SecurityHeaders() middleware already sets X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff and
X-Frame-Options: DENY globally on every response (issue #151 / PR ~securityheaders).
This commit adds the explicit acceptance test that #614 requires and extends
the apiPrefixes list to cover the new /orgs allowlist routes from PR #610.
Changes:
- securityheaders.go: add "/orgs" to apiPrefixes so allowlist routes get the
strict CSP (no unsafe-inline) rather than the canvas-tier permissive policy
- securityheaders_test.go: TestSecurityHeaders_614_NosniffOnSSEAndAPIEndpoints
verifies the header is present on SSE endpoint, /settings/secrets, /events,
and /orgs paths; TestIsAPIPath gains /orgs cases
Closes#614
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
API routes return JSON and never need 'unsafe-inline' or 'unsafe-eval'.
Serving those directives globally defeated the purpose of CSP and gave
false security assurance. Canvas-proxied routes (NoRoute → Next.js) keep
'unsafe-inline' because React hydration requires it; 'unsafe-eval' was
already absent and is confirmed unnecessary in production builds.
Implementation:
- Add isAPIPath() helper with an explicit prefix allowlist that mirrors
the routes registered in router/router.go
- Strict "default-src 'self'" on all /workspaces, /registry, /health,
/admin, /metrics, /settings, /bundles, /org, /templates, /plugins,
/webhooks, /channels, /ws, /events, /approvals paths
- Permissive CSP (unsafe-inline, no unsafe-eval) on canvas/NoRoute paths
- 4 new test functions: TestCSPAPIRoutesGetStrictPolicy (covers every
prefix + sub-path), TestCSPCanvasRoutesGetPermissivePolicy, and
TestIsAPIPath unit test including substring-non-match guard
Resolves#450
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Code review fixes:
- 🟡#1: Replace python3 with jq in Dockerfile template stages (~50MB → ~2MB)
- 🟡#2: Add clone count verification to scripts/clone-manifest.sh
(set -e + expected vs actual count check — fails build if any clone fails)
- 🟡#3: Drop 'unsafe-eval' from CSP (not needed for Next.js production
standalone builds, only dev mode). Updated test assertion.
- 🟡#4: Remove broken pyproject.toml from workspace-template/ (it claimed
to package as molecule-ai-workspace-runtime but the directory structure
didn't match — the real package ships from the standalone repo)
- 🔵#1: Add version-pinning TODO comment to manifest.json
- 🔵#3: Add full repo URLs + test counts for SDK/MCP/CLI/runtime in CLAUDE.md
Security (GitGuardian alert):
- Removed Telegram bot token (8633739353:AA...) from template-molecule-dev
pm/.env — replaced with ${TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN} placeholder
- Removed Claude OAuth token (sk-ant-oat01-...) from template-molecule-dev
root .env — replaced with ${CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN} placeholder
- Both tokens need immediate rotation by the operator
Tests: Platform middleware tests updated + all pass.
SecurityHeaders middleware widened its CSP to allow Next.js inline scripts
+ data:/blob: images (platform/internal/middleware/securityheaders.go:44,
canvas is reverse-proxied through the gin stack so it needs the permissive
policy). The two CSP asserts in securityheaders_test.go still hard-compared
against the old tight `default-src 'self'`, so they fail on main as of
this afternoon.
Fix: assert each expected CSP fragment is PRESENT in the header (substring
match) instead of byte-for-byte equality. Test intent is "CSP is set, starts
with tight default-src, contains the expected directives" — not "CSP matches
this exact string". Future subsource tuning (add a new CDN, bump blob:/data:
scope) won't re-break this test.
Caught because every PR touching anything in the monorepo currently fails
the Platform (Go) CI job on these two asserts. Fixing on a dedicated branch
so it can land ahead of every blocked PR in the queue.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes#282. CLAUDE.md documented the SecurityHeaders() middleware as
setting 6 headers (X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, Referrer-
Policy, Content-Security-Policy, Permissions-Policy, HSTS) but the
implementation only set 4 — Referrer-Policy and Permissions-Policy
were silently missing.
Adds:
- Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin — prevents
browsers from leaking full paths/queries in Referer on cross-
origin navigation. Particularly relevant for canvas embeds of
Langfuse trace URLs that may contain trace IDs.
- Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=() —
denies sensor access by default. Iframes the canvas embeds
(Langfuse trace viewer etc.) can no longer request these
without an explicit delegation.
Regression tests added to securityheaders_test.go — both headers
are now in the same table-driven assertion loop as the other 4,
so a future edit that drops them again fails CI loudly.
LOW severity — this is defense-in-depth, not a direct exploit path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
