diff --git a/platform/internal/middleware/ratelimit_test.go b/platform/internal/middleware/ratelimit_test.go
index 4f17ce56..43655915 100644
--- a/platform/internal/middleware/ratelimit_test.go
+++ b/platform/internal/middleware/ratelimit_test.go
@@ -45,6 +45,107 @@ func TestRateLimit_HeadersPresentOnAllowedRequest(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// TestRateLimit_XFF_BypassDocumented shows that WITHOUT SetTrustedProxies(nil)
+// a spoofed X-Forwarded-For header can rotate an attacker's effective IP and
+// bypass per-IP rate limiting (documents the issue #179 vulnerability).
+func TestRateLimit_XFF_BypassDocumented(t *testing.T) {
+	gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	t.Cleanup(cancel)
+	rl := NewRateLimiter(2, 5*time.Second, ctx)
+
+	r := gin.New()
+	// Intentionally NOT calling r.SetTrustedProxies(nil) — replicates the
+	// pre-fix behaviour where Gin trusts all proxies by default.
+	r.Use(rl.Middleware())
+	r.GET("/x", func(c *gin.Context) { c.String(http.StatusOK, "ok") })
+
+	// Exhaust both tokens for the real IP 10.0.0.1.
+	for i := 0; i < 2; i++ {
+		req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/x", nil)
+		req.RemoteAddr = "10.0.0.1:1234"
+		w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		r.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+		if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+			t.Fatalf("setup request %d: want 200, got %d", i+1, w.Code)
+		}
+	}
+	// Third request without XFF must be rate-limited.
+	{
+		req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/x", nil)
+		req.RemoteAddr = "10.0.0.1:1234"
+		w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		r.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+		if w.Code != http.StatusTooManyRequests {
+			t.Fatalf("3rd request (no XFF): want 429, got %d", w.Code)
+		}
+	}
+	// With default proxy trust, spoofing X-Forwarded-For rotates the effective
+	// IP → new bucket → bypass succeeds (returns 200).
+	{
+		req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/x", nil)
+		req.RemoteAddr = "10.0.0.1:1234"
+		req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", "20.0.0.1")
+		w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		r.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+		if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+			t.Skipf("bypass no longer works without trusted-proxy config (Gin version changed?): got %d", w.Code)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// TestRateLimit_XFF_NoBypassWithTrustedProxiesNil is the regression test for
+// issue #179: after r.SetTrustedProxies(nil) is added to router.Setup(), a
+// spoofed X-Forwarded-For header is ignored and the real RemoteAddr is used,
+// so the bypass no longer works.
+func TestRateLimit_XFF_NoBypassWithTrustedProxiesNil(t *testing.T) {
+	gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	t.Cleanup(cancel)
+	rl := NewRateLimiter(2, 5*time.Second, ctx)
+
+	r := gin.New()
+	// Fix for issue #179 — mirror what router.Setup() now does.
+	if err := r.SetTrustedProxies(nil); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("SetTrustedProxies: %v", err)
+	}
+	r.Use(rl.Middleware())
+	r.GET("/x", func(c *gin.Context) { c.String(http.StatusOK, "ok") })
+
+	// Exhaust both tokens for RemoteAddr 10.0.0.2.
+	for i := 0; i < 2; i++ {
+		req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/x", nil)
+		req.RemoteAddr = "10.0.0.2:9999"
+		w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		r.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+		if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+			t.Fatalf("setup request %d: want 200, got %d", i+1, w.Code)
+		}
+	}
+	// Third plain request must be rate-limited.
+	{
+		req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/x", nil)
+		req.RemoteAddr = "10.0.0.2:9999"
+		w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		r.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+		if w.Code != http.StatusTooManyRequests {
+			t.Fatalf("3rd plain request: want 429, got %d", w.Code)
+		}
+	}
+	// Spoofed XFF must NOT rotate the bucket — still 429 because
+	// SetTrustedProxies(nil) forces c.ClientIP() to return RemoteAddr.
+	{
+		req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/x", nil)
+		req.RemoteAddr = "10.0.0.2:9999"
+		req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", "99.99.99.99")
+		w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		r.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+		if w.Code != http.StatusTooManyRequests {
+			t.Errorf("XFF bypass still works after fix: want 429, got %d — SetTrustedProxies(nil) not effective", w.Code)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
 // TestRateLimit_RetryAfterOn429 — throttled responses must carry Retry-After
 // per RFC 6585, so curl/fetch clients back off the exact required window.
 func TestRateLimit_RetryAfterOn429(t *testing.T) {
diff --git a/platform/internal/router/router.go b/platform/internal/router/router.go
index 58ce2fd2..b1e482fc 100644
--- a/platform/internal/router/router.go
+++ b/platform/internal/router/router.go
@@ -25,6 +25,14 @@ import (
 func Setup(hub *ws.Hub, broadcaster *events.Broadcaster, prov *provisioner.Provisioner, platformURL, configsDir string, wh *handlers.WorkspaceHandler, channelMgr *channels.Manager) *gin.Engine {
 	r := gin.Default()
 
+	// Issue #179 — trust no reverse-proxy headers. Without this call Gin's
+	// default is to trust ALL X-Forwarded-For values, which lets any caller
+	// spoof their IP and bypass per-IP rate limiting. With nil, c.ClientIP()
+	// always returns the real TCP RemoteAddr.
+	if err := r.SetTrustedProxies(nil); err != nil {
+		panic("router: SetTrustedProxies: " + err.Error())
+	}
+
 	// CORS origins — configurable via CORS_ORIGINS env var (comma-separated)
 	corsOrigins := []string{"http://localhost:3000", "http://localhost:3001"}
 	if v := os.Getenv("CORS_ORIGINS"); v != "" {