Commit Graph

2 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Hongming Wang
ad28e10bf4 fix(org-tokens): rate-limit mint, bound list, correct audit provenance
Addresses the Critical + Important findings from today's code
review of the org API keys feature (PRs #1105-1108).

## Critical-1: rate-limit mint endpoint

Previously POST /org/tokens had no mint-rate limit. A compromised
WorkOS session or leaked bearer could mint thousands of tokens in
seconds, forcing a painful manual cleanup of each one.

Fix: dedicated per-IP token bucket, 10 mints/hour/IP. Legitimate
bursts fit under the ceiling; abuse bounces. List + Delete stay
on the global limiter — they can't be used to generate new
secret material.

## Important-1: HTTP handler integration tests

internal/orgtoken had 9 unit tests; the HTTP layer (org_tokens.go)
had none. Adds org_tokens_test.go covering:
  - List happy path + DB error → 500
  - Create actor="admin-token" (bootstrap), actor="org-token:<prefix>"
    (chained mint), actor="session" (canvas browser path)
  - Create name>100 chars → 400
  - Create with empty body mints with no name
  - Revoke happy path 200, missing id 404, empty id 400
  - Plaintext returned in response body and prefix matches first 8 chars
  - Warning text present

A regression that breaks the tier-ordering, drops the createdBy
field, or accepts oversized names now fails at CI not prod.

## Important-2: bound List output

List() had no LIMIT — a mint-storm bug or abuse could make the
admin UI slow to render and allocate proportionally. Adds
LIMIT 500 at the SQL layer. 10x realistic ceiling, guardrail
against pathological cases.

## Important-3: audit provenance uses plaintext prefix, not UUID

orgTokenActor() was logging "org-token:<first-8-of-uuid>" which
couldn't be cross-referenced with the UI (which shows first-8
of the plaintext). Users could not correlate "who minted this"
audit entries with the revoke button they're looking at.

Fix: Validate() now returns (id, prefix, error). Middleware
stashes both on the gin context. Handler reads prefix for the
actor string. Audit rows now match UI prefixes exactly.

## Nit: named constants for audit labels

actorOrgTokenPrefix / actorSession / actorAdminToken replace
the hardcoded strings scattered across the handler. Greppable
across log pipelines + audit queries; one place to change if
the format evolves.

## Tests

  - internal/orgtoken: 9 existing + 0 new, all still green (updated
    signatures for Validate returning prefix).
  - internal/handlers/org_tokens_test.go: new — 9 HTTP-layer tests
    above. Full gin.Context + sqlmock harness.
  - Full `go test ./...` green except one pre-existing
    TestGitHubToken_NoTokenProvider flake unrelated to this change
    (expects 404, gets 500 — tracked separately).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-20 14:22:38 -07:00
Hongming Wang
91187342b4 feat(auth): organization-scoped API keys for admin access
Adds user-facing API keys with full-org admin scope. Replaces the
single ADMIN_TOKEN env var with named, revocable, audited tokens
that users can mint/rotate from the canvas UI without ops
intervention.

Designed for the beta growth phase — one token tier (full admin).
Future work will split into scoped roles (admin / workspace-write
/ read-only) and per-workspace bindings. See docs/architecture/
org-api-keys.md for the design + follow-up roadmap.

## Surface

  POST   /org/tokens        mint (plaintext returned once)
  GET    /org/tokens        list live keys (prefix-only)
  DELETE /org/tokens/:id    revoke (idempotent)

All AdminAuth-gated. Bootstrap path: mint the first token via
ADMIN_TOKEN or canvas session; tokens can mint more tokens after.

## Validation as a new AdminAuth tier (2a)

AdminAuth evaluation order:
  Tier 0  lazy-bootstrap fail-open (only when no live tokens AND
          no ADMIN_TOKEN env)
  Tier 1  verified WorkOS session via /cp/auth/tenant-member
  Tier 2a org_api_tokens SELECT — NEW
  Tier 2b ADMIN_TOKEN env (bootstrap / CLI break-glass)
  Tier 3  any live workspace token (deprecated, only when ADMIN_TOKEN
          unset)

Tier 2a runs ONE indexed lookup (partial index on
token_hash WHERE revoked_at IS NULL) + an async last_used_at
bump. No measurable latency cost on the hot path.

## UI

New "Org API Keys" tab in the settings panel. Label field for
human-readable naming. Plaintext shown once + clipboard copy.
Revoke with confirm dialog. Mirrors the existing workspace-
TokensTab flow so users who've used one get the other for free.

## Security properties

  - Plaintext never stored. sha256 hash + 8-char display prefix.
  - Revocation is immediate: partial index on revoked_at IS NULL
    means the next request validates or fails in microseconds.
  - created_by audit field captures provenance: "org-token:<short>"
    when a token mints another, "session" for browser-UI mints,
    "admin-token" for the ADMIN_TOKEN bootstrap path.
  - Validate() collapses all failure shapes into ErrInvalidToken
    so response-shape can't distinguish "never existed" from
    "revoked".

## Tests

  - internal/orgtoken: 9 unit tests (hash storage, empty field
    null-ing, validation happy path, empty plaintext, unknown hash,
    revoked filtering, list ordering, revoke idempotency, has-any-
    live short-circuit).
  - AdminAuth tier-2a integration covered by existing middleware
    tests unchanged (fail-open + bearer paths).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-20 14:01:41 -07:00