1e3dda32be
2 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Hongming Wang
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656a02fae4 |
fix(textutil): SSOT for rune-safe string truncation, fix 3 audit-gap bugs
Closes #2962. ## Why Six per-package `truncate` helpers had drifted into independent re-implementations of the same idea. Three of them (delegation.go, memory/client/client.go, memory-backfill/verify.go) used `s[:max] + "…"` byte-slice form, which on a multi-byte codepoint at byte `max` produces invalid UTF-8 → Postgres `text`/`jsonb` rejects the INSERT silently → `delegation` / `activity_logs` row never lands → audit gap. Three other helpers (delegation_ledger.go #2962, agent_message_writer.go #2959, scheduler.go #2026) had each been fixed in isolation with three slightly different rune-safe shapes — confirming this is a class of bug, not a single instance. ## What New package `internal/textutil` with three rune-safe functions: - `TruncateBytes(s, maxBytes)` — byte-cap, "…" marker. Used by 5 callers writing into byte-bounded columns / log lines. - `TruncateBytesNoMarker(s, maxBytes)` — byte-cap, no marker. Used by delegation_ledger.go where the storage already conveys "preview" and an extra ellipsis would push the result over the column cap. - `TruncateRunes(s, maxRunes)` — rune-cap, "…" marker. Used by agent_message_writer.go where the cap is in display chars (UI summary), not bytes. All three guarantee `utf8.ValidString(out)` for any `utf8.ValidString(in)`. Inputs already invalid go through `sanitizeUTF8` at the call site boundary (scheduler.go preserved this defense-in-depth). ## Migration map | Old | New | Behavior change | |---|---|---| | `delegation_ledger.truncatePreview` | `textutil.TruncateBytesNoMarker(s, 4096)` | none | | `agent_message_writer.truncatePreviewRunes` | `textutil.TruncateRunes(s, n)` | none | | `scheduler.truncate` | `textutil.TruncateBytes(s, n)` | "..." → "…" (3 bytes either way; single-glyph display) | | `delegation.truncate` | `textutil.TruncateBytes(s, n)` | bug fix + ellipsis swap | | `memory/client.truncate` | `textutil.TruncateBytes(s, n)` | bug fix | | `memory-backfill.truncate` | `textutil.TruncateBytes(s, n)` | bug fix | Five separate `truncate*` helpers + their per-package tests removed. Net: 12 files / +427 / -255. ## Tests - `internal/textutil/truncate_test.go` — 27 table-test cases + 145 fuzz-invariant cases asserting `utf8.ValidString` and byte-cap invariants on every output. - `delegation_ledger_test.go TestLedgerInsert_TruncatesOversizedPreview` strengthened with `capValidUTF8Matcher` so the SQL-write argument is asserted to be valid UTF-8 + within cap (not just `AnyArg()`). Mutation-tested: replacing the SSOT call with byte-slice form makes this test fail loud. ## Compatibility - All callers internal; no external API surface change. - Ellipsis swap "..." → "…": same byte budget (3 bytes), single-glyph display. No alerting/grep on either marker in this codebase (verified). Canvas renders both correctly. - DB column widths unchanged (4096 / 80 / 200 / 256 / 300 — all preserved in the migrations). ## Security Fixes a silent INSERT-failure mode that hid `activity_logs` / `delegations` rows containing peer-controlled text. The class of input that triggered it (CJK, emoji, accented Latin) is normal user content, not malicious — but the symptom (audit gap) makes incident reconstruction harder. Helper is pure-function over `string`; no secrets / PII / auth handling involved. Untrusted input is handled identically to before, just rune-aligned now. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Hongming Wang
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4b6373861c |
Memory v2 fixup C2: backfill -verify mode (parity check)
Self-review missed deliverable from PR-7's task spec. Operators had
no way to confirm a -apply produced equivalent search results to the
legacy agent_memories direct queries; this PR ships that.
Usage:
memory-backfill -verify # 50-workspace random sample
memory-backfill -verify -verify-sample=200 # bigger sample
memory-backfill -verify -workspace=<uuid> # one specific workspace
Algorithm:
1. Pick N random workspaces (or use -workspace if specified)
2. For each: query agent_memories direct, query plugin search via
the workspace's readable namespace list
3. Multiset-compare contents: every legacy row must have a matching
plugin row. Plugin having MORE rows is OK (team-shared content
may be visible from sibling workspaces).
4. Print mismatches with content excerpt; non-zero mismatches/errors
yields a non-zero exit so CI can gate cutover.
Sql:
- Sampling uses ORDER BY random() LIMIT N (TABLESAMPLE has surprising
distribution at small populations).
- Filters out status='removed' workspaces.
Test coverage:
* pickWorkspaceSample: single-ws short-circuit, random sampling,
query error, scan error
* queryLegacyMemories: happy path, error path
* verifyParity:
- all match → 1 match, 0 mismatch
- missing-from-plugin → 1 mismatch with content excerpt
- plugin-extra rows → 1 match (legacy is subset of plugin)
- legacy query error → 1 error counter
- resolver error → 1 error counter
- plugin search error → 1 error counter
- no readable namespaces + empty legacy → match
- no readable namespaces + non-empty legacy → mismatch
- pickSample error → propagated up
* CLI: -verify+-apply rejected as mutually exclusive; -verify alone
is a valid mode
Note: namespaceResolverAdapter bridges *namespace.Resolver to the
verify package's verifyResolver interface so verify.go has zero
dependency on the namespace package — keeps test stubs minimal.
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