The SaaS tenant platform's TenantGuard middleware rejects cross-org routing with synthetic 404s unless the request carries X-Molecule-Org-Id matching the tenant's MOLECULE_ORG_ID env var. The runtime never sent it, so every non-allowlisted workspace→platform path (memories, delegations, notify, a2a, update-card, peers...) 404'd. Paired with CP change feat/workspace-export-org-id which injects MOLECULE_ORG_ID into workspace user-data env. auth_headers() now returns both headers — the existing Authorization bearer AND the new X-Molecule-Org-Id — so every caller that already threads auth_headers() through httpx picks it up for free. Self- hosted deployments with MOLECULE_ORG_ID unset keep the old behavior (no header, TenantGuard is a no-op). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
174 lines
6.3 KiB
Python
174 lines
6.3 KiB
Python
"""Workspace auth-token store (Phase 30.1).
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Single source of truth for this workspace's authentication token. The
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token is issued by the platform on the first successful
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``POST /registry/register`` call and travels with every subsequent
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heartbeat / update-card / (later) secrets-pull / A2A request.
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The token is persisted to ``<configs>/.auth_token`` so it survives
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restarts — we only expect to receive it once from the platform, since
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``/registry/register`` no-ops token issuance for workspaces that already
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have one on file.
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Storage:
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${CONFIGS_DIR}/.auth_token # 0600, one line, no trailing newline
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Callers interact with three functions:
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:func:`get_token` — returns the cached token or None
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:func:`save_token` — persists a freshly-issued token
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:func:`auth_headers`— builds the Authorization header dict for httpx
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import logging
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import os
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import re
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from pathlib import Path
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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# Valid workspace ID: lowercase alphanumeric + hyphens (UUIDs and org-generated IDs).
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# Rejects /, \, .., #, ?, &, newlines — all chars that could break URL paths
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# or HTTP header values. This is the single validation gate for WORKSPACE_ID.
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_WORKSPACE_ID_RE = re.compile(r"^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9\-]{0,127}$")
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# Cached result — validated once per process startup, not on every call.
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_validated_workspace_id: str | None = None
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def validate_workspace_id(workspace_id: str) -> str:
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"""Validate *workspace_id* and return it.
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Raises ValueError if the ID is empty, contains unsafe characters, or
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does not match the expected format. This function is the single validation
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gate — call it once at startup and reuse the result.
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Fixes issue #14 (CWE-20): prevents URL/header injection when WORKSPACE_ID
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is used in platform API URLs and ``X-Workspace-ID`` headers.
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"""
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global _validated_workspace_id
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if _validated_workspace_id is not None:
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return _validated_workspace_id # pragma: no cover — cached fast path
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if not workspace_id:
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raise ValueError("WORKSPACE_ID is empty — set the WORKSPACE_ID env var")
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# Strip and check again after strip
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workspace_id = workspace_id.strip()
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if not _WORKSPACE_ID_RE.match(workspace_id):
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raise ValueError(
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f"WORKSPACE_ID contains invalid characters: {workspace_id!r}. "
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"Only lowercase letters, digits, and hyphens are allowed. "
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"Ensure WORKSPACE_ID is a valid UUID or alphanumeric ID."
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)
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_validated_workspace_id = workspace_id
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return workspace_id
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# In-process cache so we don't hit disk on every heartbeat. The heartbeat
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# loop fires on a short interval and reading a tiny file 10x per minute
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# is wasteful. The file is the durable copy; this var is the hot path.
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_cached_token: str | None = None
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# Validated WORKSPACE_ID — read once at import time so every caller gets the
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# same validated value without re-checking. Raises on bad input.
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WORKSPACE_ID: str = validate_workspace_id(os.environ.get("WORKSPACE_ID", ""))
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def get_workspace_id() -> str:
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"""Return the validated workspace ID.
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Cached result from module-level WORKSPACE_ID constant. Call this instead
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of reading WORKSPACE_ID directly — it guarantees the ID passed validation.
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"""
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return WORKSPACE_ID
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def _token_file() -> Path:
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"""Path to the on-disk token file. Respects CONFIGS_DIR, falls back
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to /configs for the default container layout."""
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return Path(os.environ.get("CONFIGS_DIR", "/configs")) / ".auth_token"
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def get_token() -> str | None:
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"""Return the cached token, reading it from disk on first call."""
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global _cached_token
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if _cached_token is not None:
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return _cached_token
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path = _token_file()
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if not path.exists():
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return None
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try:
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tok = path.read_text().strip()
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except OSError as exc:
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logger.warning("platform_auth: failed to read %s: %s", path, exc)
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return None
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if not tok:
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return None
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_cached_token = tok
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return tok
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def save_token(token: str) -> None:
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"""Persist a newly-issued token. Creates the file with 0600 mode atomically.
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Uses ``os.open(O_CREAT, 0o600)`` so the file is never world-readable,
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even transiently. The previous ``write_text()`` + ``chmod()`` approach
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had a TOCTOU window where a concurrent reader could access the token
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between the two syscalls (M4 — flagged in security audit cycle 10).
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Idempotent — if an identical token is already on disk we skip the
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write so we don't churn the file's mtime or trigger spurious
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filesystem watchers."""
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global _cached_token
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token = token.strip()
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if not token:
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raise ValueError("platform_auth: refusing to save empty token")
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if get_token() == token:
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return
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path = _token_file()
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path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
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# O_CREAT | O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC with mode=0o600 atomically creates (or
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# truncates) the file with restricted permissions in a single syscall,
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# eliminating the TOCTOU window.
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fd = os.open(str(path), os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_TRUNC, 0o600)
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try:
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os.write(fd, token.encode())
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finally:
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os.close(fd)
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_cached_token = token
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def auth_headers() -> dict[str, str]:
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"""Return a header dict to merge into every outbound platform call.
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Two headers, both optional:
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- ``Authorization: Bearer <token>`` — the workspace-scoped auth
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token issued on first /registry/register. Empty if not yet
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issued; the platform grandfathers pre-token workspaces through.
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- ``X-Molecule-Org-Id: <uuid>`` — the SaaS cross-org routing tag
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the tenant platform's TenantGuard requires on every non-
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allowlisted route. Read from the ``MOLECULE_ORG_ID`` env var
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that the control plane exports into workspace user-data.
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Unset on self-hosted / dev deployments where TenantGuard is a
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no-op, so omitting the header keeps those paths working.
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"""
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headers: dict[str, str] = {}
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tok = get_token()
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if tok:
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headers["Authorization"] = f"Bearer {tok}"
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org_id = os.environ.get("MOLECULE_ORG_ID", "").strip()
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if org_id:
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headers["X-Molecule-Org-Id"] = org_id
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return headers
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def clear_cache() -> None:
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"""Reset the in-memory cache. Used by tests that write fresh token
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files between cases."""
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global _cached_token
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_cached_token = None
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