow
(#2410): the tenant container failed its healthcheck after 100s with
"refusing to boot without encryption in production". This is the
deferred CRITICAL flagged on PR #2401 — `crypto.InitStrict()` requires
SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY when MOLECULE_ENV=production, and the harness
sets prod-mode but never seeded a key.

Fix: add a clearly-test 32-byte base64 value (encoding the literal
string "harness-test-only-not-for-prod!!") inline. Keeping
MOLECULE_ENV=production preserves the harness's value as a production-
shape replay surface — it now exercises the full encryption boot path
including the strict check, rather than skirting it via dev-mode.

Why inline rather than .env:
- The harness compose file is meant to be self-contained and
  reproducible from a clean clone. An external .env would split the
  config across two files for one synthetic value.
- The value is intentionally a sentinel; there's no operator decision
  here to gate behind a per-deployment file.

After this lands the harness boots clean and `run-all-replays.sh` can
exercise the buildinfo + peer-discovery replays as designed. The
required-check workflow itself (#2410) needs no change.
2026-04-30 13:25:52 -07:00
Hongming Wang
046eccbb7c fix(harness): five-axis self-review fixes before merge
Three findings from re-reviewing PR #2401 with fresh eyes:

1. Critical — port binding to 0.0.0.0
   compose.yml's cf-proxy bound 8080:8080 (default 0.0.0.0). The harness
   uses a hardcoded ADMIN_TOKEN so anyone on the local network or VPN
   could hit /workspaces with admin privileges. Switch to 127.0.0.1:8080
   so admin access is loopback-only — safe for E2E and prevents the
   known-token leak.

2. Required — dead code in cp-stub
   peersFailureMode + __stub/mode + __stub/peers were declared with
   atomic.Value setters but no handler ever READ from them. CP doesn't
   host /registry/peers (the tenant does), so the toggles couldn't
   drive responses. Removed the dead vars + handlers; kept
   redeployFleetCalls counter and __stub/state since those have a real
   consumer in the buildinfo replay.

3. Required — replay's auth-context dependency
   peer-discovery-404.sh's Python eval ran a2a_client.get_peers_with_
   diagnostic() against the live tenant. Without a workspace token
   file, auth_headers() yields empty headers — so the helper might
   exercise a 401 branch instead of the 404 branch the replay claims
   to test.

   Split the assertion into (a) WIRE — direct curl proves the platform
   returns 404 from /registry/<unregistered>/peers — and (b) PARSE —
   feed the helper a mocked 404 via httpx patches, no network/auth.
   Each branch tests exactly what it claims.

   Also added a graceful skip when the workspace runtime in the
   current checkout pre-dates #2399 (no get_peers_with_diagnostic
   yet) — replay falls back to wire-only verification with a clear
   message instead of an opaque AttributeError. After #2399 lands on
   staging, both branches will run.

cp-stub still builds clean. compose.yml validates. Replay's bash
syntax + Python eval both verified locally.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-30 11:32:40 -07:00
Hongming Wang
f13d2b2b7b feat(tests): add production-shape local harness (Phase 1)
The harness brings up the SaaS tenant topology on localhost using the
SAME workspace-server/Dockerfile.tenant image that ships to production.
Tests run against http://harness-tenant.localhost:8080 and exercise the
same code path a real tenant takes:

  client
    → cf-proxy   (nginx; CF tunnel + LB header rewrites)
    → tenant     (Dockerfile.tenant — combined platform + canvas)
    → cp-stub    (minimal Go CP stand-in for /cp/* paths)
    → postgres + redis

Why this exists: bugs that survive `go run ./cmd/server` and ship to
prod almost always live in env-gated middleware (TenantGuard, /cp/*
proxy, canvas proxy), header rewrites, or the strict-auth / live-token
mode. The harness activates ALL of them locally so #2395 + #2397-class
bugs can be reproduced before deploy.

Phase 1 surface:
  - cp-stub/main.go: minimal CP stand-in. /cp/auth/me, redeploy-fleet,
    /__stub/{peers,mode,state} for replay scripts. Catch-all returns
    501 with a clear message when a new CP route appears.
  - cf-proxy/nginx.conf: rewrites Host to <slug>.localhost, injects
    X-Forwarded-*, disables buffering to mirror CF tunnel streaming
    semantics.
  - compose.yml: one service per topology layer; tenant builds from
    the actual production Dockerfile.tenant.
  - up.sh / down.sh / seed.sh: lifecycle scripts.
  - replays/peer-discovery-404.sh: reproduces #2397 + asserts the
    diagnostic helper from PR #2399 surfaces "404" + "registered".
  - replays/buildinfo-stale-image.sh: reproduces #2395 + asserts
    /buildinfo wire shape + GIT_SHA injection from PR #2398.
  - README.md: topology, quickstart, what the harness does NOT cover.

Phases 2-3 (separate PRs):
  - Phase 2: convert tests/e2e/test_api.sh to target the harness URL
    instead of localhost; make harness-based replays a required CI gate.
  - Phase 3: config-coherence lint that diffs harness env list against
    production CP's env list, fails CI on drift.

Verification:
  - cp-stub builds (go build ./...).
  - cp-stub responds to all stubbed endpoints (smoke-tested locally).
  - compose.yml passes `docker compose config --quiet`.
  - All shell scripts pass `bash -n` syntax check.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-30 11:22:46 -07:00