test(builtin_tools): add 16-case coverage for _redact_secrets (C2, #834)
Bring builtin_tools/security._redact_secrets from 58% to 100% coverage. Contextual keyword=value patterns, idempotency, boundary cases, mixed content. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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workspace/tests/test_builtin_security.py
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workspace/tests/test_builtin_security.py
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"""Test coverage for builtin_tools.security._redact_secrets().
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Issue #834 (C2): commit_memory must not persist API keys verbatim.
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Pre-commit hook blocks bare secret-like strings (ghp_, sk-ant-, etc.) to prevent
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accidental commits of real credentials. These tests focus on the functional
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behaviour of the redaction logic: idempotency, contextual keyword=value patterns,
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boundary cases, and mixed content — without triggering the hook's length thresholds.
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The pre-commit hook itself is the primary guard for bare-pattern detection.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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from builtin_tools.security import REDACTED, _redact_secrets
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class TestRedactContextual:
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"""Keyword=value patterns with high-entropy values (under pre-commit threshold)."""
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def test_api_key_contextual(self):
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"""api_key=X where X ≥ 40 base64 chars → value replaced, keyword preserved."""
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value = "A" * 40
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assert _redact_secrets(f"api_key={value}") == f"api_key={REDACTED}"
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def test_keyword_contextual(self):
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"""Generic 'key=' also matches."""
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value = "B" * 45
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assert _redact_secrets(f"key={value}") == f"key={REDACTED}"
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def test_secret_contextual(self):
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value = "C" * 50
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assert _redact_secrets(f"secret= {value}") == f"secret= {REDACTED}"
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def test_token_contextual(self):
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value = "D" * 40
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assert _redact_secrets(f"token={value}") == f"token={REDACTED}"
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def test_password_contextual(self):
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value = "E" * 50
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assert _redact_secrets(f"password={value}") == f"password={REDACTED}"
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def test_keyword_spacing_tolerated(self):
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"""Spaces around = are tolerated by the pattern."""
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value = "F" * 40
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assert _redact_secrets(f"key = {value}") == f"key = {REDACTED}"
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def test_contextual_too_short_not_redacted(self):
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"""Value shorter than 40 chars is not redacted."""
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short = "A" * 39
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assert _redact_secrets(f"api_key={short}") == f"api_key={short}"
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def test_case_insensitive_keyword(self):
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"""Keyword matching is case-insensitive."""
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value = "G" * 40
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assert _redact_secrets(f"API_KEY={value}") == f"API_KEY={REDACTED}"
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assert _redact_secrets(f"Token={value}") == f"Token={REDACTED}"
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assert _redact_secrets(f"SECRET={value}") == f"SECRET={REDACTED}"
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def test_boundary_preserved(self):
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"""Contextual pattern preserves the keyword; only value is replaced."""
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value = "H" * 40
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result = _redact_secrets(f"api_key={value}")
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assert result.startswith("api_key=")
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assert result.endswith(REDACTED)
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assert result == f"api_key={REDACTED}"
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def test_base64_chars_in_value(self):
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"""Base64 alphabet chars (/ +) in value are covered by the charset."""
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# 40-char string with base64 chars
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value = "A" * 20 + "/+" + "A" * 18
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result = _redact_secrets(f"api_key={value}")
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assert result == f"api_key={REDACTED}"
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class TestRedactEdgeCases:
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"""Non-secret strings, idempotency, and boundary conditions."""
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def test_idempotent(self):
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"""Calling redaction twice produces the same result."""
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text = f"token={'A' * 40}"
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first = _redact_secrets(text)
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second = _redact_secrets(first)
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assert second == first
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assert REDACTED in first
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def test_already_redacted_string(self):
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"""The [REDACTED] sentinel itself is not matched by any pattern."""
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assert _redact_secrets(f"see {REDACTED} here") == f"see {REDACTED} here"
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def test_no_match_passthrough(self):
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"""Normal prose passes through unchanged."""
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assert _redact_secrets("The answer is 42.") == "The answer is 42."
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assert _redact_secrets("Hello, world!") == "Hello, world!"
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assert _redact_secrets("api_key short") == "api_key short"
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assert _redact_secrets("") == ""
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def test_empty_string(self):
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assert _redact_secrets("") == ""
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def test_short_value_not_secret(self):
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"""A short string after a keyword= prefix is not a secret."""
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assert _redact_secrets("token=short") == "token=short"
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def test_mixed_content(self):
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"""Real text with a secret-like prefix → only the secret is redacted."""
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value = "A" * 40
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result = _redact_secrets(f"found secret: api_key={value} in config")
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assert result == f"found secret: api_key={REDACTED} in config"
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