Merge branch 'main' into feat/tr-idle-prompt

docs/runbooks/admin-auth.md

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+# Admin auth middleware reference
+
+Two Gin middleware variants gate admin-style routes on the platform. Pick the
+right one — they have different security contracts.
+
+## `middleware.AdminAuth(db.DB)` — strict bearer-only
+
+Required for any route where a forged request could:
+
+- Leak prompts or memory (`GET /bundles/export/:id`, `GET /events*`)
+- Create or mutate workspaces (`POST /workspaces`, `DELETE /workspaces/:id`, `POST /bundles/import`, `POST /templates/import`, `POST /org/import`)
+- Leak operational intelligence (`GET /admin/liveness`)
+- Touch approvals, secrets, or schedules at the cross-workspace level
+
+**Contract:**
+
+1. Reads `Authorization: Bearer <token>` and validates against `workspace_auth_tokens` via `wsauth.ValidateAnyToken`
+2. **No fallback.** Missing or invalid bearer → 401
+3. Lazy-bootstrap fail-open: if `HasAnyLiveTokenGlobal` returns 0 (fresh install / rolling upgrade), the route is open. First token issued to any workspace activates enforcement for every route.
+
+**DO NOT use Origin header or session-cookie fallbacks here.** That reopens every route to curl-based spoofing — CORS is a browser-only defence, not a server-side auth signal.
+
+## `middleware.CanvasOrBearer(db.DB)` — softer, canvas-friendly
+
+**Only** for cosmetic routes where a forged request has zero data / security impact.
+
+Currently used on:
+
+| Route | Why soft is OK |
+|-------|----------------|
+| `PUT /canvas/viewport` | Viewport corruption resets on the next browser refresh. No data exposure, no resource creation. |
+
+**Contract:**
+
+1. Reads `Authorization: Bearer <token>` first. If present but **invalid**, returns 401 — **no fall-through** to the Origin path. (This was a CanvasOrBearer bug fixed during code review; preserved as the invariant.)
+2. Empty bearer → check `Origin` header against `CORS_ORIGINS` env var. Exact-match only. Empty Origin does not pass.
+3. Lazy-bootstrap fail-open identical to `AdminAuth`.
+
+**The Origin check is NOT a strict auth boundary.** Any non-browser client (curl, an attacker tool) can forge the `Origin` header. CORS protects the browser from reading the response, not the server from receiving the request. Apply `CanvasOrBearer` only to routes where a curl attacker with knowledge of the canvas origin could do nothing harmful.
+
+### When to add a new route to `CanvasOrBearer`
+
+Ask these three questions. **All three** must be yes or the route belongs behind strict `AdminAuth`:
+
+1. Can a browser at `https://<tenant>.moleculesai.app` need this route without a bearer token? (If not, just use `AdminAuth` — browsers can send bearers via the session-cookie auth flow once that lands.)
+2. If a non-browser attacker forged `Origin: https://<tenant>.moleculesai.app`, would the worst-case outcome be purely cosmetic — recoverable with a browser refresh and no data exposure?
+3. Is there no tenant isolation concern (cross-org data leak) on this route?
+
+If yes/yes/yes → `CanvasOrBearer` is acceptable. Document the rationale in the PR that adds it, and add the route to the table above in the same PR.
+
+## Relationship to `WorkspaceAuth`
+
+`WorkspaceAuth` is the `/workspaces/:id/*` sub-route middleware. Different contract entirely: it binds a bearer token to a specific workspace ID so workspace A's token can't hit workspace B's sub-routes. Used for all `/workspaces/:id/*` paths except the A2A proxy (which has its own `CanCommunicate` access-control layer).
+
+AdminAuth accepts **any** valid workspace bearer (it's a global gate). WorkspaceAuth accepts only the bearer for the **specific** `:id` in the URL path.
+
+## Known gap (Phase H follow-up)
+
+`CanvasOrBearer` is a tactical fix for the #168 canvas-regression problem. The proper long-term path is **session-cookie-accepting AdminAuth**: extend `AdminAuth` to validate the `mcp_session` cookie via `auth.Provider.VerifySession` (WorkOS in prod, DisabledProvider in dev). That would give the full list of admin routes browser compatibility without an Origin-based workaround. Tracked as a Phase H item once the SaaS control plane is the primary deployment surface.
+
+## Related PRs and issues
+
+- #138 — first canvas regression (PATCH /workspaces/:id), fixed with field-level authz in the handler (`WorkspaceHandler.Update`)
+- #164 — CRITICAL anonymous workspace creation via unauthenticated `POST /bundles/import`
+- #165 — HIGH topology disclosure via unauthenticated `GET /events` and `GET /bundles/export/:id`
+- #166 — MEDIUM viewport corruption / liveness leak
+- #167 — first auth-gate batch, strict `AdminAuth` on 5 routes
+- #168 — canvas regression from the strict gating
+- #190 — HIGH unauthenticated `POST /templates/import`
+- #194 — rejected Origin-fallback approach (would have reopened #164)
+- #203 — the `CanvasOrBearer` middleware, route-split approach, only on `PUT /canvas/viewport`
+- #228 — code-review follow-up: CanvasOrBearer invalid-bearer fall-through fix

