docs(security): April 21 security changelog entries (#71)
* docs(security): add April 21 security changelog entries - CWE-918 SSRF: add PR #1364, SaaS-mode VPC-private IP exception, IPv6 bypass fix (isPrivateOrMetadataIP now handles non-IPv4 inputs) - Audit Ledger HMAC Chain Guard: add PRs #1339, #1352, #1354 - Credential Scrub: add PRs #1282, #1355, #1359 (F1088 err.Error() leak) Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: add trailing newline to security/changelog.md (Vercel build requirement) * fix(docs): correct INCIDENT_LOG.md path from docs/incidents/ to content/docs/incidents/ Vercel build fails because broken link reference in security/changelog.md. The actual file lives at content/docs/incidents/INCIDENT_LOG.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Documentation Specialist <documentation-specialist@agents.moleculesai.app> Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: molecule-ai[bot] <276602405+molecule-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Molecule AI Integration Tester <integration-tester@agents.moleculesai.app>
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@ -78,20 +78,20 @@ Workspace file deletion operations now use safe argument-passing and validate al
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Workspace URL resolution and outbound HTTP calls in the MCP and A2A proxy handlers did not validate that the target address was reachable from the platform. Without validation, a malicious workspace configuration could redirect platform requests to internal infrastructure (cloud metadata services, RFC-1918 databases, link-local monitoring endpoints) or loopback interfaces.
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Additionally, `isPrivateOrMetadataIP` returned `false` for all non-IPv4 inputs, meaning registered IPv6 URLs (`[::1]`, `[fe80::…]`) bypassed the SSRF gate entirely.
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### Fix
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`isSafeURL` validates every outbound URL before making an HTTP request:
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- **Scheme enforcement:** Only `http` and `https` are allowed.
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- **Direct IP checks:** Loopback (`127.0.0.0/8`), unspecified (`0.0.0.0`), and link-local (`fe80::/10`) addresses are blocked.
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- **Direct IP checks:** Loopback (`127.0.0.0/8`), unspecified (`0.0.0.0`), link-local (`fe80::/10`), and IPv6-mapped loopback addresses are blocked.
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- **Private IP range blocking** via `isPrivateOrMetadataIP`:
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- RFC-1918 private: `10.0.0.0/8`, `172.16.0.0/12`, `192.168.0.0/16`
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- CGNAT shared address space: `100.64.0.0/10`
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- Cloud metadata services: `169.254.0.0/16`
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- Documentation and test ranges: `192.0.2.0/24`, `198.51.100.0/24`, `203.0.113.0/24`
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- Cloud metadata and reserved ranges (always blocked): `169.254.0.0/16`, `100.64.0.0/10`, `192.0.2.0/24`, `198.51.100.0/24`, `203.0.113.0/24`
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- RFC-1918 private and IPv6 ULA (`fc00::/7`): blocked in self-hosted mode; **allowed in SaaS mode** (see below)
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- **DNS rebinding defense:** Hostnames are resolved, and each resolved IP is checked against the blocklist. DNS resolution failures block the request entirely.
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URLs that fail validation return a descriptive error; requests are never sent to unsafe destinations.
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**SaaS-mode exception:** Set `MOLECULE_DEPLOY_MODE=saas` (or leave `MOLECULE_ORG_ID` set) to allow VPC-private IPs (RFC-1918, IPv6 ULA) in workspace registration URLs. Required for cross-EC2 SaaS deployments where workspaces register with their VPC-private IPs (e.g. `172.31.x.x` on AWS default VPCs). Cloud metadata, loopback, and link-local stay blocked unconditionally in both modes.
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### SaaS Mode Gating
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@ -112,3 +112,53 @@ PR [#1430](https://github.com/Molecule-AI/molecule-core/pull/1430) restores the
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### User-facing summary
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Platform outbound requests from workspaces (MCP tool calls, A2A proxy routing) validate all target URLs against a deployment-mode-aware blocklist. In self-hosted deployments, private IP ranges and cloud metadata endpoints are rejected. In SaaS mode, cross-EC2 communication is permitted while cloud metadata and loopback remain blocked, and IPv6 addresses are fully covered. Requests to unsafe destinations return a descriptive error and are never sent.
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---
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## 2026-04-21 — Audit Ledger HMAC Chain Guard
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**Severity:** Low (denial-of-service / data integrity)
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**PRs:** [#1339](https://github.com/Molecule-AI/molecule-core/pull/1339), [#1352](https://github.com/Molecule-AI/molecule-core/pull/1352), [#1354](https://github.com/Molecule-AI/molecule-core/pull/1354) (backport to `main`)
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**Affected:** `workspace-server/internal/handlers/audit.go`
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### Vulnerability
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`verifyAuditChain` called `hex.Decode` on HMAC values without checking the slice length first. Entries with fewer than 32 bytes would panic at runtime, causing a goroutine crash and returning a 500 error for any audit chain verification request.
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### Fix
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Added a length check before `hex.Decode`:
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```go
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if len(hmacHex) < 64 { // 32 bytes = 64 hex chars
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return false, fmt.Errorf("HMAC value too short")
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}
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```
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### User-facing summary
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Audit chain verification now handles short or malformed HMAC values gracefully, returning `chain_valid: false` instead of a server error.
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---
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## 2026-04-21 — Credential Scrub: `err.Error()` Leak Prevention
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**Severity:** Medium (information disclosure)
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**PRs:** [#1282](https://github.com/Molecule-AI/molecule-core/pull/1282), [#1355](https://github.com/Molecule-AI/molecule-core/pull/1355), [#1359](https://github.com/Molecule-AI/molecule-core/pull/1359)
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**Affected:** `workspace-server/internal/handlers/plugins_install_pipeline.go`, `workspace-server/internal/handlers/workspace_provision.go`, `content/docs/incidents/INCIDENT_LOG.md`
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### Vulnerability
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Error messages returned from platform handler functions used `err.Error()` directly in log output and API error responses. When `err` was a credentials-related error (e.g. AWS `AuthFailure`, cloud API key expiry), sensitive credential fragments could appear in logs, error responses, and the `INCIDENT_LOG.md` documentation file.
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Additionally, the `INCIDENT_LOG.md` file itself contained real credential values in some historical entries.
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### Fix
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- Replaced direct `err.Error()` calls with structured error wrapping that strips credential-like patterns (AWS access key IDs, bearer tokens) before returning or logging.
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- Credential values scrubbed from `INCIDENT_LOG.md` historical entries.
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- Workspace orchestrator now exits immediately with a named error if `WORKSPACE_ID` is unset or empty, preventing nil-workspace crashes that could surface cryptic errors.
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### User-facing summary
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Error messages and logs no longer leak credential fragments. Platform handles missing `WORKSPACE_ID` gracefully with a clear startup error rather than a cryptic crash.
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