Addresses responsible disclosure from FuzzMind Security Lab (CVE pending).
The web dashboard API server had 36 endpoints, of which only 5 checked
the session token. The token itself was served from an unauthenticated
GET /api/auth/session-token endpoint, rendering the protection circular.
When bound to 0.0.0.0 (--host flag), all API keys, config, and cron
management were accessible to any machine on the network.
Changes:
- Add auth middleware requiring session token on ALL /api/ routes except
a small public whitelist (status, config/defaults, config/schema,
model/info)
- Remove GET /api/auth/session-token endpoint entirely; inject the token
into index.html via a <script> tag at serve time instead
- Replace all inline token comparisons (!=) with hmac.compare_digest()
to prevent timing side-channel attacks
- Block non-localhost binding by default; require --insecure flag to
override (with warning log)
- Update frontend fetchJSON() to send Authorization header on all
requests using the injected window.__HERMES_SESSION_TOKEN__
Credit: Callum (@0xca1x) and @migraine-sudo at FuzzMind Security Lab
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