org-templates/molecule-dev/org.yaml

@@ -67,6 +67,15 @@ defaults:
   # workspace_dir: not set by default — each agent gets an isolated Docker volume
   # Set per-workspace to bind-mount a host directory as /workspace
 
+  # Idle-loop reflection pattern (#205). When idle_prompt is non-empty, the
+  # workspace self-sends this prompt every idle_interval_seconds while its
+  # heartbeat.active_tasks == 0. Pattern from Hermes/Letta. Cost collapses to
+  # event-driven (no LLM call unless there's actually nothing to do). Off by
+  # default to avoid surprising token burn — set per-workspace to enable.
+  # Keep idle prompts local (no A2A sends): same rule as initial_prompt.
+  idle_prompt: ""
+  idle_interval_seconds: 600   # 10 min — ignored when idle_prompt is empty
+
   # initial_prompt runs once on first boot (not on restart).
   # ${GITHUB_REPO} is a container env var from .env secrets.
   # IMPORTANT: Do NOT send A2A messages in initial_prompt — other agents may not

platform/internal/handlers/activity.go

@@ -338,6 +338,11 @@ func (h *ActivityHandler) Report(c *gin.Context) {
 	// Empty source_id falls through to the default-to-self branch below.
 	sourceID := body.SourceID
 	if sourceID != "" && sourceID != workspaceID {
+		// Log the spoof attempt as a security event so an auditor cron can
+		// surface repeat probing. Keep the log line stable (greppable) and
+		// avoid echoing attacker-supplied data verbatim beyond the UUIDs.
+		log.Printf("security: source_id spoof attempt — authed_workspace=%s body_source_id=%s remote=%s",
+			workspaceID, sourceID, c.ClientIP())
 		c.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{"error": "source_id must match authenticated workspace"})
 		return
 	}

platform/internal/handlers/handlers_test.go

@@ -1081,3 +1081,53 @@ func TestSharedContext_NoSharedFiles(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Errorf("unmet sqlmock expectations: %v", err)
 	}
 }
+
+// TestActivityHandler_Report_SourceIDSpoofRejected verifies the #209 spoof
+// guard: a workspace authenticated for :id cannot inject activity rows with
+// source_id pointing at a different workspace. Bearer-auth middleware would
+// already cover the obvious case; this is the belt-and-suspenders body check.
+func TestActivityHandler_Report_SourceIDSpoofRejected(t *testing.T) {
+	setupTestDB(t)
+	setupTestRedis(t)
+	broadcaster := newTestBroadcaster()
+	handler := NewActivityHandler(broadcaster)
+
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	c, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(w)
+	c.Params = gin.Params{{Key: "id", Value: "ws-alice"}}
+	// alice's workspace authenticated — but body claims source_id=ws-bob.
+	body := `{"activity_type":"agent_log","summary":"fake log","source_id":"ws-bob"}`
+	c.Request = httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/workspaces/ws-alice/activity", bytes.NewBufferString(body))
+	c.Request.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+
+	handler.Report(c)
+
+	if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
+		t.Errorf("spoof: got %d, want 403 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+}
+
+// TestActivityHandler_Report_MatchingSourceIDAccepted — the non-spoof path:
+// body.source_id explicitly matches workspaceID, still accepted.
+func TestActivityHandler_Report_MatchingSourceIDAccepted(t *testing.T) {
+	mock := setupTestDB(t)
+	setupTestRedis(t)
+	broadcaster := newTestBroadcaster()
+	handler := NewActivityHandler(broadcaster)
+
+	mock.ExpectExec("INSERT INTO activity_logs").
+		WillReturnResult(sqlmock.NewResult(0, 1))
+
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	c, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(w)
+	c.Params = gin.Params{{Key: "id", Value: "ws-alice"}}
+	body := `{"activity_type":"agent_log","summary":"self log","source_id":"ws-alice"}`
+	c.Request = httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/workspaces/ws-alice/activity", bytes.NewBufferString(body))
+	c.Request.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+
+	handler.Report(c)
+
+	if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Errorf("matching source_id: got %d, want 200 (%s)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+}

