From 706df19b439170fe34aca827e704f304241b3285 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Molecule AI Core-BE Date: Mon, 11 May 2026 03:34:48 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 1/3] [core-be-agent] fix(security#321): CWE-22 path traversal guards in loadWorkspaceEnv MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Two vulnerable call sites confirmed on origin/main: 1. org_helpers.go:loadWorkspaceEnv (line 101): filesDir from untrusted org YAML joined directly with orgBaseDir without traversal guard. A malicious filesDir like "../../../etc" escapes the org root and reads arbitrary files. 2. org_import.go:createWorkspaceTree (line 494): same pattern directly in the env-loading block — not covered by staging-targeted PR #345. Fix (both locations): call resolveInsideRoot(orgBaseDir, filesDir) before filepath.Join. On traversal detection, org_helpers.go returns an empty map (caller contract); org_import.go silently skips the workspace .env override (matches existing template-resolution pattern in the same function). Tests: org_helpers_test.go — 3 cases covering traversal rejection, workspace-override happy path, and empty filesDir edge case. Closes: molecule-core#362, molecule-core#321 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 --- .../internal/handlers/org_helpers.go | 13 ++- .../internal/handlers/org_helpers_test.go | 104 ++++++++++++++++++ .../internal/handlers/org_import.go | 7 +- 3 files changed, 122 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 workspace-server/internal/handlers/org_helpers_test.go diff --git a/workspace-server/internal/handlers/org_helpers.go b/workspace-server/internal/handlers/org_helpers.go index 824fd2d7..24c973f8 100644 --- a/workspace-server/internal/handlers/org_helpers.go +++ b/workspace-server/internal/handlers/org_helpers.go @@ -91,6 +91,10 @@ func expandWithEnv(s string, env map[string]string) string { // loadWorkspaceEnv reads the org root .env and the workspace-specific .env // (workspace overrides org root). Used by both secret injection and channel // config expansion. +// +// SECURITY: filesDir is sourced from untrusted org YAML input (ws.FilesDir). +// resolveInsideRoot guard prevents path traversal (CWE-22) where a malicious +// filesDir like "../../../etc" could escape the org root. func loadWorkspaceEnv(orgBaseDir, filesDir string) map[string]string { envVars := map[string]string{} if orgBaseDir == "" { @@ -98,7 +102,14 @@ func loadWorkspaceEnv(orgBaseDir, filesDir string) map[string]string { } parseEnvFile(filepath.Join(orgBaseDir, ".env"), envVars) if filesDir != "" { - parseEnvFile(filepath.Join(orgBaseDir, filesDir, ".env"), envVars) + safeFilesDir, err := resolveInsideRoot(orgBaseDir, filesDir) + if err != nil { + // Reject traversal attempt silently — callers expect an empty map + // on any read failure. + log.Printf("loadWorkspaceEnv: rejecting filesDir %q: %v", filesDir, err) + return envVars + } + parseEnvFile(filepath.Join(safeFilesDir, ".env"), envVars) } return envVars } diff --git a/workspace-server/internal/handlers/org_helpers_test.go b/workspace-server/internal/handlers/org_helpers_test.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c42ca0cd --- /dev/null +++ b/workspace-server/internal/handlers/org_helpers_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +package handlers + +import ( + "os" + "path/filepath" + "testing" +) + +// TestLoadWorkspaceEnv_RejectsTraversal asserts that loadWorkspaceEnv refuses +// to read workspace-specific .env files when filesDir contains CWE-22 traversal +// patterns (../../../etc, absolute paths, etc.). This is the primary security +// control for the ws.FilesDir attack surface in POST /org/import. + +func TestLoadWorkspaceEnv_RejectsTraversal(t *testing.T) { + tmp := t.TempDir() + orgRoot := filepath.Join(tmp, "my-org") + if err := os.Mkdir(orgRoot, 0o755); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + cases := []struct { + name string + filesDir string + }{ + {"traversal_parent", "../../../etc"}, + {"traversal_deep", "../../../../../../../../../etc"}, + {"traversal_sibling", "../sibling"}, + {"traversal_mixed", "foo/../../bar"}, + {"absolute_path", "/etc/passwd"}, + } + for _, tc := range cases { + t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) { + // Write an org-level .env to confirm it loads even when the + // workspace .env is rejected. + orgEnv := filepath.Join(orgRoot, ".env") + if err := os.WriteFile(orgEnv, []byte("ORG_KEY=org-value\n"), 0o644); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + got := loadWorkspaceEnv(orgRoot, tc.filesDir) + + // Org-level .env must be loaded regardless of workspace rejection. + if got["ORG_KEY"] != "org-value" { + t.Errorf("org-level .env not loaded: got %v", got) + } + // Traversal path must NOT have been read. + if val, ok := got["TRAVERSAL_KEY"]; ok { + t.Errorf("traversal escaped: got TRAVERSAL_KEY=%q", val) + } + }) + } +} + +// TestLoadWorkspaceEnv_HappyPath verifies that legitimate filesDir values +// resolve correctly and workspace .env overrides org-level values. + +func TestLoadWorkspaceEnv_HappyPath(t *testing.T) { + tmp := t.TempDir() + orgRoot := filepath.Join(tmp, "my-org") + wsDir := filepath.Join(orgRoot, "workspaces", "dev-workspace") + if err := os.MkdirAll(wsDir, 0o755); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + orgEnv := filepath.Join(orgRoot, ".env") + wsEnv := filepath.Join(wsDir, ".env") + if err := os.WriteFile(orgEnv, []byte("ORG_KEY=org-val\nSHARED=org-wins\n"), 0o644); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if err := os.WriteFile(wsEnv, []byte("WS_KEY=ws-val\nSHARED=ws-wins\n"), 0o644); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + got := loadWorkspaceEnv(orgRoot, filepath.Join("workspaces", "dev-workspace")) + + if got["ORG_KEY"] != "org-val" { + t.Errorf("org-level key missing: %v", got) + } + if got["WS_KEY"] != "ws-val" { + t.Errorf("workspace key missing: %v", got) + } + if got["SHARED"] != "ws-wins" { + t.Errorf("workspace should override org-level: got %v", got) + } +} + +// TestLoadWorkspaceEnv_EmptyFilesDirOnlyLoadsOrgLevel verifies that an empty +// filesDir only loads the org-level .env (no workspace override). + +func TestLoadWorkspaceEnv_EmptyFilesDir(t *testing.T) { + tmp := t.TempDir() + orgRoot := filepath.Join(tmp, "my-org") + if err := os.Mkdir(orgRoot, 0o755); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(orgRoot, ".env"), []byte("KEY=only-org\n"), 0o644); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + got := loadWorkspaceEnv(orgRoot, "") + if got["KEY"] != "only-org" { + t.Errorf("expected only-org, got %v", got) + } +} diff --git a/workspace-server/internal/handlers/org_import.go b/workspace-server/internal/handlers/org_import.go index 2e06479f..e521198e 100644 --- a/workspace-server/internal/handlers/org_import.go +++ b/workspace-server/internal/handlers/org_import.go @@ -490,8 +490,13 @@ func (h *OrgHandler) createWorkspaceTree(ws OrgWorkspace, parentID *string, absX // 1. Org root .env (shared defaults) parseEnvFile(filepath.Join(orgBaseDir, ".env"), envVars) // 2. Workspace-specific .env (overrides) + // SECURITY: ws.FilesDir is untrusted YAML input — guard against CWE-22 + // traversal so a crafted filesDir like "../../../etc" cannot escape orgBaseDir. if ws.FilesDir != "" { - parseEnvFile(filepath.Join(orgBaseDir, ws.FilesDir, ".env"), envVars) + if safeFilesDir, err := resolveInsideRoot(orgBaseDir, ws.FilesDir); err == nil { + parseEnvFile(filepath.Join(safeFilesDir, ".env"), envVars) + } + // Traversal rejection: silently skip — callers expect partial env on failure. } } // Store as workspace secrets via DB (encrypted if key is set, raw otherwise) From fd40700c43bb2af008d2d3d6b89a75c486bf43bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Molecule AI Core-BE Date: Mon, 11 May 2026 03:48:31 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 2/3] [ci skip false-positive] force re-run CI (runner stuck at infra#241) From f82033a3ca3209a1d611be20c2c264ad94643932 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Molecule AI Core-BE Date: Mon, 11 May 2026 03:52:40 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 3/3] [ci force] force fresh runner