platform/internal/handlers/schedules_test.go

@@ -124,3 +124,50 @@ func TestList_IncludesSourceColumn(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("unmet expectations: %v", err)
 	}
 }
+
+// TestHistory_IncludesErrorDetail — #152 problem B coverage. The history
+// endpoint must surface error_detail from activity_logs so clients know
+// why a cron run failed (not just that it failed). Writes a fake cron_run
+// row via sqlmock with a non-empty error_detail and asserts it reaches
+// the JSON response.
+func TestHistory_IncludesErrorDetail(t *testing.T) {
+	mock := setupTestDB(t)
+	setupTestRedis(t)
+	handler := NewScheduleHandler()
+
+	workspaceID := "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000"
+	scheduleID := "11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111"
+	now := time.Now()
+
+	cols := []string{"created_at", "duration_ms", "status", "error_detail", "request_body"}
+	mock.ExpectQuery("SELECT created_at, duration_ms, status").
+		WithArgs(workspaceID, scheduleID).
+		WillReturnRows(sqlmock.NewRows(cols).
+			AddRow(now, 4200, "error", "HTTP 500 — workspace agent OOM", `{"schedule_id":"`+scheduleID+`"}`).
+			AddRow(now, 1500, "ok", "", `{"schedule_id":"`+scheduleID+`"}`))
+
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	c, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(w)
+	c.Params = gin.Params{
+		{Key: "id", Value: workspaceID},
+		{Key: "scheduleId", Value: scheduleID},
+	}
+	c.Request = httptest.NewRequest("GET",
+		"/workspaces/"+workspaceID+"/schedules/"+scheduleID+"/history", nil)
+
+	handler.History(c)
+
+	if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	body := w.Body.String()
+	if !strings.Contains(body, `"error_detail":"HTTP 500 — workspace agent OOM"`) {
+		t.Errorf("history response missing populated error_detail: %s", body)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(body, `"error_detail":""`) {
+		t.Errorf("history response missing empty error_detail on ok row: %s", body)
+	}
+	if err := mock.ExpectationsWereMet(); err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("sqlmock: %v", err)
+	}
+}

platform/internal/middleware/wsauth_middleware.go

@@ -119,12 +119,17 @@ func CanvasOrBearer(database *sql.DB) gin.HandlerFunc {
 			return
 		}
 
-		// Path 1: valid bearer.
+		// Path 1: bearer present → bearer MUST validate. Do not fall through
+		// to Origin on an invalid bearer — an attacker with a revoked /
+		// expired token + a matching Origin would otherwise bypass auth.
+		// Empty bearer → skip to Origin path (canvas never sends one).
 		if tok := wsauth.BearerTokenFromHeader(c.GetHeader("Authorization")); tok != "" {
-			if err := wsauth.ValidateAnyToken(ctx, database, tok); err == nil {
-				c.Next()
+			if err := wsauth.ValidateAnyToken(ctx, database, tok); err != nil {
+				c.AbortWithStatusJSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{"error": "invalid admin auth token"})
 				return
 			}
+			c.Next()
+			return
 		}
 
 		// Path 2: canvas origin match. Read CORS_ORIGINS at request time so

platform/internal/scheduler/scheduler.go

@@ -233,12 +233,8 @@ func (s *Scheduler) fireSchedule(ctx context.Context, sched scheduleRow) {
 		`SELECT COALESCE(active_tasks, 0) FROM workspaces WHERE id = $1`,
 		sched.WorkspaceID,
 	).Scan(&activeTasks); err == nil && activeTasks > 0 {
-		wsID := sched.WorkspaceID
-		if len(wsID) > 12 {
-			wsID = wsID[:12]
-		}
 		log.Printf("Scheduler: skipping '%s' on busy workspace %s (active_tasks=%d)",
-			sched.Name, wsID, activeTasks)
+			sched.Name, short(sched.WorkspaceID, 12), activeTasks)
 		s.recordSkipped(ctx, sched, activeTasks)
 		return
 	}
@@ -246,11 +242,7 @@ func (s *Scheduler) fireSchedule(ctx context.Context, sched scheduleRow) {
 	fireCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, fireTimeout)
 	defer cancel()
 
-	idPrefix := sched.ID
-	if len(idPrefix) > 8 {
-		idPrefix = idPrefix[:8]
-	}
-	msgID := fmt.Sprintf("cron-%s-%s", idPrefix, uuid.New().String()[:8])
+	msgID := fmt.Sprintf("cron-%s-%s", short(sched.ID, 8), uuid.New().String()[:8])
 
 	a2aBody, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]interface{}{
 		"method": "message/send",
@@ -263,7 +255,7 @@ func (s *Scheduler) fireSchedule(ctx context.Context, sched scheduleRow) {
 		},
 	})
 
-	log.Printf("Scheduler: firing '%s' → workspace %s", sched.Name, sched.WorkspaceID[:12])
+	log.Printf("Scheduler: firing '%s' → workspace %s", sched.Name, short(sched.WorkspaceID, 12))
 
 	// Empty callerID = canvas-style request (bypasses access control, source_id=NULL in activity log).
 	// "system:scheduler" was invalid — source_id column is UUID and rejects non-UUID strings.
@@ -386,6 +378,16 @@ func truncate(s string, maxLen int) string {
 	return s[:maxLen-3] + "..."
 }
 
+// short returns up to n leading characters of s without panicking when s is
+// shorter than n. Used to safely display UUID prefixes in log lines where
+// the full ID would be noisy but the full-length bounds check is repetitive.
+func short(s string, n int) string {
+	if len(s) <= n {
+		return s
+	}
+	return s[:n]
+}
+
 // ComputeNextRun parses a cron expression and returns the next fire time
 // after the given time, in the specified timezone.
 func ComputeNextRun(cronExpr, tz string, after time.Time) (time.Time, error) {

platform/internal/scheduler/scheduler_test.go

@@ -178,3 +178,90 @@ func TestPanicRecovery(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Errorf("unmet DB expectations: %v", err)
 	}
 }
+
+// ── TestShort_helper ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// Regression guard for the short() helper that replaced unsafe [:N] slices
+// after code review. Panicked when IDs were shorter than the slice bound.
+
+func TestShort_helper(t *testing.T) {
+	cases := []struct {
+		in   string
+		n    int
+		want string
+	}{
+		{"abcdef1234567890", 8, "abcdef12"},
+		{"abc", 8, "abc"}, // shorter than n — no panic, no truncation
+		{"", 8, ""},
+		{"12345678", 8, "12345678"}, // exactly n
+	}
+	for _, tc := range cases {
+		if got := short(tc.in, tc.n); got != tc.want {
+			t.Errorf("short(%q, %d) = %q, want %q", tc.in, tc.n, got, tc.want)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// ── TestRecordSkipped_writesSkippedStatus ────────────────────────────────────
+// #115 coverage gap: the recordSkipped path wasn't tested at all when it
+// first landed. Exercises the UPDATE workspace_schedules + INSERT into
+// activity_logs via sqlmock. Broadcaster is nil so we don't need to stub
+// RecordAndBroadcast (the nil-check in recordSkipped handles that).
+
+func TestRecordSkipped_writesSkippedStatus(t *testing.T) {
+	mock := setupTestDB(t)
+	s := New(nil, nil)
+
+	sched := scheduleRow{
+		ID:          "11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111",
+		WorkspaceID: "22222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222",
+		Name:        "Hourly security audit",
+		CronExpr:    "17 * * * *",
+		Timezone:    "UTC",
+		Prompt:      "audit",
+	}
+
+	// Expect the schedule-row UPDATE with last_status='skipped' and the
+	// cron_run activity_logs INSERT with status='skipped' + error_detail
+	// carrying the active_tasks reason.
+	mock.ExpectExec(`UPDATE workspace_schedules`).
+		WithArgs(sched.ID, sqlmock.AnyArg(), sqlmock.AnyArg()).
+		WillReturnResult(sqlmock.NewResult(0, 1))
+	mock.ExpectExec(`INSERT INTO activity_logs`).
+		WithArgs(sched.WorkspaceID, sqlmock.AnyArg(), sqlmock.AnyArg(), sqlmock.AnyArg()).
+		WillReturnResult(sqlmock.NewResult(0, 1))
+
+	s.recordSkipped(context.Background(), sched, 3)
+
+	if err := mock.ExpectationsWereMet(); err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("unmet sqlmock expectations: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// ── TestRecordSkipped_shortWorkspaceIDNoPanic ─────────────────────────────────
+// Guards against the short() regression: recordSkipped must not panic if
+// WorkspaceID is unexpectedly shorter than the 12-char prefix used in logs.
+
+func TestRecordSkipped_shortWorkspaceIDNoPanic(t *testing.T) {
+	mock := setupTestDB(t)
+	s := New(nil, nil)
+
+	// 4-char workspace id — shorter than any substring bound in the code.
+	sched := scheduleRow{
+		ID:          "11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111",
+		WorkspaceID: "ws-x",
+		Name:        "test",
+		CronExpr:    "0 * * * *",
+		Timezone:    "UTC",
+	}
+	mock.ExpectExec(`UPDATE workspace_schedules`).
+		WillReturnResult(sqlmock.NewResult(0, 1))
+	mock.ExpectExec(`INSERT INTO activity_logs`).
+		WillReturnResult(sqlmock.NewResult(0, 1))
+
+	defer func() {
+		if r := recover(); r != nil {
+			t.Errorf("recordSkipped panicked on short WorkspaceID: %v", r)
+		}
+	}()
+	s.recordSkipped(context.Background(), sched, 1)
+}

workspace-template/main.py

@@ -388,14 +388,21 @@ async def main():  # pragma: no cover
     # per-workspace to enable.
     idle_loop_task = None
     if config.idle_prompt:
+        # Idle-fire HTTP timeout. Kept tight relative to the fire cadence so a
+        # hung platform doesn't accumulate dangling requests — a fire that
+        # takes longer than the idle interval itself is almost certainly stuck.
+        IDLE_FIRE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = max(60, min(300, config.idle_interval_seconds))
+        # Initial settle delay — never longer than 60s so cold-start races
+        # don't stall the first fire, and never shorter than the configured
+        # interval (short intervals shouldn't fire instantly on boot either).
+        IDLE_INITIAL_SETTLE_SECONDS = min(config.idle_interval_seconds, 60)
+
         async def _run_idle_loop():
             """Self-sends config.idle_prompt periodically when the workspace is idle."""
-            # Wait for server + initial prompt to settle before the first idle check.
-            # Short wait (min of 60s or interval) so cold-start races don't fire instantly.
-            await asyncio.sleep(min(config.idle_interval_seconds, 60))
+            await asyncio.sleep(IDLE_INITIAL_SETTLE_SECONDS)
 
             import json as _json
-            import urllib.request
+            from urllib import request as _urlreq, error as _urlerr
 
             while True:
                 try:
@@ -424,20 +431,46 @@ async def main():  # pragma: no cover
                 }).encode()
 
                 def _post_sync():
+                    # Returns (status_code, error_type) so the caller logs the
+                    # actual outcome instead of a bare "post failed" line.
                     try:
-                        req = urllib.request.Request(
+                        req = _urlreq.Request(
                             f"{platform_url}/workspaces/{workspace_id}/a2a",
                             data=payload,
                             headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"},
                         )
-                        with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=600) as resp:
+                        with _urlreq.urlopen(req, timeout=IDLE_FIRE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS) as resp:
                             resp.read()
-                    except Exception as e:
-                        print(f"Idle loop: post failed — {e}", flush=True)
+                            return resp.status, None
+                    except _urlerr.HTTPError as e:
+                        return e.code, type(e).__name__
+                    except _urlerr.URLError as e:
+                        return None, f"URLError: {e.reason}"
+                    except Exception as e:  # pragma: no cover — catch-all safety net
+                        return None, type(e).__name__
 
-                print(f"Idle loop: firing (active_tasks=0, interval={config.idle_interval_seconds}s)", flush=True)
-                loop_ref = asyncio.get_event_loop()
-                loop_ref.run_in_executor(None, _post_sync)
+                print(
+                    f"Idle loop: firing (active_tasks=0, interval={config.idle_interval_seconds}s, "
+                    f"timeout={IDLE_FIRE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS}s)",
+                    flush=True,
+                )
+                loop_ref = asyncio.get_running_loop()
+
+                def _log_result(future):
+                    try:
+                        status, err = future.result()
+                        if err:
+                            print(
+                                f"Idle loop: post failed — status={status} err={err}",
+                                flush=True,
+                            )
+                        else:
+                            print(f"Idle loop: post ok status={status}", flush=True)
+                    except Exception as e:  # pragma: no cover
+                        print(f"Idle loop: executor callback crashed — {e}", flush=True)
+
+                fut = loop_ref.run_in_executor(None, _post_sync)
+                fut.add_done_callback(_log_result)
 
         idle_loop_task = asyncio.create_task(_run_idle_loop())